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Abstract 
 
This PhD thesis is an extended critical investigation of Martin Heidegger’s 
influential account of the problem of phenomenality, i.e., of how things 
show up as meaningful phenomena in our experience. As such, it is also a 
study of his effort to develop and probe the question of phenomenology, i.e., 
what it means to see, understand, and articulate such phenomena. The aim of 
the thesis is both historical and systematic. On the one hand, it offers a 
unified interpretation of how Heidegger’s struggle with the problem of 
phenomenality unfolds during the main stages of his philosophical 
development, from the early Freiburg lecture courses 1919-1923, over the 
Marburg years and the publication of Being and Time in 1927, up to his later 
thinking stretching from the mid 1930s to the early 1970s. It is argued that 
the problem of phenomenality constitutes one of the core problems that 
Heidegger is concerned with from beginning to end, and that focusing on 
this problem allows us to shed new light on the philosophical logic and 
motives behind the main changes that his thinking undergoes along the way. 
On the other hand, the thesis examines both the philosophical power and the 
problems and ambiguities of Heidegger’s consecutive attempts to account for 
the structure and dynamics of phenomenality. In particular, it critically 
interrogates Heidegger's basic idea that our experience of meaningful 
phenomena is determined by our prior understanding of the historical 
contexts of meaning in which we always already live. A central argument of 
the thesis is that Heidegger’s conception of the historical structure of 
phenomenality raises the decisive question of how to distinguish between 
historical prejudice and primordial understanding, and that Heidegger’s 
inability to answer this question in Being and Time generates a deep ambiguity 
between his program of historical-destructive thinking and his employment 
of a Husserlian intuition-based phenomenological method in his concrete 
investigation. Moreover, it is argued that Heidegger’s later thinking of the 
clearing/event of being is centrally motivated by the effort to answer 
precisely this question by showing how a historical world can arise and give 
itself as a binding destiny. Ultimately, however, the thesis suggests – 
elaborating on the criticisms previously presented by, e.g., Ernst Tugendhat 
and Emmanuel Levinas – that Heidegger’s radical historicization of 
phenomenality makes him unable to account either for the truth of our 
understanding or for the ethical-existential significance of other persons. 
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Introduction 
 
Heidegger and the Problem of Phenomenality 
 
For about a century it seems that the question of phenomenality – of 
givenness – has haunted philosophy as a central problem. What does it 
mean that something shows itself or gives itself as a meaningful 
phenomenon in our experience? What does it mean to see, understand 
and give expression to such phenomena? Can our direct intuitive 
experience of the phenomenally given serve as a ground and measure for 
our understanding? Or is this experience essentially determined by the 
historical contexts of meaning – languages, concepts, norms, values, 
practices, vocabularies – in which we live, in such a way that our critical 
understanding of these contexts cannot ground itself on any 
phenomenological description of the experientially given, but will need to 
take the form of another kind of conceptual, hermeneutical or 
deconstructive analysis?   
      At the beginning of the 20th century Edmund Husserl launched his 
immense attempt at transforming philosophy into a rigorous 
phenomenological science. In order for philosophy not to collapse into 
empty and prejudiced theoretical speculation on the basis of received 
concepts and theories, Husserl argued, it must concentrate on strictly 
seeing and describing what is concretely given in our experience. At the 
same time, Husserl widened the notion of experiential givenness to 
include not only sense perceptions or empirical data but everything that 
may show itself as identifiable unities of meaning for our consciousness. 
Phenomenology is born and lives on the promise that phenomenal 
givenness may serve as an ultimate ground for our understanding of 
meaningful reality.  
      But is this possible?  
      The fact is that since the middle of the last century philosophy has 
centrally been characterized by the tendency to dismiss the very idea of 
direct phenomenal givenness – the “myth of the given,” as Wilfrid Sellars 
called it.1 The variations of the critique of the given are of course multiple: 
                                         
1 Cf. Sellars 1956. 
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on the continental side we have, e.g., the hermeneutics of Martin 
Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, the structuralism of 
Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss, the post structuralist and 
deconstructivist thought of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jacques 
Lacan, and the critical theory of Theodore Adorno and Jürgen Habermas; 
on the analytical side we have, e.g., the Neo-Kantianism-cum-Hegelianism 
of Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell and Robert Brandom, the everyday 
language philosophy of John Austin, the holistic naturalism of Willard Van 
Orman Quine and Donald Davidson, the thinking of the later Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and much of the philosophy that it has inspired, the 
philosophy of science developed by Thomas Kuhn, and the Neo-
Pragmatism of Richard Rorty. Notwithstanding the immense differences 
between these philosophers, one of the vital effects of their combined 
efforts has been to establish one of the leading paradigms of thought 
pervading contemporary philosophy: the general and more or less vague 
idea that our experiential access to reality is essentially mediated by the 
historical contexts of meaning – languages, concepts, norms – in which we 
live, and which determine in advance what we may see and identify as 
meaningful phenomena. Whereas this paradigm largely dominates the field 
of continental philosophy it has never achieved a governing role in the 
analytic tradition, where it lives in a tense relation to the fundamental 
inclination towards naturalist thought. In so far as the above paradigm 
currently tends to link our philosophical thinking and imagination in a 
habitual and unquestioned manner, granting to our basic concepts and 
distinctions – conceptual, empirical, meaning, object, context, tradition, 
historicity, value, norm, groundless, incommensurability, horizon, 
otherness, etc. – what appears to be their ready understandability and 
weight, I suggest calling it the metaphysics of historical meaning.2    
      Martin Heidegger stands at the very center of the historical 
development sketched above. As Heidegger emerges as an autonomous 
philosopher in the beginning of the 1920s, he adopts Husserl’s basic 
phenomenological demand to return to the experientially given while at 
the same time critically pursuing the question concerning the nature of 
phenomenal givenness. In contrast to Husserl, who according to 
                                         
2 In the epilogue of the thesis I will outline my view of the ”metaphysics of historical 
meaning” in a little more detail.  
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Heidegger had largely built on the model of theoretical observation, he 
insists that our primary access to meaningful reality lies in our pre-
theoretical experience of the world. In the course of laying bare the 
rootedness of this experience in the historical contexts of meaning into 
which we always already find ourselves thrown, Heidegger gradually 
moves away from the intuition-based phenomenology of Husserl towards 
a radicalized hermeneutical reflection on how our contexts of meaning 
arise and concern us as a finite and groundless historical destiny. Hence, 
while Heidegger takes his starting point in Husserl’s phenomenology, he – 
through a long critical reflection on that phenomenology – eventually 
becomes the philosopher who more than anyone else contributes to 
establishing the dominance of the metaphysics of historical meaning in the 
continental tradition.  
      This thesis is a study of Heidegger’s struggle to come to terms with the 
question of phenomenality, i.e. what it means for something to show or give 
itself as a meaningful phenomenon; as such, it is also a study of his effort 
to critically develop and probe the question of phenomenology, i.e. of what it 
means to see, understand, and articulate such phenomena. However, to 
the extent that Heidegger’s struggle with these questions constitutes one 
of the exemplary trajectories instituting our present situation, I also hope 
that my study will help to open up and illuminate some of the 
philosophical problems, ambiguities and blindnesses marking our present.   
 
The Heidegger Discussion 
 
By now the scholarly literature on Heidegger has already grown into an 
enormous mass encompassing hundreds of books and thousands of 
articles – and it is still rapidly growing.  
      This discursive situation – whose closest contemporary counterpart is 
to be found in the research on Wittgenstein – certainly brings with it some 
obvious advantages. We are now in possession of a large amount of 
careful historical research covering most parts of Heidegger’s production 
and including detailed studies of the key philosophers and traditions 
influencing or providing background for his thought. However, there are 
also grounds for interpreting the discursive situation as the symptom of a 
philosophical crisis, a crisis which the situation is itself contributing to. On 
the one hand, the greater part of the literature on Heidegger is primarily 
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philological in character, exhibiting little or no independent and systematic 
philosophical work. On the other hand, the circumstance that Heidegger’s 
thought constitutes a paradigm for our own thinking makes it possible to 
feel that in charting the internal conceptual networks of Heidegger’s texts 
one is indeed trailing the highest perimeters of our contemporary horizon 
of understanding. Yet this is a delusion – for the simple reason that a 
philological interpretation of a philosophical text, however philosophically 
powerful that text might be, can never of itself effect a genuine 
philosophical understanding. Hence, to the extent that we go on tracing 
the conceptual connections of Heidegger’s thinking, repeating his 
criticisms of philosophical positions that we strictly speaking do not take 
seriously anymore, all the while believing that we are engaged in 
philosophy proper, his work has started to function as an invisible wall for 
our thinking. The sheer mass of literature supports this state of affairs by 
making it virtually impossible to confront the basic thoughts of Heidegger 
in a systematic fashion without failing the academic demand to anchor the 
interpretation in the relevant literature and the elaborate picture of 
Heidegger’s thought that it sustains. 
      Let me try to specify the distinction between philological and 
philosophical interpretations a little. By philological – or historical – 
interpretations I do not only denote interpretations that deliberately or 
unambiguously realize a philological purpose. I mean all interpretations 
that essentially move – trace, connect, map concepts and ideas – within 
the conceptual horizon of the interpreted text and possible intertexts, 
without critically probing and accounting for the philosophical force of 
these concepts. By philosophical – or systematic, or problem-oriented – 
interpretations I mean all interpretations that explicate a text through 
providing some kind of independent articulation of what the text shows or 
fails to show. One reason why this distinction has tended to grow dim in 
the current discussion may be found in the sharp and widely recognized 
critique that Heidegger himself levels against any attempt to draw a simple 
distinction between historical and systematic investigations. Heidegger’s 
central argument is that every systematic investigation is always already 
guided by some historical pre-understanding of the matter in question; 
hence, it becomes an integral part of the systematic task to engage in a 
critical reflection on the historical conditions determining the focus of our 
questioning. But the reverse is also the case, as Heidegger himself was well 
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aware: in order for an interpretation to bring the sense of a text to life and 
to bring it to view in its philosophical claim on us, it must itself be able to 
confront and give voice to that claim.3 Given that the sense of a 
philosophical text ultimately resides in its capacity to teach us something 
about ourselves and the world, our understanding and interpretation of 
such a text must essentially involve an understanding of what the text 
teaches us about these matters: to understand the text means understanding 
what the text tells us about the world such as we are now – with and 
independently of the text – able to see and understand it. If the 
interpretation does not do this, it is philosophically empty. This, however, 
does not in any way rule out the possibility that philological interpretations 
may have a great value and function of their own, providing crucial 
guidance for philosophical interpretations.      
      In so far as our research on Heidegger is still motivated by a genuine 
philosophical will to learn I believe it is imperative that we elevate the 
philosophical capacity to independently open up and articulate the matters 
themselves as our highest criterion for judging the secondary literature on 
Heidegger. Such a systematically oriented interpretation may of course 
take many shapes: it may expand, rearticulate, critically delimit or 
deconstruct Heidegger’s concepts and analyses; it may apply Heideggerian 
figures of thought to new questions and situations; or it may use 
Heidegger’s thinking as a critical starting point for philosophical inquiries 
in quite other directions. Of course, there is a risk that such a program 
might be exploited as an apology for producing texts that renounce 
serious interpretation and translate Heidegger into a strawman for the 
interpreter’s own purposes. But this is a risk I think we have to take today; 
otherwise, we hazard a greater danger: that Heidegger’s work is 
transformed into a prison and a sanctuary instead of being freed up, 
critically delimited and overcome – in short, teach us what it can teach us 
– as the powerful, finite and deeply problematic work that it is.      
 
Previous Literature 
 
To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the first extended study 
focusing on what I suggest is Heidegger’s life-long effort to come to terms 
                                         
3 Cf. SZ, pp. 150-153; GA 62, pp. 354-348.   
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with the problem of phenomenality, examining how this effort to explore 
the structure and dynamics of phenomenality motivates the development 
of his thinking in general and his critical transformation of 
phenomenology in particular.  
      However, there are certainly a host of works potentially relevant for a 
study of the problem of phenomenality – and phenomenology – in 
Heidegger. To begin with, there are numerous books and articles focusing 
on the fate of phenomenology in Heidegger’s thinking, including more or 
less indirect accounts of the theme of phenomenality, and many of these 
will be referred to or discussed in the course of my thesis.4 Besides, since 
the problem of phenomenality – as I will argue – constitutes a 
fundamental problem in Heidegger’s thought, which is linked to almost all 
other central concepts in his philosophical corpus, every general 
interpretation of his philosophy, whether or not it has phenomenality/ 
phenomenology as its explicit theme, will eo ipso involve an interpretation 
of Heidegger’s conception of phenomenality.   
      In my thesis I am mainly going to stake out my own interpretation in 
relation to what I believe are the two philosophically most powerful 
interpretations of what constitutes the systematic heart of Heidegger’s 
thinking and, by implication, the sense of phenomenality/phenomenology 
in his thought. On the one hand, we have the transcendental phenomenological 
interpretation defended by, e.g., Steven Crowell, Daniel Dahlstrom, Søren 
Overgaard, Burt Hopkins and Dermot Moran.5 This interpretation 
basically reads Heidegger’s philosophy as a critical yet fundamentally 
faithful elaboration of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, which is 
conceived of as providing the key to rigorous philosophizing. Even 
though Heidegger criticizes Husserl for having neglected the pre-
theoretical and historically conditioned nature of our experience the 
systematic promise of his own philosophy lies precisely in a 
hermeneutically sharpened intuitive reflection on the basic – necessary and 
universal – structures characterizing our primary experience of the 
                                         
4 The major works in this field include Tugendhat 1970; Gethmann 1974; von 
Herrmann 1981; 1990; 2000; Stapleton 1983; Held 1988; Hopkins 1993; Marion 1998; 
Crowell 2001; Dahlstrom 2001; Overgaard 2004; Figal 2009, pp. 43-54; Rese [ed.] 
2010; Figal & Gander [eds.] 2013. 
5 For some of the central texts defending this interpretation, see Gethmann 1974; 
Hopkins 1993; Crowell 2001; 2003; Dahlstrom 2001; Overgaard 2004; Moran 2007; 
Zahavi 2003b.  
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meaningful world. On the other hand, we have the hermeneutic-deconstructive 
interpretation defended by, e.g., Hans-Georg Gadamer, Charles Guignon, 
Françoise Dastur, Günter Figal, John Sallis, John van Buren, David Farrell 
Krell, and Hans Ruin.6 This interpretation explicates and hails Heidegger 
as one of the most severe critics of the idea, still held by Husserl, that our 
reflective seeing of intuitively given structures of meaning could serve as a 
measure for our understanding. According to this interpretation, 
Heidegger provides a groundbreaking analysis of the radical historicity of 
all experience of meaning: it is only on account of our thrownness into 
groundless and finite historical contexts of meaning that we are able to 
experience objects as meaningful. Hence, philosophy cannot hope to 
ground itself on any direct experience of the phenomenally given, but 
needs to take the form of a critical explication of its own historical 
predicament. There have been two basic ways of developing this line of 
interpretation, which cannot always be kept strictly apart. The hermeneutic 
interpretation – represented by e.g. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Francoise 
Dastur, and Günter Figal – tends to highlight our fundamental rootedness 
in our own finite tradition and inquires into the possibilities of remaining 
faithful to that tradition while at the same time critically reflecting upon it 
and opening ourselves up to other people and histories. The 
deconstructive interpretation – represented by e.g. John Sallis, David 
Farrell Krell and Hans Ruin – tends to stress the primary task of tracing 
and answering to the groundless differential logic at the basis of every 
possible formation of meaning.  
      It is no surprise that the two systematic visions outlined above tend to 
favor different sorts of descriptions of the role of phenomenology in the 
history of Heidegger’s thought. From the point of view of the 
transcendental phenomenological interpretation, Heidegger’s early 
thinking from the early 1920s up to Being and Time naturally emerges as the 
philosophical summit of his path of thought. The general picture is this: In 
                                         
6 For some of the central texts defending this interpretation, see Gadamer 1986; 1987, 
pp. 175-430; 1990; Guignon 1983; Bernasconi 1984; Sallis 1978; 1990; Figal 1992; 
2010; van Buren 1990; 1994; Krell 1986; 1992; Theodore Kisiel 1993; Ruin 1994; 
Dastur 1999; Sheehan 1998; 2001. In addition to the works listed so far, which 
basically affirm Heidegger’s hermeneutic-deconstructivist thinking, there are also 
works that explicate Heidegger as a representative of a hermeneutic-deconstructivist 
approach  but are more or less critical of this approach. Cf., e.g., Tugendhat 1970; 
1984; Apel 1973; 1989; Lafont 2000.  
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the early twenties Heidegger develops his hermeneutical phenomenology 
as a critical elaboration of Husserl’s phenomenology. Even though 
Heidegger emphasizes the historical conditions of thinking and focuses his 
attention on the temporal and projective structure of our pre-theoretical 
experience of the world, he nevertheless essentially remains faithful to 
Husserl’s method of phenomenological reflection. Consequently, the turn 
that Heidegger’s thinking undergoes in the middle of the 1930s is viewed 
as a transition from the hermeneutical phenomenology of Being and Time 
towards a historical thinking, which, although in practice containing 
important pieces of rigorous phenomenological description, is more prone 
to give rise to speculation and metaphysical construction. From the point 
of view of the hermeneutic-deconstructive interpretation the story is 
almost the reverse: Heidegger’s exploration of his main theme – the 
opening up of groundless, finite being – is bound to appear as a more 
continuous journey from his groping and ambivalent phenomenological 
origins towards a historical thinking which is able to answer more 
consistently to its own finitude and historicity. Moreover, John van Buren 
has recently brought forth a tripartite narrative, which views Heidegger’s 
early Freiburg-lectures – with their strong emphasis on the elusive, 
theoretically ungraspable event-character of our primary experience of the 
world – as a promising beginning, which gets lost in the more traditional, 
transcendental phenomenological project of fundamental ontology of 
Being and Time, and which is then rehabilitated and radicalized in 
Heidegger’s later thinking.7  
      As will become clear I think that both of the above interpretations are 
able to capture and illuminate basic aspects of Heidegger’s thinking and of 
its development. This is because they correspond to and explicate, each in 
its own way, two of Heidegger’s basic philosophical convictions: on the 
one hand, his phenomenological conviction that the experientially given 
constitutes the measure of our understanding; on the other hand, his 
radical historicization of phenomenal givenness. However, I also believe 
that both interpretations suffer from a one-sidedness that cannot be easily 
overcome since it is connected with problems in both their exegetical and 
their philosophical force. Indeed, none of the interpretations is able to see 
clearly how throughout his life Heidegger is struggling with the problem 
                                         
7 Cf. van Buren 1994. Cf. Kisiel 1993, pp. 3, 16. 
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of phenomenality in the tension between his basic convictions, and why it 
is so difficult – philosophically – for him to give up either of them.   
      In their readings of Heidegger’s philosophical journey both the 
transcendental phenomenological and the hermeneutic-deconstructive 
interpretation tend to set out from a given idea of the systematical core of 
Heidegger’s thought, from the point of view of which Heidegger’s relation 
to phenomenology appears as a temporary – more or less central and 
promising – commitment to a basically Husserlian stance, which from the 
middle of the 1930s gives way to another kind of historical reflection on 
the destinal event of being. This way of writing the history of 
phenomenology in Heidegger’s thinking has deep roots and goes back to 
William J. Richardson’s pioneering book from 1963: Heidegger: Through 
Phenomenology to Thought. Richardson originally intended to use the formula 
“From Phenomenology to thought” but changed the “from” to “through” 
on Heidegger’s own suggestion.8 Nevertheless, Richardson portrays 
Heidegger’s philosophical development as a trajectory which starts from a 
phenomenology of the human being and develops into a thinking of the 
primary event of being itself. More recently Theodore Kisiel has called the 
years 1919-1927 Heidegger’s “phenomenological decade,”9 a description 
later echoed by, e.g., Dermot Moran, Steven Crowell and Edgar C. 
Boedeker Jr.10 Still, in reproducing this story of Heidegger’s development 
– which is not in itself incorrect – the commentators systematically tend to 
overlook the extent to which Heidegger himself from beginning to end 
was engaged in a continuous battle to think and articulate the problem of 
phenomenality, and, by implication, the problem of phenomenology, as an 
issue which never ceased to challenge his previous strategies to come to 
terms with it.  
      Moreover, this neglect is liable to go hand in hand with a neglect for 
the philosophical challenge that the problem of 
phenomenality/phenomenology itself poses. Hence, in pursuing the 
transcendental phenomenological interpretation one will be apt to 
downplay the force with which Heidegger’s explication of the historical as-
                                         
8 Heidegger’s comments on the title are found in a letter that he sent to Richardson in 
April 1962, and which was published as the “Preface” of Richardson’s book. Cf. 
Richardson 1963, pp. ix-xxiii; GA 11, pp. 145-152. 
9 Kisiel 1993, p. 59. 
10 Moran 2000, p. 194; Crowell 2001, pp. 115, 225; Boedeker 2005, p. 156. 
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structure of understanding from the early 1920s onwards upsets the very 
possibility of using intuitive reflection on the structures of experience as 
the central means for any such explication. Or else, in following the 
hermeneutic-deconstructive interpretation, one will be inclined to 
disregard the deep difficulties arising from any serious attempt to dispense 
with intuitive experience as an irreducible measure for our understanding 
of the meaningful world. To Heidegger, however, the critical questions 
issuing from his pursuit of the historicity of thought always remained 
awake and pressing: Granted that all our phenomenal experience is 
determined by our factical historical understanding, what is it that allows 
us to uphold the critical difference between historical prejudice and 
originary understanding? What is it that guides and measures our 
understanding of the matters themselves? How can the finite historical 
contexts of meaning in which we live address us as a binding destiny, if, 
that is to say, they can do it all? In the course of the thesis, the above 
interpretational tendencies will be specified according to how individual 
commentators interpret the different periods and aspects of Heidegger’s 
thinking. 
      The interpretations above are of course not the only distinct 
systematic approaches to Heidegger’s thought available. An interpretation 
which especially deserves mentioning is the one developed by Hubert L. 
Dreyfus in his seminal work Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s 
Being and Time, Division I from 1991. Having his main background in 
pragmatism and the later Wittgenstein Dreyfus reads Heidegger as 
primarily concerned with emphasizing and expounding the primacy of our 
practical pre-theoretical ability to handle and cope with things in our 
social-historical context, so that this coping functions as the background 
condition for all theoretical knowledge and understanding. Although 
ultimately quite limited as an explication of Heidegger’s philosophical 
project, Dreyfus’s interpretation certainly contains many important 
analyses and insights, and it has also given rise to a vital tradition of 
Heidegger research. In addition to this, Heidegger has also been read in 
terms of many other philosophical frameworks, e.g., as a pragmatist, as a 
Sartrean existentialist, and as a Kantian transcendentalist. However, as I 
see it, the basic problem of all these strategies of interpretation is that even 
if they may provide limited clarifications and insights into Heidegger they 
remain too blind to the basic concerns of his thinking, taking their cue 
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from some particular aspect of his thought which cannot account for the 
main thrust of his philosophical project.  
 
Objective  
 
The overall objective of this thesis is to provide a unified and critical 
explication of Heidegger’s continuous effort to understand and articulate 
the problem of phenomenality during his path of thinking.  
      As mentioned above, the secondary literature has been characterized 
by a basic tendency to portray Heidegger’s relationship to phenomenology 
in terms of a temporary commitment to a basically Husserlian stance 
during his early years which then, in the mid 1930s, gives way to a more 
historical mode of thinking. In my study, I shift the focus from the theme 
of phenomenology to the theme of phenomenality. And I do this for 
particular reasons. What I hope to show is that the question concerning 
the nature and structure of phenomenal self-showing indeed constitutes 
one of the core problems that Heidegger’s thinking revolves around from 
his earliest Freiburg lecture courses of the early 1920s up to his last 
writings from the early 1970s – i.e. even in the long period of Heidegger’s 
later thinking during which he largely refrains from employing the word 
“phenomenology” as an appropriate term for his own thinking. The thesis 
aims to demonstrate that the problem of phenomenality plays a very basic 
role as a problem which constantly motivates Heidegger and moves his 
thinking forward, not only regulating his effort to critically develop and 
eventually abandon the phenomenological method of inquiry, but also 
informing his central analyses of the pre-theoretical experience, the 
historical structure of understanding, the ontological difference, the 
clearing/event of being, etc. By thus focusing on the problem of 
phenomenality I also think it is possible to shed new light on some of the 
central aspects of Heidegger’s philosophical development, for example: on 
what I believe is the shift that Heidegger’s earliest Freiburg 
phenomenology of factical life undergoes in 1921 when in Aristotle he 
discovers the historical as-structure of understanding; on the ambivalences 
in his conception of phenomenality/phenomenology that underlie his 
abandonment of the project of fundamental ontology launched in Being 
and Time; and on the so called “turn” of Heidegger’s thinking in the mid 
1930s, which I interpret as a turn in his interrogation of phenomenality 
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towards the question concerning the dynamics which let a binding 
historical world shine forth and prevail.  
      The historical explication carried out in the thesis is not primarily a 
conceptual history. I have no ambition to chart Heidegger’s use of the 
words phenomenon, phenomenology, givenness and so forth in any 
exhaustive manner. Although I will certainly be paying close attention to 
the rhetoric of phenomenality in Heidegger’s work, it will essentially serve 
as so many indications of the philosophical problems that Heidegger is 
dealing with and articulating in terms of his whole central conceptuality. 
As concerns the historical sources of Heidegger’s conception of 
phenomenality, I will deal in more detail only with Husserl’s 
phenomenology. In addition to providing a short exposition of Husserl’s 
general phenomenological program as the starting point of Heidegger’s 
thinking, the thesis also examines the basic critical confrontations with 
Husserl that Heidegger undertakes during his Denkweg. Although I cannot 
hope to do anything like full justice to Husserl’s massive and complex 
philosophical work, I nevertheless try, with some independence, to 
indicate the force and limits of Heidegger’s criticisms. By contrast, the 
other central sources informing Heidegger’s thinking of phenomenality – 
e.g., Aristotle, Dilthey, Hölderlin, the Pre-Socratics – are only mentioned 
briefly, and they will only figure in the roles that Heidegger accords to 
them in his own interpretations.  
      In and beyond explicating the history of Heidegger’s struggle with the 
problem of phenomenality the thesis also has a critical-systematic 
ambition. To begin with, it attempts to articulate the philosophical content 
of Heidegger’s thought in a jargon-free manner, and account for the force 
of his thinking in relation to various other philosophical standpoints. 
Moreover, my thesis continually pursues a kind of internal critique of 
Heidegger, exposing the inner problems and ambiguities that motivate and 
drive his thinking of phenomenality forward. Finally, towards the end of 
the thesis – in the last chapter and in the epilogue – I also make an 
attempt to interrogate more independently what I believe are some of the 
basic problems and unclarities arising resulting from Heidegger’s radical 
historicization of phenomenality, and to suggest a provisional positive 
vision of how these problems could be better understood.     
      In this thesis I will provide no extended treatment of the difficult and 
inflammatory question of Heidegger’s relationship to National Socialism – 
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although I will briefly touch upon the issue in the third part of the thesis. 
There are two main reasons for my decision: first, it is not possible within 
the framework of the present study to open up the systematic space – 
constituted by the relations between philosophy, ethics, politics, and 
psychology – in which it would be possible to raise sharp questions and 
present nuanced arguments about Heidegger, philosophy, and Nazism; 
second, it is not possible to take into account the massive scholarly 
controversies about this question.11 However, there should be no doubt 
about the importance of this question for our efforts to understand and 
assess Heidegger’s life as well as his thinking. 
      The basic facts of the story are today in plain view:12 Heidegger 
enthusiastically embraced National Socialism, which he viewed as a 
counterforce against the destructive and leveling tendencies of modernity 
and as a possible beginning of the ontological revolution that his own 
thinking was aiming at. As rector of the University of Freiburg in 1933-
1934, he supervised the enactment of the Nazi university reform, 
including the implementation of the Führer principle and the application of 
the Nazi laws of racial cleansing to the student body of the university. He 
secretly denounced colleagues and students, and he undeniably had a 
leaning towards Anti-Semitism (although he never endorsed the biological 
racism of the Nazi regime). Although, following the debacle of the 
rectorate, he began to lose faith in the philosophical capacity of the official 
ideology and politics of National Socialism  –  which he gradually began to 
                                         
11 For some of the basic works dealing with Heidegger’s relationship to politics and 
Nazism see, e.g., Krockow 1958; Schwann 1965; Farias 1989; Sheehan 1988; Ott 1992; 
Gethmann-Siefert & Pöggeler [eds.] 1988; Derrida 1989; Pöggeler 1990; Altweg [ed.] 
1988; Sheehan 1988a; Zimmermann 1990; Wolin 1990; Brainard [ed.] 1991; Rockmore 
& Margolis [eds.] 1992; Sluga 1993; de Beistegyi 1998; Bambach 2003. 
12 The most comprehensive and reliable biographical accounts of Heidegger’s life and 
politics available today are Ott 1992 and Safranski 1997. My remarks on Heidegger’s 
relationship to National Socialism in this thesis were written before the publication in 
February 2014 of Heidegger’s “Black notebooks” (schwarze Hefte) from the years 1931-
1941 (cf. GA 94, GA 95, GA 96). The notebooks contain a lot of new and troubling 
material, exhibiting the depth, duration and ambivalence of Heidegger’s Nazi 
engagement and, above all, demonstrating the extent of his Anti-Semitism and its 
connection to his account of the history of being. Nevertheless, my impression is that 
the notebooks do not significantly alter the basic picture of Heidegger’s relationship to 
National Socialism which my remarks build on, and which has already for some time 
been discernable in its central features – for those who have been willing to see.  
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interpret critically as a manifestation of the nihilistic subjectivist-technical 
metaphysics to which he first thought it would be an antidote – for many 
years he continued to express support for Hitler and the Nazi party, and 
to uphold his belief in the “inner truth and greatness” of National 
Socialism according to his idealized vision of the forfeited potential of the 
movement.13 He remained a member of the NSDAP until the end of the 
war, and never showed any remorse, never apologized for his actions, 
never seriously acknowledged and confronted the moral catastrophe of 
Nazism in his later thinking, and never published a single word on the 
Holocaust. Although he refers to the death camps in two unpublished 
lectures and in a least one letter, these minimal mentions are either 
extremely unsatisfactory or terribly reductive.14 
       It is clear, I think, that Heidegger’s engagement in National Socialism 
and his later failure to respond to it are connected with some of his central 
– and most problematic – philosophical convictions, and it remains an 
important responsibility to investigate the nature and depth of this 
connection. However, this does not in any way remove the philosophical 
task of explicating the sense of Heidegger’s thinking, and critically 
interrogating its truth and untruth as well as its moral problems 
independently of the role it played in his relationship to Nazism. 
 
Structure 
 
The thesis proceeds chronologically. It is divided into three main parts 
successively investigating what I suggest are the three main phases in 
Heidegger’s struggle with the problem of phenomenality. These parts are 
then followed by an epilogue in which I offer a critical discussion of 
Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference at the root of his 
                                         
13 GA 40, p. 208: “innere Wahrheit und Größe.” To facilitate the reading, quotations 
in German have been moved from the main text to the footnotes. In translating 
Heidegger, Husserl and others I have followed the strategy of consulting the available 
English translations, sometimes using them as such, sometimes modifying them. 
However, I will only refer to the original German texts in the footnotes and will not 
seperately mention if my translation deviates from the published translation. The 
English translations are listed in the bibliography. 
14 Cf. GA 17, p. 27; GA 17, p. 56. Heidegger’s letter to Herbert Marcuse – in which he 
compares the Holocaust to the Soviet Union’s treatment of Germans in Eastern 
Europe – is cited, e.g., in Farias 1989, p. 285, and in Sheehan 1988a. 
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conception of phenomenality, and provisionally sketch an alternative 
account of the problems at stake here.  
      Part One focuses on Heidegger’s earliest Freiburg lectures 1919-1921, 
in which he critically elaborates Husserl’s phenomenology into an 
“originary science” (Urwissenschaft) of factical life.15 It analyses Heidegger’s 
decisive notion that what is primarily given is what we encounter in our 
pre-theoretical experience of a significant world. It is argued that while 
Heidegger accentuates the temporality and historical familiarity of the pre-
theoretical experience, he still understands his “originary science” as 
basically Husserlian phenomenology reflectively describing the 
fundamental structures of factical life. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s emphasis 
on the primacy of our pre-theoretical experience in its temporality 
eventually gives rise to acute problems and ambivalences both in his 
conception of phenomenology as intuition-based reflection, as well as in 
his effort to account for the role of philosophy in pre-theoretical life.  
      Part Two focuses on the period commencing with Heidegger’s 
groundbreaking confrontation with Aristotle in 1921 and culminating with 
the publication of Being and Time in 1927. Whereas the earliest Freiburg 
lectures had only provided a rudimentary analysis of the historical nature 
of phenomenality, Heidegger now, by way of an explication of Aristotle, 
elaborates his paradigmatic analysis of the structure of phenomenal 
understanding in terms of what he will call the “ontological difference”:16 
it is only on the basis of our prior understanding of the historical contexts 
of meaning/being we live in that we can experience particular beings as 
meaningful phenomena. This analysis in turn motivates Heidegger’s idea 
that philosophy cannot transpire as intuition-based phenomenology 
anymore but needs to take the form of a hermeneutic-destructive 
reflection on the historical origins of our understanding. However, the 
project of fundamental ontology launched in Being and Time is still beset 
with deep ambivalences, which – it is argued – stem from Heidegger’s 
inability to account for how historical meanings can address us as 
something originary and binding, and be distinguished from mere 
prejudices. Firstly, this lacuna in Heidegger’s vision of a historical thinking 
prompts him – contrary to his belief in the historical structure of 
phenomenality and his program of historical destruction – to have 
                                         
15 GA 56/57, p. 12. 
16 GA 24, pp. 22, 102. 
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recourse to a Husserlian method of phenomenological reflection in 
concrete investigations. As a result, the radical historicity of understanding 
is investigated as a universal and ahistorical structure of the human being, 
Dasein. Secondly, Heidegger’s failure to depict the binding power of 
historical meaning undercuts his analysis of authenticity – i.e., of Dasein’s 
transparent choice of its historical possibilities – in a way that ultimately 
gives rise to an uncontrolled vacillation between collectivism and 
subjectivism.    
      Part Three focuses on Heidegger’s later philosophy. It commences 
with the years 1928-1933 after the publication of Being and Time in which 
Heidegger gradually abandons the project of fundamental ontology. It 
then analyses the so-called “turn” that Heidegger’s thinking undergoes in 
the mid 1930s as a turn in his questioning of phenomenality, and traces 
how the problem of phenomenality is developed in his later writings. I 
argue that Heidegger’s later thinking of the clearing/event of being is 
centrally motivated by the effort to show how a historical world can shine 
forth and prevail as a groundless but binding destiny. Along the way I 
explicate Heidegger’s conception of the phenomenal dynamics that make a 
world shine forth as binding, as well as his rearticulation of 
phenomenology in terms of a historical mode of thinking whose rigor lies 
in its capacity to attend and answer to the hidden origin of our received 
understanding of being. In the last chapter I undertake a critical 
delimitation of the clarificatory force of Heidegger’s late historical thinking 
of phenomenality, with the aim of distinguishing what it wants to but 
cannot account for in contrast to what it actually can account for. Here I 
suggest – elaborating on criticisms previously presented by, e.g., Ernst 
Tugendhat, Cristina Lafont, and Emmanuel Levinas – that Heidegger’s 
radical anchoring of phenomenality in our prior understanding of 
historical meaning ultimately makes him unable to account either for the 
truth of our understanding or for the ethical-existential significance of the 
human beings we encounter.  
      The thesis ends with an epilogue in which I sketch a critique of the 
ontological difference, which, I argue, is not only the foundation stone of 
Heidegger’s thinking of phenomenality but which is also at the basis of the 
metaphysics of historical meaning dominating large parts of contemporary 
philosophy. The critique starts out from a late commentary that Heidegger 
wrote on Cézanne in 1974, in which Heidegger suggests an “overcoming 
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of the ontological difference between being and beings.”17 Following 
Heidegger’s suggestion I here attempt to open up and develop, in a 
provisional fashion, the central question that Heidegger’s self-criticism 
gives rise to: How should we understand the relationship between our 
factical understanding of the historical meaning-contexts in which we live 
and our direct experience of beings? Ultimately, I suggest that we need to 
conceive of our openness towards the particular beings we experience 
both as our source of truth and as our source of ethical-existential 
significance.   
     
 
 
 
 
  
                                         
17 Heidegger’s original German text is found in Figal [ed.] 2007a, p. 342: 
“Überwindung der ontologischen Differenz zwischen Sein und Seiendem.” 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Part One: A Phenomenology of                                         
Factical Life 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Martin Heidegger’s breakthrough as an independent philosopher takes 
place a few months after the end of World War One. In the lecture course 
“The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview,”18 delivered at 
the University of Freiburg in the extraordinary war emergency semester 
(Kriegsnotsemester) in the beginning of 1919, Heidegger launches the idea 
that phenomenology, in order to realize its true philosophical potential, 
needs to develop into an “originary science” (Urwissenschaft) of life:19 a 
science that leaves the traditional philosophical effort to find theoretical 
foundations for our naive everyday experience behind, and takes on the 
task of explicating and salvaging our factical pre-theoretical experience as 
our primary and irreducible access to meaningful reality.  
      It seems no exaggeration to highlight “The Idea of Philosophy” as the 
decisive opening of Heidegger’s philosophical authorship.20 In his pre-war 
writings – including his PhD thesis from 1913 and his Habilitationsschrift 
from 1915 – Heidegger still basically appears as a capable yet 
unexceptional philosopher on the contemporary academic scene taking his 
main philosophical cues from Husserlian phenomenology and neo-
Kantianism. Had this been all he wrote he would today at most be 
remembered as a typical figure of the philosophical debate of that time. In 
“The Idea of Philosophy,” by contrast, Heidegger for the first time 
emerges as a distinct and autonomous philosophical voice provisionally 
opening up many of the basic philosophical questions and motifs that will 
henceforth guide his thinking. This marks the beginning of a period of 
lecture courses in which he develops the idea of phenomenology as an 
originary science.   
                                         
18 “Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschuungsproblem,” in GA 56/57 
(henceforth referred to as “The Idea of Philosophy” in the main text).  
19 GA 56/57, p. 12. 
20 For an account of the pioneering role of this lecture course in Heidegger’s 
philosophical authorship, see Kisiel 1993, pp. 15-20; Kisiel 1992. 
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      However, Heidegger’s way into phenomenology starts earlier than the 
war emergency semester of 1919. It is clear that already in his student 
years from 1909 to 1915 Heidegger became electrified by Husserl’s 
phenomenological impulse without as yet being able to achieve an 
independent philosophical opening. Let me give a brief overview of the 
phenomenological motifs entering his thinking during these years, before I 
turn the attention to his early Freiburg lectures.21 
      In one of his first philosophical publications, “Recent Research in 
Logic”22 from 1912, Heidegger endorses Husserl’s and the neo-Kantians’ 
critique of psychologism on account of Lotze’s well-known distinction 
between the psychological act, which “is” (ist), and the logical sense, which 
“holds” (gilt).23 According to Heidegger, it is a crucial task for philosophy, 
so far not fully realized, to bring to light “the realm of validity (Geltung)” in 
its “pure own essentiality” as something distinct both from “the 
sensorially being” and from “the suprasensorially metaphysical.”24 In 
regard to the question how this realm of sense should be investigated, he 
introduces a distinctly Husserlian outlook. Although the “validity-value” 
(Geltungswert) of logical sense cannot be founded on psychology, he 
maintains that the logical is “embedded in the psychic.”25 For an 
investigation of the psychic to be logically relevant, however, it must take 
the form of a “phenomenology of consciousness” focusing on “the 
significances, the sense of the acts.”26 Finally, he insists, with Husserl, that our 
knowledge of the realm of logical sense must ultimately be grounded on 
                                         
21 Cf. Heidegger’s late autobiographical sketch “My Way into Phenomenology” (Mein 
Weg in die Phänomenologie) from 1963, GA 14, pp. 81-86, for a depiction of his early 
efforts to read and come to terms with Husserl’s Logical Investigations. For more detailed 
treatments of Heidegger’s pre-war philosophical writings, see Crowell 2001, pp. 76-
111; van Buren 1994a, pp. 51-129; Sheehan 1981; 1988; Denker 2004. See also Kisiel 
1993, pp. 25-38.  
22 “Neue Forschungen über Logik,” in GA 1. 
23GA 1, p. 22. 
24 GA 1, p. 24: “Dieses Reich des Geltenden muß jetzt seinem Umfang nach 
prinzipiell gegenüber dem Sinnlich-Seienden ebenso wie gegenüber dem Übersinnlich-
Metaphysischen in seiner reinen eigenen Wesenhaftigkeit herausgehoben werden.” 
25 GA 1, pp. 29ff. 
26 GA 1, p. 30: “Die Untersuchung geht auf die Bedeutungen, den Sinn der Akte und 
wird so zur Bedeutungslehre, zur Phänomenologie des Bewußtseins.” 
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“insight into the objective states of affair.”27 What is needed is, in short, 
an intuitive phenomenological investigation of the categorial sense-
structures of intentional consciousness along Husserlian lines. In his 1913 
dissertation, The Theory of Judgment in Psychologism: Critical and Positive 
Contributions to Logic,28 Heidegger echoes the same phenomenological 
motifs in his extended critical investigation of some of the key figures of 
contemporary psychologism (Wilhelm Wundt, Heinrich Maier, Franz 
Brentano, Anton Marty, Theodor Lipps). He repeats his notions of the 
irreducibility of sense and the need to exhibit it phenomenologically while 
at the same time sharpening the question concerning the ontological sense 
of this domain of sense: “What is the sense of sense? [...] Perhaps we 
stand here at something ultimate and irreducible, concerning which a 
further elucidation is ruled out, and every further question necessarily 
falters.”29 Up to this point one could say that Heidegger moves within the 
horizon of Husserl’s phenomenology as a promising philosophical 
possibility without, however, as yet being able to engage it in an 
independent questioning of the philosophical matters themselves.  
      Heidegger’s Habilitationsschrift, The Theory of Categories and Meaning in 
Duns Scotus30 from 1915 exhibits a somewhat bolder effort to push 
phenomenology in new independent directions of questioning. The main 
part of the work is devoted to an investigation of the scholastic treatise De 
modi significandi – a work that was actually written by Duns Scotus’s pupil 
Thomas von Erfurt in the 13th century, but which at the time of 
Heidegger’s habilitation was commonly ascribed to Scotus himself. Here 
Heidegger for the first time displays his extraordinary talent for historical 
explication by reading Erfurt’s treatise as an essentially phenomenological 
analysis of how different logical senses are given in correlation with 
particular intentional acts of judgment and expression. However, although 
the main work proceeds within Husserl’s phenomenological framework it 
is clear that Heidegger wants more than a translation of the scholastic 
grammatica speculativa into a Husserlian vocabulary. In a footnote to the 
introduction he highlights Husserl’s decisive importance for the 
                                         
27 GA 1, p. 39: “Einsicht in den objektiven Sachverhalt.” 
28 Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik, in GA 1. 
29 GA 1, p. 171. “Was ist der Sinn des Sinnes? [...] Vielleicht stehen wir hier bei einem 
Letzten, Unreduzierbaren, darüber eine weiter Aufhellung ausgeschlossen ist, und jede 
weitere Frage notwendig ins Stocken gerät.” 
30 Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus, in GA 1. 
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development of the idea of a “pure logic,” but adds the critical proviso 
that the “object domain” of this logic “must nevertheless be further 
problematized,” moreover, that this can only be effected “with the 
systematic means of a principally worldview-oriented philosophy.”31 In the 
programmatic epilogue, which was later appended to the main text, he 
returns to the same problem: 
 
But the problem is precisely what kind of objectivity this can be, when one 
considers that objectivity makes sense only for a judging subject. 
Without this subject, one could never succeed in bringing out the 
full sense of what is meant by “validity” (Geltung). The question, 
whether it [validity] refers to a special “being” or to an “ought,” or 
to neither of these, so that it can be comprehended only by means of more 
profound constellations of problems, which are contained in the concept of the 
living spirit, and which are unquestionably connected with the problem of value 
– this will not be decided here.32 
 
In short, Heidegger claims that there are two basic tasks that 
phenomenology must face up to: on the one hand, phenomenology needs 
to address the basic question concerning the ontological sense and 
givenness of the primordial realm of sense; on the other hand, this 
questioning must be executed through a “worldview-oriented” 
investigation of what he, using a Hegelian term, names the “living spirit.” 
Against Husserl and the neo-Kantians, he now argues that the 
“epistemological subject” is inadequate to account for the “metaphysically 
most significant sense of spirit, to say nothing of its full content,”33 and 
that, for this purpose, we have to carry out an interpretation of the spirit 
as “meaningful and sense-realizing living deed.”34 Whereas the first task 
                                         
31 GA 1, p. 205: “mit den systematischen Mitteln einer prinzipiell weltanschaulich 
orientierten Philosophie.” 
32 GA 1, pp. 404f.: “nur ist eben Problem, welcher Art die Gegenständlichkeit nur sein kann, 
wenn man beachtet, daß Gegenständlichkeit nur Sinn hat für ein urteilendes Subjekt, 
ohne welches Subjekt es auch nie gelingen wird, den vollen Sinn dessen 
herauszustellen, was man mit Geltung bezeichnet. Ob sie ein eigentümliches ‘Sein’ oder 
ein ‘Sollen’ oder keines von beiden bedeutet, sondern erst durch tiefer liegende, im Begriff des 
lebendigen Geistes beschlossene und fraglos mit dem Wertproblem eng verknüpfte Problemgruppen zu 
begreifen ist, soll hier nicht entschieden werden.” 
33 GA 1, p. 407: “Das erkenntnistheoretische Subjekt deutet nicht den metaphysisch 
bedeutsamsten Sinn des Geistes, geschweige denn seinen Vollgehalt.” 
34 GA 1, p. 406: “sinnvolle und sinnverwirklichende lebendige Tat.” 
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prefigures Heidegger’s subsequent projection of the “origin of life” or the 
“sense of being” as the guiding questions of philosophy, the second task 
anticipates his unremitting effort to seek the origin and structure of 
phenomenal meaning in our pre-theoretical experience of the world. If our 
philosophical interest in the end concerns nothing but the sense that 
beings primarily have for us, we can only hope to explicate this sense from 
within our pre-theoretical everyday experience of them as significant: as 
precious, demanding, useful, fearful, etc. 
   In the last pages of the book Heidegger voices the basic Hegelian 
thought that the “living spirit” is essentially a “historical spirit”:35 “The 
spirit can be comprehended only when the full abundance of its 
accomplishments, i.e., its history, is taken up within it (in ihm aufgehoben wird). 
This ever-growing abundance, in its philosophical comprehendedness, 
provides a continually increasing means for a living conception of the 
absolute spirit of God.”36 He then ends the book by insisting that the way 
to a philosophy of the living spirit must proceed through a principal 
confrontation with Hegel.37 As we shall see shortly, Heidegger’s 
programmatic intention to turn from Husserl to Hegel will not be realized 
in the following years. However, his remark introduces the basic double 
impetus that lies at the bottom of and animates his whole philosophical 
enterprise: the ambivalence between his belief in phenomenal givenness as 
an ultimate measure for all understanding, and his conviction that the 
given is always already mediated by historical categories of understanding. 
For the time being Heidegger provides no concrete analysis whatsoever of 
how the historicity of thought would enter into and determine the pre-
theoretical givenness of sense, and his early Freiburg lecture courses will 
primarily be devoted to a radicalization of Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology into a phenomenology of pre-theoretical life.38  Still, the 
idea concerning the fundamental historicity of human experience and 
                                         
35 GA 1, p. 407. 
36 GA 1, p. 408: “Der Geist ist nur zu begreifen, wenn die ganze Fülle seiner 
Leistungen, d.h. seine Geschichte, in ihm aufgehoben wird, mit welcher stets wachsenden 
Fülle in ihrer philosophischen Begriffenheit ein sich fortwährend steigerndes Mittel 
der lebendigen Begreifung des absolutes Geistes Gottes gegeben ist.” 
37 GA 1, p. 410. 
38 Cf. Figal 1992, pp. 11-22, for an interesting reading of Heidegger’s Habilitationsschrift 
as an attempt to negotiate between Hegel’s notion of the basic historicity of thought 
and  Kierkegaard’s insistence on the individuality of all human experience.   
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thinking is an embryo that will gradually develop through Heidegger’s 
phenomenological investigations of the structure of experience, and reach 
its full consequence and expression in Heidegger’s later thinking of the 
historical event of being.    
      Being, givenness, pre-theoretical life, historicity – although 
Heidegger’s Habilitationsschrift provisionally opens up all the central 
questions guiding his subsequent thinking it also leaves them almost 
completely open and undetermined, as urgent directions of questioning 
still to be travelled and explored. 
    
It is only after the war, in “The Idea of Philosophy,” that Heidegger 
launches his idea of phenomenology as an originary science of life. This 
signals the beginning of an intensive period of lecture courses, which 
Heidegger gives as a Privatdozent at the University of Freiburg. The time in 
Freiburg continues until the autumn of 1923 when he moves away to 
become Professor of Philosophy in Marburg. However, in this part I am 
going to focus only on Heidegger’s earliest Freiburg lectures courses 1919-
1921. My reason for this periodization is that – as I hope to show – the 
lecture courses of 1919-21 exhibit a quite distinct philosophical approach, 
which lasts until 1921. Although Heidegger’s lectures are often wild and 
groping in character, unrelentingly probing new directions of questioning 
and description without establishing a fixed general conceptuality, they still 
constitute a relatively unified philosophical project guided by the idea of 
phenomenology as an originary science of life. This period reaches its end 
with the two courses on the phenomenology of religion that Heidegger 
delivers in 1920-1921, “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” 
from the winter term 1920-2139 and “Augustine and Neo-Platonism” from 
the summer of 1921.40 After that, Heidegger – sparked by the inner 
problems of his originary science – begins a period of intensive study of 
Aristotle, which eventually results in a new analysis of the structure of 
phenomenality and a rearticulation of the task of philosophy in terms of 
the question of the sense of being. These events, which initiate the project 
of Being and Time, will be examined in the next part.41     
                                         
39 “Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion,” in GA 60. 
40 “Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus,” in GA 60. 
41 As a result of my suggested periodization, some of the texts that have been central 
to previous interpretations of Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures courses – e.g. the 
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      Heidegger’s chief source of influence in this early period is 
undoubtedly to be found in Husserl’s phenomenology.42 His projection of 
phenomenology as an originary science from the outset proceeds through 
an affirmative-critical confrontation with Husserl’s phenomenological 
program. From Husserl he adopts the basic phenomenological idea that 
philosophy must abandon its traditional tendency to rely on theoretical 
arguments or historical concepts and henceforth do nothing but describe 
what is concretely given in our experience. At the same time, however, he 
rejects what he takes to be the lingering theoretical bias of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, setting off a series of questions concerning the meaning 
and consequences of the phenomenological impulse: What is phenomenal 
                                                                                                                      
lecture course “Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into 
Phenomenological Research” (Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung 
in die phänomenlogische Forschung) from the winter semester 1921-22 (GA 61), the 
important text “Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle (Indication of the 
Hermeneutic Situation)” (Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der 
hermeneutischen Situation)) from 1922 (in GA 62), as well as the course “Ontologie (The 
Hermeneutics of Facticity)” (Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)) (GA 63) from the 
summer semester of 1923 – are irrelevant for my interpretation of Heidegger’s earliest 
Freiburg lectures. Moreover, from the perspective of my explication many of the 
interpretations of Heidegger’s early Freiburg lecture courses – especially the ones 
written before all the lectures were published in the early 1990s – prove to be more or 
less anachronistic. To begin with, the ealiest lectures courses 1919-1921 are almost 
without exception lumped together with the later ones 1921-1923, in such a way that 
the Freiburg lectures courses emerge as a uniform period of thinking. Moreover, the 
Freiburg courses are regularly interpreted as the beginning of – and, hence, as 
belonging to – Heidegger’s early thinking, which continues practically uninterruptedly 
through the Marburg years and reaches its climax in Being and Time. The presuppostion 
of such interpretations is that the periods thus posited – Heidegger’s early Freiburg 
lectures, the early Heidegger –  would display a more or less uniform philosophical 
approach, so that it becomes possible to use texts from the entire period to illuminate 
the same philosophical stance. Hence, it is not uncommon that texts written after 
1921 are used to substantiate claims about the historical character of Heidegger’s 
thinking 1919-1921 or texts from these earliest years are used to substantiate claims 
about his commitment to phenomenology throughout the Marburg period and in Being 
and Time. My own suggestion is, however, that Heidegger’s earliest Freiburg lecture 
courses 1919-1921 display a relatively distinct philosophical approach, which is very 
much a critical continuation of Husserl’s phenomenology. This approach undergoes a 
shift in 1921-22 when Heidegger, through his reading of Aristotle, opens up the 
paradigm of thinking – which sketches out the historical structure of understanding 
and stresses the necessity of a destruction of the tradition – that will receive its classic 
formulation in Being and Time.  
42 For some historical accounts of the start and development of Heidegger’s 
relationship to Husserl, see Sheehan 1997; Kisiel 1997; Figal 2009, pp. 31-39. 
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givenness and what does it mean to phenomenologically describe matters? 
What is primarily given if not our pre-theoretical experience of 
significances? Are these significances given as objects of direct intuitive 
seeing or are they rather determined by the historical contexts of meaning 
in which we live? Moreover, how is our understanding of the problems 
and tasks of philosophy transformed in the light of these insights into the 
primacy of factical pre-theoretical life? Husserl – like Aristotle later – thus 
plays a double role for Heidegger: on the one hand, Husserl’s emphasis on 
givenness as the ultimate measure of understanding in Heidegger’s view 
opens up the need to radically question the task of philosophy and to 
return to pre-theoretical life as our primary access to phenomenal 
meaning; on the other hand, he holds that Husserl’s own transcendental 
phenomenology remained trapped within the paradigm of theoretical 
philosophy. Thus, the goal of realizing the revolutionary philosophical 
implications of phenomenology must essentially be achieved through a 
critical delimitation of Husserl.  
      Next to Husserl’s phenomenology, the most palpable historical 
background to Heidegger’s early thought is Wilhelm Dilthey and the 
hermeneutic tradition in general. Dilthey’s influence is profoundly 
discernable in Heidegger’s emphasis on the pre-theoretical experience and 
in his effort to explicate its temporal-historical character.43 In his attempt 
to press phenomenology towards the pre-theoretical sphere of dynamic 
individual life, Heidegger also takes his inspiration, first, from modern life-
philosophers such as Nietzsche, Bergson and Jaspers; second, from 
Christian thinkers such as St. Paul, Augustine and Meister Eckhart, and 
Kierkegaard.44 What is more, Heidegger’s lectures courses unfold in a 
continuous critical dialogue with some of the main representatives of the 
neo-Kantian philosophy that dominated the German academic philosophy 
at the time. Whereas Heinrich Rickert and Paul Natorp mostly function as 
                                         
43 Gadamer has emphasized that Dilthey already played an important formative role 
for Heidegger in his early Freiburg lecture courses. Cf. Gadamer 1987, pp. 420ff. For 
works examining Dilthey’s influence on Heidegger, cf.  Guignon 1983, pp. 44-63, 110-
115; Kisiel 1993, pp. 315-361; Bambach 1995; Maakreel 2004. See also Ruin 1994, pp. 
9, 15f., 41f., 112f. 
44 For an investigation of the impact of contemporary life-philosophy on Heidegger’s 
early thought, see, e.g., Krell 1992. Cf. also Fehér 1994. For studies of the influence of 
Christian thinkers on Heidegger’s thought, see, e.g., van Buren 1994a, pp. 113-129, 
157-202; 1994b; Kisiel 1993, pp. 69-115; Sommer 2005.  
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exemplary manifestations of the theoretical philosophy to be overcome, 
the writings of the younger Emil Lask – killed during the war in 1918 – 
play an import role in Heidegger’s attempts to articulate the way categorial 
meaning is given in the pre-theoretical experience of life.45 
      In what follows I will concentrate on what, given the theme of this 
thesis, I take to be the philosophically most powerful and relevant courses 
of this period, above all “The Idea of Philosophy” from 1919 and “Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology” from the winter term 1919/20.46 Whereas 
“The Idea of Philosophy” constitutes Heidegger’s philosophical 
breakthrough, offering a first sweep through the problems that will 
occupy him, it is in “Basic Problems of Phenomenology” that he for the 
first time develops a more unified program for a phenomenological 
philosophy, conceived as an originary science. It is thus no coincidence 
that this course also contains Heidegger’s first critique of Husserl’s 
phenomenology. Other important courses from this period are 
“Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression” from the summer term 
192047 and “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” from the 
winter term 1920-21. 
    
The philosophical reception of the early Freiburg lectures has been shaped 
by the remarkable fact that Heidegger publishes nothing during these 
decisive formative years. Indeed, the entire period between the publication 
of his Habilitationsschrift in 1916 and of Being and Time in 1927 is one of 
silence in the public domain. Hence, as Being and Time is finally published 
and captivates the contemporary philosophical scene it is as if it had 
appeared out of nowhere, leaving its readers to struggle with this 
pioneering and difficult text with no opportunity to consult the early 
Freiburg and Marburg lecture courses in which this thinking evolved. 
Moreover, the bulk of Heidegger’s early Freiburg courses were only 
published in the Gesamtausgabe in the 1990s. The upshot of this textual 
situation is that for a long time Heidegger scholars have lacked access to 
the material necessary for explicating his early development, and largely 
                                         
45 The Neo-Kantian context of Heidegger’s early philosophy has been examined in, 
e.g., Crowell 2001, pp. 23-36; Friedmann 2000; Steinmann 2004. For studies dealing 
with Emil Lask’s influence on Heidegger’s early thinking, see, e.g., Kisiel 1995; 
Crowell 2000, pp. 37-55, 76-92.  
46 “Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie,” GA 58 . 
47 “Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks,” GA 59. 
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had to contend with the testimony and hearsay of his former students and 
colleagues. 
      However, the lack of publications did not mean that Heidegger would 
have been totally unknown to his contemporaries. From the moment of 
his first post-war lecture course in 1919 his novel philosophical approach 
and charismatic lecturing style soon gave rise to a growing reputation, 
which made philosophy students from all over Germany – among them 
Hanna Arendt, Oskar Becker, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl Löwith, and 
Hans Jonas – travel first to Freiburg, then to Marburg, to attend his 
lectures. Let me quote Arendt’s well-known account: 
 
The beginning in Heidegger’s case is neither the date of his birth 
[…] nor the publication of his first book, but the lecture courses 
and seminars which he held as a mere Privatdozent (instructor) and 
assistant to Husserl at the University of Freiburg in 1919. For 
Heidegger’s “fame” predates by about eight years the publication of 
Sein und Zeit in 1927; indeed it is open to question whether the 
unusual success of this book […] would have been possible if it had 
not been preceded by the teacher’s reputation among the students 
in whose opinion, at any rate, the book’s success merely confirmed 
what they had known for many years. […] In Heidegger’s case 
there is nothing on which his fame could have been based, nothing 
written, save for notes taken at his lectures which circulated among 
students everywhere. The lectures dealt with texts that were 
generally familiar; they contained no doctrine that could have been 
learned, reproduced, and handed on. There was hardly more than a 
name, but the name traveled all over Germany like the rumor of 
the hidden king.48 
 
Apart from the fact that Heidegger’s early lecture courses were famous 
from the beginning, there was also from early on a sense that these 
lectures, in their intense tentative explorations of the dynamics of pre-
theoretical life, might contain a philosophical thinking which was to some 
extent distinct and unique, and which might transform the standard 
picture of Heidegger formed by Being and Time. Oskar Becker, who began 
attending Heidegger’s lecture courses in 1919, gives expression to the 
above expectation when he writes: “Sein und Zeit is no longer the original 
                                         
48 Arendt 1969, p. 893. 
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Heidegger, but rather repeats his original breakthrough in a scholastically 
hardened form.”49 
      Then, as Heidegger’s early courses were successively published from 
the late 1980s to the early 1990s, a feverish and ambitious effort of 
research by scholars took off, driven by many ambitions: to philologically 
map his early development, to shed light on the problematic and 
conceptuality of Being and Time, to come across original and strong 
philosophical thoughts, and perhaps above all, to detect in these early 
lecture courses primordial problems and motifs which could confirm or 
substantiate one or another claim about what constitutes Heidegger’s basic 
philosophical concern.  
      In this discussion, the question of phenomenality/phenomenology has 
been present as a central and controversial theme. Indeed, it is possible to 
divide up the chief interpretations into two divergent groups depending 
on how they relate to this question. On the one hand, both of the major 
chronicles of Heidegger’s early thought – Theodore Kisiel’s The Genesis of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time from 1993 and John van Buren’s The Young 
Heidegger from 1994  – portray his thinking in these years as a radical 
departure from the ambitions of traditional transcendental philosophy, 
including Husserl’s phenomenology. Abandoning Husserl’s belief in the 
possibility of describing phenomenally given universal structures of sense, 
they claim, Heidegger here launches a drastically hermeneutical-
deconstructivist mode of thinking tracing the finite historical sense of 
factical life.50 On the other hand, interpreters such as Steven Crowell and 
Dan Zahavi have read these lectures as a critical yet basically faithful 
elaboration of Husserl’s phenomenological program, claiming that 
Heidegger’s originary science of life essentially unfolds as a 
phenomenological reflection on the constitutive structures of our first-
person experience. 
      The central and controversial character of the theme of phenomenality 
in the recent reception should come as no surprise. For one thing, 
Heidegger’s early lectures basically unfold as a critical elaboration of 
                                         
49 The quotation is found in Pöggeler 1983, p. 351. Gadamer has for decades 
emphasized the importance and philosophical productivity of Heidegger’s early 
Freiburg lecture courses. See, e.g., Gadamer 1987, pp. 250, 418ff. Cf. also van Buren 
1994a, pp. 3-5. 
50 This kind of hermeneutic-deconstructivist reading of Heidegger’s early Freiburg 
lectures is also developed by Hans Ruin in Ruin 1994, pp. 35-70. 
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Husserl’s phenomenology, suggesting that they are likely to contain 
important keys for understanding his relationship to phenomenology. For 
another, already at a quick glance it is evident that these lectures exhibit 
what seems like opposing tendencies concerning the question of 
phenomenality. While we have Heidegger’s guiding aim to elaborate 
Husserl’s phenomenology into an originary science of the structures of 
factical life we also have his insistence on the need to abandon all the 
traditional theoretical ambitions of philosophy in favor of a thinking 
answering to the finite temporal-historical movement of factical life.  
      But what is the sense of this tension in Heidegger’s early attempt to 
come to terms with the problem of phenomenality? How should we 
understand and delimit the relative truth of the opposing interpretations 
mentioned above? The aim of the following pages is to shed light on 
questions such as these by examining in some detail Heidegger’s effort to 
critically transform Husserl’s phenomenology into an originary science of 
factical life. In so doing I also try to critically indicate some of the 
philosophical possibilities that Heidegger’s early lecture courses at 
Freiburg open up as well as the basic limits and unclarities that impede 
them.  
      The second part is divided into the following chapters: (1.2) 
Phenomenology as Originary Science of Life, (1.3) Pre-theoretical Life and 
Theoretical Philosophy, (1.4) Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Factical Life, 
and (1.5) Life and the Task of Philosophy. 
 
1.2 Phenomenology as Originary Science of Life 
 
Husserl and the Promise of Phenomenology 
 
Before turning to Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures, I will give a brief 
outline of Husserl’s phenomenological program as the critical starting 
point of Heidegger’s philosophical endeavor. Given that Husserl is a 
complex thinker whose philosophical development manifests itself in a 
huge mass of published works and unpublished manuscript, I cannot offer 
anything like a comprehensive account of his phenomenology here. My 
aim is thus not to provide a contribution to the vast field of exegetical 
research on Husserl but to lay out what I take to be his guiding general
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understanding of the transcendental philosophical task and method of his 
phenomenology.51  
      Husserl’s phenomenological breakthrough took place in his Logical 
Investigations, published in two volumes in 1900 and 1901,52 and his 
conception of phenomenology as transcendental philosophy gradually 
matured in the following decade. In 1911, this conception was 
provisionally announced in the article “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”53 
and it received its first standard formulation in Husserl’s key work Ideas 
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy from 
1913.54 The transcendental philosophical program consolidated in this 
period largely remained in force in Husserl’s later thinking even though he 
never tired of rearticulating and complementing it. It should also be kept 
in mind that the general philosophical program which I will try to outline 
here is incessantly modified and specified, even to some extent exceeded 
and contradicted, in Husserl’s prolific work of concrete phenomenological 
description. 
      The heart of Husserl’s phenomenology comes to expression in the 
famous motto “To the matters themselves!” Against what he conceives as 
the age-old tendency of philosophy to resort to theoretical constructions 
or historical prejudices in its effort to achieve basic epistemological-
ontological knowledge Husserl insists that philosophy must go to the 
matters themselves as they are concretely given as phenomena in our 
experience. It is precisely this demand to abide by the phenomenally given 
that receives its classic formulation in “the principle of all principles” in 
Ideas I:  
 
But enough now of absurd theories. No conceivable theory can 
make us err with respect to the principle of all principles: that every 
originarily giving intuition (Anschauung) is a legitimizing source of knowledge, 
that everything originarily (in its tangible actuality, so to speak) offered to 
us in “intuition” (Intuition), is simply to be received as what it gives itself, but 
                                         
51 For an excellent general introduction to Husserl’s phenomenology, see Zahavi 
2003a. See also Bernet & Kern & Marbach 1993; Held 1985; 1986; Moran 2005; 
Welton 2000; Sokolowski 1974; 2000.  
52 Logische Untersuchungen, Hua XVIII and Hua XIX.  
53 “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” in Hua XXV. 
54 Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Hua III 
(henceforth referred to as Ideas I in the main text). 
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also only within the limits in which it gives itself there. […] Every statement 
which does no more than confer expression on such givens by 
simple explication and by means of significations precisely 
conforming to them is […] really an absolute beginning, called upon to 
serve as a foundation in a genuine sense, a principium.55  
 
Hence, Husserl claims, the only way to rigorously grounded knowledge 
consists not in arguing or inferring anything but in strictly seeing and 
describing what is concretely given and discernible in our de facto 
experiences while avoiding all conceptual and theoretical prejudices.    
      However, what is the philosophical import of this principle? What 
does it mean that something is given as a phenomenon in our experience, 
and how do we see and describe such phenomena?  
      According to Husserl, it has been the decisive characteristic of the 
Western philosophical tradition to disregard and pass over the full 
phenomenal content of our de facto experiences – in which the world is 
concretely given to us as meaningful – instead it has dogmatically limited 
the scope of experiential givenness to include only particular empirical 
objects and sense data. With momentous results. As the phenomenal 
content of our experience is denied as a measure of understanding, 
philosophy sets itself the task of accounting for the ontological meaning 
of the world and the possibility of knowledge by relying on theoretical 
arguments of different sorts, e.g., on deductions from first principles, on 
inductive inferences, or on analyses of our received historical concepts. 
However, Husserl claims, every attempt to account for the meaning of 
things and the structure of our experience and knowledge with reference 
to any other, supposedly more secure and deep-seated ground of 
knowledge, than their self-presentation in our experience, is bound to 
result in prejudiced belief and theoretical construction. 
      Husserl’s diagnosis of this state of affairs is seductively simple: our 
tendency to limit the sphere of true phenomenality to our experience of 
                                         
55 Hua III, p. 51: “Doch genug der verkehrten Theorien. Am Prinzip aller Prinzipien: daß 
jede originär gebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis sei, daß alles, was sich uns in 
der ‘Intuition’ originär, (sozusagen in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit) darbietet, einfach 
hinzunehmen sei, als was es sich gibt, aber auch nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich da gibt, 
kann uns keine erdenkliche Theorie irre machen. […] Jede Aussage, die nichts weiter 
tut, als solche Gegebenheiten durch bloße Explikation und genau sich anmessende 
Bedeutungen Ausdruck zu verleihen, ist also wirklich […] ein absoluter Anfang, im 
echten Sinne zur Grundlegung berufen, principium.” 
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empirical objects is rooted in the “natural attitude.”56 According to 
Husserl, our natural manner of experience is centrally characterized by its 
strong and exclusive directedness towards its objects. In seeing a tree, we 
are primarily directed towards the tree itself; in remembering a landscape, 
our attention dwells on the landscape itself. It is, Husserl claims, part of 
the intentionality of our natural experience that it presents its objects 
independently of our acts of experiencing them: the objects appear to us 
as objectual identities in the manifold of perspectival experiences without 
our being aware of the experiences themselves in their potential meaning-
constituting function.57 Hence, what Husserl calls the “general thesis of 
the natural attitude” emerges with a certain necessity:58 the conviction that 
reality is essentially made up of individual objects that exist and are what 
they are independently of every human subject and experience. The 
natural attitude thus of itself tends to divert us from and induce 
speculative theoretical accounts of all the phenomena which happen to fall 
outside the scope of our natural object-directed experience.  
      With regard to what Husserl takes to be the central problems of 
philosophy, the confinement of traditional philosophy to the natural 
attitude fatally hampers its ability; first, to explain how our subjective acts 
of knowledge may arrive at act-transcendent objects at all; second, to 
account for the full ontological sense which different types of objects take 
on in our experiences. The metaphysical thesis of the natural attitude 
strictly speaking amounts to a prejudiced generalization of a certain kind 
of experience which, because of its narrow focus on particular objects, 
cannot provide an adequate phenomenal basis for a philosophical 
clarification of the epistemic experienceability or ontological sense of the 
objects experienced. As the philosopher of the natural attitude tries to 
account for the relationship between our experiences and their objects, he 
is forced to construe this relation in terms of an interaction between 
different kinds of objects, thereby inescapably giving way to incoherence 
and reductionism. 
      It is with the aim of breaking free from the naturalistic impasse of 
traditional philosophy that Husserl stakes out the decisive methodological 
maneuver of his transcendental phenomenology: the phenomenological 
                                         
56 Cf. Hua III, pp. 56-60. 
57 Cf. Hua III, pp. 86ff. 
58 Cf. Hua III, pp. 60f. 
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reduction. The reduction comprises two central components, which are 
described in the following way in the later postscript to Ideas I, published 
in 1930:    
 
On the one hand, all judgments are excluded, which, resting on the 
natural attitude, are about this world constantly and altogether 
unquestionably pregiven as existing [...] On the other hand, by 
means of this epoché the regard becomes free for the universal 
phenomenon, “the world of consciousness purely as such,” the 
world purely as given in the manifold flux of conscious life.59 
 
That is to say: On the one hand, the phenomenologist suspends the 
general thesis of the natural attitude concerning the metaphysical status of 
reality, seeing that every such thesis based on the natural direction of 
experience necessarily lacks a sufficient phenomenal basis and is thus 
prejudiced; on the other hand, the phenomenologist frees himself from 
the object-directed movement of our natural experience, and instead 
carries out a reflective turn, which allows him to observe the objects of 
experience strictly as they are given in corresponding acts of 
consciousness.   
      How should this be understood?  
      Husserl describes the phenomenological reduction as a reflective turn 
in which we free ourselves from our normal directedness at the objects of 
our experience and instead reflect on these objects as they are given in our 
experiences. This does not – as, e.g., Dan Zahavi has pointed out60 – 
imply that we turn our attention from the objects of the outer world 
towards the inner acts of the experiencing subject, but rather it means that 
we expand our attention so that we shift from the one-sided object-
directedness of our natural attitude toward a synoptic reflection on the 
objects in correlation with the specific acts of consciousness in which they 
are given. Husserl makes it very clear that the reduction does not entail a 
“restriction of the investigation to the sphere of real immanence,” but 
                                         
59 Hua V, p. 145: “Einerseits sind alle auf natürlicher Erfahrung beruhende Urteile 
über diese Welt, die uns beständig und ganz fraglos als seiend vorgegebene, 
ausgeschlossen [...]. Anderseits wird durch diese Epoché der Blick frei für das 
universale Phänomen: ‘Bewußtseinswelt rein als solche’, rein als in mannigfaltigen, 
‘zusammenstimmenden’ Erfahrungen ‘originaliter’ erscheinende.”  
60 Cf. Zahavi 2003b, pp. 44ff.  
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signifies a “limitation to the sphere of pure self-givenness, to the sphere of 
that [...] which is given in precisely the same sense in which it is meant, 
self-given in the strictest sense, in such a way that nothing that is meant 
fails to be given.”61  
      Indeed, Husserl claims, the reflective study opened by the reduction 
reveals precisely that our human consciousness essentially exhibits an 
intentional structure:62 our seeing is always a seeing of something, our 
brooding is always a brooding over something. It belongs to the very 
sense of our acts of consciousness that they are directed, not at inner 
representations or sense data that would mediate our relation to outer 
reality, but at the things themselves that they intend. Conversely, the world 
is only available as concretely given unities of meaning in correlation with 
particular acts of experience. Husserl’s concept of intentionality thus 
effects a dissolution both of the traditional idea of consciousness as an 
inner sphere that has to be transcended in order to attain true knowledge 
of the outer world and of the idea of reality as basically mind-independent. 
Just as it is impossible to understand the meaning of things in isolation 
from the experiences in which they are given as meaningful, it is 
impossible to understand the acts of the subject in abstraction from the 
matters and things with which they are concerned. As a result, Husserl 
states that the word “phenomenon” is itself “ambiguous by virtue of the 
essential correlation between appearance (Erscheinen) and that which 
appears (Erscheinendem).”63 
      Hence, the reflective turn of the phenomenological reduction should 
not be understood as a turn to a self-contained subject, but to our 
experience as a whole in its intentional correlation between our acts of 
consciousness and the objects as they are given in these acts, between 
noesis and noema. Whereas in the natural attitude we pass through our 
intentional experiences as in a tunnel, directed straightly and exclusively at 
                                         
61 Hua II, pp. 60f.: “Demnach bedeutet die phänomenologische Reduktion nicht etwa 
die Einschränkung der Untersuchung auf die Sphäre der reellen Immanenz [...] 
sondern die Beschränkung auf die Sphäre der reinen Selbstgegebenheiten, auf die Sphäre 
dessen, über das nicht nur geredet und das nicht nur gemeint wird [...] sondern dessen, 
was genau in dem Sinn, in dem es gemeint ist, auch gegeben ist und selbstgegeben im 
strengsten Sinn, derart, daß nichts von dem Gemeinten nicht gegeben ist.” 
62 Husserl himself takes up the concept of intentionality from his teacher Franz 
Brentano who, in turn, rediscovered and revived this scholastic concept.  
63 Hua II, p. 14: “Das Wort Phänomen ist doppelsinnig vermöge der wesentlichen 
Korrelation zwischen Erscheinen und Erscheinendem.”   
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the particular objects of these experiences, in the reduction we reflect on 
the pure and full sphere of experiential givenness, in which the objects 
appear in their concretion as noematic identities in correlative noetic acts 
of consciousness.  
      However, the phenomenological reduction is not enough to access the 
proper field of transcendental phenomenology but needs to be 
supplemented by the “eidetic reduction” (eidetische Reduktion).64 For 
Husserl the task of phenomenology is not to study the empirical 
particularities of different experiences but to explicate the basic essential 
structures characterizing these experiences and their correlative objects.  
In Ideas I he defines his notion of “essence” as follows: “it belongs to the sense 
of anything contingent to have an essence and therefore an Eidos that can be 
apprehended purely. […] An individual object […] has [...] its own specific 
character, its stock of essential predicables which must belong to it (as ‘an 
existent such as it is in itself’) if other, secondary, relative determinations 
can belong to it.”65 An essential structure is thus a general structure of 
sense necessarily and universally constituting a particular kind of being. 
According to Husserl, it is possible to phenomenologically access and 
describe essences through what he calls “eidetic variation” and which he 
basically characterizes as follows: in order to explicate the essence of a 
thing we perform an imaginative variation of a manifold of particular 
cases, so that we become able to distinguish what constitutes the essential 
features of the being in question without which it would cease to be what 
it is.66  
     In the end, the phenomenological and the eidetic reductions open up 
the possibility of implementing Husserl’s guiding idea of the philosophical 
                                         
64 Hua III, p. 6.  
65 Hua III, pp. 12f.: “[Es gehört] zum Sinn jedes Zufälligen, eben ein Wesen, und somit ein rein 
zu fassendes Eidos zu haben [...]. Ein individueller Gegenstand [...] hat als ‘in sich selbst’ 
so und so beschaffener Eigenart, seinen Bestand an wesentlichen Prädikabilien, die ihm 
zukommen müssen (als ‘Seiendem, wie er in sich selbst ist’), damit ihm andere 
sekundäre, relative Bestimmungen zukommen können.” 
66 Cf. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil (henceforth referred to as E&U in the footnotes), 
§§86-93; Hua IX, pp. 72-87. Let this brief depiction of Husserl’s notion of eidetic 
variation suffice here. I will return to the sense and problems of this notion in the next 
part in my discussion of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl in his Marburg lecture courses 
“Introduction to Phenomenological Research” (Einführung in die phänomenologische 
Forschung) (1923-24) and “History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena” (Prolegomena 
zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs) (1925), where this idea plays a central role.  
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task of phenomenology as transcendental constitutional research: to 
investigate, through strict phenomenological reflection, how different 
kinds of objects are given and constituted in different kinds of acts and to 
detect, in these act-systems of transcendental consciousness, the 
transcendental structures a priori determining the possible 
experienceability and givenness of different objects and, hence, their basic 
senses of being. Led by this idea Husserl is during his whole career 
ceaselessly occupied with carrying out concrete phenomenological 
descriptions of different experiences with a view to their constitutive 
structures and features, his themes including, e.g., time-consciousness, the 
difference between signitive and fulfilled intentions, the unthematic 
horizons of intentional experience, eidetic variation, the lived body, 
passive synthesis, the life-world, and intersubjectivity.  
 
The Question of the Problem of Philosophy 
 
Heidegger opens his 1919 breakthrough course “The Idea of Philosophy” 
by radically questioning what he claims to be the traditional conception of 
the task of philosophy that has tended to guide philosophy in a more or 
less habitual and inarticulate way.67 It has, he suggests, always been the 
implicit aim of philosophy to establish a philosophical “worldview” 
(Weltanschauung), by which he means “a basic conception of the world” on 
the basis of which it should become possible to achieve well-founded 
knowledge of the “sense and purpose of human life.”68  
                                         
67 It is important to note at the outset that any interpretation of Heidegger’s early 
Freiburg lecture courses is faced with an awkward text-critical situation given that 
parts of these lectures are only availabe in the Gesamtausgabe in the form of students’ 
transcripts of his courses. In my explication I have as a rule chosen to quote such 
transcripts as sufficiently trustworthy sources to what Heidegger said in his lectures at 
the time without explicitly discussing or marking out their status as transcripts. 
Although the notes taken by students cannot enjoy the same reliability as Heidegger’s 
first-hand writing I think that, on the whole, the wording attributed to Heidegger in 
these transcripts seems quite authentic and consistent with his own manuscripts. 
Moreover, the basic trust of my interpretation is not dependent on any exact 
formulations in the transcripts, which might have been inaccurately rendered.  
68 GA 56/57, p. 8. Cf. also GA 58, p. 37. It seems clear that Heidegger has picked up 
the term “worldview” from Husserl, who in his article “Philosophy as Rigorous 
Science” famously distinguishes between “worldview-philosophy” and “scientific 
philosophy.” However, as we shall see shortly, Heidegger does not simply reproduce 
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      And yet, Heidegger asks, what if “there is no connection at all” 
between philosophy and worldview? What if the traditional self-
understanding of philosophy as worldview-formation is essentially 
misleading?  
 
There remains only the empty possibility that no connection exists 
between the two, in which case worldview would be an utterly 
heterogeneous figure to philosophy. Such a radical separation 
would contradict all previous conceptions of philosophy, for it 
would imply a demand to discover an entirely new concept of 
philosophy which would be totally unrelated to all the ultimate 
questions of humankind. Philosophy would thus be deprived of its 
most ancestral entitlements – of its regal, superior calling. What 
value at all could it have if it should lose this role?69 
 
Heidegger’s drastic questioning of the traditional idea of philosophy has a 
clear purpose: to awaken our attention to the common conceptions of the 
idea of philosophy that tend to guide our philosophical investigations in 
an unnoticed manner, and open up the question of philosophy itself – its 
problem and its task – as a primary and decisive question for every 
possible philosophy: “Worldview becomes a problem of philosophy in a quite 
new sense. But the core of the problem lies in philosophy itself – it is itself 
a problem. The cardinal question concerns the essence, the concept of 
philosophy. The topic is, however, formulated:  ‘The Idea of Philosophy...,’ 
more precisely ‘The Idea of Philosophy as Originary Science 
(Urwissenschaft)’.”70 However, what is it that motivates Heidegger’s 
questioning of the problem of philosophy and where does it lead him?  
                                                                                                                      
Husserl’s sense of the term “worldview” but transforms its meaning in such a way that 
Husserl’s scientific phenomenology is interpreted as a species of worldview-
philosophy.  
69 GA 56/57, p. 11: “Es bleibt nur noch die leere Möglichkeit, daß zwischen beiden 
kein Zusammenhang besteht. Weltanschauung wäre dann ein der Philosophie 
gegenüber völlig heterogenes Gebilde. Diese radikale Trennung widerspräche aller 
bisherigen Auffassung der Philosophie; denn sie schlösse die Forderung in sich, einen 
ganz neuen Begriff der Philosophie zu entdecken, und zwar einen solchen, der sie 
außerhalb jeder Beziehung mit den letzen Menschheitsfragen stellen müßte. Die 
Philosophie käme so um ihre angstammtesten Vorrechte, um ihren königlichen, 
überlegenen Beruf. Was sollte ihr, ginge dieser verlustig, überhaupt noch Wert 
verleihten.” 
70 GA 56/57, p. 12: “Die Weltanschauung wird zum Problem der Philosophie in einem 
ganz neuen Sinne. Aber der Kern des Problems liegt in dieser Selbst – sie selbst ist ja 
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      As we shall see, Heidegger’s early Freiburg philosophy is very much 
driven by the urge to make good Husserl’s phenomenological demand to 
resist prejudices and strictly abide by what is concretely given in our 
experience. For Heidegger, however, this demand centrally involves the 
need to interrogate the basic problems and tasks of philosophy which 
ultimately guide our philosophical investigations. Hence, he begins his 
important lecture course “Basic Problems of Phenomenology” with the 
following statement of purpose:  
 
 “Basic problems of phenomenology” – the most urgent and 
ineffaceable, the most originary and ultimate basic problem of 
phenomenology is itself for itself. Phenomenology is the originary 
science, the science of the absolute origin of the spirit in and for 
itself – “life in and for itself.” [...] The challenge now is to bring to 
“life,” in an originary and radical way, out of a new basic situation, 
the innermost, living vocation, the fate of philosophy, its idea, the 
manifestations of which are known to us under the names of Plato, 
Kant, Hegel. 71  
 
That is, the basic problem of phenomenology is phenomenology itself. In 
so far as phenomenology is called to realize the vocation and idea of 
philosophy as originary science, the first task must be to question and 
bring to life the basic problem and idea of such a science. A few pages 
later, he raises the question “What is a problem?”72 whereupon he 
characterizes phenomenology as “genuine, originary, living [...] 
indefatigable problem-consciousness (Problembewußtsein).”73 
      This statement of purpose should be understood against the backdrop 
of Heidegger’s belief that Husserl, while opening up the ideal of 
                                                                                                                      
Problem. Die Kardinalfrage geht auf das Wesen, den Begriff der Philosophie. Das 
Thema ist aber formuliert: ‘Die Idee der Philosophie…’, und näherhin: ‘Die Idee der 
Philosophie als Urwissenschaft’.”  
71 GA 58, pp. 1f.: “‘Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie’ – das brennendste und nie 
austilgbare, das ursprünglichste und endgültigste Grundproblem der Phänomenologie 
ist sie selbst für sich selbst. Sie ist die Urwissenschaft, die Wissenschaft vom absoluten 
Ursprung des Geistes an und für sich – ‘Leben an und für sich’. […] Die innerste, 
lebendige Berufung, das Schicksal der Philosophie, ihre Idee, deren größte 
Manifestationen wir kennen unter den Namen: Plato, Kant, Hegel, gilt es ursprünglich 
und radikal aus einer neuen Grundsituation heraus zum ‘Leben’ zu bringen.” 
72 GA 58, p. 4. 
73 GA 58, p. 5. 
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phenomenal givenness as the ultimate measure of understanding, never 
allowed his demand for phenomenological accountability to extend to a 
critical questioning of the guiding problems of philosophy. Hence, in 
“Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression” Heidegger writes that “the 
basic phenomenological attitude, provided that one understands it in the 
widest sense as descriptive essential analysis of the phenomena of 
consciousness that are not psychologically apperceived, is not sufficient 
for a fundamental philosophical problematic as long as it is not itself 
explicated in a genuinely philosophically originary way.”74 It is, he 
continues, inappropriate to put forward phenomenology as the 
“fundamental science for philosophy” without having a “radical concept 
of philosophy.”75 As long as phenomenology does not commence with a 
basic phenomenological explication of the guiding problems of 
philosophy, it may only assert itself as a superior philosophical method by 
uncritically submitting itself to some traditional notion of the problematic 
of philosophy.   
      I believe Heidegger’s critical assessment of Husserl on this point is 
basically correct. To be sure, Husserl’s phenomenological call to keep to 
what is given in intentional experience implies a break with the old 
philosophical tendency to provide theoretically constructive grounds for 
our understanding of things; it also brings with it an ability to overcome 
and dissolve a series of traditional problem-constellations, most 
importantly the dualism between inner consciousness and outer reality; it 
even, as we shall see, leads Husserl to state in principle the need to start 
out from questioning the problems of philosophy. Still, it also seems clear 
to me that Husserl largely lacked the basic sense for radically interrogating 
the philosophical-existential meaning and motivation of the problems of 
philosophy. Hence, apart from a continuous reflection on the relation 
between philosophy and the natural sciences, we look in vain in Husserl’s 
massive work for a radical engagement with such questions as the 
following: How do philosophical problems meet us in life? What role does 
philosophy play in our ethical-existential understanding of life? How is it 
                                         
74 GA 59, p. 7: “Die phänomenologische Grundhaltung, sofern man sie im weitesten 
Sinne versteht als deskriptive Analyse der nicht psychologisch apperzipierten 
Bewußtseinsphänomene, genügt aber nicht, solange sie nicht selbst genuin 
philosophisch ursprünglish expliziert ist, für eine prinzipielle philosophische 
Problematik.” 
75 GA 59, p. 31. 
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that philosophy has always been drawn into the ambivalence between our 
will to flee from and explain away our personal existential problems, and 
our will and effort to relate openly and clearly to the challenges of life? I 
would seem that this inability on Husserl’s part to radically question the 
problems of philosophy is linked to the fact that his thinking on ethical, 
existential, and political matters on the whole remains quite weak and 
commonplace, often reproducing the prejudices of his age.  
      The tension between the principal possibility and concrete failure of 
Husserl’s phenomenology to interrogate the problems of philosophy 
manifests itself sharply in his programmatic article “Philosophy as 
Rigorous Science,” which also functions as a chief point of reference for 
Heidegger’s critical engagement with Husserl during these early years. The 
article opens grandly: “From its earliest beginnings philosophy has claimed 
to be a rigorous science, indeed a science that satisfies our highest 
theoretical needs and renders possible from an ethical-religious point of 
view a life regulated by pure norms of reason.”76 Moreover, to realize this 
ideal of a rigorous science philosophy must take the form of a 
“philosophical system of doctrine (Lehrsystem) that, after the gigantic 
preparatory work of generations, really begins from the ground up with a 
foundation free of doubt and rises up like every skillful construction, 
wherein stone is set upon stone, each as solid as the other, in accord with 
guiding insights.”77  
      Now, although Husserl’s opening statement should be read as quite a 
formal and provisional determination of the purpose of phenomenology it 
leaves no doubt concerning the extent to which Husserl assumes the old 
ambition of philosophy to achieve a rigorously grounded universal 
epistemologico-ontological knowledge granting ultimate justification to 
our understanding. Indeed, it could be taken as an exemplary illustration 
of Heidegger’s definition of the traditional task of philosophy as 
worldview-formation. The paradox is that Heidegger picks up his notion 
                                         
76 Hua XXV, p. 3: “Seit den ersten Anfängen hat die Philosophie den Anspruch 
erhoben, strenge Wissenschaft zu sein, und zwar die Wissenschaft, die den höchsten 
theoretischen Bedürfnissen Genüge leiste und in ethisch-religiöser Hinsicht ein von 
reinen Vernunftnormen geregeltes Leben ermögliche.” 
77 Hua XXV, p. 6: “ein philosophisches Lehrsystem, das nach gewaltigen Vorarbeit 
von Generationen, von unten her mit zweifelssicherem Fundament wirklich anfängt 
und wie jeder tüchtige Bau in die Höhe wächst, indem Baustein um Baustein gemäß 
leitenden Einsichten als feste Gestalt dem Festen angefügt wird.”  
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of worldview precisely from Husserl’s article. Here Husserl famously 
distinguishes between “worldview-philosophy,” which is content with 
producing practice-guiding overviews of the preeminent opinions of a 
particular historical time, and “scientific philosophy,” which aims at 
achieving evident and universal knowledge. However, as Heidegger claims 
that the tacit aim of previous philosophy has been worldview-formation 
he transforms the concept, so that Husserl’s phenomenology now also 
falls under this heading.78 According to Heidegger, Husserl’s 
phenomenology is thus guided by the aim to establish a philosophical 
worldview: an ultimate knowledge of the basic structures of being capable 
of founding and critically justifying our otherwise naive understanding of 
life and the world.  
      However, while “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” contains some of 
the most striking expressions of Husserl’s confinement to a traditional 
ideal of philosophy, it also includes what Heidegger considered to be 
Husserl’s most radical formulation of the phenomenological impulse itself 
in its open potentiality. Reaching the end of his article Husserl writes, as if 
explicating his own dictum “To the matters themselves!”: 
 
The impulse to research must proceed not from philosophies but from the matters 
and problems. Philosophy is essentially a science of the true 
beginnings, of the origins, of the rizōmata pantōn. The science of the 
radical must also in every respect be radical in its own procedure. 
Above all it must not rest until it has attained its absolutely clear 
beginnings, i.e., its absolutely clear problems, the methods 
preindicated by the proper sense of these problems, and the most 
basic field of work wherein matters are given with absolute clarity.79 
 
                                         
78 Cf. GA 59, p. 11, where Heidegger writes, referring to Husserl: “The separation 
between scientific philosophy and worldview philosophy can be easily overcome in a 
scientific worldview philosophy” (Die Trennung von wissenschaftlicher Philosophie und 
Weltanschauungsphilosophie läßt sich leicht überwinden in einer wissenschaftlichen 
Weltanschauungsphilosophie). 
79 Hua XXV, p. 61: “Nicht von den Philosophien sondern von den Sachen und Problemen muß der 
Antrieb zur Forschung ausgehen. Philosophie ist aber ihrem Wesen nach Wissenschaft von 
den Wahren Anfängen, von den Ursprüngen, von den ῥιζώματα πάντων. Die 
Wissenschaft vom Radikalen muß auch in ihrem Verfahren radikal sein und das in 
jeder Hinsicht. Vor allem darf sie nicht ruhen, bis sie ihre absolut klaren Anfänge, d.i. 
ihre absolut klaren Probleme, die im eigenen Sinn dieser Probleme vorgezeichneten 
Methoden und das unterste Arbeitsfeld absolut klar gegebener Sachen gewonnen hat.” 
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Not only does Husserl here insist that philosophy should commence with 
a clarification of the sense of the philosophical problems themselves as 
they elicit research in the first place and prescribe the method of 
investigation; he also suggests that philosophy is essentially a “science of 
the true beginnings, of the origins.” In the margin of his own copy, 
Heidegger remarks: “We take Husserl at his word!” (Wir nehmen Husserl 
beim Wort).80 Indeed, Heidegger’s entire project to transform 
phenomenology into an originary science of life could be read as an 
attempt to liberate this passage from Husserl’s transcendental framework 
in order to realize and develop its revolutionary philosophical potential. 
      Heidegger’s expansion of the demand for phenomenological 
accountability to include the question concerning the problem of 
philosophy is thus nothing but a radicalization of Husserl’s own teaching 
about the need always to start from the problems and to adjust our 
method of investigation according to them. Hence, before any other 
conceptual or methodological decision is taken, philosophy needs to 
attend to the philosophical problems – resisting and critically clearing the 
pseudo-problems – which call for thinking and prescribe the way to 
understand them.  
 
Phenomenology as a Science of Origin    
 
However, even though Heidegger insists on the question of the problem 
of philosophy in an uncommonly sharp manner, the fact is that he never 
lets this question unfold concretely in a truly radical way. As we have 
already seen, Heidegger, before any investigation has even begun, has 
taken one fundamental decision: that philosophy is essentially an 
“originary science” or a “science of origin.”   
      What does this mean? 
      Even though Heidegger’s idea at this stage is still extremely formal, 
still waiting to be given concrete phenomenal meaning, the formal 
structure of the question can already be specified. Heidegger employs two 
terms to indicate his vision of the task of philosophy: “originary science” 
(Urwissenshaft) and “science of origin” (Ursprungswissenschaft). Heidegger 
defines the science he has in mind as a science concerned with the 
                                         
80 The quotation is found in Sheehan 1988b, p. 96: “Wir nehmen Husserl beim Wort!” 
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“origin” of “life.” The science of origin is, he writes, “the science of the 
absolute origin of the spirit in and for itself – ‘life in and for itself.’”81 
Moreover: “The phenomenological comprehension of life: toward life as 
life = the manifestation of life out of its origin.”82 Later, as the 
investigations advance he rearticulates the question of origin as a question 
of the “originary structure” (Urstruktur), “originary articulation” 
(ursprüngliche Artikulation), or “originary sense” (Ursprungssinn) of life.83 
Hence, the task of the phenomenological science of origin projected by 
Heidegger is none other than to explicate the basic structure and sense of 
life as the fundamental ontological being-sense constituting our 
understanding of all other provinces of reality: “From here [the basic 
sense of ‘existence’] the sense of reality in all its layers becomes 
understandable.”84 Heidegger is thus from the outset convinced that it has 
always been the guiding task of philosophy to come to know something 
like the origin of life and reality, and that the fate of philosophy depends 
on whether we will rediscover this problem in life as an essential task.   
      Let us, before we go on, briefly pause to assess Heidegger’s basic 
decision to project phenomenology as a science of origin.  
      It seems clear to me that this decision – which is taken dogmatically, 
and which Heidegger will never seriously question – is deeply problematic 
and fateful in so far as it determines the shape and trajectory of his path of 
thinking. Heidegger is, I believe, basically right in claiming – although the 
range and precise meaning of this claim is open to question – that at least 
since Plato and Aristotle, philosophy has to a great extent been motivated 
by the ambition to seek and establish an understanding of the ground – 
archē, principium – of being-knowledge, ultimately intended to serve as a 
basis for all our other knowledge of different beings: human beings, 
artifacts, natural things. However, by promptly opting for the problem of 
origin as the single guiding motive of philosophy Heidegger a priori 
forfeits the opportunity to listen to and account for all the other questions 
and concerns that have moved, or could have moved, philosophy apart 
from the question of ground. To take what I consider the perhaps most 
                                         
81 GA 58, p. 1.  
82 GA 58, p. 145: “Die phänomenologische Erfassung des Lebens: auf das Leben als 
Leben = Manifestation seiner aus seinem Ursprung.” 
83 GA 58, pp. 259, 158, 167. 
84 GA 58, p. 261: “Von hier [der Grundsinn von ‘Existenz’] wird der Sinn der 
Wirklichkeit in allen Schichten des Lebens verständlich. – ” Cf. also GA 58, p. 167. 
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crucial example: at least since Socrates it seems that philosophers have also 
pursued and reflected on ethical, existential and political questions 
concerning human life and the good – happiness, justice, love, wisdom, 
beauty, courage, honor, etc. – as immediately pressing questions exhibiting 
a more or less autonomous relationship to the question of the ground of 
being-knowledge. But this is not all. When Heidegger takes up the 
question of origin as the primary question of philosophy he not only fails 
to consider other possible questions, but also dogmatically adopts the idea 
that the question of origin is hierarchically basic in relation to every other 
question, so that our understanding of the origin of life or being somehow 
regulates our understanding of all other matters. The effects of this 
problematic idea on the development of Heidegger’s thinking are 
thorough and wide-ranging: after the Freiburg years it will guide, first, his 
projection of the question of the “sense of being” as his basic question, 
and then, later, his reformulation of this question as a question of the 
“openness” or “truth” of being.  
      However, these critical reflections do not – even if ultimately true – by 
themselves imply that Heidegger’s quest for the basic structure and sense 
of life would be thoroughly false or confused. Far from it. As Heidegger 
raises the question of origin, he does it with an unprecedented demand on 
phenomenological accountability, projecting the notion of origin as a 
strictly formal and open notion whose sense and motivation in life remain 
to be clarified by concrete phenomenological investigation. Hence, while 
uncritically endorsing the idea of philosophy as a science of origin he also 
carries out a critical formalization and phenomenological trial of the 
concept of origin, which means that it again opens up as a question: What 
is an origin? How does it show up in life? What role does it play in our 
effort to understand the world and ourselves? Indeed, I believe 
Heidegger’s phenomenological pursuit of this question offers one of the 
most qualified opportunities to clarify and delimit the sense and problems 
of this question, which in different shapes has been such a dominant 
concern in the history of Western philosophy. It is also essential to note 
that although the question of origin opens up Heidegger’s life-long path of 
philosophical investigations, the meaning and clarificatory force of these 
investigations is not necessarily dependent on the legitimacy of the guiding 
question of origin.  
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      In any case, for Heidegger the task of his early Freiburg lectures 
courses is clear: to cultivate Husserl’s phenomenological impulse into a 
phenomenological philosophy conceived as a science of origin: “The 
phenomenologico-philosophical understanding is an understanding of 
origin, which takes its departure from the concrete figures of life.”85 
 
The Question of Origin as the Question of Givenness 
 
Having projected phenomenology as a science of origin Heidegger goes 
on to specify the question of origin in terms of the question of givenness.  
      In the beginning of “Basic Problems of Phenomenology” he sets forth 
a series of questions concerning how the science of origin should get 
started in the first place. Provided that in phenomenology the method 
should correspond to the problem in question, how are the problems of 
philosophy given? Do they simply lie dispersed in different object-
domains for us to take up and study? Or do they on the contrary arise only 
as we, from some particular methodological point of view, send in 
questions among the objects? And how are these objects given? 
Heidegger’s array of ironic questions culminates in the question 
concerning the notion of givenness itself: “Is it [the domain of objects] 
simply given, pre-given? What does ‘given’ mean, ‘givenness’ – this magic 
word of phenomenology and the ‘stumbling block’ for others?”86 Here, 
the question of givenness materializes as the central problem on which the 
entire originary science turns. As Hans Ruin aptly notes: “the nature of the 
given is here addressed as a problem in its own right. [...] givenness is 
precisely the problem.”87 
      In “The Idea of Philosophy” Heidegger offers an even more pointed 
articulation of the intimate connection between the question of origin and 
the question of givenness. As we shall see, Heidegger maintains that the 
traditional idea of philosophy as worldview-formation is rooted in the 
                                         
85 GA 58, p. 240: “Das phänomenologisch-philosophische Verstehen ist ein 
Ursprungsverstehen, das seinen Ausgang nimmt von den konkreten Gestalten des 
Lebens.” 
86 GA 58, p. 5: “Ist es [das Gegenstandsgebiet] schlecht und recht gegeben, 
vorgegeben? Was heißt ‘gegeben’, ‘Gegebenheit’ – dieses Zauberwort der 
Phänomenologie und der ‘Stein des Anstoßes’ bei den anderen.” 
87 Ruin 1994, p. 55.  
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“general domination (Generalherrschaft) of the theoretical” within 
philosophy,88 i.e., in the conviction that theoretical knowledge constitutes 
our primary way of knowing reality. Denying the phenomenal substance 
of our pre-theoretical experience, theoretical philosophy thus sets itself the 
task of grounding and critically justifying our pre-theoretical experience by 
examining the theoretical structures which normally guide our naive 
experience of things in a blind and prejudiced way. However, in “The Idea 
of Philosophy” Heidegger, as a thought experiment, probes what it would 
mean if our basic understanding of the world actually had the character of 
a theoretical knowledge of objectified things. Hence, he writes: “Is even a 
single thing given if only things are given (Gibt es überhaupt eine einzige Sache, 
wenn es nur Sachen gibt)? In that case nothing would be given; not even 
nothing, because with the sole supremacy of the sphere of things not even 
the ‘is given’ would be given (weil bei einer Allherrschaft der Sachsphäre auch 
kein ‘es gibt’ gibt). Is the ‘is given’ given?”89 And he immediately answers:  
 
Already in the opening question “is something given...?” something 
is given. Our entire problematic has arrived at a decisive point, 
which, however, makes a meager impression. [...] We are standing 
at the methodical crossroads which decides on the very life or death 
of philosophy. We stand at an abyss: either into the nothing, that is, 
the nothing of absolute thingness, or we manage for the first time 
to make the leap into another world, or, more precisely, into the 
world as such.90 
 
That is to say: if there were only theoretical matters, there would strictly 
speaking be nothing at all – not even the nothing – since there would be 
no experiential givenness in which any matters would be there and 
concretely present for us as intelligible phenomena. What Heidegger does 
here is nothing less than elevate givenness into the ultimate condition 
                                         
88 GA 56/57, p. 87.  
89 GA 56/57, p. 62: “Gibt es überhaupt eine einzige Sache, wenn es nur Sachen gibt? 
Dann gibt es überhaupt keine Sachen; es gibt nicht einmal nichts, weil es bei einer 
Allherrschaft der Sachsphäre auch kein ‘es gibt’ gibt. Gibt es das ‘es gibt’?” 
90 GA 56/57, pp. 62f.: “Schon bei dem Frage-ansatz ‘Gibt es…?’ gibt es etwas. Unsere 
ganze Problematik ist an eine entscheidende Stelle gekommen, die in ihrer 
Kümmerlichkeit gar nicht diesen Anschein macht. Wir stehen an der methodischen 
Wegkreuzung, die über Leben oder Tod der Philosophie überhaupt entscheidet, an 
einem Abgrund: entweder ins Nichts, d.h., der absoluten Sachlichkeit, oder es gelingt 
der Sprung in eine andere Welt, oder genauer: überhaupt erst in die Welt.” 
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determining what it means to be rather than not be. As a result, the 
question of givenness – “Is the ‘is given’ given?” – emerges as the decisive 
question determining and specifying the meaning of the question of origin: 
to understand the origin is to understand the basic structure and sense of 
phenomenal givenness.91  
      To sum up then: Heidegger is convinced that the question of 
givenness has always constituted the central issue which philosophy has 
revolved around. Whereas it is the suppression and misinterpretation of 
what is primarily given that gives rise to traditional theoretical philosophy, 
the task of the phenomenological science of origin is precisely to explicate 
what givenness is all about. 
 
 
1.3 Pre-Theoretical Life and Theoretical Philosophy 
 
The Primacy of Pre-Theoretical Experience 
 
Heidegger’s early Freiburg lecture courses acquire their concrete direction 
from the effort to rehabilitate our pre-theoretical experience as the 
primary irreducible domain where things are given as meaningful for us. 
As we shall see, this effort illuminates the sense in which the traditional 
quest for theoretical grounds is misguided and opens the prospects and 
problems of a phenomenological science of origin.  
      In “The Idea of Philosophy” Heidegger, in response to the theoretical 
conception of the immediately given as sense data, exclaims: “What is 
immediately given! Every word here is significant. What does ‘immediate’ 
mean?”92 So what is immediately given? Heidegger offers the following, by 
now classic, phenomenological description of what happens as he enters 
the lecture hall and sees the lectern at which he is to speak: “What do ‘I’ 
see? Brown surfaces, at right angles to one another? [...] A large box with 
another smaller one set upon it? Not at all. I see the lectern at which I am
                                         
91 In his early Freiburg lectures Heidegger uses the word “givenness” as his general 
designation of the problem of givenness or phenomenality.  
92 GA 56/57, p. 85: “Was unmittelbar gegeben ist! Jedes Wort ist hier von Bedeutung. 
Was besagt unmittelbar?” 
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to speak.”93 There is, Heidegger writes, no “order of foundation” 
(Fundierungszusammenhang) in the pure experience, so that he would first see 
brown surfaces, which would then present themselves as a wooden box, in 
order then, finally, to come forth as a lectern in the university lecture hall. 
Not at all, he sees the lectern “in one strike, as it were” (gleichsam in einem 
Schlag) as it appears as significant within the context of the academic world 
and the present situation of lecturing: 
 
In the experience of seeing the lectern something is given to me 
from out of my immediate environment (Umwelt). This 
environmental milieu (lectern, book, blackboard, notebook, 
fountain pen, caretaker, student fraternity, tram car, motor car, etc.) 
does not consist of things with a certain character of significance, 
of objects, which are then conceived as signifying this and that; 
rather, the significant is primary and immediately given to me 
without any mental detours across an apprehension of things. 
Living in an environment, it signifies to me everywhere and always, 
everything is worldly; “it worlds,” which is something different 
from “it values.”94    
 
In short, what is primarily given in our pre-theoretical experience is not 
sense data but significances that immediately appear to us and engage us 
without any active effort of interpretation or judgment. Moreover, these 
primary significances do not have the character of isolated objects 
parading before our theoretical gaze. On the one hand, the significances 
essentially appear as moments belonging to and having their place within 
the surrounding world of significances. On the other hand, the pre-
theoretical experience of significance constitutes a unitary “appropriating 
event” (Ereignis) in which the experiencing self “swings along” (schwingt 
                                         
93 GA 56/57, p. 71: “Was sehe ‘ich’? Braune Flächen, die sich rechtwinklig schneiden? 
[…] Eine Kiste, und zwar eine größere, mit einer kleineren daraufgebaut? Keineswegs, 
ich sehe das Katheder an dem ich sprechen soll.” 
94 GA 56/57, pp. 72f.: “In dem Erlebnis des Kathedersehens gibt sich mir etwas aus 
meiner unmittelbarer Umwelt. Dieses umweltliche (Katheder, Buch, Tafel, Kollegheft, 
Füllfeder, Pedell, Korpsstudent, Straßenbahn, Automobil usf. usf.) sind nicht Sachen 
mit einem bestimmten Bedeutungscharakter, Gegenstände, und dazu noch aufgefaßt 
als das und das bedeutend, sondern das Bedeutsame ist das Primäre, gibt sich mir 
unmittelbar, ohne jeden gedanklichen Umweg über ein Sacherfassen. In einer Umwelt 
lebend, bedeutet es mir überall und immer, es ist alles welthaft, ‘es weltet’.”  
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mit),95 which means that it cannot be understood in terms of a distanced 
theoretical experience of observation in which the perceiving subject looks 
at the perceived object: “The lived experience does not pass in front of me 
like a thing, which I position, like an object; instead I appropriate it to 
myself (ich selbst er-eigne es mir), and it occurs (es er-eignet sich) according to its 
essence.”96 
      In “Basic Problems of Phenomenology” Heidegger expands his 
analysis of our primary pre-theoretical experience – which he from now 
on calls “factical life” (das faktische Leben),97 or simply “life”98 –   by 
highlighting three of its central features. 
      First, Heidegger claims, it is a central feature of factical life that we 
primarily experience and live in a world of significances: “Factically I 
always live ensnared in significances, so that every significance has its 
surrounding of new significances: horizons of engagement, involvement, 
utilization, destiny.”99 Taken together these “contexts of significances”100 
make up our “world.”101 We do not first perceive some kind of sense data 
or meaningless objects, which we would then be required to actively 
interpret and furnish with sense. What we primarily experience – whether 
trivial, worthless, strange, meaningless – essentially presents itself as 
significant against the backdrop of our world of significances. Hence, 
there is no meaningful reality to be posited or interrogated beyond the 
significant world we experience: “The experience of existence terminates 
and satisfies itself with the characterization of significances.”102 
      Second, it belongs to the significances of the world that they always 
express or present themselves in particular ways: “That, which concerns 
life, in which it absorbs itself, always presents itself, gives itself 
                                         
95 GA 56/57, p. 75. 
96 GA 56/57, p. 75: “Das Er-leben geht nicht von mir vorbei, wie eine Sache, die ich 
hinstelle, als Objekt, sondern ich selbst er-eigne es mir, und es er-eignet sich seinem 
Wesen nach.” 
97 GA 58, p. 37. 
98 GA 58, p. 29. 
99 GA 58, p. 104: “Ich lebe faktisch immer Bedeutsamkeitsbefangen, und jede 
Bedeutsamkeit hat ihren Umring von neuen Bedeutsamkeiten: Beschäftigungs-, 
Beteiligungs-, Verwertungs-, Schicksalshorizonte.” 
100 GA 58, p. 105: “Zusammenhang von Bedeutsamkeiten.” 
101 GA 58, p. 34. 
102 GA 58, p. 106: “die Existenzerfahrung endigt und genügt sich in der 
Bedeutsamkeitscharakteristik.”  
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‘somehow.’”103 At this point Heidegger introduces the term 
“phenomenon” as an alternative expression for the fact that the world 
always expresses itself in correlation with the way in which we experience 
it: “We can also formulate the fact that something, something experienced, 
always gives itself somehow [...] by saying that it appears, that it is a 
phenomenon.”104 He has not yet taken up the word phenomenon into his 
central conceptuality and only uses it to name a particular aspect of the 
structure of life. It is rather the term “givenness” that still functions as the 
main operative concept guiding his investigation of the phenomenality of 
factical life. Ultimately, Heidegger claims, the way in which the 
significances of the world present themselves is rooted in the situation of 
the experiencing self or “self-world” (Selbstwelt),105 which constitutes the 
particular temporal-historical setting and rhythm of every experience.106  
      I will later return to Heidegger’s analysis of the structure of factical 
life. So far, the characterization of pre-theoretical life in terms of the 
unitary interplay between the significances we experience and the way we 
experience them is basically an elaboration of Husserl’s conception of the 
intentional correlation between noema and noesis. However, we may already 
note two points on which Heidegger’s accentuations anticipate a critical 
divergence from Husserl: first, he heavily emphasizes the character or the 
pre-theoretical experience as a unitary happening preceding the dualism 
between subject and object which, he believes, still haunts Husserl’s 
concept of intentionality; second; by anchoring the pre-theoretical 
experience in the particular situation of the self-world he opens the gate 
towards a historicization of the pre-theoretical given.  
      The third aspect of factical life highlighted by Heidegger is its “self-
sufficiency” (Selbstgenügsamkeit). The notion is important since it conditions 
both his critique of theoretical philosophy as well as his vision of the task 
of phenomenology. But what is “self-sufficiency”? He writes: 
 
It [the sense of self-sufficiency] touches a structural character of life, 
which places it on itself: that it is an “in itself” for itself. It bears within 
                                         
103 GA 58, p. 49: “Das, was das Leben angeht, worin es aufgeht, stellt sich immer dar, 
gibt sich ‘irgendwie’.” 
104 GA 58, p. 50: “Daß sich irgendetwas, etwas Erlebtes, immer irgendwie gibt […] 
können wir auch so formulieren, daß es erscheint, Phänomen ist.” 
105 GA 58, p. 59. 
106 Cf. GA 58, p. 62. 
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itself as a matter of structure (which fundamentally governs every 
substantial How and What) the availabilities that it needs as 
possibilities of fulfilling the tendencies that it itself engenders.107  
 
That is, life is self-sufficient in the sense that the world of experience in 
which we always already live supplies all the significances and motives 
which guide our understanding of life. Life does not, as Heidegger puts it, 
need to “twist itself out of itself” (sich aus sich selbst herausdrehen) in order to 
understand and accomplish its own possibilities:108 the “reign of factical 
experience” is “boundless” given that “all and everything can become 
accessible to it, since it is not modeled on anything else.”109 Hence, to say 
that life is self-sufficient is to say that the factical context of significance 
experienced in pre-theoretical life constitutes a basic irreducible domain of 
givenness, that the phenomena encountered here cannot be grounded on 
anything else – some deeper or more secure ground – but must be 
understood on the basis of the pre-theoretical experiences in which they 
occur.  
      What is more, Heidegger claims that pre-theoretical life also possesses 
its own possibilities of judging, clarifying and communicating its 
experience of the world, which he sums up under the title “consideration” 
(Kenntnisnahme):110 “We explicate factically experienced contexts of 
significance but, in so doing, let them be in their living facticity. The 
explication is of a considering-narrating kind, in the basic style of the 
factical experience.”111 The pre-theoretical consideration that he has in 
mind is prior to every theoretical effort at knowledge, which detaches the 
objects from the primary context of significance in which they are given 
and reduces them to instances of general theoretical principles and 
                                         
107 GA 58, p. 42: “Er [Der Sinn von ‘Selbstgenügsamkeit’] trifft einen Strukturcharakter 
des Lebens, der es auf sich selbst stellt: daß es sich selbst ein ‘an sich’ ist. Es trägt in sich 
selbst strukturhaft (das alles inhaltliche Wie und Was im Innersten durchherrscht) die 
von ihm selbst benötigten Verfügbarkeiten als Möglichkeiten der Erfüllung der ihm 
selbst entwachsenden Tendenzen.” 
108 GA 58, pp. 31, 42. 
109 GA 58, p. 217: “Damit zeigt sich wieder die Schrankenlosigkeit der Herrschaft des 
faktischen Lebens, dem deshalb, weil es auf nichts ’zugeschnitten’ ist, alles und jedes 
zugänglich werden kann.” 
110 GA 58, p. 112. 
111 GA 58, p. 111: “Es werden faktisch erlebte Bedeutungszusammenhänge zwar 
expliziert, aber doch in ihrer lebendigen Faktizität dabei belassen. Die Explikation ist 
die kenntnisnehmend erzählende, aber im Grundstil des faktischen Erfahrens.” 
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structures. By contrast, the pre-theoretical consideration essentially relies 
on the “experiential certainty” (Erfahrungsgewißheit) of our experience, 
attending to and articulating the particular significances given here.112 Still, 
in pre-theoretically considering something our “attitude” to what we 
experience undergoes a certain “modification”:113 we to some extent 
detach ourselves from our primary immediate absorption in the 
experience in order to overview and articulate its different aspects from 
the point of view of the “guiding idea” or interest of the current 
situation.114 According to Heidegger, the pre-theoretical consideration can 
take many forms – deliberation, recollection, narration, report, discussion 
– and it makes use of the factical everyday language at our disposal. 
However, even though its linguistic expressions are often incomplete and 
conceptually floating this in no way implies that they could not be clear 
and fully adequate. 
      Heidegger thus ends up with a conception of factical pre-theoretical 
life as our primary self-sufficient domain of phenomenal givenness, 
characterizing it in terms of the unitary interplay between the experienced 
significances and our way of experiencing them, which is ultimately 
centered in the particular self-world. This conception not only provides 
the basis for his critique of theoretical philosophy as a project of 
constructive grounding but also sharpens the question of the task and 
motivation of the projected science of origin: if our pre-theoretical life is 
self-sufficient and contains its own full possibilities of understanding and 
passing judgment on its world – what, then, could the function and 
motivation of a philosophical science of origin be?  
 
The Problem of Theoretical Philosophy 
 
According to the diagnosis offered in Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures, 
the tradition of Western philosophy has been determined by the effort to 
establish a theoretical ground – a worldview – for our pre-theoretical life. 
As such, theoretical philosophy is essentially unphenomenological: it lives 
on a denial and misinterpretation of the phenomenal substance of pre-
                                         
112 GA 58, p. 113. 
113 GA 58, p. 116. 
114 GA 58, p.112. 
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theoretical life and a dream of critically delimiting the truth of this 
supposedly naive experience by reducing it to a theoretical ground.  
      Let us take a look at how Heidegger depicts the makeup of theoretical 
philosophy and at what he takes to be its central problems. As he sees it, 
the whole traditional idea of philosophy as worldview-formation is rooted 
in the “general domination of the theoretical” within philosophy,115 i.e., in 
the “conviction that it [the theoretical] comprises the basic level which 
grounds all other spheres in a specific way.”116 But what is the motivation 
and meaning of this conviction? 
      Ultimately, Heidegger believes there are strong ethical-existential 
motivations behind the ideal of theoretical philosophy, above all the 
impulse to flee from and cover up the weight and finitude of factical life 
by fostering the dream of attaining the kind of secure and universal 
theoretical knowledge that would allow us to overview and control life 
without having to actually live it. Spurred by such motives and others – 
e.g. by its impressedness by the knowledge of mathematics and natural 
science – philosophy sets up theoretical object-knowledge as its 
paradigmatic ideal of rigorous knowledge. Basically, what is aimed at is a 
knowledge which is independent of any factical life-world, and which is 
able to establish a “pure […] in itself solidified and explicit objectual 
context,”117 whose conceptual order admits of being traversed and 
confirmed in the same way by anyone at any time.118 Of course, the more 
specific notions of the qualified method of philosophy, and of the 
fundamental domain of being-knowledge, have varied a lot through the 
history of philosophy, e.g., deduction from first axioms or principles, 
generalization and abstraction from empirical data, transcendental 
deduction of the basic features of the transcendental subject, dialectical 
analysis of the ultimate historical concepts always already determining our 
factical understanding of the world.  
      The idealization of theoretical knowledge goes hand in hand with a 
denial and misrepresentation of the phenomenality of pre-theoretical life. 
According to the standard picture of theoretical philosophy, what is 
                                         
115 GA 56/57, p. 87.  
116 GA 56/57, p. 59: “die Überzeugung, daß es [das Theoretiche] die fundamentale 
Schicht darstellt, alle übrigen Sphären [...] fundiert.” 
117 GA 58, p. 126: “die Idee eines reinen, abgehobenen, in sich selbst verfestigten, 
expliziten gegenständlichen Zusammenhangs.” 
118 GA 58, pp. 141-144, 234-236. 
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strictly speaking given in our pre-theoretical experience is more or less 
chaotic sense data. If so, however, then this sensory data, in order to 
emerge as identifiable units of meaning and to become objects of 
knowledge, must necessarily receive its meaning and organization from 
somewhere else, namely from the conceptual-logical structures 
constitutive of theoretical knowledge. Hence, our pre-theoretical 
experience is essentially naive and prejudiced. Since in directly enacting 
this experience we only have access to sense data and lack every measure 
for examining the truth of the concepts that determine our sight we are 
necessarily guided by these concepts in a blind and prejudiced manner. As 
a consequence, the task of theoretical philosophy ensues: “The 
justification of naive consciousness and its elevation to the scientific and 
critical level.”119 
      Heidegger uses – as he often does in his earliest lecture courses – the 
neo-Kantians Paul Natorp and Heinrich Rickert as exemplary cases of the 
theoretical denial of pre-theoretical givenness. According to Natorp, we 
are never in a position to speak of an object being given to us. Since the 
sensory content of our sense perception can only be experienced as a 
given object in so far as it is determined by the conceptual laws and 
structures of objectifying thought, it strictly speaking amounts to no more 
than a pure undetermined x. As Heidegger puts it: “The sensation is [...] 
only the x of the equation, and only receives its sense in and through the 
context of theoretical objectivation.”120 In contrast to Natorp, Rickert 
emphasizes that the sensory content of our perceptions constitutes an 
ultimate given which cannot be dissolved into conceptual determinations 
but which has to be received as an irreducible fact. However, Rickert from 
the outset equals the given with the immanent sensory content of 
consciousness, which means that in order for these contents to become 
true objects of knowledge they need to be qualified by a theoretical 
judgment, which grants them the “form of givenness.” “What is 
                                         
119 GA 56/57, p. 84: “Die Rechtfertigung des naiven Bewußtseins bzw. seine 
Erhebung auf das wissenschaftliche, kritische Niveau.” 
120 GA 56/57, p. 87: “Die Empfindung ist […] nur das X der Gleichung, bekommt 
ihren Sinn überhaupt erst im Zusammenhang der theoretischen Objektivierung und 
durch diese.” Cf. GA 58, pp. 132f. 
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perceived” (das Wahrgenomenne) is thus for Rickert “always already what is 
taken as true” (das für wahr Genommene).121  
      According to Heidegger, this denial of the pre-theoretical gives rise to 
the violently oscillating thought-movement of traditional transcendental 
philosophy. The first step consists in an objectification which detaches the 
objects from the factical context of life in which they are primarily given 
as significant, so that what is left is “scattered remnants from the 
breakdown of a world.”122 The second step consists in a subjectification. 
Since the remnants produced by the objectification do not exhibit any 
structures of significance anymore, amounting only to rudimentary sense 
data, the meaning-structure of the objects is accounted for by way of a 
return to the transcendental subject as the ultimate source of these 
structures. The third step is a logification of the experiencing subject, which 
transforms it into a logical-conceptual framework capable of determining 
the a priori structures of the objects.123 
       It could perhaps seem that Heidegger by using two key figures of 
Neo-Kantianism as his primary examples would limit the range of his 
critique to affect only a doomed and long-forgotten philosophical species. 
But this, I believe, is an overhasty judgment. On the one hand, it fails to 
appreciate the extent to which the neo-Kantian questioning of the given 
anticipates and resembles the paradigmatic critique of the given later 
developed by philosophers such as Sellars, McDowell, Quine, Gadamer, 
Derrida and Rorty – and, as we shall see, by Heidegger himself. On the 
other hand, it underestimates the degree to which Neo-Kantianism for 
Heidegger functions as an example of a more general effort to ground our 
pre-theoretical experience which, he claims, has characterized the 
philosophical tradition ever since its Greek inception.  
      It is of course impossible to relate the long and complex history of the 
problem of phenomenality in Western philosophy here. Still, I think it is 
no exaggeration to claim that philosophy since its Greek beginning has 
been characterized by a strong inclination to deny and downgrade the 
phenomena given in our everyday pre-theoretical experience as a source of 
knowledge. Indeed, the philosophical tradition has to a more or less great 
degree been characterized by the following formal scheme: denying the 
                                         
121 GA 58, p. 134. 
122 GA 58, p. 121: “Trümmer aus dem Zusammenbruch einer Welt.” 
123 GA 58, pp. 131-141, 223-227. 
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epistemic value of our pre-theoretical experience philosophy takes on the 
task of discovering and elaborating a qualified theoretical method which 
could lead us out of our everyday imprisonment in the world of mere 
appearances, and allow us to establish a deeper and more secure ground 
with reference to which it would become possible to achieve absolute 
knowledge of the things themselves in their true being.124 
      According to Heidegger, however, the traditional aim of philosophy to 
theoretically ground and justify our factical pre-theoretical experience is 
necessarily bound to fail. Why so? The theoretical attitude, he argues, 
essentially emerges as an estrangement from the pre-theoretical 
experience. Adopting a theoretical attitude we no longer enact our primary 
unified experience of the given world as significant, but rather observe 
things at a distance as a set of theoretical objects or sense data devoid of 
phenomenal meaning: “The object-being as such does not touch me. I am 
not the I that ascertains. The ascertaining as an experience is still only a 
rudiment of lived experience (Er-leben); it is a de-living (Ent-leben).”125 
Hence, in so far as philosophy dogmatically prioritizes the theoretical, 
granting unqualified authority to whatever counts as theoretical forms of 
knowledge and argument, it blinds itself to the pre-theoretical domain of 
experience where things are primarily and concretely given as meaningful:  
 
I cannot explain these meaningful phenomena of the experience of 
the environmental world by destroying their essential character, by 
abolishing their sense, and advancing a theory. Explanation through 
dismemberment, i.e., destruction: one wants to explain something 
which one no longer has as such, which one will not and cannot 
recognize in its validity.126 
 
                                         
124 Cf. Figal 2006, pp. 145-147, for a brief account of how Plato and Aristotle already 
exhibit a basic tendency to interpret the phenomena encountered in everyday 
experience in terms of the way things for the most part merely seem to us.   
125 GA 56/57, pp. 73f.: “Das Gegenstand- oder Objektsein als solches berührt mich 
nicht. Das ich, das fest-stellt, bin ich gar nicht. Das Feststellen als Erlebnis ist nur noch 
ein Rudiment von Er-leben; es ist ein Entlebnis.” 
126 GA 56/57, p. 86: “Diese sinnhaften Phänomene der Umwelterlebnisse kann ich 
nicht in der Weise erklären, daß ich ihren wesentlichen Charakter zerstöre, sie in ihrem 
Sinne aufhebe und eine Theorie entwerfe. Erklärung durch Zerstückelung, d.h. hier 
Zerstörung: Man will etwas erklären, das man gar nicht mehr als solches hat und als 
solches gelten lassen will und kann.”  
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I think the central point of Heidegger’s argument could be explicated as 
follows. In so far as philosophy sets out to seek a theoretical foundation 
for the significances primarily given in our pre-theoretical life philosophy, 
it loses sight of the very experience in which the significances are given 
and understandable for us. In order to understand or analyze the meanings 
that things have in our lives the only possible way is to look at the 
situations in which we experience these meanings. If, given a certain 
question or problem, we want to understand what “love,” “knowledge,” 
“greed,” or “car” is, we need to attend to the different situations in which 
these phenomena manifest themselves and try to describe and explicate 
their meaning. If, on the contrary, we turn away from the situations in 
which we de facto experience such significances, and instead attempt to 
infer their meaning from some other source – e.g. other more 
fundamental concepts or principles, sense data, historical origins or 
perhaps neurological events in the brain – we will inevitably be examining 
something else than the significances in question. These other things may, of 
course, by way of likeness or contrast or supplementary information, shed 
light on the significances that we wanted to understand, yet in order to 
pursue this comparison we need, again, to turn back to the primary 
experiences that we had left behind. However, the trust of the argument is 
not that the theoretical perspective would be intrinsically illusionary or 
blind; rather, it contains and opens up specific possibilities of investigation 
and knowledge which may play an important role, e.g., in the natural 
sciences. It is thus only when philosophy attempts to reduce the pre-
theoretical to the theoretical that the theoretical starts functioning as an 
illusionary false ground. 
      The consequence of this is, Heidegger claims, that to the extent that 
theoretical philosophy neglects the primary pre-theoretical givenness of 
significances it is bound to give rise to construction. For the most part, to 
be sure, theoretical philosophy is not purely theoretical in that it 
unwittingly tends to develop its thinking with reference to pre-theoretical 
experiences that it ostensibly denies. However, should philosophy realize 
itself as pure theory it would necessarily materialize as an endless circular 
construction. In order to make one single motivated conceptual move 
theoretical philosophy would need to rely on earlier concepts and 
principles that would themselves remain unaccounted for: “Precisely that 
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which first is to be posited (gesetzt) must be presupposed (vorausgesezt).”127 To 
establish the validity of its presupposed concepts with any logical force 
philosophy would, again, need to presuppose new more basic concepts, 
and so on ad infinitum. It is worth noting how strongly Heidegger in these 
early lectures courses emphasizes the concrete experiential givenness of 
meaning as the sole possible source of non-constructive understanding. 
Hence, the problem with theoretical thinking not only lies in its 
objectifying and distortive character but in its principal powerlessness to 
account for how understanding transpires at all: “If there were a theoretical 
originary science, then the circularity would be irresolvable. Knowledge 
would be unable to get outside of itself.”128 
      However, even though I think Heidegger’s distinction between the 
pre-theoretical and the theoretical contains genuine insight, it is important 
to recognize that his articulation of the distinction in terms of a general 
ontological hierarchy also harbors the risk of turning it into a dogma 
potentially covering up and distorting the matters to which it is supposed 
to apply. For example: Does not Heidegger’s idea of the pre-theoretical 
encompass a manifold of different experiences and situations, some of 
which fit and some of which are not captured by his characterization of 
the pre-theoretical? Is it not misleading to ascribe priority to the pre-
theoretical as such? Does not the primacy depend on both the questions 
and problems concerned and is it not the case that, given the problem-
situation at hand, some pre-theoretical experiences may come up as more 
primary than others? And could we not say that just as it is possible to 
repress a pre-theoretical experience by reducing it to a theoretical it is 
equally possible to distort a pre-theoretical experience by interpreting it in 
terms of another pre-theoretical experience, which it is not? Is not 
Heidegger’s concept of the theoretical far too vague to capture the 
different sorts of theoretical thinking and reflection out there, along with 
their complex relationships to our pre-theoretical forms of understanding? 
Is there not also a reversed order of constructive grounding, such as when 
we offer magical explanations for the causal relationships in nature in 
                                         
127 GA 56/57, p. 95: “Vorausgesetzt wird gerade das, und muß das werden, war erst 
gesetzt werden soll.” 
128 GA 56/57, p. 96: “Gibt es aber die theoretische Urwissenschaft, dann ist der Zirkel 
unaufhebbar. Das Erkennen kommt nicht aus sich selbst heraus.” 
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terms of meaningful happenings dependent on quasi-divine or human 
purposes and actions? And so on.  
      Consequently, I propose that we understand Heidegger’s conception 
of the pre-theoretical and the theoretical as an open and undetermined 
general paradigm or model of meaning whose range and clarificatory force 
is determined by its de facto capacity to shed light on particular cases. 
Ultimately, it seems to me that the main insight articulated by Heidegger’s 
argument is not dependent on the distinction between the pre-theoretical 
and the theoretical but lies in the formal idea that to understand a matter 
we need to attend to the concrete experiences and situations in which it 
has the meaning it has for us.  
      To sum up Heidegger's diagnosis then: The tradition of theoretical 
philosophy arises out of a failure to account for the experience of factical 
life. As soon as the primary unity of life's experience-of-significance is 
destroyed, the central task of theoretical philosophy ensues: to reconstruct 
the lost domain of experienced phenomenal significance by grounding it at 
a level of logico-conceptual formation which a priori determines the sense 
of every possible experience and object, without being given as significant 
in these experiences themselves. Hence, it is the destiny of every 
theoretical philosophy to remain constructive and prejudiced in its positive 
claims and reductionist in its ambition to reconstruct and compensate the 
lost significance of life. 
 
Heidegger’s First Critique of Husserl 
 
Towards the end of “Basic Problems of Phenomenology” Heidegger 
interrupts the earlier path of his lecture course to take up the central 
“problem of givenness.”129 Guided by this problem the final part of the 
course discharges a concentrated attempt to push forward and articulate 
the question of the sense and method of his phenomenological science of 
origin. In so doing, Heidegger also formulates his first critique of what he 
conceives as the basic theoretical bias of Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology.  
      Broaching the problem of givenness Heidegger declares that in 
contrast to the neo-Kantian versions of transcendental philosophy 
                                         
129 GA 58, p. 127. 
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Husserl's phenomenology has been able to open up this problem anew, 
especially with regard to a possible experience of the self-world. In fact, 
his own explication of factical life as somehow centered in the self-world 
seems to come extremely close to Husserl's central figure of thought. To 
execute an intuitive explication of the basic structures of the primary first-
person experience of the self, taken as the originary domain in which 
significances present themselves in correlation with specific ways of 
experiencing – what could this be if not a faithful repetition of Husserl's 
phenomenological program? It is precisely this undeniable proximity to 
Husserl which impels Heidegger to carry out a critical delimitation of 
Husserl's transcendental phenomenology in a series of comments, sketchy 
and at the same time overburdened, thereby giving himself the 
opportunity to try to specify his own phenomenological science of origin 
in the supreme light of this closest of differences. 
   To the best of my knowledge, this first attempt of Heidegger’s to 
articulate a critique of Husserl’s phenomenology has received almost no 
attention in the secondary literature on the relation between Heidegger 
and Husserl.130 Still, although Heidegger's comments on Husserl may at 
first seem fragmentary and disjointed, I hope to show that they indeed 
fashion a unified and distinct critique of the theoretical tendency of 
Husserl's phenomenology.131 But what about the systematic interest of this 
                                         
130 In fact, none of the major studies of Heidegger’s critical relationship to Husserl’s 
phenomenology – e.g. Crowell 2001; Dahlstrom 2001; von Herrmann 2000; 
Overgaard 2004 – contain any explication of this early Freiburg critique. It is perhaps 
symptomatic of the situation that in a recent article, “Heidegger’s Early Critique of 
Husserl,” Søren Overgaard points out that it is a common feature of many 
commentaries on the relation between Husserl and Heidegger that they neglect 
“Heidegger’s first formulations of his critique of Husserl, as found in the lecture 
courses Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) and Einführung in die phänomenologische 
Forschung, respectively from 1923 and 1923-4” (2003, p. 158). However, even though it 
is true that these courses are also often neglected they do not strictly speaking 
constitute Heidegger’s first formulation of his critique of Husserl, which is rather to be 
found in Basic Problems of Phenomenology from 1919-20.  
131 In volume 58 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe the final part of Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology is rendered in two versions. The first version is a reconstruction based 
on Heidegger’s own manuscripts, such that the available papers and fragments have 
been arranged according to the chronological order of the lectures as testified by 
student notes. The second version consists of Oskar Becker’s – Heidegger’s student at 
the time – transcript of the course. Since the majority of Heidegger’s comments on 
Husserl are found in Becker’s transcription the reliability of my interpretation is to 
some extent dependent on the reliability of this transcription. Nevertheless, it seems to 
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critique? What might this early attempt have to offer that does not receive 
a sharper and more elaborate articulation in Heidegger's major 
confrontations with Husserl in the Marburg lecture courses “Introduction 
to Phenomenological Research” (1923-24)132 and “History of the Concept 
of Time: Prolegomena” (1925),133 or in the late essay “The End of 
Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” (1964)?134 This, I believe: Since 
Heidegger’s approach is not yet determined by his later question of being 
and his conception of the historical as-structure of understanding, his 
critique still essentially unfolds as an inner critical elaboration of Husserl’s 
reflective-intuitive method of investigation. From this perspective he is 
able to offer an original criticism of how Husserl’s phenomenological 
reduction is rooted in the paradigm of distanced theoretical observation, 
so that it is drawn into the ambivalent effort to ground the significances of 
the world in the act-structures of transcendental subjectivity.   
      Given the framework of this thesis, the main purpose of explicating 
Heidegger’s critique of Husserl is to present the former’s view of the latter 
as the backdrop in relation to which Heidegger develops his own thought 
– regardless of the truth and accuracy of this critique. Still, it seems to me 
that in order to clarify the philosophical sense of Heidegger’ critique it is 
also motivated to try to assess, with some independence, the systematic 
force of his criticisms.  As pointed out above, however, the Husserl 
presented in this thesis is of necessity an abridged one: a Husserl made up 
of his main published attempts to articulate his program of transcendental 
phenomenology. Hence, although I think my presentation indeed captures 
basic tendencies in Husserl’s phenomenology it is also clear that the view 
here ascribed to Husserl is to some extent – the magnitude of which 
remains open for the reader to judge – specified, modified and even 
superseded in his widespread concrete work of phenomenological 
description and analysis.  
                                                                                                                      
me that this transcription provides a trustworthy enough basis for an explication of 
Heidegger’s critique of Husserl. In this, it is possible for the reader to determine the 
source of the quotes by looking at pages numbers given in the footnotes. Heidegger’s 
manuscript version is found on pp. 131-168 while the transcript of Oskar Becker is 
found on pp. 223-263 in GA 58. 
132 “Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung,” GA 17. 
133 “Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs,” GA 20 (henceforth referred to as 
“Prolegomena” in the main text). 
134 “Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens,” in GA 14. 
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      Heidegger’s basic assessment is that Husserl, despite the revolutionary 
potential of his call to return to the given, was never able to radically 
question the basic theoretical self-understanding of traditional philosophy, 
and so remained captivated by the task of providing a theoretical ground 
for our otherwise naive pre-theoretical experience. In Husserl’s case, 
however, the theoretical attitude does not take the form of a rejection of 
the given in favor of theoretico-dialectical construction but is instead 
manifest in the way he articulates the task and method of his 
phenomenology. Heidegger’s critique focuses on two main aspects of 
Husserl’s thought: first, on his alleged tendency to construe the 
phenomenological reduction as an attempt to ground pre-theoretical life 
through a reflection on the basic structures of transcendental subjectivity; 
second, on the alleged theoretical bias of his basic notions of intuitive 
reflection and description. Since I find the first-mentioned criticism more 
original and philosophically interesting I will begin by dealing with it at 
some length before turning to the second critique. 
      According to Heidegger, it is only on the basis of a “prior taking of a 
transcendental standpoint” that the phenomenological reduction may 
suggest itself as the necessary methodical maneuver of phenomenology at 
all. Designed to open up the very sphere of relevant transcendental 
phenomenality, the reduction cannot of itself account for its philosophical 
motivation and purpose: “Phenomenological reduction: after its 
accomplishment [...] the true problem would only first arise: what now?”135 
Husserl’s failure to question the guiding problem of philosophy arguably 
goes hand in hand with his inability to account for the phenomenality of 
our primary pre-theoretical experience. Misinterpreting this primal 
givenness in terms of the object-directed experience of the natural 
attitude, Heidegger claims, Husserl is led to construe the task of his 
phenomenology as a reflection on the basic structures of transcendental 
subjectivity constructively grounding our otherwise naive natural 
experience.   
      How is this accusation to be understood and judged? 
      Heidegger’s critical comments are centered on Husserl’s failure to 
account for the primacy of factical life. Hence, he claims that Husserl’s 
                                         
135 GA 58, p. 151: “Phänomenologische Reduktion: nach ihrem Vollzug, sodern man ihn 
überhaupt für notwendig hält (was nur auf transzendentaler Vorstandpunktnahme der 
Fall ist), entstünde erst das eigentliche Problem: was nun?” 
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insensitivity to our primary experience of significance already determines 
his decisive analysis of the natural attitude as an objectifying mode of 
experience in which objects have been detached from their original 
context of experience and appear isolated as the limited phenomenal range 
of naive life: “It is said: in the ‘natural attitude,’ I do not reach experiences. 
Only in the acts of reflection on my experience do I direct myself towards 
my experiences.”136 Since in our natural experience we are supposedly 
directed exclusively towards intentional objects, it seems that we need to 
take a reflective stance in order to behold the experiences themselves as 
the total domain of givenness in which the full sense-structure of the 
objects may present itself at all. In so doing, however, the reduction is 
bound to repeat the subjectifying thought-movement typical of 
transcendental philosophy:   
 
One must observe [...] all the contents of intuition and 
comprehension, all the presentative contents (darstellenden Gehalte); these 
are governed by specific forms of comprehension [...] Now, if the 
idea of constitution of objectivities through contents is transferred 
to all sciences, then a noetic-noematic content goes along, which 
one may observe reflectively; in a certain sense in the direction of 
“subjectification” as opposed to that of “objectification.” This 
outlook is provided by “transcendental phenomenology.”137  
 
Yet how should this subjectification be understood? As noted above, 
Husserl’s reduction does not amount to a reflection on our inner 
experiences in contrast to our natural perception of the world itself. Nor is 
this Heidegger’s claim. The central argument of the dense passage cited 
above should rather be articulated as follows. Because Husserl is unable to 
account for our primary experience of significance, he is forced to refer 
the rudimentary objectified content of the natural attitude back to those 
                                         
136 GA 58, p. 251: “Man sagt [d.i. Husserl]: in der ’natürlichen Einstellung’ komme ich 
nie zu Erlebnissen. Erst in dem Akte der Reflexion auf mein Erleben richt ich mich 
auf meine Erlebnisse.” 
137 GA 58, pp. 229f.: “Man muß [...] alle darstellenden Gehalte betrachen; diese sind von 
bestimmten Auffassungsformen durchherscht [...]. Überträgt man nun die Idee der 
Konstitution von Objektivitäten durch Gehalte auf alle Wissenschaften, – so geht ein 
noetisch-noematischer Gehalt mit, den man reflexiv betrachten kann; gewissermaßen in 
der Richtung der ‘Subjektivierung’ im Gegensatz zu der der ‘Objektivierung’. Diese 
Betrachtungsweise liefert die ‘transzendentale Phänomenologie’.” 
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structures of experience in which the objects appear. The reflective turn to 
the experiential structures of the naturally perceived world thus acquires 
all its transcendental force from the assumption that these structures 
somehow “govern” (durchherrschen) the sense of the objects experienced, in 
such a way that the full noematic sense of the objects only becomes 
accessible through a reflective investigation of the correlative noetic act-
structures without being discernible in the objects themselves such as they 
appear in our immediate naive experience. According to Heidegger, 
Husserl’s reduction would essentially involve a phenomenologically 
unsubstantiated inference of the full sense of the objects experienced in 
the natural attitude from the acts of experience in which these objects 
occur.   
      To clarify the import of Heidegger’s critique a little, we need to move 
beyond the scope of his sparse remarks. To begin with, it is important to 
note that Husserl is aware of, and in fact anticipates, exactly the kind of 
criticism here put forward by Heidegger. In his Ideas I Husserl insists that 
the “noematic characters” of the object may not be understood as mere 
“determinations of reflection” (Reflexionsbestimmtheiten), i.e., as 
“determinations which are ascribed to the intentional objects on account 
of these objects being referred back to the modes of consciousness in 
which they are precisely objects of consciousness.”138 Far from it. We can, 
Husserl claims, only grasp “what concerns the correlate as such through 
the glance being turned directly on the correlate itself.”139  
      However, Husserl’s clear insight on this particular point does not 
really do away with the problems; rather it points forward towards a 
fundamental ambivalence that seems to characterize the transcendental 
reduction as a whole, and which is linked to the question concerning its 
phenomenal purity and surplus in relation to the natural attitude. In short: 
if it is the case that the noematic sense of the object can only present itself 
to an immediate, straightforward experience of this object, then it 
becomes unclear in what precise way a reflective investigation may 
complement the inherent potential of the natural attitude to see and 
                                         
138 Hua III, p. 246: “Bestimmtheiten, welche den intentionalen Objekten dadurch 
zuwachsen, daß diese auf die Bewußtseinsweisen zurückbezogen werden, in denen sie 
eben Bewußtseinsobjekte sind.”  
139 Hua III, p. 246: “Wir erfassen, was eigene Sache des Korrelats ist, direkt in der 
Blickrichtung aeben auf das Korrelat.” 
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describe its objects with a view to their essential structures. While Husserl 
seems to run the risk of deriving the full sense of the objects against his 
own best insights from the experiences in which they occur, to the extent 
that he denies the viability of such a maneuver, he seems to be 
jeopardizing the basic transcendental claim of his phenomenology. 
      At one point, Heidegger makes the suggestion that Husserl’s 
characterization of the phenomenological reduction as a reflective 
suspension of the original direction of our natural experience is 
conditioned by the fact that Husserl “regards all experiences as intentional 
beforehand, and, what's more, starts out from object-comprehending 
experiences (e.g., perceptions).”140 Even though Heidegger does not 
develop this any further on this occasion, it seems to indicate a productive 
line of questioning.   
      Why? Because, what at the end of the day makes it possible for 
Husserl to describe the phenomenological reduction as a shift from our 
natural enactment of the intentional acts straight at their objects to a 
reflection on the acts themselves in their full phenomenal range – from 
the what to the what-cum-how – is that he takes his starting point in an 
experiential paradigm in which these correlata have been detached from 
each other in a peculiar way. As Husserl himself has shown so well, it is 
indeed a distinctive feature of our sense perceptions of relatively 
insignificant objects that the objects so experienced primarily present 
themselves as to an exceptionally high degree cut off from, and essentially 
capable of preserving their self-identity through our manifold acts of 
different perspectival perceptions. To invoke a contrast, it would 
obviously be awkward to maintain that, in riding a bicycle or listening to a 
concert, we are only directed towards the objects in question to the 
exclusion of the experiential modes in which they appear: our practical 
coping and interests, our moods and fantasies. It is, then, by way of a 
violent generalization of the paradigmatic experience of object-perception 
that Husserl is able to advance his description of the natural attitude as 
exclusively directed towards the intended object: “When we engage 
straightforwardly in conscious activity, we focus exclusively on the present 
                                         
140 GA 58, p. 254: “Man kann die phänomenologische Reduktion nur dann so 
charakterisieren, wenn man von vornherein die Erlebnisse sämtlich als intentionale 
ansieht und außerdem noch von dingerfassenden Erlebnissen (z.B. Wahrnehmungen) 
ausgeht.” 
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things, thoughts, values, goals, means; but not on the psychic experiencing 
itself, in which these things are recognized as such. Only reflection reveals 
this to us.”141 In consequence, the phenomenological reduction takes on 
the character of a complementary reflective extension of the narrow 
object-directedness of the natural attitude, which first allows the 
phenomenologist to see the noematic objects together with the noetic acts in 
which they essentially appear.  
      It is precisely this scheme, which also organizes Husserl’s general 
phenomenological program of transcendental constitution. As Husserl 
articulates it in his Paris Lectures of 1929, the central methodological 
procedure of constitutional research consists in taking the objectual types 
and ontologies available in the natural attitude as transcendental 
“guidelines,” in order to investigate, then, by way of reflective analysis, the 
“systematic totality of real and possible conscious experiences, which are 
prescribed in my ego as relatable to it [the object].”142 However, even 
though Husserl stresses that the constitutional analysis must take its 
guiding clues from the object-types whose correlative act-types it wants to 
examine, this very procedure presupposes a separation and hierarchization 
of the correlata. It assumes, first, that the object-types can be accessed as 
clues on the basis of the natural attitude; second, that it is possible to carry 
out a largely separable analysis of the act-systems of transcendental 
subjectivity as the hidden basic dimension constituting the givenness and 
being-senses of the objects. 
      His inability to account for the unity of our primary experience-of-
significance compels Husserl to describe the reduction as a reflective 
complementation of our natural experience, which first allows us to survey 
the phenomenal field in its pure noetic-noematic totality. Yet to the extent 
that the reflective turn from the experienced object to its experiencedness 
as a whole is conditioned by a prior destruction of the originary unity of 
                                         
141 Hua IX, p. 279: “So, geradehin uns bewußt betätigend, sind in unserem Blick 
ausschließlich die jeweiligen Sachen, Gedanken, Werte, Ziele, Hilfsmittel, nicht aber 
das psychische Erleben selbst, in dem sie als solche uns bewußt sind. Erst die 
Reflexion macht es offenbar.” 
142 Hua I, p. 24: “Phänomenologische Konstitution eines Gegenstandes, das besagt: 
Betrachtung der Universalität des ego unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Identität dieses 
Gegenstandes, nämlich in der Frage nach der systematischen Allheit von wirklichen 
und möglichen Bewußtseinserlebnissen, die als auf ihn beziehbare in meinem ego 
vorgezeichnet sind und für mein ego eine feste Regel möglicher Synthesen bedeuten.”  
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these correlata, the projected reflective restoration will not be able to 
avoid exhibiting some degree of constructive grounding. As Heidegger 
writes: “ontology and the research into consciousness ‘correlative’ to it, do 
not form a true unity.”143 The reflective constitutional analysis will of 
necessity attempt to bind the intentional correlata, which the elementary 
analysis of intentionality has always already permitted to slide apart.     
      The result of this is that Husserl’s phenomenological analyses are 
destined always to grant either too much or too little to the object to be 
constituted: too much in so far as the reflective analysis of the intentional 
experiences correlative to a certain objectivity threatens to become 
constructive in relation to the objectual phenomenality of our natural 
experience, by claiming to supply the full sense of the natural 
phenomenality without this sense manifesting itself in this phenomenality 
itself; too little in so far as Husserl’s phenomenological analyses risk 
amounting to no more than general descriptions of various structures of 
consciousness without sufficient transcendental force to determine the 
primary sense of the correlative objects of experience. The first of these 
tendencies seems to be decisive for, e.g., Husserl’s formal-ontological 
effort to provide a constitutive analysis of the noetic-noematic structures, 
which a priori determine the basic sense of what it means to be an object 
at all. The second tendency makes itself felt in many of Husserl’s analyses 
of consciousness (such as perception and time-consciousness), in so far as 
the analytical focus is placed on a background dimension of perceptual 
operations which necessarily accompany and structure different kinds of 
conscious acts without however possessing the transcendental authority 
required to constitute the basic sense-structure of our primary experiences 
of e.g. cars, friends, and concerts.  
      But these are limit cases. In general, Husserl’s description of the 
phenomenological reduction as a complementary shift from the what to 
the what-cum-how of intentionality, puts itself to work as a deep and 
unyielding ambivalence which cuts across every central concept in the 
Husserlian corpus, and lets every phenomenological analysis, however 
pertinent, float out in a fundamental ambiguity concerning its 
transcendental status. Although Husserl’s groundbreaking analysis of the 
                                         
143 GA 58, p. 240: “Die Ontologie und die ihr ‘koorelative’ Bewußtseinsforschung 
bilden keine wahre Einheit.” 
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intentionality of consciousness dissolves the traditional question 
concerning the relation between mind and world and firmly anchors the 
sense of the world in the experiences in which it appears, he is never able 
to achieve a clear conception of the intentional correlation itself.144 
Indeed, the ambivalence characterized above already seems to haunt 
Husserl’s concept of the intentional correlation itself: whereas the notion 
of the correlation, taken seriously, prescribes that all phenomenological 
descriptions must unfold as descriptions of particular unified experiences 
in which the correlative aspects remain to be specified, the correlation 
itself is determined as a universal feature of transcendental subjectivity.  
      Here we have exceeded the limits of Heidegger’s analysis, however. 
For him, the verdict is clear: Husserl’s phenomenological reduction 
replicates the guiding effort of traditional transcendental philosophy to 
provide a theoretical foundation for factical life; this time, however, in the 
peculiar form of a reflective return from the limited – and therefore 
prejudice-generating – phenomenality of the natural attitude, to the pure 
and full phenomenality of consciousness, which is supposed to grant our 
natural phenomenality its ultimate sense-structure without this sense being 
accessible in this phenomenality itself. Should the reduction not amount 
to a constructive grounding of factical life, it would have to be possible to 
show that the sense-structures exhibited by the transcendental experience 
of pure consciousness already manifest themselves in our primary factical 
experience as its very own sense. If this could not be shown, the reduction 
would emerge as a theoretical construct; if it could be shown, however, 
the reduction would not be needed at all. Hence, the phenomenological 
reduction would be able to avoid constructive grounding to the precise 
extent that it would be superfluous.   
      Heidegger’s second line of critique first surfaces in “The Idea of 
Philosophy” when he considers two criticisms voiced by Paul Natorp 
concerning Husserl’s notion that phenomenology essentially proceeds 
through intuitive reflection and description. Against this Natorp objects: 
First, in reflectively observing our pre-theoretical experience we make the 
experience into an object of theoretical observation. Hence, as Natorp 
puts it, we “still and interrupt the continuous stream of becoming,” so that 
we “detach [the finding] from the experienced, from the subjective” and 
                                         
144 Cf. Figal 2006, pp. 149ff., for a similar critique of Husserl.  
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“make it into an object.”145 Second, in describing the experience we 
necessarily make use of generalizing and subsuming concepts, which 
transform the factical temporal movement of pre-theoretical life into 
examples of general and universal concepts and categories.146  
      Now, at least on the face of it, it seems that Heidegger to some extent 
accepts Natorp’s criticisms. Noting that Husserl himself has not yet 
responded to Natorp’s objections he writes: “In the reflective turn of our 
gaze we make something which was previously unobserved, something 
simply unreflectively experienced, into something ‘observed’. We look at it. 
In reflection it stands there before us, we are directed towards it and make 
it into an object in general.”147 In fact, he goes as far as to suggest that 
already our grasping the experiences as “given” involves a “theoretical 
reflection on it.”148 However, despite the seeming agreement with 
Natorp’s critique, Heidegger dismisses Natorp’s own attempt to account 
for our subjective experience by way of an indirect theoretical 
reconstruction, claiming that Natorp’s objections have not “exhausted all 
possibilities.”149 For Heidegger, then, Natorp’s critique is no reason to give 
up the phenomenological pursuit of the given, but rather presents us with 
the challenge of investigating and conceptualizing our pre-theoretical 
experience without objectifying it.150 
   Still, how exactly does Heidegger think Natorp’s criticisms affect 
Husserl’s phenomenology and what is his own response to them? As soon 
as one tries to pinpoint the philosophical content of the critique as 
                                         
145 Natorp 1912, pp. 102f.: “bliebe man nicht dennoch immer genötigt, [den Befund] 
irgendwie abzugrenzen, ihn aus dem ganzen Geflecht des Erlebens irgendwie, und 
wäre es bloß mit dem Finger zeigend, mit den Augen winkend, herauszuheben, also 
den kontinuerlichen Strom des Werdens, als der alles innere Leben sich unzweifelhaft 
darstellt, gleichsam zu unterbrechen, künstlich für die Betrachtung stillzustellen, den 
Einzelbefund zu isolieren und, zum Zweck der Isolierung, zu fixieren, gleichsam zu 
sterilisieren, wie der Anatom sein Präparat?” 
146 Natorp 1912, pp. 91f., 190. 
147 GA 56/57, p. 100: “In der reflektiven Blickwendung machen wir ein vordem nicht 
erblicktes, sondern nur schlicht, reflexionslos Erlebtes zu einem ‘erblickten’. Wir sehen 
auf es hin. In der Reflexion haben wir es dastehen, sind auf es gerichtet, machen es 
zum Objekt, Gegenstand überhaupt.” 
148 GA 56/57, p. 89.  
149 GA 56/57, p. 109. Cf. GA 56/57, pp. 107, 111.  
150 For a more detailed discussion of Heidegger’s response to Natorp’s criticims and 
their bearing on the idea of phenomenological reflection, see Zahavi 2003b.  
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accepted by Heidegger it emerges that his attitude on this point is 
ambiguous and far from crystal clear. To begin with, it is important to 
note that Heidegger does not reject the notions of intuitive reflection and 
description as such. This becomes clear as he restates the same criticism in 
“Basic Problems of Phenomenology” – this time without referring to 
Natorp by name:   
 
A decisive step for phenomenology: emphasis on the originary intuition 
(originäre Anschauung) – evidence! – the idea of accurate description 
(adäquate Beschreibung). However, both intuitions (Intuitionen) – 
absolutely concrete in their original vitality – easily fall prey to an 
unnoticed degrading deformation, so that they are deprived of their 
true possibilities to perform. Intuition not as understanding – the 
problem of description as a phenomenological problem not raised at all.151 
 
What Heidegger basically claims here is that Husserl’s notions of intuition 
and description have been “decisive” and indeed, in their “original 
vitality,” point to central aspects of the phenomenological method, yet 
that they have not been sufficiently clarified by Husserl and thus run the 
risk of theoretical deformation. Hence, the task Heidegger sets himself is 
precisely to demonstrate what sense the notions of intuition, reflection, 
and description take on in his originary science of factical life, in the 
course of which intuitive reflection will be renamed “hermeneutic 
intuition” or “understanding,” and “description” will be rearticulated as 
“formal indication.”  
      But in what way are Husserl’s notions theoretically biased? In fact, 
taken as they stand the criticisms presented by Natorp – and echoed by 
Heidegger – do not suffice to articulate a sharp and penetrating critique of 
Husserl. As we shall see, it is only by following Heidegger’s own 
elaboration of his originary science that it becomes possible to determine 
in what precise way his phenomenological method critically differs from 
Husserl. This is the task of the next chapter. Here let me only reject some 
                                         
151 GA 58, p. 146: “Ein entscheidender Schritt der Phänomenologie: Betonung der originären 
Anschauung – Evidenz! – Idee der adäquaten Beschreibung. Aber beide Intuitionen – absolut 
konkret in ihrer ursprünglichen Lebendigkeit – verfallen leicht der Degradierung einer 
unbemerkten Deformation, so daß sie um ihre eigentlichen Leistungsmöglichkeiten 
gebracht sind. Anschauung nicht als Verstehen – Problem der Beschreibung als 
phänomenologische überhaupt nicht gestellt.” 
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misleading versions of the critique and provisionally indicate the problems 
at stake. 
      As concerns the first criticism – that Husserl’s concept of intuitive 
reflection is theoretically objectifying – we need to see that the two 
arguments explicitly voiced by Natorp and Heidegger to support the 
criticism are misguided. The first argument is that in reflecting on our pre-
theoretical experience we break off and detach ourselves from the 
experience in order to observe it.  However, even though this is true, it is 
hard to see why it would be a problem. Even if reflection requires that we 
are not totally immersed in the experience we reflect upon, this 
detachment in itself in no way seems to hinder us from accessing and 
explicating the sense of the experience in question. Indeed – as we shall 
see – Heidegger himself will argue that phenomenological understanding 
always involves such a moment of reflective disengagement. The second 
argument is that in reflecting on our experience we inevitably observe it as 
a set of objects. But neither is this argument convincing. While it is true 
that in reflecting on our experience it will stand before us as an object of 
explication – in the unproblematic sense mentioned above – there seems 
to be no ground for claiming that reflection is inherently reifying and 
conceives whatever it reflects upon as objects or entities. In fact, Husserl 
never tires of stressing that the phenomenological reflection explicates 
subjectivity as the transcendental domain of sense, which conditions every 
experience of objects. Moreover, on this point Heidegger would agree.  
      However, if I am right in suggesting that the above criticisms are 
philosophically weak and build on blatant misconceptions of 
phenomenology – both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s own – is it really 
plausible that Heidegger endorsed them? I think not. Rather, it seems that 
this would be a more convincing account of Heidegger’s stance: He 
ostensibly accepts the criticisms of Natorp, first for the vain rhetorical 
reason of casting doubt upon and outshining his teacher, yet, second, for 
the reason that he truly believes that the criticisms – although misguided 
in their present form – indirectly point to basic problems in Husserl’s 
phenomenology that he will attempt to overcome.  
      As concerns the second criticism – that phenomenological description 
in Husserl’s sense employs subsuming and generalizing concepts – the 
philosophical edge of the critique is not readily discernible. While 
Heidegger claims that Natorp’s criticism presupposes a narrow theoretical 
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conception of language, he suggests that Husserl too would have shared 
such a conception. But in what sense? In “Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology” he specifies his critique by claiming that Husserl’s idea 
of phenomenology as a rigorous science led him to conceive of the 
concepts of phenomenology on the model of theoretical “concepts of 
order” (Ordnungsbegriffe),152 i.e., general concepts which serve to determine 
objects and which gain their sense on account of their place in the 
conceptual order. By contrast, Heidegger claims that the concepts of 
phenomenology must be “concepts of expression” (Ausdrucksbegriffe), i.e., 
concepts that express the sense displayed by our experience.  However, 
the point of the critique is not that Husserl would have taken over a totally 
unphenomenological theoretical view of concepts – which would be 
plainly false – but that Husserl’s basic idea that phenomenology transpires 
as an intuitive explication and description of essences is modeled on the 
paradigm of general theoretical concepts:  
 
One thinks [...] of the correlate of the phenomenological intuition 
as something object-like. The “essence” (eidos) is thought to be 
divided into genera, species, individual essences, etc. This leads to 
the danger of equating the phenomenological intuition with the 
comprehension of relations of order.153   
 
What Heidegger suggests is that Husserl dogmatically presupposes that the 
structures of sense articulated by phenomenology basically have the 
character of general essences determined by their necessary defining 
features. This raises the critical questions: Is it not a dogmatic 
presupposition on Husserl’s part that our experiences exhibit general 
essences, which it is possible for us to detect and conceptualize? Given 
that the phenomenological description always proceeds as a description of 
particular factical experiences and situations – how can we ever claim that 
we have come upon general and universal essences without yielding to 
theoretical prejudice and construction?  
                                         
152 GA 58, p. 238. 
153 GA 58, p. 237: “Man denkt sich […] das Korrelat der phänomenologischen 
Anschauung als etwas Objektartiges. Das ‘Wesen’ (εἶδος) denkt man sich gegliedert in 
Gattungswesen, Artwesen, individuelle Wesen etc. Das führt zu der Gefahr der 
Gleichsetzung der phänomeologischen Anschauung mit dem Erfassen von 
Ordnungsbeziehungen.” Cf. also GA 58, pp. 240f. 
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      In the next chapter, as we follow Heidegger’s own attempt to develop 
phenomenology as a science of factical life, it will become clearer on 
which points he critically develops Husserl’s notions of intuitive reflection 
and description. Anticipating this explication I want to indicate the three 
main points of critique: 1. By insisting that the phenomenological 
understanding be guided by a “love” or “sympathy” for life, Heidegger 
will try to account for the sensibility which allows us to access and 
understand what is important and meaningful in our experience, 
something that no pure intuition seems able to do. 2. By accentuating the 
way in which understanding must “go along with” the primary unitary 
movement of our pre-theoretical experience, he will try to rearticulate the 
reflective moment of phenomenology as a pure shift to explicating the 
sense-structure of experience, and so avoid Husserl’s tendency to conceive 
of reflection as a subjectifying turn to transcendental subjectivity as the 
basic constitutive dimension of experience. 3. By rethinking the concepts 
of phenomenology as “formal indications”, he will try to account for the 
way in which the general descriptions of phenomenology remain anchored 
in and referred to the particular situations of factical life, and so avoid the 
essentialism which he believes haunts Husserl’s idea of phenomenology as 
a science of essences.   
 
1.4 Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Factical Life 
 
The driving ambition of Heidegger’s early Freiburg lecture courses is, as 
we have seen, to critically elaborate Husserl’s phenomenological 
imperative into an originary science of factical life. But how is this non-
theoretical phenomenological science of life to be effected? What kind of 
origin can it hope to find and articulate?       
      The purpose of the following chapter is to explicate Heidegger’s 
response to these questions. As a background for my explication, I will 
begin by sketching what I suggest to be the two main competing 
interpretations of Heidegger’s conception of the problem of 
phenomenality/phenomenology in his early lectures. After that I go on to 
investigate, first, Heidegger’s phenomenology of factical life, i.e. his 
methodical way of explicating the origin of life, and, second, his 
conception of the basic structure of factical life, i.e., the structure of the 
primary domain of phenomenality or givenness.  
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Two Interpretations  
 
Since the publication of Heidegger’s early Freiburg lecture courses was 
completed in the first half of the 1990s, the inspection and discussion of 
this textual territory has been intense. As regards the theme of 
phenomenality/phenomenology – which has been at the center of the 
discussion – the debate has been dominated by two almost diametrically 
opposing lines of interpretation: the transcendental phenomenological 
interpretation versus the hermeneutic-deconstructivist interpretation. 
      Let me now attempt to account for these interpretations in some more 
detail by depicting the arguments of some of their main defenders. I will 
let John van Buren and Theodore Kisiel, the foremost chroniclers of 
Heidegger’s early work, represent the hermeneutic-deconstructive 
interpretation, and let Steven Crowell, whose book Husserl, Heidegger, and 
the Space of Meaning provides the most elaborated transcendental 
phenomenological reading of Heidegger’s early lectures, represent that 
reading.  
      In his massive study, The Young Heidegger van Buren tells the following 
story: in his early Freiburg lectures courses Heidegger accomplishes his 
decisive breakthrough to his life-long topic, which is not being, but rather 
the “differentiated temporal giving of being in factical life.”154 However, 
during the mid 1920s this promising beginning gets curbed and diluted as 
Heidegger gives way to the influence of the “transcendental thought of 
Husserl and Kant,” which results in the “plodding scientific treatise called 
Sein und Zeit.”155 As Heidegger then, in the middle of the 1930s, radicalizes 
his questioning of the basic historical happening of being, which he from 
now on calls the “event” (Ereignis), this famous turn in his thinking should, 
van Buren claims, essentially be understand as “a return to and creative 
reinscription of his youthful thought.”156  
      In his book, van Buren continuously highlights Heidegger’s criticism 
of the traditional metaphysical effort to found our factical historical life-
experience by determining the basic features of being through an 
immediate theoretical intuition. According to van Buren, Heidegger 
                                         
154 van Buren 1994a, p. 239. 
155 van Buren 1994a, p. 136. 
156 van Buren 1994a, p. 137. 
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essentially considered Husserl to be an exemplary representative of 
modern “ego-metaphysics.”157 Although Husserl’s concept of the 
categorial intuition paved the way for Heidegger’s question concerning the 
historical givenness of being, Husserl remained a prisoner to the 
metaphysical hope of accessing and describing “a universal, transtemporal, 
eidetic kingdom of transcendental subjectivity.”158 Far from taking over 
Husserl’s central method of intuitive reflection on the transcendental 
structures of subjectivity, Heidegger, according to van Buren, carries out a 
“hermeneutical intuition” which “interpretatively explicates the factical 
preconception of being that belongs to factical life.”159 Hence, the fact 
that Heidegger still calls his thinking phenomenological does not imply 
any reliance whatsoever on a reflective intuition, but only signifies that he 
studies “being as it appears historically.”160 Ultimately, van Buren claims, 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic explication of our prior unthematic historical 
pre-understanding leads him back to the origin of all such understanding, 
which is “the anarchic temporalizing of being out of an original 
concealment and impropriety.”161 This groundless origin of being 
essentially withdraws from all seeing and determination, and only intimates 
itself in and through the differentiated manifold of finite historical epochs 
and worlds that it produces as its effect. The infinite task of Heideggerian 
post-metaphysical philosophy would, according to van Buren, consist in 
tracing and formally indicating, again and again, out of ever new historical 
situations, the groundless event of being, thus opening up the possibility 
of a relativist “ecumenical” ethics affirming and answering to the 
differentiation of being into a manifold of finite equivalent worlds. 
      Like van Buren, Theodore Kisiel in his vast chronicle The Genesis of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time maintains that Heidegger’s main theme is the self-
withdrawing source of temporal-historical being: “the primary but mystical 
‘something’”162 which “contextualizes (Es weltet) and temporalizes (Es er-
eignet sich) each of us.”163 According to Kisiel, Heidegger’s first post-war 
lecture course, “The Idea of Philosophy,” constitutes a breakthrough in 
                                         
157 van Buren 1994a, p. 203. 
158 van Buren 1994a, p. 203.  
159 van Buren 1994a, p. 211; cf. also p. 216.  
160 van Buren 1994a, p. 245. 
161 van Buren 1994a, p. 39.  
162 Kisiel 1993, p. 24. 
163 Kisiel 1993, p. 9. 
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that Heidegger here comes up with an answer to the critical questions – 
posed by Natorp – of how it is possible to access and articulate the pre-
theoretical and seemingly ineffable something that grants being. To begin 
with, Kisiel claims that Heidegger in the place of Husserl’s objectifying 
intuitive reflection makes use of a “non-intuitive form of access which 
hermeneutics calls understanding, a certain familiarity which life already 
has of itself and which phenomenology needs only to repeat. This 
spontaneous experience of experience, this streaming return of 
experiencing life upon already experienced life, is the immanent historicity 
of life.”164 Moreover, Heidegger is said to articulate the findings of this 
hermeneutic understanding, which goes along with and repeats the 
historical self-understanding of factical life, with the aid of “formal 
indications” which “at once retrieve and forerun life’s course without 
intrusion.”165 
      In contrast to both van Buren and Kisiel Steven, Crowell defends the 
view that Heidegger’s early thinking essentially unfolds within the horizon 
of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Though conceding that 
Heidegger’s philosophy contains “two voices,”166 one of which succumbs 
to the anti-philosophical temptation of trying to appropriate being as an 
“ultimately mystical ‘sending’,”167 Crowell insists that the “philosophical 
relevance” of Heidegger’s thinking “depends largely on our being able to 
recollect the Husserlian infrastructure of his work and to carry out new 
constitutional analyses within the framework Heidegger provides.”168 
According to Crowell, Heidegger’s idea of phenomenology as an originary 
science is nothing but an elaboration of Husserl’s effort to investigate the 
transcendental conditions and sense-structures of our experience. This, 
Crowell writes, can only be achieved by way of intuitive reflection: while 
we are normally oriented “towards entities through meaning,” the reflection 
allows us to focus on “meaning (being) as meaning” without reifying it 
into a new set of entities.169 If we sacrifice the reflective method, we lose 
our only way of rigorously accounting for the space of meaning and end 
up, like van Buren and Kisiel, constructing it as a product of a mystical 
                                         
164 Kisiel 1993, p. 48. Cf. also p. 55.  
165 Kisiel 1993, p. 376. 
166 Crowell 2001, p. 7. 
167 Crowell 2001, p. 7.  
168 Crowell 2001, p. 4. 
169 Crowell 2001, p. 146.  
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metaphysical happening. Though Heidegger disapproves of Husserl’s 
concept of reflection and does not make use of this term, Crowell argues 
that Heidegger’s own method contains a decisive “moment of reflection”: 
“The method of formal indication […] is an explicitly cognitive-
illuminative self-recollection (reflection)” which moves along with life 
explicating its structures of meaning.170 According to Crowell, Heidegger’s 
critical elaboration of Husserl’s phenomenology involves two basic 
aspects: “Heidegger’s achievement would thus consist in his systematic 
effort to respect the difference between straightforward (positive) and 
reflective (critical) inquiries – the difference between entities and the 
meaning of entities – while simultaneously doing justice to the demand 
that philosophy demonstrate the grounds of its own possibility as an 
inquiry into meaning.”171 That is, first, Heidegger gives up Husserl’s 
concept of reflection because it threatens to objectify the space of 
meaning and lead it back to transcendental subjectivity as a constitutive 
ground;172 second, he radicalizes the question of the concrete existential 
possibilities of the human being to get access to meaning as meaning. 
However, these criticisms of Husserl should not be taken as a rejection of 
transcendental phenomenology but rather as an effort to accomplish this 
project more clearly and unambiguously. 173   
      To sum up then: whereas van Buren and Kisiel both claim that 
Heidegger in his early lecture courses rejects Husserlian phenomenology 
in favor of a hermeneutic explication of the historical self-understanding 
of life in order to indicate its groundless self-withdrawing origin, Crowell 
argues that his originary science is basically a faithful elaboration of 
Husserl’s attempt to investigate, by way of intuitive reflection, the 
necessary transcendental structures of our experience.  
      There is, I think, no doubt that both the interpretations related above 
contain truth and highlight existing aspects or tendencies in Heidegger’s 
                                         
170 Crowell 2001, p. 127.  
171 Crowell 2001, p. 5.  
172 Cf. Crowell 2001, p. 130.  
173 In Zahavi 2003b Dan Zahavi provides an interpretation of Heidegger’s early 
Freiburg lecture courses which is very much akin to Crowell’s. Thus Zahavi maintains, 
first, that Heidegger does not give up Husserl’s reflective method but elaborates it in 
the direction of a “non-objectifying and merely accentuating type” of reflection (p. 
170); second, that Heidegger’s goal is to examine the “transcendental structures of 
life” (p. 160) that we “normally live through but fail to notice due to our absorption in 
the surrounding world” (p. 170).   
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early philosophy and that these seem to stand in a strained relationship to 
each other. Yet what should we do about this tension? Should we, as 
Crowell suggests, acknowledge the existence of two conflicting voices in 
Heidegger, and opt for what we consider to be the philosophically 
stronger alternative: “the best lesson to draw.”174 Certainly, at the end of 
the day the philosophical aim of these investigations is to critically 
appropriate whatever is clarifying or true in Heidegger and discard the 
rest. However, the only way to this goal goes through a clarification of 
what is at stake in his thinking, giving rise to the above interpretations. If 
we simply chose between the alternatives above we dogmatically 
presuppose that Heidegger’s project can be reduced to an inconsistent 
vacillation between the two standard philosophical standpoints that it is 
intended to leave behind: rigorous scientific philosophy versus worldview 
philosophy. Hence, in order to clarify and delimit the truth of the two 
interpretations we need to examine more closely the precise sense of the 
above tension in Heidegger’s concrete effort to realize an originary science 
of life. 
 
Phenomenology and History 
 
For Heidegger the question of the relationship between phenomenology 
and history is from the outset an explicit and central theme.  
      During the preceding decades the dichotomy between systematic 
philosophy and historicism had surfaced as an acute philosophical 
problem in the philosophical debate, where prominent philosophers such 
as Rickert175 and Husserl had stood up and defended the systematic 
ambition of philosophy to attain true and universal knowledge against the 
threat of “historicism,” a term largely constructed by the defenders of 
systematic philosophy to designate the perceived contemporary inclination 
to relativize the epistemic knowledge-claims of philosophy or reduce the 
systematic investigations of philosophy to historical surveys of existent 
philosophical standpoints. In his Logos essay from 1911, Husserl thus 
famously argues that philosophy must reject historicism and worldview 
philosophy in order to accomplish its calling as a rigorous science, and 
                                         
174 Crowell 2001, p. 7.  
175 Cf. Rickert 1907. 
80 A Phenomenology of Factical Life
  
 
 
that this can only be done by means of phenomenology, i.e., by means of a 
direct intuition of the essential structures characterizing our experience of 
the world.176  
      Whereas Heidegger emphatically embraces Husserl’s 
phenomenological demand to abide by the given, he does not follow 
Husserl in opposing the systematic ambition of phenomenology to 
historicism. Instead, he proclaims that the very distinction between 
systematics and history is misleading and needs to be overcome. Here is 
how he puts it in the lecture course “Phenomenology and Transcendental 
Philosophy of Value” from the summer of 1919: “For our purposes, 
however, it suffices to refer to the close connection between historical and 
‘systematic’ examination – both are to be overcome!”177 By this, however, 
Heidegger in no way means to collapse the distinction between 
philosophical investigations directed at problems or matters themselves 
and historical investigations only concerned with detecting and mapping 
historical standpoints. His central claim is rather that the systematic 
investigations of phenomenology are themselves intrinsically historical: 
“Phenomenology and historical method; their absolute unity in the purity of the 
understanding of life in and for itself.”178 Or, to quote “Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology”: “History is the true organon of the understanding of life.”179 
Ultimately, Heidegger suggests that the historical character of 
phenomenological understanding is constituted by the fact that “life in and 
for itself” is “historical […] in an absolute sense.”180 
      Yet how should we understand the philosophical implications of the 
idea that the phenomenological understanding deployed by the originary 
science is essentially a historical understanding? So far, the idea is no more 
than a programmatic declaration, a declaration which opens up a set of 
questions. At least on the face of it, the proposed unity of 
                                         
176 For a concise and illuminating account of how the dichotomy of history and 
systematics surfaces and is played out in Dilthey, Rickert, and Husserl, thus setting the 
stage for Heidegger’s early thinking, see Ruin 1994, pp. 37-42. 
177 “Phänomenologie und Transzendentale Wertphilosophie,” in GA 56/57, p. 132: 
“Für unsere Zwecke genügt aber der Hinweis auf einen engen Zusammenhang 
zwischen geschichtlicher und ’systematischer’ Betrachtung: beide sind aufzuheben!” 
178 GA 56/57, p. 125: “Phänomenologie und historische Methode; ihre absolute Einheit in der 
Reinheit des Verstehens des Lebens an und für sich.” 
179 GA 58, p. 256: “Das eigentliche Organon des Lebensverstehens ist die Geschichte.” Cf. 
also GA 58, p. 252. 
180 GA 56/57, p. 21. 
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phenomenological and historical thinking emerges as a deep and 
challenging tension between, on the one hand, Heidegger’s guiding belief 
in intuitive givenness as the ultimate measure of understanding which 
transcends theoretical and historical prejudices, and, on the other hand, his 
proclamation that this intuitive access is itself in some sense rooted in and 
mediated by history. Will Heidegger be able to overcome the tension by 
elaborating a radically hermeneutic thinking, without losing every 
possibility of accounting for the difference between truth and prejudice? 
Or will the tension in the end haunt his thinking as an uncontrolled 
ambivalence? Or something else? 
      In fact, Heidegger’s proclamation of a radical historicization of the 
intuitive method of phenomenology opens up the basic problematic which 
his thinking of phenomenality will henceforth try to address in different 
ways. Let us now turn to examining how this problematic is played out in 
his early lectures.  
 
Heidegger’s Pre-Theoretical Phenomenology 
 
Heidegger’s challenge is to show how an originary science of factical life is 
possible. Such a science, he claims, must in some sense be “pre-
theoretical” or “over-theoretical”:181 it must avoid the traditional tendency 
to theoretically deny, objectify and ground life, and instead, prior to any 
theory, go along with life in its primary pre-theoretical givenness in order 
to articulate its originary structure and sense.  
      In “The Idea of Philosophy” Heidegger confronts the question 
concerning the methodical character of the science of origin through a 
reinterpretation of Husserl’s “principle of all principle,” i.e., his basic 
articulation of the phenomenological demand to purely receive and 
describe “everything that originarily offers itself in the intuition.”182 
According to Heidegger, the very name of the principle – the principle of all 
principles – indicates that it cannot be understood as a theoretical 
principle among others, but rather needs to be conceived as the “originary 
habitus” (Urhabitus) of phenomenology, which precedes all such principles.  
Hence, he writes: 
                                         
181 GA 56/57, p. 96. 
182 Hua III, p. 51: “alles, was sich uns in der ‘Intuition’ originär [...] darbietet.” 
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It is the originary intention of genuine life, the originary attitude of 
experience and life as such, the absolute sympathy with life that is 
identical with the experience. [...] The “rigor” of the scientificity 
awakened in phenomenology gains its originary sense from this 
basic attitude and is incomparable with the “rigor” of derivative 
non-originary sciences.183 
 
In the next winter Heidegger rearticulates the same theme by stating that 
the basic attitude of philosophy consists in “erōs” or a “love of life and 
wisdom”:184 “Erōs is not only a motivational basis for philosophy; the 
philosophical pursuit itself requires that one lets oneself loose into the 
ultimate tendencies of life and returns to its ultimate motives.”185  What 
happens here? 
      Whereas Husserl’s “principle of all principles” strictly speaking focuses 
exclusively on the epistemic rigor of seeing as such – on the necessity of 
strictly seeing what is given and abide by the given – Heidegger inscribes a 
certain “love” or “sympathy” into the core of the phenomenological 
attitude itself, effecting both the motivation and method of philosophy. 
Although he does not specify what he means by “love” and “sympathy,” 
the basic thrust of his move is clear enough.  
      To begin with, the idea that the motivation of philosophy must be 
sought in a love of life suggests that the philosophical problems we 
encounter are not purely intellectual problems that can be clarified or 
answered by way of strict seeing and thinking. Rather, what is at stake in 
the task of understanding the sense of life and reality is from the very 
beginning our ethical-existential will and ability to encounter and face up 
to the demands and difficulties of life. According to Heidegger, the failure 
of theoretical philosophy to account for factical life was thus never just a 
cognitive mistake but rather had the character of flight and denial. As for 
                                         
183 GA 56/57, p. 110: “Es ist die Urintention des wahrhaften Lebens überhaupt, die 
Urhaltung des Erlebens und Lebens als solchen, die absolute, mit dem Erleben selbst 
identische Lebenssympathie. […] Die ‘Strenge’ der in der Phänomenologie erwachten 
Wissenschaftlichkeit gewinnt aus dieser Grundhaltung ihren originären Sinn und ist 
mit der ‘Strenge’ abgeleiteter, nicht-ursprünglicher Wissenschaften nicht vergleichbar.” 
184 GA 58, p. 23. 
185 GA 58, p. 263: “Der ἔρως ist nicht nur ein Motivgrund der Philosophie, sonder die 
philosophische Betätigung selbst verlangt ein sich Loslassen in die letzen Tendenzen 
des Lebens und ein Zurückgehen in seine letzen Motive.” Cf. also GA 58, p. 23. 
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Husserl, the fact that the principle of all principles ultimately amounts to a 
demand for rigorous seeing makes it insufficient to account for the sense 
and motivations of philosophical problems, thus indicating why Husserl is 
bound to submit too easily to the traditional theoretical problematic of 
philosophy.  
      Moreover, Heidegger claims that something like love or sympathy is 
involved in the motivations of philosophy but also in its methodical mode 
of understanding life. This comes to clear expression in his 
reinterpretation of the term “rigor” (Strenge) – Husserl’s key attribute for 
designating the presuppositionless carefulness of seeing and thinking – to 
mean: “intense (angestrengt): purely abandoned to (hingegeben) the genuine 
situations of life.”186 By installing an element of love into the very eye of 
understanding Heidegger claims that the understanding of 
phenomenology must essentially be guided by a sensibility for what is 
significant and important in our primary pre-theoretical experiences, in 
order, then, to trace out and explicate the basic sense-structures of these 
experiences. Conversely, he suggests that no pure intuition of the kind 
proposed by Husserl can ever gain access to and account for what is given 
as important and meaningful in life.  
      Indeed, although I cannot argue it here, I think Heidegger’s points 
constitute important – perhaps the most important – criticisms of Husserl, 
and ultimately help to account for the peculiar way in which his insistence 
on concrete phenomenological description goes hand in hand with a 
certain insensibility to the ethical-existential sense of philosophical 
problems and matters, thus often making his meticulous descriptions of 
the transcendentalia of our intentional experiences powerless to account 
for the truly significance-constituting origins of these experiences. 
      But how is the originary science to proceed concretely? According to 
Heidegger, we primarily live immersed in the specific situations and 
contexts we experience and lack any phenomenal understanding of the 
origin of life. How, then, is it possible to gain access to and articulate the 
originary structure of life? At the end of “The Idea of Philosophy” 
Heidegger suggests that the phenomenological science must take the form 
of an “understanding, hermeneutic intuition” which is able to explicate life 
                                         
186 GA 58, p. 137: “angestrengt: rein hingegeben den echten Lebenssituationen.” 
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without objectifying it. But what is this hermeneutic intuition and how is it 
executed?  
      It is only in “Basic Problems of Phenomenology” that Heidegger 
offers a more detailed account of the concrete methodical route of 
phenomenological understanding. Here he divides the “phenomenological 
method” employed by the originary science into six main steps: (1) The 
first step consists simply in a preliminary “pointing to” (Hinweisen) a 
particular sphere of factical life.187 (2) The second step consists in “gaining 
a foothold in” (Fußfassen) and “going along with” (Mitgehen) the primary 
movement of life “with the utmost vitality and ardor,”188 in order to see 
what we always already experience and understand “without any reflection 
whatsoever.”189 (3) Then follows what Heidegger describes as the “seeing 
ahead, leaping ahead (Vorschauen, Vorausspringen) of the phenomenological 
intuition into the horizons that are given in the life experience itself, into 
the tendencies and motives that lie in the life experience.”190 (4-5) The 
fourth and fifth steps consist in an articulation and interpretation of the 
dominant structural moments of the experience. (6) Finally follows what 
Heidegger calls a “Gestaltgebung,” which articulates the basic structural 
moments of the experience in their unity and reciprocity.191 Moreover, 
Heidegger maintains that during the whole course of phenomenological 
explications the phenomenologist needs to carry out a continuous “critical 
destruction (Destruktion) of the objectivations, which are always ready to 
attach themselves to the phenomena“.192 In so far as we live in a historical 
context of seemingly self-evident theoretical concepts threatening to 
distort our factical experience, it becomes an essential part of the 
phenomenological method to destruct, i.e., attend to and critically delimit 
common theoretical conceptualizations. 
      It seems quite clear to me that Heidegger’s hermeneutic intuition 
basically – as Crowell and Zahavi have claimed – constitutes an 
                                         
187 GA 58, p. 254. 
188 GA 58, p. 254. 
189 GA 58, p. 255. 
190 GA 58, pp. 254f.: “Es folgt das Vorschauen, Vorausspringen der phänomenologischen 
Intuition in die Horizonte, die in der Lebenserfahrung selbst gegeben sind, in die 
Tendenzen und Motive, die in der Lebenserfahrung liegen.” 
191 GA 58, p. 255. 
192 GA 58, p. 255. See also GA 59, pp. 34-38, 182-186. 
 Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Factical Life 85
  
 
 
affirmation and continuation of Husserl’s method of intuitive reflection, 
albeit with some critical qualifications. 
      On the one hand, the phenomenological method of understanding, as 
presented and practiced by Heidegger in his early Freiburg lectures, 
essentially relies on intuition. Hence, the decisive third step of the method 
is described as a “seeing ahead” of the “phenomenological intuition” into 
the tendencies and horizons of the experience in question,” i.e., as an 
intuitive grasp of the basic structures of the experience which it only thus 
becomes possible to describe and articulate. There is – as opposed to what 
van Buren and Kisiel maintain – nothing that indicates that Heidegger 
would as yet envisage the phenomenological understanding as an 
explication of the historical pre-understanding we always already live in, so 
that the structures he describes – e.g. significance, self-world, historicity – 
would amount to so many manifestations of that specific historical 
understanding. On the contrary, he explicitly rejects the idea that 
“everything immediate is mediated” as a Hegelian “absolutization of the 
theoretical,” which can only generate logical or historical constructions. 
Also, the central methodical role ascribed by Heidegger to the “critical 
destruction” in no way threatens the primacy of intuition. The point of the 
destruction is not, as it will be in Being and Time, to lead us back to the 
historical origins of our traditional concepts as an ultimate source of 
understanding, but rather to hold off the theoretical concepts that 
obstruct and distort the possibility of directly seeing and describing our 
pre-theoretical experience.  
      Indeed, during these years Heidegger does not hesitate to describe his 
mode of understanding using the central phenomenological terminology 
of “intuition,” “seeing,” “givenness,” and “evidence.”193 Although he 
stresses that the phenomenological intuition cannot be understood as a 
pure intellectual seeing but centrally involves a love or sympathy which 
allows it to sense and understand the significances of life, he maintains the 
idea of a direct intuitive access to the experientially given which is not 
mediated by, but rather provides our ultimate measure for critically 
examining, our historical preconceptions and prejudices. It is, moreover, 
precisely the notion of a transhistorical intuition which makes it possible 
                                         
193 See, e.g., the following passages: evident/evidence (GA 56/57,  pp. 113f., 126); 
intuition/intuitive (GA 56/57, pp. 217-220; GA 58, pp. 240, 255), and seeing (GA 
56/57, p. 218; GA 58, p. 254). 
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for him to retain the claim to explicate the basic universal structures of our 
pre-experience irrespective of our historical preconceptions. In “The Idea 
of Philosophy” Heidegger, having just described his experience of seeing 
the lectern in the lecture hall, considers the possibility of a Senegalese – he 
uses the racially prejudiced word “Senegalneger” – entering the hall. 
Coming from a non-scientific culture, and not being familiar with 
universities and lecterns, the Senegalese would probably first experience 
the lectern as “a something, ‘which he does not know what to make 
of’.”194 Nevertheless, Heidegger claims, the experience of the Senegalese 
would be characterized by exactly the same sense-structure as his own 
experience: “The significant character of the “equipmental strangeness” 
and the significant character of the “lectern” are absolutely identical in 
their essence.”195  That is to say, the aim of Heidegger’s phenomenological 
descriptions is not to explicate the sense manifested by some specific 
historical context of understanding but to describe, on the basis of 
intuition, the basic structures of pre-theoretical life as such.   
      On the other hand, the phenomenological understanding projected 
and practiced by Heidegger is reflective. To be sure, Heidegger levels hard 
criticism at Husserl’s conception of the phenomenological reduction as a 
reflective turn from the objects of our natural experience to the correlative 
acts of consciousness conceived as the transcendental domain constitutive 
of the sense of the objects. Nonetheless, his own phenomenological 
method retains an essential element of reflection. Holding off the 
temptation to deny and objectify the pre-theoretically given, Heidegger 
insists that the phenomenological understanding must “go along with” the 
primary movement of our pre-theoretical experience in order to explicate 
what we here experience without any reflection. However, the aim of the 
explication is not just to plunge into and repeat this experience. Since, as 
Heidegger argues, we normally tend to be immersed in the particular 
situations we experience,196 the point of the explication is precisely to 
distance ourselves from the particular situation at hand in order to “see 
ahead” into, and explicate the tendencies and structures of, the 
experiences under consideration: “The phenomenological reduction is a 
                                         
194 GA 56/57, p. 72: “mit dem er nichts anzufangen weiß.” 
195 GA 56/57, p. 72: “Das Bedeutungshafte des ‘zeuglichen Fremdseins’ und das 
Bedeutungshafte ‘Katheder’ sind ihrem Wesenskern nach absolut identisch.” 
196 Cf. GA 58, p. 117. 
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going along – such a one in which I am not absorbed.”197 Hence, while 
rejecting Husserl’s notion of reflection as a turn from the what to the what-
cum-how of intentional experience, Heidegger critically appropriates the 
idea of reflection as a pure shift of attention from the particular situations 
experienced to the sense-structures constituting these experiences. The 
point of phenomenological understanding is thus to go along with the pre-
theoretical experience in its primary unity in order to see and articulate 
how such things as world, act, self, history are given as more or less basic 
complementary aspects of the experience in question.198  
       The methodological self-understanding of Heidegger outlined here 
also answers well to the methodical mode of the concrete 
phenomenological descriptions offered throughout his earliest Freiburg 
period. Taking his starting point in our de facto pre-theoretical 
experiences, he persistently attempts to point to and describe the basic 
structures which manifest themselves as constitutive of the experiences in 
question.   
 
Formal Indication 
 
But how should the sense-structures of life grasped by the hermeneutic 
intuition be described and articulated? According to Heidegger, the 
phenomenological descriptions of the originary science must make use of 
non-objectifying indicatory expressions which he calls “formal 
                                         
197 GA 58, p. 162: “Die Phänomenologische Reduktion ein Mitmachen – als ein 
solches, in dem ich nicht aufgehe.” 
198 Cf. Bernet 1990 where Rudolf Bernet articulates Heidegger’s phenomenological 
approach to intentionality as follows “[Heidegger] insists on the fact that the sense of 
phenomenological reduction does not consist in the separation of the ‘intentio’ and the 
‘intentum’, but rather on the contrary, in the letting-be-seen of the being of their 
belonging together. Though it is true that this demands that man tears himself away 
from the entangled involvement in things, this does not mean that he [like Husserl] 
has to take flight in the direction of transcendental subjectivity” (p. 147). Though 
Bernet’s statement is intended as an analysis of Heidegger’s later critique of Husserl in 
“Prolegomena” from 1925, it is more apt as an expression of Heidegger’s early 
Freiburg phenomenology centering on the primary correlation of life and world. 
Indeed, it seems to me that Bernet’s formulation is partly distortive as a description of 
Heidegger’s phenomenology at the time of “Prolegomena” and Sein und Zeit since it 
does not sufficiently take into account  the extent to which Heidegger here anchors 
the intentional correlation in the Dasein’s preceding historical understanding of being.  
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indications” (formale Anzeigen). The term is first presented in “Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology” to account for the special character of 
phenomenological concepts. There, and in the lectures courses of the 
following semesters, we find a handful of scattered and fragmentary 
remarks on the sense of this term.199  
      In recent years Heidegger’ notion of “formal indication” has received 
a lot of attention in the secondary literature.200 It has also been a central 
theme of the discussion of the problem of 
phenomenality/phenomenology. Thus, John van Buren, defending a 
hermeneutic-deconstructive reading, has argued that Heidegger’s formal 
indication is part of his rejection of Husserlian phenomenology. Provided 
that Heidegger’s matter of thinking – which, according to van Buren, is 
the historical Ereignis of being – cannot be intuited as a universal essential 
structure, but is always differentiated into different historical epochs and 
contexts, the function of formal indication is to indicate, always from a 
certain epoch, the non-present differential logic determining all such 
epochs. Hence: “formal indication [...] indicates the matter of thinking in 
its non-presence und unsurveyable difference,” so that it “remains open 
for being kairologically fulfilled and differentiated into an alterity of 
worldviews, principles, historical ages, philosophies, societies, institutions, 
and personal selfworlds.”201 Against this, representatives of the 
                                         
199 My treatment of Heidegger’s notion of “formal indication” will be limited to the 
texts from the period under consideration here, i.e., the period starting at the 
beginning of 1919 and ending in the summer term of 1921. In fact, Heidegger 
provides his most detailed account of this notion in the lecture course 
“Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. Initiation into Phenomenological 
Research” from the winter semester of 1921-22. However, since I believe this course 
is already part of Heidegger’s attempt to reorient his thinking through an 
interpretation of Aristotle – a reorientation that centrally involves a new analysis of the 
historical as-structure of understanding as well as of the question of being, and which, 
accordingly, to some extent modifies the sense of “formal indication” – I will refrain 
from using it as a source here. After that, during his Marburg years and in Being and 
Time, Heidegger continues to make use of the term “formal indication” without 
however explicitly reflecting on its sense anymore. It seems that the last time he uses 
the term is in the lecture course “The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics” 
(Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik) from the winter term 1929-30. Cf. GA 29/30, pp. 421-
435. Cf. also Kisiel 1993, p. 497. 
200 Heidegger’s notion of ”formal indication” has been discussed by, e.g., Dahlstrom 
1994; 2001, pp. 242-252, 436-445; Inkpin 2010; Kisiel 1993; 2010; van Buren 1994a; 
1995; Oudemans 1990; Pöggeler 1989; van Dijk 1991.  
201 van Buren 1995, pp. 158, 165. 
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transcendental phenomenological reading have argued that Heidegger’s 
notion of formal indication does not upset but continues and presupposes 
his commitment to reflective phenomenology.202  
      Let me try to outline the basic aspects of Heidegger’s “formal 
indication” on the basis of his sparse remarks. In “Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology” he introduces the term to account for the special 
character of phenomenological expressions: “The meanings of the words 
are all still completely formal, prejudicing nothing, only suggesting a direction 
– without any definite commitment to it. Perhaps they only serve the 
purpose of letting us return on their path to the originary motives of 
life.”203 In contrast to theoretical concepts, whose meaning is determined 
by certain defining features and by their place in a conceptual network, the 
formal indications of phenomenology function by pointing to the concrete 
experiences and situations in which that which they express is 
experienceable and given. It belongs to their very way of signifying that we 
cannot understand them with reference to some pre-conceived theoretical 
or historical concepts, but rather need to follow in the direction they 
indicate in order to experience and see for ourselves the phenomena thus 
expressed. Formal indications could thus be said to involve  both a 
negative and a positive aspect: on the one hand, to call attention to the 
formally indicative character of the concepts employed means to ward off 
any attempts to determine their meaning in a premature and dogmatic 
way, instead leaving it open and undetermined – “held in abeyance” (in der 
Schwebe gehalten) – until we access the experiences whose sense is at 
stake;204 on the other hand, to make use of formal indications means 
pointing to the concrete experiences in which the signified meaning is 
given and evident.205 As Daniel Dahlstrom lucidly puts it: “[Heidegger] 
regards the ‘formal indication’ as a revisable way of pointing to some 
phenomenon, fixing its preliminary sense and the corresponding manner 
of unpacking it, while at the same time deflecting any ‘uncritical lapse’ into 
                                         
202 For some phenomenological readings of ”formal indication,” see Dahlstrom 1994; 
Crowell 2001, pp. 137-144. 
203 GA 58, p. 3: “Die Wortbedeutungen sind alle noch ganz formal, nichts präjudizierend, 
lassen nur eine Direktion anklingen – ohne Festlegung auf sie –, vielleicht, daß sie nur 
dazu dient, auf ihrem Weg zurückzugehen zu ursprünglichen Motiven des Lebens.” 
204 GA 60, p. 64. 
205 Cf. GA 58, p. 248; GA 59, p. 85; GA 60, pp. 3, 55; GA 9, pp. 9-11. Cf. also GA 61, 
pp. 17-20, 32-34, 141-142.  
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some specific conception that would foreclose pursuit of ‘a genuine sense’ 
of the phenomenon.”206 
      Heidegger’s designation of the expressions of phenomenology as 
“formal” indications is meant to convey not only that they remain open 
and revisable until we experience for ourselves the meaning indicated, but 
also that they do not say anything about the content of the specific 
significances we experience, but exclusively articulate the basic structure 
and sense of the experience qua experience, what Heidegger calls “the pre-
worldly something of life in itself.”207 Moreover, given Heidegger’s view 
that our pre-theoretical experience of the world is always rooted in the 
particular historical situation of the self, the formal indications of the 
sense-structures of life must ultimately call attention to the personal 
experiences of the individual as “the absolute – primordially factical” 
where these structures are given: “The function of calling-attention – from out of 
personal existence and for it – co-determines the structure of the 
concept.”208 
      Heidegger attempts to specify the way in which formal indications are 
able to indicate phenomena by arguing that in contrast to theoretical 
concepts, whose content is defined by their place in a pregiven conceptual 
order, the indicative force of formal indications arises by way of negative 
contrasts with other received concepts. Hence, the fact that the 
phenomenologist continuously says “no” to different alternative concepts 
should not just be understood as a purely negative gesture, since 
“negation” constitutes the “creative force” of expressive concepts.209 
Heidegger calls this peculiar negatively dialectical logic of formal 
indications “diahermeneutics”: “the philosophical dialectic is 
‘diahermeneutics’. Through the overturnings of the understanding and the 
intuition (use of negation) the phenomena are brought to expression.”210 
                                         
206 Dahlstrom 1994, p. 780. 
207 GA 56/57, p. 116: “das vorweltliche Etwas des Lebens an sich.” Cf. also GA 60, 
pp. 63f.; GA 61, pp. 20, 23.  
208 GA 59, p. 197: “Die Funktion des Aufmerksam-machens – von personaler Existenz aus 
und für sie – ist für die Struktur des Begriffs mitbestimmend.” 
209 GA 58, p. 240. 
210 GA 58, p. 263: “die philosophische Dialektik ist ‘Diahermeneutik’. Durch die 
Umkippungen des Verstehens and Anschauens (Verwendung der Negation) kommen 
die Phänomene zum Ausdruck.” 
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      Now on the basis of the above explication it seems clear to me that 
Heidegger’s notion of formal indication does not in any way unsettle the 
absolute primacy he ascribes to direct intuition in his phenomenological 
method. To begin with, he emphatically underscores that the 
phenomenological intuition precedes and conditions every description and 
linguistic expression of the given: “I can indeed only describe, when I 
have already seen.”211 Furthermore, his concrete articulation of the central 
aspects of formal indications all build on the fact that the meaning of 
these indications is not determinable with reference to any theoretical or 
historical preconceptions we might have, but resides solely in their ability 
to point to concrete phenomenal experiences. Neither is the primacy of 
intuition threatened by Heidegger’s idea that the expressive force of 
formal indications arises out of negative dialectical contrasts. The central 
point of the argument is not that the meaning of formal indications would 
be determined by such dialectical contrasts but, rather, that this dialectics 
makes it possible for the expressions to point to our concrete experiences 
as the ultimate autonomous source of meaning which specifies and revises 
our preconceptions. Indeed, having just stressed the central role of 
negation in phenomenological expressions Heidegger adds: “All 
understanding is enacted in the intuition. From this fact originates the 
descriptive character of phenomenological work.”212 
      This said, however, there is also a sense in which Heidegger’s 
reflections on formal indication raise some fundamental questions about 
the character of phenomenological intuition, more precisely about the 
central phenomenological idea that it is possible to intuit universal and 
necessary structures of meaning.  
      To see this it is crucial to note that Heidegger’s remarks on the 
indicative concepts of phenomenology are from the outset stirred by his 
critique of Husserl’s idea of phenomenology as a science of “essences.”213 
As mentioned above, Heidegger believes Husserl’s notion of essential 
intuition is modeled on the paradigm of general theoretical concepts in 
such a way that Husserl dogmatically presupposes that our experiences 
                                         
211 GA 56/57, p. 217: “ich kann doch erst beschreiben, wenn ich bereits gesehen 
habe.”  
212 GA 58, p. 240: “Alles Verstehen vollzieht sich in der Anschauung. Daher rührt der 
deskriptive Character des phänomenologischen Arbeitens.” 
213 Cf. GA 58, pp. 237, 240.  
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exhibit necessary and universal structures of meaning which can be 
articulated and defined by the concepts of phenomenology. By stressing 
that the concepts employed by phenomenology are referred to our factical 
particular experiences as their ultimate source of meaning, Heidegger 
raises the question of how the explication of these experiences – in their 
historical facticity and particularity – can ever grant an understanding of 
necessary and universal structures of meaning. However, as far as I can 
see, Heidegger’s remarks on formal indication are quite insufficient to 
account for the tension between the idea of factical historical life as the 
source of phenomenological understanding, and the idea of 
phenomenology as a science of essential structures. Although Heidegger 
stresses the need to return to our concrete factical experiences as the 
primary domain of givenness, it seems that these experiences are still 
basically conceived of as the particular site or place where the originary 
universal structures of life manifest themselves – without the structures 
themselves becoming historicized or relativized.  
      In the following years, Heidegger will develop a new analysis of the 
historical structure of phenomenality, according to which all our 
experience and understanding of meaning is anchored in the historical pre-
understanding of being in which we always already live. As a result, 
Heidegger’s early attempt to reflect on how it is possible to intuitively 
explicate the basic structures of life through attending to our particular 
factical experiences gives way to a reconception of the method of 
phenomenology in terms of a destructive explication of our historical pre-
understanding of being.  
 
The Originary Structure of Life 
 
The aim of Heidegger’s originary science it to explicate the origin of 
factical life – its originary structure and sense. What does he find?  
     Heidegger ends “The Idea of Philosophy” by articulating the theme of 
his originary science as the “originary something” (Ur-etwas) of life: the 
“basic character” of pre-theoretical life as such, prior to and irrespective of 
the specific world we happen to live in.214 He articulates the sense of the 
originary something as follows: “Life is in itself motivated and tendential; 
                                         
214 GA 56/57, pp. 218f. Cf. also GA 56/57, pp. 115f. 
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motivating tendency, tending motivation. The basic character of life is to 
live toward something, to world out (auswelten) into particular experiential 
worlds.”215 Hence, the basic character of life is said to consist precisely in 
the fact that it is fundamentally referred to and “worlds out into” 
particular historical worlds. As such, Heidegger maintains, the originary 
something constitutes an “index of the highest potentiality of life” since to 
understand it in the end amounts to transparently taking over the factical 
world we live in as the groundless self-sufficient predicament that it is.216   
      However, how should this preliminary dense projection of the 
originary sense of life be understood concretely? 
      In “Basic Problems of Phenomenology” Heidegger works out a more 
detailed description of the basic structure of phenomenal life. Here – as 
we saw above – he explicates pre-theoretical life in terms of three main 
aspects: first, we always experience and live into a worldly context of 
significances; second, these significances are expressed and manifest in 
accordance with the ways in which we experience them; third this 
experience of significance is ultimately anchored in the “self-world,” i.e., in 
the particular historical situation of the experiencing self. Towards the end 
of the course, the originary structure of factical life is then rearticulated in 
terms of three sense-directions: “content-sense” (Gehaltssinn), “relation-
sense” (Bezugssinn) and “enactment-sense” (Vollzugssinn).217 This scheme is 
developed during the following terms and constitutes Heidegger’s basic 
conception of the structure of phenomenality up to the winter of 1921-22. 
Let me quote a passage from the lecture course “Introduction to the 
Phenomenology of Religion” in which Heidegger spells out this structure 
as the totality of sense constituting every “phenomenon”:  
 
What is phenomenology? What is phenomenon? Here this can be 
itself indicated only formally. Each experience – as experiencing and 
as experienced – can “be taken in the phenomenon,” that is to say, 
one can ask: 1. After the originary “what,” that is experienced 
therein (content). 2. After the originary “how,” in which it is 
experienced (relation). 3. After the originary “how,” in which the 
                                         
215 GA 56/57, p. 218: “das Leben [ist] in sich motiviert und [hat] Tendenz; 
motivierende Tendenz, tendierende Motivation: Grundcharakter des Lebens, zu etwas 
hin zu leben, in bestimmte Erlebniswelten auszuwelten.” 
216 GA 56/57, p. 115: “Index für die höchste Potentialität des Lebens.” 
217 GA 58, p. 261. 
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relation-sense is enacted (enactment). But these three directions of 
sense (content-, relation-, enactment-sense) do not simply coexist. 
“Phenomenon” is the totality of sense in these three directions. 
“Phenomenology” is the explication of this totality of sense; it gives 
the “logos” of the phenomena.218 
 
That is to say, “content-sense” denotes the significances that show up as 
parts of our world, “relation-sense” denotes our ways of experiencing and 
relating to these significances, and “enactment-sense” refers to the way in 
which the individual self enacts these unitary experiences of significance. 
The first two sense-directions – content-sense and relation-sense – can be 
understood as rephrasings of Husserl’s concepts of noema and noesis, with 
special emphasis laid on their irreducible unity in our pre-theoretical 
experience. However, the crucial addendum of Heidegger’s analysis is his 
thesis that the content- and relational-sense of the experience is centered 
in the enactment-sense, in the way the particular self enacts the 
experiences: “The relation-sense is [...] itself already the sense of an 
enactment, in which a self is present.”219 
      What might this mean, however? The critical engagement with Husserl 
makes it necessary for Heidegger to reject the impending misreading of 
this thesis in terms of a turn to transcendental subjectivity, and to reopen 
the question of what “special, yet not transcendentally deflectable and 
absolutizable role”220 the self may be said to play in our factical life-
experience. It no longer seems possible to postulate transcendental 
subjectivity as the basic experiential domain in which the significances of 
life appear, determining their basic sense as “significance for a subject.”221 
                                         
218 GA 60, p. 63: “Was ist Phänomenologie? Was ist Phänomen? Dies kann hier nur 
selbst formal angezeigt werden. – Jede Erfahrung – als Erfahren wie als Erfahrenes – 
kann ‘ins Phänomen genommen werden’, d.h. es kann gefragt werden: 1. nach dem 
ursprünglichen ‘Was, das in ihm erfahren wird (Gehalt), 2. nach dem ursprünglichen 
‘Wie’, in dem es erfahren wird (Bezug), 3. nach dem ursprünglichen ‘Wie’ in dem der 
Bezugssinn vollzogen wird (Vollzug). Diese drei Sinnrichtungen (Gehalts-, Bezugs, 
Vollzugssinn) stehen aber nicht einfach nebeneinander. ‘Phänomen’ ist Sinnganzheit 
nach diesen drei Richtungen. ‘Phänomenologie’ ist Explikation dieser Sinnganzheit, sie 
gibt den ‘λόγος’ der Phänomene.” 
219 GA 58, p. 260: “Der Bezugssinn ist [...] selbst schon Sinn eines Vollzugs, eines 
Dabeiseins des Selbst.” 
220 GA 58, p. 136: “besondere, aber nicht transzendentalphilosophisch umbiegbare und 
verabsolutisierbare Rolle.” 
221 GA 58, p. 232. 
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How should we then understand Heidegger’s claim that the pre-theoretical 
experience is centered in the self who enacts the experience – a self which 
is said to be always particular and historical?  
      In the last hours of “Basic Problems of Phenomenology” Heidegger 
makes a final attempt to explicate how the experiencing self “has” or 
“enacts” its life: “We try to understand how life experiences itself, [...] how 
it takes itself, has itself, and fulfills itself in this having.”222 Eventually he 
manages to outline what he calls an “originary articulation (ursprüngliche 
Artikulation) of life”223 in which our life-experience is supposed to be 
centered. As we go along with our pre-theoretical experience, he claims, 
we find that we primarily enact our experiences without any awareness of 
an I-subject. Still, before any reflection on the subject of the experiences, 
we already “have ourselves” in a peculiar way. What Heidegger discovers 
here is the “character of familiarity” (Charakter des Vertrautsein) in which 
the significances experienced always and essentially present themselves to 
us:224  
 
I live in contexts of significance, which are self-sufficient in scope. 
What is experienced addresses us (spricht an), but in a way that is 
always familiar to us in some way. It is itself such that it also always 
concerns me somehow, that I am present there (daß ich dabei bin). 
Somehow, I have myself there.225 
 
According to Heidegger, a basic structural feature of our primary factical 
experience is that the significances address and concern us as familiar. 
When something shows up as significant for us, this always involves its 
being familiar in a double sense: first, the significant matter is something 
that we recognize as always already familiar and intelligible; second, it is 
something that addresses us as belonging to us as our own matter (or, as 
Heidegger puts it, what the self experiences as significant “expresses” the I 
                                         
222 GA 58, p. 156: “Wir versuchen zu verstehen wie Leben sich selbst erfährt, […] sich 
lebendig nimmt, hat und in diesem haben sich erfüllt.” 
223 GA 58, p. 158. 
224 GA 58, p. 157. 
225 GA 58, p. 157: “Ich lebe in Bedeutsamkeitszusammenhänge selbstgenügsamen 
Ausmaßes; das Erfahrene spricht an, aber in einer Weise, die uns simmer irgendwie 
vertraut ist. Es selbst ist so, daß es auch immer irgendwie angeht, daß ich dabei bin. 
Ich habe mich dabei selbst irgendwie.” 
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(drückt mich aus).226 This original familiarity cannot be understood as the 
result of a particular subject's having acquainted itself with chosen parts of 
the surrounding world, which now, as a consequence, appear as familiar; 
rather, the fundamental character of familiarity which Heidegger has in 
mind determines and delimits in advance what may address the self as 
significant at all. Since our world always encounters us as our own familiar 
context of significance, it also functions as an expression of who we are. 
Hence, it becomes possible to clarify the non-subjectifying sense of 
Heidegger’s initial thesis that life is centered in the enactment of the 
individual self: the life-world is, to be sure, always the world of a particular 
self; this self, however, is nothing before or beside the factical context of 
significance which has always already addressed it as its own world: “‘I 
myself’ am a context of significance, in which I live.”227  
      According to Heidegger, this basic character of familiarity becomes 
conspicuous precisely in such situations where we become distanced from 
it. He gives two examples: the experience of remembering something and 
the experience of encountering something new or alien. Thus, Heidegger 
argues, when I remember some event or experience from my past this past 
experience essentially meets me as something familiar that belongs to me 
and expresses me.228 Likewise, when I am surprised by something new or 
unknown I experience an inhibition of my habitual everyday familiarity 
with my world, whereby this familiarity becomes striking to me in its very 
removal.229 
      The ultimate upshot of Heidegger’s explication of the familiarity of 
every experienced significance is that factical life takes on the basic 
character of historical “destiny” (Schicksal). Granted that the world always 
already addresses me as the familiar context of significance that 
determines me – before and as a condition for my being able to 
experience something as intelligible and important at all – this implies that 
it addresses me as a destiny: “an originary circle of familiarity [grace, 
calling, destiny].”230 As noticed earlier Heidegger from the very beginning 
                                         
226 GA 58, pp. 158f. 
227 GA 58, p. 248: “‘Ich selbst’ bin ein Bedeutsamkeitszusammenhang, in dem ich 
selbst lebe.” 
228 GA 58, pp. 158f., 252. 
229 GA 58, p. 251.  
230 GA 58, p. 167: “urspünglicher Vertrautheitskreis [Gnade, Berufung, Schicksal].” Cf. 
also GA 58, p. 259. 
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of the Freiburg years had insisted on the historical character of life and on 
the “absolute unity” of the phenomenological and historical method.231 
Still, up to this point this idea had amounted to nothing more than a 
programmatic declaration of intent. The analysis of the character of 
familiarity constitutes nothing less than his first and last attempt during 
these years to offer a concrete determination of the basic “historicity” or 
“facticity” of life.232 “History,” he says, “is here [...] understood [...] in 
terms of the familiarity of life with itself and its abundance”:233 
 
These characters of familiarity, which are expressive of myself [...] 
also designate the unaccented place of motivation (Motivstelle) in 
factical life, which motivates how all comprehension of the 
relations of life must let itself be addressed by life itself and its 
abundance, by its history.234   
 
To sum up, then: to say that life is essentially “historical” or “factical” is to 
say that the world we primarily experience does not have the character of 
an ahistorical reality that could be objectively and universally registered 
and described. Instead, it amounts to a specific finite historically 
transmitted context of significance, which constitutes an absolute and self-
sufficient sphere that cannot be founded on some supposedly deeper or 
more secure theoretical ground. In the end, Heidegger claims that his 
analysis of the originary structure of life as historical determines the “basic 
sense of ‘existence’” (Grundsinn von ‘Existenz’). Granted that the primary 
givenness of pre-theoretical factical life constitutes the basis for all 
understanding of the meaning of entities, then the explication of the 
originary structure of this givenness amount to an explication of sense of 
                                         
231 GA 56/57, pp. 21, 125, 258. 
232 Cf. Kisiel 1986-87 for an account of the historical roots and development of the 
concept of facticity in Heidegger’s early thinking. 
233 GA 58, p. 252: “Geschichte ist hier [...] verstanden [...] als Vertrautsein des Lebens 
mit sich selbst und seiner Fülle.” 
234 GA 58, p. 159: “Diese Charaktere des mich selbst ausdrückenden Vertrautseins [...] 
bezeichnen zugleich die unabgehobene, im faktischen Leben selbst liegende 
Motivstelle dafür, wie alle Erfassung der Lebensbezüge des Lebens sich ansprechen 
lassen muß aus dem Leben selbst und seiner Fülle, seiner Geschichte.” 
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being as such: “From here the sense of reality of all the strata of life 
becomes understandable.”235 
 
An Intuitive Phenomenology of Historical Life? 
 
Heidegger’s analysis of the historicity of our pre-theoretical experience 
obviously complicates the question of the relationship between intuition 
and history in his early Freiburg lecture courses. Above I stated that 
Crowell and Zahavi were right in claiming that Heidegger’s 
phenomenological method of understanding basically amounts to an 
intuitive reflection on the basic structures of experience. Now, using this 
method, Heidegger claims that the fundamental structural aspect of life 
consists in the fact that the experienced world is always already given as a 
particular historical destiny – which seems to confirm the interpretation 
presented by van Buren and Kisiel.  
      How should this peculiar tension between intuition and history be 
understood?  
      Ultimately, I think it cannot be understood at all within the framework 
of Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures, but cuts right through this frame as 
a fundamental and uncontrolled ambivalence running between his 
conception of the structure of the phenomenality of factical life and his 
phenomenological explication of that very structure. On the one hand, the 
entire project of an originary science of life starts from and critically 
elaborates Husserl’s phenomenological method, retaining as a decisive 
methodical moment the idea of direct intuitive reflection. In his 
explications of the origin of life, Heidegger from first to last makes use of 
intuitive descriptions of different experiences in order to bring out the 
basic structural elements constitutive of these experiences. Hence, 
everything Heidegger has to say about the historical and factical character 
of life emerges as universal features of life as such. On the other hand, his 
analyses of the basic structures of life lead him to the result that our pre-
theoretical experience is fundamentally historical, in as much as the 
phenomenal significances we experience are essentially given as a finite 
historical destiny. All the way through his earliest lectures, these divergent 
                                         
235 GA 58, p. 261: “Von hier wird der Sinn der Wirklichkeit in allen Schichten des 
Lebens verständlich.”  
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viewpoints collide with each other, engendering questions that Heidegger 
cannot answer. If we take the idea of the radical historicity of pre-
theoretical phenomenality seriously, it clearly challenges Heidegger’s trust 
in the method of intuitive reflection: If the basic condition for 
experiencing something as meaningful is that it presents itself as 
historically familiar, how could philosophical understanding itself be 
exempt from that condition? How could it claim, always basing itself on 
particular historical contexts of factical experiences, to access and describe 
the universal structures characterizing factical experience as such? At the 
same time, Heidegger holds on to the idea of intuition as the critical 
methodical moment that sustains his own explications and hinders them 
from collapsing into historico-theoretical constructions. Indeed, if the 
phenomenological intuition would be nothing but an explication of the 
historical world we happen to live in – how should the critical moment of 
evident givenness then be understood, and what would grant this 
understanding its force and its hold over and above our received historical 
prejudices? 
      Heidegger cannot answer these questions. 
      In the end, it seems to me that the ambivalence between intuition and 
history disrupting Heidegger’s early lectures derives from the basic 
insufficiency of his attempt to account for the historical structure of 
experience. Although Heidegger, as if driven by a strong yet unclear 
impulse, both wills and programmatically declares the historicity of life – 
and, eventually, meaningful being as such – he is still unable to articulate 
how history works at the center of our phenomenal understanding.236  
                                         
236 In Ruin 1994 Hans Ruin argues that Heidegger in his early Freiburg lectures is 
already engaged in an attempt to reflect on the way in which our access to the given is 
historically mediated and self-reflective in a fundamental way. Heidegger, Ruin claims, 
gives up Husserl’s trust in an “original intuition” (p. 48) , instead bringing out and 
elaborating the historicity inherent in the very movement of phenomenological 
explication: “there is a circular temporality inscribed in the method itself, in that the 
phenomenological reflection establishes an origin through a recapitulating enactment 
of previous intentional accomplishments” (p. 51). Ultimately, Heidegger is said to 
open the thought that “history, as that which is past, and thus non-present, is 
incorporated into a supposedly present givenness” (p. 48). However, is seems to me 
that Ruin is downplaying Heidegger’s fundamental problems with actually accounting 
for the historicity of thinking beyond his programmatic declarations. In fact, it could 
perhaps be seen as a symptom of this that Ruin’s interpretation appears to vacillate 
between a weaker and a bolder claim. On the one hand, he claims that Heidegger 
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   Heidegger explicates the structure of phenomenality in terms of the 
unity of the significances we experience – the content-sense – and our ways 
of experiencing them – the relation-sense – whereby the experience-of-
significance is always centered in the situation of the particular historical 
self that enacts it. Above we saw how Heidegger’s emphasis on the unity of 
the content- and relation-sense of our pre-theoretical experience was 
meant to overcome Husserl’s tendency to detach and hierarchize the 
noematic and noetic correlata of intentional experience. It is only by 
radically commencing from the pre-theoretical experience in its unity that 
we may detect such aspects as object, act, subject as more or less basic and 
interrelated features of that experience. Thus far, however, the analysis 
says nothing about the historicity of experience.  
      Heidegger then introduces the theme of historicity in terms of the 
particular self’s enactment of the experience-of-significance. However, this 
move comes so late in the argument that it becomes hard for it to 
substantiate the radical concept of historicity that he is aiming at. As long 
                                                                                                                      
conceives of the phenomenological explication as a thematizing enactment of previous 
experiences.  
This is clearly correct, yet as far as I can see it does not imply any radical 
historicization of thought. The fact that our experiences are always already there as the 
factical ground of every explication does not mean that they are historical in the strong 
sense of constituting the particular historical tradition in which we are situated; rather, 
it only implies that they are the contingent experiences that we humans happen to 
have, such as love, memory, pain, anxiety. This does not shut out the possibility – 
exploited by Heidegger himself – of intuitively reflecting on their necessary and 
universal structures. On the other hand, Ruin advances the bolder claim that “[the 
subject] understands its history by being that history, and it is that history in 
understanding it” (p. 64). However, this claim does not follow from the first, and 
Heidegger does not yet open up the notion of thinking as a retrieval of previous 
historically transmitted meanings. Rather, whereas the significances encountered in 
our experiences are considered historical, the phenomenological explication essentially 
unfolds as an intuitive reflection on the universal features of the pre-theoretical 
experiences as such. Still, although I think Ruin exaggerates the degree to which 
Heidegger historicizes phenomenology in his early  Freiburg lectures, he is clearly 
more aware than van Buren and Kisiel of the gap between Heidegger’s historical 
program and his concrete work: “The conceptual transformation is obvious; from the 
strict subordination of historical matters to a philosophical systematic, to the 
‘historical’ characterization of the very aim of the systematic approach. But if we turn 
to the level of the actual philosophical content the development is much more difficult 
to assess” (p. 69f.). For an illuminating discussion of the distinction between the 
factical as a designation of the contingent character of our experiences and the factical 
as a designation of their historically situated and changeable nature, see Crowell 2002. 
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as the historicity of life transpires at the level of the individual self’s 
enactment of meanings it is hard to see how this figure of thought could 
overcome the traditional division between universal ahistorical possibilities 
of meaning and the individual self’s historically situated actualization of 
these meanings. To break with this scheme Heidegger would have to show 
that the content- and relation-sense of our experience are fundamentally 
determined by their historical enactment-sense, so that there would strictly 
speaking be no possible senses to enact prior to the particular historical 
enactment. Pursuing this line of thought, however, would mean 
dethroning enactment as the master concept for thinking historicity, and 
opening the question of how the individual self is situated in and 
addressed by a historical context of meaning which always already guides 
its possibilities of understanding both itself and its world.   
      Heidegger’s only concrete attempt to account for the historicity of 
phenomenal meaning – his analysis of the character of familiarity 
supposedly pertaining to all experienceable significances – appears quite 
inadequate to its task. To be sure, there is a sense in which the matters we 
experience appear meaningful and intelligible precisely owing to their 
being familiar parts of the historical context we live in. However, 
Heidegger offers no analysis of why – no account of the structure due to 
which – such familiarity would constitute a necessary condition for 
experiencing things as meaningful. For example, he does not yet claim – as 
van Buren and Kisiel erroneously do – that our experience of something 
as a meaningful phenomenon is always already determined by our 
historical pre-understanding of being. Hence, although the analysis of 
familiarity points in the direction of Heidegger’s later conception of the 
historical as-structure of experience, taken on its own it remains weak and 
incapable of answering the objections it gives rise to. For example, why 
would familiarity be a necessary criterion for experiencing something as 
meaningful? Is not our normal familiar understanding often prejudiced 
and distortive? What is it that allows me to distinguish the prejudices from 
the truths of our familiar understanding if not some sort of direct seeing 
of the matters in question, which transcends the familiar? In encountering 
new and unfamiliar things – do we really experience these as essentially 
unintelligible? Even if such encounters, for example with a person from an 
alien culture, might at first be bewildering in so far as parts of the behavior 
of the other person are not readily explained by my familiar understanding 
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of things, might they not also offer an occasion for transcending and 
critically questioning the prejudices of that understanding?   
      Let me try to sum up the constellation then.   
      In his early Freiburg lecture courses, Heidegger remains trapped in the 
ambivalence between his effort to elaborate Husserl’s reflective intuitive 
phenomenological method and his will to open up a radically historical 
conception of phenomenality. Lacking a viable account of the nature and 
place of historicity in our phenomenal experience he is unable to show in 
what sense the world is given as fundamentally historical, to say nothing of 
how the philosophical understanding itself could be conceived as an 
explication of such a historical understanding. The transcendental 
phenomenological interpretation developed by Crowell and Zahavi 
correctly highlights the intuitive-reflective character of Heidegger’s 
phenomenological method. In so doing, however, it downplays his driving 
desire to explicate the radical historicity of life, and the potential 
challenges this venture poses to the idea of an intuition-based 
phenomenology. The hermeneutic-deconstructive reading of van Buren 
and Kisiel does the reverse. While emphasizing Heidegger’s programmatic 
declaration of the historicity of life it is blind to his basic and concrete 
commitment to a Husserlian phenomenological method. Although both 
interpretations are one-sided, overlooking the ambivalence of Heidegger’s 
thought, I think it is fair to say that the phenomenological interpretation 
of this period is more rewarding since it captures more of the concrete 
philosophical work he is doing.  
 
1.5 Life and the Task of Philosophy 
 
I will end this part by reflecting on Heidegger’s effort – so central to his 
early Freiburg lectures – to articulate the task of philosophy in life. Having 
hitherto focused on the epistemic method and results of his originary 
science, the question I now want to raise concerns the existential 
motivation and purpose of such a science. What role can a philosophical 
science of life play in our lives?  
      The question of the existential task of philosophy is for Heidegger 
from the outset intimately linked to the question of phenomenality, and 
will continue to be so doing his entire path of thought. In the early
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Freiburg years, the question arises in the following form. If, as Heidegger 
claims, our factical pre-theoretical experience constitutes our primary open 
and self-sufficient access to the realm of significance – and neither need 
be nor can be theoretically grounded by philosophy – what task, if any, 
remains for philosophy as an originary science of life? 
 
Two Interpretations 
 
In view of the challenge that, I think, Heidegger’s radical emphasis on the 
self-sufficiency of our pre-theoretical life poses to the long-standing 
ambition of philosophy to overcome the naivety of everyday life by 
clarifying the basic structures of life and being, it is striking that most 
commentators tend to see his originary science as a straightforward 
continuation and radicalization of precisely that tradition. For example, 
although offering almost diametrically opposed interpretations of the 
theme and method of Heidegger’s early Freiburg thinking, Steven Crowell 
and John van Buren basically agree that he carries on the traditional quest 
for the basic structures of meaningful being – be it in the form of a 
phenomenological explication of the transcendental structures of 
experience or in the form of a thinking of the historical event of being.  
      According to Crowell, Heidegger is wholeheartedly guided by the 
traditional goal of philosophy to carry out “categorial research.”237 Giving 
no weight to Heidegger’s accentuation of the self-sufficiency of pre-
theoretical life or to his questioning of the existential motives of 
philosophy, he argues that the “‘existential’ issues” surfacing in 
Heidegger’s lecture courses gain their “systematic sense” from his 
methodological notion that only phenomenological reflection on our 
concrete experiences can provide access to the space of meaning.238 
Instead, Crowell claims that Heidegger, just like Husserl, discovers the 
motivation of philosophy in life’s orientation toward “genuine seeing”: “in 
Husserl’s terms, the orientation toward fulfillment adumbrated in every 
intention.”239 The task of philosophy is, then, none other than to realize 
our aspiration to ultimate and evidently grounded self-understanding by 
                                         
237 Crowell 2001, p. 125.  
238 Crowell 2001, p. 131; cf. also p. 136.  
239 Crowell 2001, p. 136. 
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overcoming the limited perspective of “naive life”240 – in which we are 
oriented “towards entities through meaning” – and reflectively clarifying the 
structures of meaning that always already organize our primarily naive 
experience. Thus, Crowell states, reformulating the dream that has always 
tended to set philosophy in motion: “philosophy is […] life’s own 
homecoming.”241 Although van Buren’s hermeneutic-deconstructive 
interpretation of the early Heidegger is opposed to Crowell’s 
phenomenological reading he shares the latter’s view of the existential 
motivation and task of philosophy. Hence, in van Buren’s story the young 
Heidegger is presented as an “heir to the Greek prote philosophia,” an heir 
which radicalizes the traditional quest for the ground or arche of being in 
the direction of its “anarchic arche”:242 the “a priori of temporality, 
difference, finitude.”243 Even if van Buren never tires of stressing the 
groundlessness and finitude of being he endorses, without further 
question, the view that the task of philosophy is to reach a qualified – 
though finite, differential – understanding of the anarchic event of being, 
an understanding capable of guiding our lives in the form a “post-
metaphysical ethics of ecumenism.”244 
      In contrast to Crowell and van Buren, Theodore Kisiel appears more 
attentive to Heidegger’s incessant questioning of the existential roots of 
philosophy in factical life. Highlighting Heidegger’s constant emphasis on 
the primacy of our pre-theoretical experience and his critique of the 
traditional effort of philosophy to ground and articulate it theoretically, 
Kisiel argues that Heidegger’s sense of philosophy is essentially 
“phronetic.”245 Since the goal of the philosophical science of origin is 
none other than to “serve life,”246 the purpose of its understanding and 
formal indications is not to achieve a science of life for its own sake, but 
to “smooth the way toward intensifying the sense of the immediate in 
which we find ourselves.”247 Hence, what Kisiel seems to suggest is that 
Heidegger’s rejection of the possibility of philosophy to ground or deepen 
                                         
240 Crowell 2001, p. 146; cf. also p. 136.  
241 Crowell 2001, p. 145.  
242 van Buren 1994a, p. 243.  
243 van Buren 1994a, p.219. 
244 van Buren 1994a, p. 41.  
245 Kisiel 1993, p. 270. 
246 Kisiel 1993, p. 59. 
247 Kisiel 1993, p. 59. 
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our factical pre-theoretical understanding of life makes him think that the 
existential function of philosophical understanding ultimately consists in 
its phronetic ability to lead the individual self back from its theoretical 
alienation to its self-sufficient context of life.  
      So what is the truth of these interpretations? Is the first interpretation 
wrong and the other right? Or should they rather – as I will suggest – be 
conceived as partial, not fully clarified truths, arising from the interpreter’s 
one-sided focus on either side of an ambivalence at the center of 
Heidegger’s early thought? 
 
The Question of the Motivation of Philosophy 
 
Heidegger from the outset launches his early Freiburg philosophy as a 
science of the origin of life. In so doing, he uncritically and without 
further question adopts the traditional idea that the task of philosophy is, 
in some sense, to learn to know the basic structure and sense of 
meaningful reality. This hasty jump to the idea of an originary science can, 
in retrospect, be seen as an indication of the fact that during these years he 
will be unable to offer a convincing account of how the problem of origin 
is encountered in life as a decisive existential problem. Nevertheless, as the 
originary science unfolds, the question of the motivation of philosophy 
soon emerges as an urgent and uncircumventable question – a question 
that will prove hard to answer.  
      As we have seen, Heidegger develops his originary science as a 
phenomenological explication of the basic structures of our pre-theoretical 
experience-of-significance, anchoring it in the historical situation of the 
particular self. In opposition to theoretical philosophy, which promises to 
offer a theoretical ground for our seemingly naive and prejudiced pre-
theoretical experience, he claims that it is precisely this experience that 
constitutes our primary and self-sufficient access to the realm of 
significance. However, as Heidegger rejects the theoretical self-
understanding of philosophy he also deprives it of its traditional 
motivation. From the viewpoint of theoretical philosophy, pre-theoretical 
life appears as a naive form of theoretical knowledge dominated by 
concepts that it lacks the means to verify. Hence, theoretical philosophy 
emerges as the much-needed task of grounding the concepts that normally 
guide our understanding in a prejudiced way. If, however, our pre-
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theoretical experience provides access to the realm of significance and 
contains its own measures for understanding and judging the significances 
we experience, then philosophy can no longer uphold its central promise 
of critically questioning and justifying factical life on the basis of a 
privileged understanding of its ground or origin. Provided that every 
meaningful question “receives its answer within the structural form of life 
in itself,”248 the motivation of philosophy becomes doubtful. What could a 
philosophical science of origin possibly hope to find that would not 
amount to “primordial grounds and unrealities, from which I […] derive 
factical life as such”?249 
      Heidegger’s radical emphasis on the self-sufficiency of factical life and 
his critique of theoretical philosophy thus makes the question of the 
motivation of philosophy urgent: “For philosophy, the philosophical 
experience of life is motivated out of life itself. One must take seriously 
the motivation of the philosophical method of understanding out of life 
itself.”250 The challenge facing Heidegger is, then, to show how the task of 
understanding the origin is motivated by our factical life itself.  
      One thing is clear; philosophy cannot hope to attain a better – deeper 
and more secure – understanding of the significances of our life-world 
than that which is given within our factical experience itself. However, 
Heidegger claims, there is one crucial matter concerning which life is not 
self-sufficient: “The phenomenon of ‘self-sufficiency’ cannot itself be seen 
within life as such, as long as we remain therein.”251 That is, as long as we 
enact the primary movement of factical life in a straightforward way the 
significances we encounter are given in a self-evident way; yet in so doing 
we lack any experience of the basic character of life as self-sufficient, as 
our originary factical domain of significance. In so far as life is confronted 
with the philosophical question concerning its own ontological sense, it 
                                         
248 GA 58, p. 43: “Jede Fraglichkeit also (nicht nur theoretisch-wissenschaftliche) 
erhält ihre Antwort in der Strukturform des Lebens an sich.” 
249 GA 58, p. 37: “Urgründe und Irrealitäten, aus denen ich [...] das faktisch Leben an 
sich ableite.” 
250 GA 58, pp. 253f.: “Die philosophische Erfahrung des Lebens selbst ist für die 
Philosophie aus dem Leben selbst motiviert. Es ist Ernst zu machen mit der 
Motivierung der philosophischen Methode des Verstehens überhaupt aus dem Leben 
selbst.” Cf. also GA 59, p. 149.  
251 GA 58, p. 41: “Das Phänomen der ‘Selbst-genügsamkeit’ selbst kann innerhalb des 
Lebens an sich, im Verbleiben innerhalb seiner, nicht gesehen werden.”  
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lacks the phenomenal ground for answering this question. Confronted 
with the question of origin, life is thus in the first place forced either to 
retreat into a naive absolutization of its own life-world as a kind of 
unquestionable universal reality,252 or succumb to the traditional 
philosophical demand for theoretical grounding. As a result of this 
phenomenal deficit of factical life, an originary science is called for.  
      According to Heidegger, the existential aim of the originary science is 
to free us from all prejudiced attempts to ground factical life – either by 
absolutizing our historical world or by founding it theoretically – and 
make possible a transparent enactment of life as the finite self-sufficient 
destiny it is. The goal is the “achievement of a pure objectification-free life 
out of significances.”253 Or, to quote “Phenomenology of Intuition and 
Expression”: “The task of philosophy is to preserve and strengthen the 
facticity of life.”254 Hence, Heidegger’s notion of the aim of his originary 
science both continues and critically transforms the traditional theoretical 
conception of the task of philosophy. While rejecting the ambition of 
philosophy to theoretically ground life Heidegger holds on to the idea that 
the task of philosophy is to offer an ultimate understanding of life qua life, 
which is not given in our pre-theoretical experience but which conditions 
a clear-sighted enactment of this experience. As Heidegger puts it in a key 
passage in “The Idea of Philosophy”: “But genuine naivety – this is the 
paradox – can only be achieved through the innermost philosophical 
intuition!!”255 
      Such is the paradox of Heidegger’s early articulation of the task of 
philosophy: whereas he explicates our pre-theoretical experience as 
essentially self-sufficient, he claims that philosophy is needed precisely to 
effect a genuinely naive and self-sufficient life. Is Heidegger able to bear 
out this paradox as a clear track of thinking or are we rather faced with an 
ambivalence that he cannot account for?  
      It seems that Heidegger’s entire description of the existential task of 
philosophy rests on the presupposition that our everyday pre-theoretical 
                                         
252 GA 58, pp. 31, 113. 
253 GA 58, p. 156: “Gewinnung des reinen verdinglichungsfreien Leben aus 
Bedeutsamkeiten.” Cf. also GA 58, pp. 86, 250.  
254 GA 59, p. 174: “Die Philosophie hat die Aufgabe, die Faktizität des Lebens zu 
erhalten und die Faktizität des Daseins zu stärken.” 
255 GA 56/57, p. 92: “Aber die echte Naivität, das ist das Paradoxe, läßt sich erst in der 
höchst inneren philosophischen Intuition gewinnen!!” 
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experience is centrally concerned with the problem of the origin of life 
and being – as a problem which in some sense conditions and determines 
our possibilities of transparently experiencing and grasping the factical 
significances we encounter in their ultimate sense, but which we normally 
lack the phenomenal means of accounting for. It is only if we are from the 
outset concerned with the problem of origin as a decisive problem that it 
becomes possible to explain how theoretical interpretations of the ground 
of reality are able to address us as meaningful and convincing in the first 
place, why they are supposedly blinding and devastating to our 
understanding of the significances of life, and why a philosophical science 
of the origin is necessary to make possible a fully clarified and genuine life.   
      However, the fact of the matter is that Heidegger in his early Freiburg 
lecture courses provides no substantial account of how the question of 
origin would meet us in life as an essential question determining our 
understanding of things. In his phenomenological descriptions, Heidegger 
normally depicts life in terms of our pre-theoretical experiences of 
different contexts of significance, experiences we enact without being 
touched by – understanding or misunderstanding – any question of origin. 
On a few occasions he mentions the possibility that life may become 
dominated by worldviews or life forms which take on a governing 
function: “These life-relations can be pervaded – in quite different ways – 
by a genuine form of accomplishment and life, e.g. scientific, religious, 
artistic, political.”256 However, he never specifies how the problem of the 
origin is there for us as a central question, which the different worldviews 
and philosophies attempt to answer. Instead, he tends to picture the way 
in which philosophy addresses life as pure seduction. It is only, as he 
ironically puts it in “The Idea of Philosophy,” theoretical philosophy that 
“awakens” life from its “slumber” and “reveals problems.” To see these 
problems “the naive individual, who knows nothing about philosophical 
critique” must free herself from her pre-theoretical experience and heave 
herself up to the theoretical perspective: “One thereby enters a new 
dimension, the philosophical.”257 Hence, it is only in so far as theoretical 
                                         
256 GA 56/57, p. 4: “Diese Lebensbezüge können durchherrscht sein – und zwar in 
ganz verschiedenen Weisen der Durschherrschung – von einer genuinen Leistungs- 
und Lebensform, z.B. der wissenschaftlichen, religiösen, künstlerischen, politischen.” 
Cf. also GA 58, pp. 39f. 
257 GA 56/57, pp. 79f. 
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philosophy presents its promise of a theoretical grounding of life that the 
problem of origin starts to address us, that is, address us as a seduction.  
 
An Unsettling Suggestion 
 
So far, I have argued that Heidegger’s picture of the task of philosophy 
presupposes that we are essentially engaged by the problem of origin as a 
decisive problem that we initially enact in a naive way, that theoretical 
philosophy provides a powerful yet false account of, and that his own 
originary science is able to clarify. However, not only does Heidegger 
provide no satisfying account of how the problem of origin addresses us 
in life; his description of the self-sufficiency of factical life also contains 
elements which are deeply unsettling to his picture of the task and 
motivation of philosophy. 
   Explicating our capacity for pre-theoretical “consideration,”258 i.e., for 
thinking over and critically reviewing our pre-theoretical experiences prior 
to any theoretical or philosophical question about the origin of life, 
Heidegger writes:    
 
One may not speak of validity and validity-claims as long as the 
objects of our consideration have not abandoned the factical 
context of experience and formed a self-reliant objectivity standing 
in front of factical life. [...] On the other hand, however, the 
experiential character of the factical experiential certainty is of an 
absolute and unshakeable kind, often bracing and asserting itself 
stubbornly against every theoretical argumentation offered. This it 
does as a living conviction, springing from the factical experience, a 
conviction that does not simply stand there as a theoretical 
formation in general, but is real in the form of significance. The 
conviction sustains my life.259 
                                         
258 GA 58, p. 112. 
259 GA 58, p. 113: “Sofern die Gegenständlichkeit der Kenntnisnahme überhaupt nicht 
aus dem faktischen Erfahrungszusammenhang heraustritt und eine dem faktischen 
Leben gegen-überstehende selbständige Objektivität nicht ausformt [...] darf von 
Gültigkeit und Geltungsanspruch gar nicht gesprochen werden, obwohl andererseits 
der Erlebnischarakter der faktischen Erfahrungsgewißheit ein absoluter ist, 
unerschütterlich ist und sich oft auch gegen jede herangebrachte theoretische 
Beweisführung hartnäckig versteift und behauptet und zwar als lebendige, in der 
faktischen Erfahrung erwachsene Überzeugung, die nicht lediglich und überhaupt als 
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What Heidegger suggests here is that our pre-theoretical consideration – 
relying on the “factical experiential certainty” of our experience – has the 
capacity of asserting itself against the theories and claims of theoretical 
philosophy. That is to say, even in want of any philosophical 
understanding of the originary sense of life, which would allow us to 
critically discuss and delimit the claims of theoretical philosophy, it is 
nevertheless possible for us to reject philosophical theories as 
unintelligible or distortive in relation to our primary experience of 
phenomenal significance. Such a rejection could, I suppose, take the 
following form: “I do not know what is wrong about Richard Dawkin’s 
thesis that we are ultimately selfish creatures, yet it cannot make me doubt 
that my friend is a generous and loving person.” Although such rejections, 
due to their lack of philosophical argument and clarity, might appear 
naive, unwarranted, and irresponsible from a theoretical perspective – and 
thus be socially and intellectually hard to abide by – they may in fact be 
entirely to the point in so far as they rely on our experience of the matters 
at issue. 
      Now it seems to me that, if pursued, Heidegger’s suggestion has 
radical consequences for how we should conceive of the task of 
philosophy, consequences which ultimately unsettle his own attempts to 
account for this task.  
      To begin with, Heidegger’s suggestion implies that our immediate pre-
theoretical experiences give us open unlimited access to the particular 
significant matters we encounter, an access which is not hierarchically 
determined by any preceding understanding of the being or sense-
structures of these matters. If so, however, philosophy would not be able 
to uphold its central promise to explicate the basic senses which normally 
determine our experience in a naive and prejudiced manner, thus allowing 
us to attain as basic and ultimate a clarification of life as is possible. Even 
if philosophical reflection were possible, it would not have the character 
of an a priori understanding of the basic conceptual schemes determining 
these experiences. Rather, we would have to think of philosophy as a 
certain kind of thematizing reflection on the structures and sense-relations 
characterizing the particular experiences and phenomena which we 
                                                                                                                      
theoretisches Gebilde dasteht, sondern wirklich ist in der Form der Bedeutsamkeit. 
Die Überzeugung trägt mein Leben.” 
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basically always already have access to. Hence, although possible and more 
or less helpful, philosophy would not constitute a necessary or privileged 
way to clarify life.  
      Moreover, the suggestion points to the way in which our tendency to 
be seduced by blinding and distorting philosophical theories is 
fundamentally a problem of the will rather than a purely cognitive 
problem. If, prior to any philosophizing, we have open access to what is 
significant in life, and, on this basis, have the possibility of rejecting 
philosophies and other worldviews that deny or distort what we 
experience, then our resorting to such theories is essentially a result of 
problems in our will. We could have dismissed the theory and held on to 
what we knew, but, due to the difficulties of facing the ethical-existential 
demands confronting us, we chose not to.  
      Heidegger, to be sure, is more awake than most philosophers to the 
problems of the will at the root of philosophy, claiming that traditional 
philosophy has been motivated by a propensity to flee from and cover up 
the difficulties of life, and insisting that philosophy must be led by an 
existential will and ability – love, sympathy, resolute acceptance of death – 
to face those difficulties. However, it seems to me that his conception of 
philosophy as originary science holds on to a certain intellectualism, which 
his description of the self-sufficiency of pre-theoretical life threatens to 
undermine. Granted, as Heidegger claims, that factical life has no 
understanding of its origin when it is seduced by theoretical philosophy – 
it is seduced in the dark, as it were – then an originary science is necessary 
in order to clarify, for the first time, the shortages of theoretical 
philosophy and the sense of life as a finite historical destiny. Hence, it is 
only through this philosophical understanding of the origin of life that it 
becomes possible to clearly see and face up to the problems of life – for 
Heidegger: its frightening groundlessness and finitude – that initially 
repelled us. Thus conceived, the understanding aimed at by philosophy is 
in a curious sense prior to and a condition for our experience of these 
problems. It is only by explicating the temporal-historical sense of life that 
it becomes fully experienceable as the challenge that it is. The 
philosophical challenge of understanding thus precedes and conditions the 
challenge of encountering in person the ethical-existential problems 
thereby understood. 
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      Heidegger’s suggestion unsettles this scheme since it implies that the 
philosophical understanding is from the very outset drawn into and does 
not condition our pre-theoretical experience of the ethical-existential 
problems of life. If we are essentially able to dismiss philosophical theories 
as distortive of our experience then our attraction to reductive theories 
basically has the character of a willful repression and covering up of 
matters that we could but do not want to see. We become convinced of 
the truth of such philosophical theories because we want to believe them, 
we do not believe them because we are convinced about their truth.  
Hence, no better or clearer philosophical understanding of the problems 
can of itself overcome our problems of will. As long as we lack the will 
and courage to face the ethical-existential problems of life there will always 
be ways of dismissing all efforts to clarify and describe these problems, 
and of finding new distortive theories and worldviews to obscure them.  
This has at least two consequences for how we should think of the task of 
philosophy. First, even if it is possible to critically delimit philosophical 
theories and other worldviews, such critique does not in itself touch the 
problems that motivated our need for such philosophies in the first place. 
To the extent that we appropriated the theories because we needed them – 
and because they were good enough for us – they are essentially 
replaceable by others as long as we want them and need them.  Second, 
even though it is possible to provide illuminating philosophical 
descriptions and clarifications of our central existential experiences, such 
understanding cannot give us access to anything that we are not basically 
already open to, nor compensate for or overcome the personal ethical-
existential challenges we are facing. Hence, philosophical understanding is 
in no way privileged or more basic in relation to our more immediate and 
philosophically unreflective ways of thinking about life, and it runs the 
same risk of being willfully misunderstood as long as we want and need to 
misunderstand it. 
      Heidegger, however, never radically pursues the directions of thought 
that his notion about the possibility of life to reject philosophical theories 
– with evidence yet without philosophical clarity – opens up. Indeed, I 
think this suggestion ultimately points toward insights that unsettle and 
undermine every attempt to conceive of the task of philosophy as that of 
achieving an understanding – of being, knowledge, language, concepts, 
experience – which somehow hierarchically determines our possibilities of 
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immediately experiencing and understanding particular phenomena. 
Hence, it not only unsettles much of the traditional self-understanding of 
philosophy, but also Heidegger’s own subsequent attempt to rethink the 
task of philosophy, first, as fundamental ontology, and, later, as a thinking 
of the openness of historical being.  
 
Philosophy as Phronetic Guidance and Self-Destruction 
 
Heidegger, as said, does not pursue the consequences of his proposal that 
factical life harbors the phenomenal resources for rejecting philosophical 
theories. Nevertheless, his failure to account for how the philosophical 
problem of origin addresses us in life as a basic and decisive task of 
understanding drastically effects his conception of the existential function 
and task of philosophy.  
      Although Heidegger declares that an originary science is necessary for 
achieving a transparent enactment of factical life, and though he 
demonstrates the possibility of explicating the originary structures of life, 
the role of this philosophical understanding in life remains unclear and 
doubtful. All through his investigations, factical life preserves its primary 
rank as the absolute and self-sufficient stratum of experience where life 
lives and significances signify – in such a way that these significances 
cannot be critically justified or grounded by any understanding of their 
origin. The upshot of this is, however, that the philosophical 
understanding of the origin of life, since it cannot ground or 
fundamentally enhance our understanding of the significances of life, has 
no role to play in life except that of leading us back to our primary 
enactment of our factical life-worlds in so far as we have been alienated 
therefrom by theoretical philosophy. 
      Here is how Heidegger articulates the existential task of philosophy in 
terms of a kind of phronetic guidance:   
 
Philosophical research is: neither a view and systematization of 
propositions of knowledge and general principles of being [...]; nor a 
teaching in the sense of a provision of practical clauses and norms 
[...]; but rather a researching-understanding guiding into the life-
figures themselves, not with directives and rules, not in a historicist 
way as a historical understanding of the mere objectified past, but 
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rather a guiding that, at decisive points and in general, surrenders 
the living understanding to itself and to the genuineness of its 
originary understanding, from which genuine motives accrue for 
the (tasks) determinations assigned to it, to its generation, and to 
humanity.260 
 
We see: the task of philosophy is ultimately to lead us back and surrender 
us to our individual pre-theoretical life-worlds, out of which our historical 
“tasks” and “determinations” grow forth and address us.  
      This view of the task of philosophy implies that the phronetically 
guiding capacity of philosophy becomes an essential part of philosophical 
understanding proper. Should philosophy only manage to develop a host 
of more or less accurate descriptions of the structures of life without 
thereby being able to direct the individual back to her concrete particular 
life it would not only remain existentially pointless and sterile, but would 
at worst be obstructive and misleading with regard to its edifying goal. 
Hence, it is no longer feasible to conceive of the originary science in terms 
of an external relationship between the philosophical understanding and 
its possible concrete existential effect. On the contrary, the philosophical 
understanding realizes and fulfills itself in its capacity to imbue the 
individual with a preparedness to take over and enact her own life. To 
quote Heidegger’s closing words in “The Idea of Philosophy”: “The 
genuine insights are only to be won through honest and unreserved 
immersion into the genuineness of life in itself, ultimately through the 
genuineness of personal life.”261   
      However, in the end Heidegger’s projection of philosophy as an 
originary science with a purely edifying goal emerges as an unviable 
compromise. If the philosophical understanding of the origin has no role 
                                         
260 GA 58, pp. 149f.: “Philosophische Forschung ist: weder Gesinnung und Systematisierung 
von Erkenntnissätzen und allgemeinen Gesetzen des Sein […]; noch ein Lehren im 
Sinne der Beistellung von praktischen Sätzen und Normen […]; sondern ein forschend-
verstehendes Führen in die Lebensgestalten selbst, nicht mit Anweisungen und 
Regeln, nicht historizistisch als historisches Verstehen im Sinne des objektivierten 
bloß Vergangenen, sondern ein Führen, das das lebendige Verstehen in 
entscheidenden Stellen und überhaupt sich selbst und der Echtheit seines 
Ursprungsverstehens überläßt, aus dem ihm für seine, seiner Generation und der 
Menschheit zufallenden (Aufgaben) Bestimmungen echte Motive erwachsen.” 
261 GA 56/57, p. 220: “Die echten Einsichten aber sind zur zu gewinnen durch die 
ehrliche und rückhaltlose Versenkung in die Echtheit des Lebens an sich, letztlich 
durch die Echtheit persönlichen Lebens.” 
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to play in our struggle to understand and encounter the particular 
significances of life it is also unclear how such an understanding could 
ever guide us back to life. Does not this presuppose that the problem of 
origin concerns us as a problem that philosophy clarifies? If it does not, 
however, must we not conclude that the only task left for philosophy is 
purely negative, consisting in a negative dismantling of the constructions 
of theoretical philosophy? 
      In fact, in some passages in “Phenomenology of Intuition and 
Expression” Heidegger goes so far as to suggest that the edifying work of 
philosophy is realized through self-destruction. Having reviewed some of 
the contemporary strategies for salvaging an autonomous task for 
philosophy, Heidegger concludes that none of these strategies dares touch 
upon the possibility that the only task of philosophy would consist in 
“making itself look ridiculous with all rigor and of annihilating itself and 
furthermore of preventing itself from ever reoccurring.”262 That this is 
exactly the purpose of his own originary science quickly becomes clear: 
“We do not philosophize in order to show that we need a philosophy but 
exactly in order to show that we do not need any.”263 If philosophy besets 
life as an empty distortive construction and life itself has no need of a 
positive understanding of the origin, then the only task that remains for 
philosophy is to dismantle traditional philosophical theories, and, through 
this destruction, let factical life be.264 However, would not this mean that 
all the positive phenomenological investigations carried out in his early 
Freiburg lectures would at the end of the day be existentially futile? 
                                         
262 GA 59, p. 189: “sich selbst in aller Strenge lächerlich zu machen un zu vernichten 
und weiterhin sich nicht mehr aufkommen lassen.” 
263 GA 59, p. 191: “Wir philosophieren nicht, um zu zeigen, daß wir eine Philosophie 
brauchen, sondern um zu zeigen, daß wir keine brauchen.” 
264 On this point, there is an obvious parallel to Wittgenstein’s therapeutic view of 
philosophy, which would deserve closer examination. Cf. § 6.54 of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: “My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who 
understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through 
them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has 
climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world 
rightly” (Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, dass sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig 
erkennt, wenn er durch sie – auf ihnen – über sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er muss sozusagen die Leiter 
wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.) Er muss diese Sätze überwinden, dann sieht er die 
Welt richtig). Cf. also Wittgenstein’s remarks on the task of philosophy in his 
Philosophical Investigations, §§ 109-133. 
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      We should now be equipped to critically review and delimit the truth 
of the diverging interpretations of Heidegger’s view of the existential task 
of philosophy presented at the beginning of the chapter. Ultimately, I have 
argued, Heidegger’s difficulties with thinking the task of philosophy spring 
from his fundamental inability to account for how the problem of origin 
concerns us in life as a determining problem, which the philosophical 
science of origin is called to clarify. This central lack gives rise to an 
uncontrolled vacillation between two disparate tendencies: on the one 
hand, Heidegger projects his originary science as a basic and necessary 
path to a transparent enactment of factical life; on the other hand, he 
insists that, since the originary science cannot ground our pre-theoretical 
experience of significance its sole existential function lies in its phronetic 
ability to guide the individual person back to her factical context of life. By 
exclusively focusing on either of these tendencies Heidegger’s 
commentators have developed their opposite readings of his view of the 
task of philosophy. Hence, there is no doubt that Crowell and van Buren 
are right in claiming that Heidegger accepts and pursues the traditional 
ambition of philosophy to provide an understanding of the origin of life 
and meaningful being in general. This ambition is carried out concretely in 
Heidegger’s phenomenologically reflexive analyses of the originary 
structure of factical life, which culminate in his articulation of the basic 
sense of life as a familiar historical destiny. Conversely, it is precisely 
Heidegger’s explication of the self-sufficiency of factical life that results in 
an elimination of the possible existential place of philosophy in life, and, 
consequently, to the contention that the philosophical understanding of 
origin only accomplishes itself in and through its edifying ability to lead 
the individual back to her own pre-theoretical context of life. Kisiel’s 
emphasis on the phronetic character of Heidegger’s thought highlights this 
tendency in his early work. 
      However, even though both interpretations can be said to articulate 
limited truths about Heidegger’s earliest thinking none of them seems to 
be able to address the philosophical problems at the heart of this thinking, 
which spark and organize the tendencies about which the interpretations 
are true. If, on the one hand, one focuses exclusively on Heidegger’s 
pursuit of an originary science one inevitably foregoes his radical emphasis 
on the self-sufficiency of our factical pre-theoretical experience and his 
intensive questioning of the role of philosophy in life. Consequently, one 
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is apt to cling, without further question, to the vague and comfortable 
promise that philosophy will eventually achieve an understanding of the 
basic structures of life, which will then, in some way or other, shed a 
clarifying, critically measuring light on all the factical significances of life. 
If, on the other hand, one exclusively pursues the idea of the edifying task 
of philosophy, one loses all means to account for and probe the 
philosophical possibilities of understanding that Heidegger tries to 
develop in his concrete phenomenological work. 
 
The End of Heidegger’s First Beginning 
 
Heidegger’s problems with accounting for the role of philosophy in life in 
his earliest Freiburg lecture courses are mirrored in and to some extent 
reinforced by his historical orientation during that period.  
      In his early post-war lectures Heidegger is convinced that the entire 
tradition of Greek philosophy – from Plato and Aristotle up to Husserl 
and the Neo-Kantians – is essentially an outgrowth of the governing idea 
about the primacy of the theoretical attitude. Conversely, in his own effort 
to open up a science of pre-theoretical life he is influenced, first, by 
contemporary life-philosophers such as Dilthey, Nietzsche, Bergson, 
Simmel and James, and, second, by Christian thinkers such as St. Paul, 
Augustine, Meister Eckhart, Luther and Kierkegaard. According to 
Heidegger, it has indeed hitherto been the exclusive privilege of original 
Christianity – especially St. Paul – to emphasize and articulate factical life 
in its temporal and finite movement. However, none of these historical 
paradigms provides a model for a new understanding of the role of 
philosophy in life: whereas the life-philosophers tend to fluctuate between 
an urge to keep up the traditional task of philosophy and an impulse to 
dissolve it into psychology or historicism, the edifying Christian thinking 
of St. Paul et al essentially transpires in a pre-theoretical discourse on this 
side of every philosophical question concerning the basic structures of life. 
Thus, in instigating his originary science as a strict phenomenological 
realization of the traditional task of philosophy while denying the 
preceding philosophical tradition any experience of the origin of life, he 
loses every historical paradigm for understanding how the specific 
philosophical problematic is motivated in life itself.  
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      Roughly speaking, Heidegger’s effort to develop an originary science 
of life on the paradigmatic basis of original Christianity reaches its inner 
limit in the courses “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” and 
“Augustine and Neo-Platonism” delivered in the winter and summer of 
1920-21. Even though the first of these courses offers an innovative 
reading of St Paul’s letters as an articulation of the basic temporality and 
finitude of life, it is incapable of shedding any new light on the nature of 
the philosophical explication itself and its relation to life. The lectures, 
indeed, are caught between two impossible tasks. On the one hand, 
Heidegger writes that the ambition of his lecture course is “only to open 
the access to the New Testament,” yet abstain from an “ultimate 
understanding” of Christian life, which can “only be given in the genuine 
religious experience.”265 Reaching the closing stages of his lectures 
Heidegger eventually complains that it is “almost hopeless to gain entry to 
such a context of enactment.”266 On the other hand, the whole question 
concerning the relevance of religious experience for the philosophical 
understanding of origin remains unanswered. Heidegger ends his lecture 
course by stating that it is a “difficult question” why the Christian 
religiosity in particular “stands in the focus of our considerations,” and 
that this question can only be answered through attaining an “originary 
relationship to history.”267 However, this goal cannot be achieved by 
religious explication on its own. To be able to address critical questions 
concerning the role of philosophy and history in our pre-theoretical 
experience Heidegger would need to do nothing less than open up a new 
radical investigation of the basic structure of phenomenality.  
      In the end, Heidegger’s basic analysis of the structure of our pre-
theoretical experience of significant phenomena is unable to account 
either for the function of historicity in the phenomenal experience or for 
the role of philosophy in life. It is, then, precisely these questions – the 
question of history and the question of philosophy – that motivate 
Heidegger’s further questioning and provoke the return to Aristotle, which 
will set the stage for all his subsequent thinking.  
                                         
265 GA 60, p. 67. 
266 GA 60, p. 121. 
267 GA 60, p. 124. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Part Two: The Historical Structure of    
Phenomenality 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the summer of 1921 Heidegger, still Privatdozent at the University of 
Freiburg and working as Husserl’s assistant, decides to give a seminar on 
Aristotle’s On the Soul. As it turns out this seminar signifies the beginning 
of a new phase in Heidegger’s development. It initiates a period of 
intensive explication and lecturing on Aristotle that in important respects 
refurbishes his philosophical stance. Through an exceptionally productive 
reading of Aristotle – sensitive and violent at the same time – Heidegger 
carries out a new analysis of the basic historical structure of 
phenomenality, which also allows him to rethink the task of philosophy in 
terms of the question of being. It is now that Heidegger becomes the 
Heidegger that has exercised such a strong influence on the subsequent 
development of philosophy and that has functioned as the primal point of 
focus for later interpretations of his thinking. The development begun in 
1921 culminates with the publication of Heidegger’s early magnum opus, 
Being and Time in 1927. 
      Yet how should this return to Aristotle be understood? What is it that 
motivates it and what makes it philosophically crucial? 
      In fact, it seems that Heidegger was far from clearly anticipating what 
he would find in Aristotle as he decided to dedicate his seminar to On the 
Soul. Heidegger’s historical orientation during the first post-war years 
1919-1921 had been determined by his conviction that the entire tradition 
of Western philosophy was rooted in the theoretical attitude, and that the 
most qualified historical articulation of the dynamics of pre-theoretical life 
available to us was found in original Christianity. In this constellation 
Aristotle principally figured as the Greek originator of traditional 
theoretical philosophy. Given his view that since the Middle Ages both 
philosophy and theology had been steeped in the conceptuality of 
Aristotelian philosophy, covering up and distorting the original Christian 
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experience, Heidegger thought it is “one of the innermost tendencies of 
phenomenology” to “radically liberate itself” from the Aristotelian 
heritage, in order to retrieve a better understanding of pre-theoretical 
life.268  When Heidegger chose Aristotle as the theme of his seminar he 
was simultaneously lecturing on “Augustine and Neo-Platonism,” and it 
seems – as Theodore Kisiel has argued – that his choice to a large extent 
happened “almost casually and seemingly by way of default,” being 
motivated partly his frustration at the poor theological grounding of his 
students, partly by his interest in dismantling the Greekification of 
primitive Christianity by taking on the primal Greek influence in this 
process, Aristotle.269 However, even though Heidegger’s turn to Aristotle 
was to some extent the result of arbitrary circumstances, he very soon 
came to believe that Aristotle’s writings held decisive keys to the problems 
he was struggling with at the time.   
      Let me briefly recapitulate the background.  
      As we have seen, Heidegger’s first Freiburg lectures courses after the 
war were guided by the aim of critically elaborating Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology into an originary science of factical life. In
                                         
268 GA 58, p. 61. Cf. also GA 58, p. 205. 
269 Kisiel 1993, pp. 227f. However, although Kisiel seems to be right in claiming that 
Heidegger’s turn to Aristotle was to some extent accidental, I also think it is 
reasonable to suppose that Heidegger did entertain some more or less unspecified 
hopes that Aristotle’s thinking might open up new perspectives on the problems and 
aporias into which his originary science of factical life had led him. Not only do we 
know from the old Heidegger’s testimony that ever since he received Franz Brentano’s 
dissertation On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle (Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des 
Seienden nach Aristoteles) as a gift in his student years, he had been acquainted with 
Aristotle and intrigued by his question of being (cf. GA 14, p. 93). Moreover, although 
Heidegger is primarily dismissive of Aristotle during his earliest Freiburg years, his 
course “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion” from the winter term 1920-
21 already contains the following passage on Aristotle: “Already Aristotle says in his 
metaphysics: to on pollakhōs legetai (beings are multiply said). However, Aristotle meant 
something more than what one had theretofore seen. For Aristotle, at issue is not only 
an ontological consideration; rather, an entirely other, implicit consideration hovers 
therein. Aristotle’s metaphysics is perhaps already further than we ourselves are today 
in philosophy” (Schon Aristoteles sagt in seiner Metaphysik: τὸ ὂν πολλαχῶς λέγεται (das 
Seiende wird vielfach gesagt). Doch meint Aristoteles wohl noch etwas anderes, als man bisher gesehen 
hat. Es handelt sich bei ihm nicht nur um ontologische Betrachtungen, sondern es schwebt eine ganz 
andere Betrachtung unabgehoben mit. Die aristotelische Metaphysik ist vielleicht schon weiter als wir 
selbst heute in der Philosophie sind) (GA 60, p. 56). Clearly, this remark expresses at least a 
hunch that Aristotle’s texts might offer insights crucial to the originary science 
Heidegger was trying to develop.    
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contrast to Husserl, who, according to Heidegger, took over the 
traditional purpose of philosophy to provide a foundation for factical life 
and whose conception of the intentional structure of consciousness was 
modeled on the paradigm of theoretical observation, Heidegger insists that 
our basic phenomenal access to the domain of meaning lies in our pre-
theoretical experience of the world. He articulates the structure of factical 
life in terms of a self-sufficient experience in which the experienced 
significances and our way of experiencing them form an indivisible unity, 
which is ultimately anchored in the historical situation of the particular 
self. However, Heidegger’s advance towards factical life leads him into 
deep aporias that he is not able to answer. In the end, his analysis of the 
basic structure of factical life does not suffice for accounting either for the 
radically historical character of our experience of phenomena – on which 
Heidegger nevertheless insists – or for the motivation and role of 
philosophy in life. 
      It is in this situation that Heidegger turns to Aristotle. As I will argue 
in the following, Heidegger’s explication of Aristotle, and the shift in his 
thinking that it occasions, very much revolves around the problem of 
phenomenality. Heidegger’s systematically crucial discovery is that 
Aristotle’s writings harbor a model for rethinking the basic structure of 
phenomenality with a view to how our direct intuitive experience of 
significant phenomena is always already determined by our preceding 
understanding of the historical contexts of meaning in which we live. This 
new conception of the structure of phenomenality makes it possible for 
Heidegger to account for the historical character of phenomenal 
appearing, and to rearticulate the phenomenological method in terms of a 
hermeneutic explication that centrally involves a critical destruction of the 
philosophical tradition and a retrieval of the historical sources of our 
understanding. Moreover, it allows him to account for the task of 
philosophy in terms of the question of being, conceived as the normally 
hidden horizon of all our experience and understanding. 
      As Heidegger returns to Aristotle, he sees a peculiar possibility 
precisely in Aristotle’s role as primus motor of the philosophical tradition. 
Given his view that Aristotle shapes the basic philosophical concepts 
henceforth governing the tradition in an almost autistic manner, it is 
possible to assume that the basic experiences underlying these concepts 
are still conspicuously present and effective in his texts. By tracing the 
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origin of the tradition back to Aristotle, Heidegger thinks it is possible not 
only to critically delimit the concrete experiential basis of the traditional 
conceptuality, but also to access a more primordial understanding of the 
matters at stake. In the following years, Aristotle will thus play a highly 
ambivalent role for Heidegger.270 On the one hand, Heidegger believes 
that Aristotle’s works harbor – in a still hidden and disfigured way – an 
unsurpassed explication of factical life in its historical structure; on the 
other he sees that Aristotle’s ontology, which founds the philosophical 
tradition, is ultimately determined by the paradigm of theoretical 
knowledge and by an understanding of being as presence – ousia – which 
hampers, distorts and covers up his latent insights into the dynamics of 
life. Aristotle’s ambivalent father-role makes him philosophically decisive: 
it is only by explicating Aristotle that we can hope to dismantle and 
critically delimit the traditional concepts of philosophy and open up a 
more primordial explication of the basic problems of philosophy. 
      Although the development of Heidegger’s thinking in these years 
chiefly takes place through his explications of Aristotle, Husserl’s 
phenomenology continuous to exercise a basic influence on his thought. 
Heidegger’s main rhetorical strategy consists in invoking Aristotle as the 
source of a more original analysis of the structure of phenomenality, in a 
way that allows him to free himself from Husserl’s phenomenological 
framework and diagnose his erstwhile mentor as a late representative of 
the tradition of theoretical philosophy that is to be overcome. 
Nevertheless, Husserl’s impact remains strong, perhaps stronger than 
Heidegger wants to admit. It is precisely Heidegger’s phenomenological 
investigations of the structures of factical life – Husserlian at their core – 
which guide his explications of Aristotle and makes them so productive. 
Moreover, it is an open question – to be explored in the following pages –
to what extent Heidegger, despite his effort to develop a radically 
historical thinking, remains committed to a Husserlian method of intuitive 
phenomenological reflection.  
      Heidegger’s thinking during this period also continues to be heavily 
influenced by the hermeneutic tradition, especially by Dilthey. Indeed, 
Dilthey’s presence in Heidegger’s attempt to work out the temporality and 
                                         
270 Günter Figal formulates the ambivalent role of Aristotle deftly when he states that 
“Heidegger’s Aristotle is a Janus-headed thinker” (Heideggers Aristoteles ist ein 
janusköpfiger Denker) (Figal 2007b, p. 61). 
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historicity of Dasein is strong and constant, although it often remains 
hidden behind Heidegger’s ambition to stage his new thinking as a 
reappropriation of Aristotle.271 An important event in these years was 
Heidegger’s reading of the correspondence between Dilthey and Count 
Yorck, which provided vital incentives for his thinking of historicity. 
Finally, I should mention Kierkegaard, whom Heidegger read intensively 
at the time, and whose influence is palpable in the analysis of authenticity 
and death in Being and Time.272  
      Heidegger’s seminar on On the Soul in the summer of 1921 is the first 
of a series of courses and seminars on Aristotle’s texts that will continue 
uninterruptedly until the end of 1924. In the summer of 1922, he delivers 
his first full scale course on Aristotle, consisting of detailed translations 
and interpretations of selected parts of the Metaphysics and Physics. At the 
time, Heidegger is also planning a book on Aristotle. In the autumn of 
1922, he composes an introduction to the book project, intended to serve 
as textual support for his twin applications for professorships in Marburg 
and Göttingen. The book was never written but the introduction to the 
project, named “Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle (Indication 
of the Hermeneutic Situation),”273 constitutes Heidegger’s first 
compressed articulation of his new philosophical stance. Eventually 
“Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation” also served its worldly purpose. 
First turned down in Göttingen, Heidegger is elected Professor of 
Philosophy in Marburg in the summer of 1923. In Marburg Heidegger 
continues and expands his conception of the structure of phenomenality 
by further developing his analyses of Dasein as being in the world and 
temporality. The period also contains two extensive critical engagements 
with Husserl’s phenomenology. In his first Marburg lecture course 
“Introduction to Phenomenological Research” from the winter of 1923-
24, he interprets Husserl’s modern phenomenology as an alienation from 
Aristotle’s originary phenomenology. After a few semesters of Aristotle-
courses, he offers his most extensive treatment of Husserl ever in the 
                                         
271 Cf. Gadamer 1987, pp. 420ff.;  Guignon 1983, pp. 44-63, 110-115; Kisiel 1993, pp. 
315-361; Bambach 1995; Maakreel 2004; Ruin 1994, pp. 9, 15f., 41f., 112f.  
272 For some studies of Heidegger’s relationship to Kierkegaard, see, e.g., Guignon 
2011; McCarthy 2011; Magurshak 1985; van Buren 1994, pp. 157-202. 
273 “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der 
hermeneutischen Situation),” in GA 62 (henceforth referred to as “Indication of the 
Hermeneutic Situation” in the main text).  
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lecture course “History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena” from the 
summer of 1925. In these years, Heidegger thus works on two fronts 
simultaneously: while he lets his new conception of phenomenality grow 
forth in the rich and moldable soil of the Aristotelian corpus, he is at the 
same time eager to specify and sharpen his vision by critically contrasting 
it to Husserl’s phenomenological program.  
      The philosophical development initiated in 1921 culminates and 
receives its final systematic expression as Heidegger publishes Being and 
Time in 1927. The aim of the book is to carry out a fundamental ontology, 
that is to say, an investigation of the sense of being on the basis of an 
existential analytic of the human being, Dasein. Originally, the treatise was 
meant to consist of two main parts, each containing three divisions, but 
Heidegger never published more than the two first divisions of the first 
part. During the years following the publication of Being and Time 
Heidegger continues probing new strategies for realizing his project of 
fundamental ontological but eventually gives up the idea on account of the 
deep inner problems of the project. In what follows, I will focus on 
Heidegger’s thinking from 1921 to 1927.  I begin by offering an account 
of how Heidegger’s new conception of the structure of phenomenality 
grows forth through his readings of Aristotle, and how this leads him to 
rearticulate his critique of Husserl’s phenomenology. After that, I go on to 
investigate in detail how Heidegger’s struggle with the problem of 
phenomenality is played out in Being and Time.  
 
When Being and Time was published in 1927, it rapidly brought Heidegger 
fame and massive attention on the larger philosophical scene. From that 
moment, the book for many decades functioned as the principal 
hermeneutic point of focus for interpreting and discussing Heidegger’s 
philosophical thinking in its entirety.  
     The reception of Heidegger’ magnum opus was centrally marked by 
the fact the publication of the book was preceded by a decade of silence. 
Since the publication of his Habilitationsschrift on Duns Scotus in 1916, 
Heidegger had not published anything. Instead, the thinking that comes to 
expression in Being and Time had been elaborated in the numerous lecture 
courses that Heidegger had held in Freiburg and Marburg after the First 
World War. The result of this was that, as Theodore Kisiel has put it, for 
many years “one was forced to regard this complex work as something 
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that sprang fullgrown, like Athena, from the head of Zeus.”274 This 
situation gradually began to change after Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe was 
launched in 1975. However, even though editions of important lecture 
courses were published in the 1970s and 1980s, it was only in the 1990s – 
when the bulk of the early Freiburg lecture courses were published – that 
it became possible to get a full picture of the philosophical path that 
culminated in Being and Time.  
      What made the lack of context particularly demanding for the readers 
of Being and Time was not only the notorious difficulty of the work, but its 
driving philosophical ambition to open up a new framework of 
philosophical questioning. In articulating his project of fundamental 
ontology Heidegger was palpably influenced by many philosophical 
sources (e.g. Aristotle, Husserl, Dilthey, Count Yorck, Kierkegaard, Kant 
and Hegel) yet at the same time the roles and senses accorded to these 
sources – all of them ultimately belonging to the tradition of 
Seinsvergessenheit that was to be overcome – within Heidegger’s project was 
far from obvious. This awkward hermeneutic situation to some extent 
accounts for the fact that over the years Being and Time has been the object 
of so many divergent interpretations, highlighting and exploiting different 
aspects of this complex work depending on the interpreter’s own 
philosophical orientation and interests. Hence, Heidegger has been 
interpreted and enlisted as a life-philosopher, as an existentialist, as a 
Christian mystic, as an Aristotelian, as a hermeneutic thinker, as a 
deconstructivist, as a Husserlian phenomenologist, as a Kantian 
transcendentalist, and so on. With the publication of Heidegger’s collected 
works, and with the ever-increasing amount of research undertaken into 
the historical contexts from which Being and Time evolves, the multitude of 
interpretations has been reduced somewhat as we have gained a better 
picture of the basic philosophical impulses and motives informing 
Heidegger’s early thinking.  
      Although the question of phenomenality/phenomenology has always 
been present in the discussion of Being and Time, it is only in last decades 
that it has surfaced as one of the most central and controversial themes of 
the Heidegger-discussion. The most obvious reason why this question 
remained in the background for so long is that for many years the 
                                         
274 Kisiel 1993, p. 1.  
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reception was dominated by interpretations that largely ignored or 
downplayed the influence of Husserl’s phenomenology on Heidegger’s 
thinking. Instead, Heidegger was commonly regarded as the definitive 
critic of the supposed Cartesianism and belief in direct intuitive givenness 
still characterizing Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. The 
interpretation presented by Gadamer in Truth and Method in 1960 set the 
agenda for the impending years. Hailing Heidegger as the decisive stimulus 
for his own attempt to develop a philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer 
describes how Heidegger abandons the idea of the “self-givenness of 
experience,” which still functioned as the “methodological basis” of 
Husserl’s phenomenology: “Under the rubric of a ‘hermeneutics of 
facticity,’ Heidegger confronted Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology […] 
with a paradoxical demand. Phenomenology should be ontologically based 
on the facticity of Dasein, existence, which cannot be based or derived 
from anything else, and not on the pure cogito as the essential constitution 
of typical universality – a bold idea, but difficult to carry through.”275 This 
picture of Heidegger is basically reproduced – albeit in a critical vein – in 
the interpretations of Ernst Tugendhat, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen 
Habermas. Likewise, the first two full-scale philosophical biographies of 
Heidegger – Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking (Der Denkweg Martin 
Heideggers) (1963) by Otto Pöggeler and Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to 
Thought (1963) by William J. Richardson – both largely play down the 
Husserlian origins and character of Heidegger’s early thinking. Moreover, 
in his role as a major influence on the post-structuralist and 
deconstructivist thought of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jacques 
Lacan and others, Heidegger is also greeted as a severe critic of the ideal 
of direct “presence” and “self-givenness,” and as a thinker of the radical 
historicity and finitude of thought. The proponents of the pragmatist 
reading of Heidegger – which has been prominent on the Anglo-Saxon 
scene – have also tended to see Heidegger as a thinker who overcomes the 
theoretical-epistemological framework of Husserl’s phenomenology as 
well as its supposed subjectivism and intuitionism.  
                                         
275 Gadamer 1990, p. 259: “Unter dem Stichwort einer ‘Hermeneutik der Faktizität’ 
stellte Heidegger der eidetischen Phänomenlogie Husserls […] eine paradoxe 
Forderung entgegen. Die unbegründbare und unableitbare Faktizität des Daseins, die 
Existenz, und nicht das reine cogito als Wesensverfassung von typischer 
Allgemeinheit, sollte die ontologische Basis der phänomenologischen Fragestellung 
darstellen – ein ebenso kühner wie schwer zu einlösender Gedanke.”  
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      We have to wait until the 1990s for the emergence of a strong 
phenomenological interpretation – elaborated by, e.g., Steven Crowell, 
Daniel Dahlstrom and Søren Overgaard – of Heidegger’s work.276 There 
are many reasons for this delay. Although Heidegger pays homage to 
Husserl in Being and Time, and calls the method of his fundamental 
ontology “phenomenology,” the concrete influence of Husserl largely 
remains implicit. Instead, Heidegger’s explicit program for a hermeneutic-
destructive explication of Dasein as being-in-the-world can easily be read 
as a rejection of Husserl’s phenomenology in favor of a radically historical 
thinking. When Heidegger’s early Freiburg and Marburg lecture courses – 
in which the strong influence of Husserl is much more conspicuous and is 
elaborated in more detail – were published in the 1980s and 1990s, it 
became easier to get a grip on the phenomenological character of 
Heidegger’s early thinking. Another reason – perhaps the philosophically 
most decisive reason – for the late birth of the phenomenological 
Heidegger is found in the fact that it is only in the 1990s that a new wave 
of intensive research on Husserl was able to bring about a more nuanced 
and philosophically potent picture of Husserl’s phenomenology. Indeed, 
only when we learn to see that Husserl cannot simply be dismissed as a 
traditional Cartesian epistemologist but opens up a powerful and open-
ended idea of philosophy as strict intuitive description of the meaning-
structures of our concrete experiences – only then does it become possible 
to interpret Heidegger’s thinking as an elaboration of Husserl’s 
phenomenological program.  
      For some years now, the discussion of the problem of 
phenomenality/phenomenology in Being and Time and in the Marburg-
years has been characterized by the already familiar antagonism between 
the transcendental phenomenological reading and the hermeneutic-
deconstructive reading of Heidegger. Whereas proponents of the first 
reading have primarily concentrated on bringing out what they believe is 
Heidegger’s basic phenomenological method of reflective description, 
defenders of the second reading have tended to focus on Heidegger’s 
analysis of the historical as-structure of understanding and on his explicit 
                                         
276 There are of course some exceptions to this general scheme. See, e.g., Carl 
Friedrich Gehtmann’s important 1974 book Verstehen und Auslegung which presents an 
interpretation of Heidegger as a transcendental phenomenologist. Cf. also Stapleton 
1983.   
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program for a hermeneutic-destructive mode of thinking. In what follows, 
I am going to develop by explication of the problem of 
phenomenality/phenomenology in Heidegger’s Marburg-years against the 
backdrop of these opposed readings, with the aim of delimiting their 
relative truths. In due course, I will specify the general tendencies outlined 
above by discussing the viewpoints of particular commentators. 
Ultimately, I hope to demonstrate the extent to which the conflict 
between the transcendental phenomenological and the hermeneutic-
deconstructive reading mirrors the deep ambivalences that haunt 
Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology.  
      The second part is divided into the following chapters: (2.2) Towards a 
New Conception of Phenomenality, (2.3) The Project of Fundamental 
Ontology, (2.4) The Basic Structure of Phenomenality, (2.5) Heidegger’s 
Method, and (2.5) Authenticity and the End of Being and Time. 
 
2.2 Towards a New Conception of Phenomenality 
 
So what did Heidegger find in Aristotle and how did it effect his 
conception of phenomenality and phenomenological philosophy?  
      The results of Heidegger’s confrontation with Aristotle come to a first 
dense expression in “Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation,” the 
introduction Heidegger wrote to his planned book on Aristotle in 1922. In 
fact, the text is nothing less than Heidegger’s first outline of the 
philosophical stance that receives its final systematic articulation in Being 
and Time. I will begin this chapter by examining how Heidegger, in 
“Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation,”  carves out his new conception 
of the structure of phenomenality in the clay of Aristotle’s writings, and 
how this conception allows him to reformulate the ontological task and 
the historical method of phenomenology. I then explicate how Heidegger, 
on this basis, appropriate and reinterprets the word “phenomenon” in his 
first Marburg lecture course “Introduction to phenomenological 
Research.” Heidegger’s new quasi-Aristotelian account of phenomenality 
also leads him to reformulate his critique of Husserl. In the remaining part 
of the chapter, I will examine this critique as it is developed in the lecture 
courses “Introduction to Phenomenological Research” and 
“Prolegomena.”
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      In what follows I will provide no detailed historical account of how 
Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle develops, nor will I offer any thorough 
critical comparison measuring this reading against an independent 
interpretation of Aristotle’s texts. Generally speaking, Heidegger’s 
explication of Aristotle is characterized by its curious blend of receptivity 
and violence. By reading Aristotle’s texts as one long phenomenological 
explication of factical life, Heidegger is able to extract a series of 
phenomenological structures, which, in their original Aristotelian context, 
rarely have the emphasis, precision or ontological sense he ascribes them. 
However, here I will leave the question of the historical force and accuracy 
of Heidegger’s reading aside and focus strictly on the systematic role that 
Aristotle’s concepts acquire in Heidegger’s own philosophical endeavor.277 
 
The Confrontation with Aristotle 
 
Heidegger begins “Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation” by declaring 
that the capacity of a historical interpretation to open up and explicate its 
object is dependent on its ability to clarify its “hermeneutic situation,”278 
i.e., the current situation of questioning on the basis of which the past may 
address and become intelligible to us. To secure the hermeneutic situation 
of his Aristotle-interpretation, he provides a preliminary outline of the 
philosophical problematic guiding the interpretation. This outline – which 
is in fact a first draft of the project of Being and Time – unfolds as follows:  
      Philosophy, Heidegger writes, is “fundamental ontology” (prinzipielle 
Ontologie), a questioning of the “being of factical life.”279 The basic sense of 
life is “care” (Sorge) for its “world.”280 This care is not blind but guided by 
a “circumspection” (Umsicht), which apprehends the object of concern “as 
signified in this or that way” (als so und so bedeutendes).281 Moreover, life 
always already moves in a certain historical “interpretedness” (Ausgelegtheit) 
                                         
277 Heidegger’s relationship to Aristotle has been the subject of several studies. Cf., 
e.g., Sheehan 1978; 1988c; Volpi 1984a; 1984b; Sadler 1996; McNeill 1999; Weigelt 
2002; Brogan 2005; Sommer 2005; Backman 2005; Rese 2007; Denker et al. [eds.] 
2007; Figal 2007b. 
278 GA 62, p. 346.  
279 GA 62, p. 364. 
280 GA 62, p. 352.  
281 GA 62, p. 353. 
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of itself and its world, which determines its circumspection.282 Given the 
difficulty of facing and accepting the mortality and finitude of life, life has 
a basic tendency to “flee” and “fall away” (abfallen) from itself,283 such that 
the individual tends to renounce her responsibility and take over the 
received traditional interpretedness of life – what “They” (man) think, do, 
and appreciate284 –  without independent critical questioning. In so doing, 
life forfeits the possibility of true “existence,”285 i.e., of confronting its 
own essential mortality and transparently grasping itself in its finite 
temporal and historical being. The task of philosophy, Heidegger states, is 
to explicitly and radically enact life’s basic concern with understanding its 
own being, in order thus to make possible genuine and clear-sighted 
existence.286  
      Such is, roughly, the scheme that Heidegger projects to articulate the 
structure of life and the task of philosophy. But why does he not go on 
elaborating his description, widening and deepening it, instead of 
conceiving of it as a provisional preparation for an interpretation of 
Aristotle? Or to quote Heidegger: “But it has still not become understandable 
what kind of role historical investigations are supposed to play” for a 
hermeneutic of factical life, and “why Aristotle is to be placed within the 
theme of the investigation, and further how the investigation is to be 
carried out”?287 
      According to Heidegger, the propensity of life to fall away from itself 
implies that is has always already slid into and taken over a certain 
traditional interpretation of its own being.  As a result of the tendency to 
uncritically pass on the tradition, Heidegger maintains that the 
contemporary interpretation of life still basically operates within the Greek 
conceptuality that has been handed down to us, but which stems from 
experiences that are not available to us anymore: “For the most part the 
philosophy of the contemporary situation moves inauthentically within the 
                                         
282 GA 62, p. 354. 
283 GA 62, pp. 356, 360. 
284 GA 62, p. 358. 
285 GA 62, p. 361. 
286 Cf. GA 62, pp. 349, 351. 
287 GA 62, p. 366: “Noch ist aber nicht verständlich geworden, was für eine solche 
Hermeneutik geschichtliche Untersuchungen sollen end warum gerade Aristoteles in 
das Thema der Untersuchung gestellt ist, wie ferner diese zu bewerkstelligen sein 
wird.” 
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Greek conceptuality – indeed one that has passed through a chain of 
diverse interpretations. The basic concepts have lost their original 
expressive functions, functions which were particularly tailored to fit 
particularly experienced regions of objects.”288 Ultimately, Heidegger 
claims that the Greco-Christian interpretation of life in which we live is 
rooted in Aristotle’s philosophy. It is Aristotle who shapes and 
conceptualizes the basic understanding of man and being that will 
henceforth – through a series of displacements and modifications – 
dominate the whole Western tradition: from St. Paul and Augustine, over 
the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, over Luther and Descartes,  through 
Kant and German idealism up to today. Hence, in order to be able to 
critically explicate the traditional concepts governing our self-
understanding we need to undertake a “destruction” (Destruktion) of these 
concepts in order to arrive at their origin in Aristotle’s philosophy:  
 
Thus the phenomenological hermeneutic of facticity sees itself 
called upon to loosen up the handed-down and dominating 
interpretedness in its hidden motives, unexpressed tendencies, and 
ways of interpreting; and to push forward by way of a dismantling 
return toward the original motive sources of the explication. The 
hermeneutic carries out its task only on the path of destruction. So long as it 
has understood the kind of objectivity and being which belongs to 
its thematical toward-which (the facticity of life), philosophical 
research is “historical” knowing in the radical sense. For 
philosophical research, the destructive confrontation with 
philosophy’s history is not a mere appendix for the purposes of 
illustrating how things were earlier. [...] The destruction is rather the 
authentic path upon which the present must encounter itself in its 
own basic movements.289  
                                         
288 GA 62, p. 367: “Die Philosophie der heutigen Situation bewegt sich zum großen 
Teil uneigentlich in der griechischen Begrifflichkeit, und zwar in einer solchen, die durch 
eine Kette von verschiedenartigen Interpretationen hindurchgegangen ist. Die 
Grundbegriffe haben ihre ursprünglichen, auf bestimmt erfahrene 
Gegenstandsregionen bestimmt zugeschnittenen Ausdrucksfunktionen eingebüßt.” 
289 GA 62, p. 368. “Die phänomenologische Hermeneutik der Faktizität sieht sich 
demnach […] darauf verwiesen, die überkommene und herrschende Ausgelegtheit 
nach ihren verdeckten Motiven, unausdrücklichen Tendenzen und Auslegungswegen 
aufzulockern und im abbauenden Rückgang zu den ursprünglichen Motivquellen der 
Explikation vorzudringen. Die Hermeneutik bewerkstelligt ihre Aufgabe nur auf dem Wege der 
Destruktion. Philosophische Forschung ist, sofern sie die Gegenstands- und Seinsart 
ihres thematischen Worauf (Faktizität des Lebens) verstanden hat, im radikalen Sinne 
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Heidegger’s insistence on the necessity of destructing our received 
understanding is a clear mark of the transformation that his conception of 
phenomenality and phenomenology is undergoing at this time. Already in 
his earliest Freiburg lectures, he had emphasized the need to attend to and 
critically destruct the prejudiced concepts by which we normally live. At 
that time, however, he still believed that emancipation and originary 
understanding could be achieved through an intuitive phenomenological 
explication of the basic structures of life. Now he closes this possibility. 
Given that the phenomenological hermeneutic can gain access to its 
matter “only on the path of destruction,” this implies two things: first, that 
our intuitive experience of meaning is so fundamentally determined by our 
historical pre-understanding that this pre-understanding cannot be 
critically examined through an intuition-based explication of the matters in 
question but only through a destructive return to its historical sources; 
second, that as long as the Western tradition of philosophy has never been 
able to retrieve its origin in Aristotle’s philosophy it has necessarily 
unfolded as a virtually autistic sequence doomed to repeat and vary the 
basic concepts it has always already inherited as its point of departure.  
      For Heidegger the purpose of interpreting Aristotle is thus not to 
provide a historical foil for the illumination of his primary systematic 
description of life. Rather, the interpretation constitutes the central path of 
the systematic investigation itself. It is only by returning to Aristotle that it 
becomes possible to dismantle the prejudiced philosophical tradition and 
trace it back to the sources out of which its central conceptuality has 
grown forth. Moreover, by freely and critically delimiting the meaning of 
its traditional concepts philosophy is also opened up to the possibility of 
finding, in Aristotle’s texts, a new and more originary explication of life. 
According to Heidegger, the preliminary explication of the structure of 
factical life, guiding his historical interpretation of Aristotle, is thus strictly 
speaking already a result of that very interpretation.  
      As mentioned above, Heidegger believes there are two ambivalent 
sides to Aristotle’s thinking, which make him philosophically decisive.  On 
the one hand, Aristotle ultimately determines being as ousia – as pure and 
                                                                                                                      
‘historisches’ Erkennen. Die destruktive Auseinandersetzung mit ihrer Geschichte ist für 
die philosophische Forschung kein bloßer Annex zu Zwecken der Illustration dessen, 
wie es früher gewesen ist. [...] Die Destruktion ist vielmehr der eigentliche Weg, auf 
dem sich die Gegenwart in ihren eigenen Grundbewegtheiten begegnen muß.” 
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constant presence – on the basis of the experiential paradigm of 
theoretical observation, sofia. It is, Heidegger claims, this conception of 
being that constitutes the ultimate ontological horizon of all of Aristotle’s 
thinking, and that will henceforth dominate the history of philosophy. On 
the other hand, Heidegger claims that Aristotle’s thinking also contains a 
qualified and unsurpassed articulation of the structure of factical pre-
theoretical life. Since this articulation is shadowed and hampered by 
Aristotle’s conception of being as ousia, the task Heidegger sets himself is 
to spell it out and radicalize it as an articulation of the basic sense of 
factical life. Indeed, he also believes that Aristotle’s conception of life 
sheds light on the existential roots of the traditional theoretical 
understanding of being as presence. 
      According to Heidegger, Aristotle’s analysis of phronēsis in the 
Nichomachean Ethics provides a qualified model for thinking the structure of 
our pre-theoretical phenomenal understanding. Phronēsis, Heidegger 
maintains, signifies the circumspection that guides life’s practical coping 
with its world. This circumspection is no simple sense perception but 
exhibits a synthetic structure: “a going-toward the being with ‘regard’ to 
another being-intended.”290 It is only to the extent that we intend 
particular beings on the basis of a preceding concern and understanding 
that these beings may show up as something significant: as a tree, as a 
house, as a human being. This synthetic as-structure is the condition for 
both truth and untruth. I can only perceive a horse on a field or mistake a 
donkey for a horse on the backdrop of a certain understanding of horses. 
Aristotle calls the preceding understanding guiding all our phenomenal 
experience “nous”: “Nous is perception pure and simple; it is that which in 
the first place enables and gives a whereupon (Worauf) for any and every 
‘coping’ whatsoever. […] The perceiving puts everything forth (stellt alles 
her) as something available. Nous gives sight, gives a something, gives a 
‘there’. […] Nous is aisthēsis tis, an apprehending which in each case simply 
pregives the ‘look’ of the objects.”291 Nous thus has the character of an 
                                         
290 GA 62, p. 378: “ein zugehen auf das Seiende in der ‘Hinsicht’ eines anderen 
Vermeintseins.” 
291 GA 62, p. 381: “Der νοῦς ist das Vernehmen schelchthin, das heißt das, was ein 
Worauf für irgendwelchen gerichteten ‘Umgang mit’ überhaupt ermöglicht, vorgibt. 
[...] Das Vernehmen stellt alles her als ein Verfügenkönnen darüber, und zwar so wie 
das Licht. Der νοῦς gibt überhaupt Sicht, ein Etwas, ein ‘Da’. [...] Der νοῦς ist 
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understanding that, prior to every possibility of truth or mistake, presents 
the eidē – the meaningful looks or essences, the “as-what-determinations” 
– in the light of which beings can show up as one thing or the other.292 
Given that nous constitutes the light conditioning all possible seeing and 
experience of beings, it cannot itself have the character of seeing, but must 
rather be understood as the primary unthematic “doxa” or “originary 
belief” (Urglaube) preceding all such seeing.293 Heidegger ultimately 
interprets nous in terms of the pre-understanding of historical meaning that  
we always already live in, and which determines our possibilities of 
apprehending particular entities as meaningful phenomena.  
      Nous, Heidegger continues, does not only present the meaningful 
looks or essences – eidē – that determine as what beings can show up. This 
understanding-of-eidē is, in its turn, guided by an understanding of the 
archai: the ultimate “from which” that we always already “keep in sight” 
and which determine the “domains of being” of different beings.294 This 
hierarchical stratification of nous provides the basis for Heidegger’s new 
conception of the task of philosophy as a questioning of being. If our 
experience of meaningful beings is from the outset organized by an 
understanding of the archai – the different senses of being and the sense of 
being as such – in an unthematic way, then the philosophical task of 
clarifying the sense of being emerges as the fundamental condition for 
achieving a transparent understanding of ourselves and the world.  
      According to Heidegger, Aristotle’s analysis of phronēsis thus amounts 
to a supreme explication of the circumspection that guides life in its pre-
theoretical dealings with the surrounding world. In so far as phronēsis is 
truly disclosive – alētheia praktikē – life is there for us as the “full, unveiled, 
moment of factical life in the how of its decisive readiness to cope with 
itself,”295 i.e., as the finite temporal-historical situation in which we can 
live and act. However, Aristotle is never able to achieve a positive 
ontological characterization of the temporal being of factical life, but 
                                                                                                                      
αἴσθησίς τις, ein Vernehmen, das das Aussehen der Gegenstände jeweils schlicht 
vorgibt.” 
292 GA 62, p. 379: “Als-Was-Bestimmtheiten.” 
293 GA 62, p. 405. 
294 GA 62, p. 382. 
295 GA 62, p. 384. “Die ἀλήθεια πρακτική ist nichts anderes als der jeweils unverhüllte 
volle Augenblick des faktischen Lebens im Wie der entscheidenden Umg 
angsbereitschaft mit ihm selbst.” 
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rather defines life negatively by contrasting it to his conception of the 
primordial sense of being as ousia.  
      Aristotle, Heidegger maintains, develops his basic conception of being 
as ousia as an explication not of phronēsis but of sofia. Terrified and repelled 
by its own finitude, life has a basic tendency to give up its pre-theoretical 
concern with the world, and instead engage in sofia: a pure perception of 
the eidē determining what particular beings are. However, by focusing 
strictly on the eidē the perception of sofia loses sight of the pre-theoretical 
movement of life in its temporality and historicity, thereby also covering 
up its own origin in factical life. As a result of this suppression, it becomes 
possible to enact sofia as a pure theoretical observation of the eidē as a 
steady and constant possession.  For Aristotle, sofia constitutes the 
primordial being of life: “The authentic being of the human being 
manifests itself in the true in the pure enactment of sofia as the 
unconcerned leisurely (scholē) lingering with the archai of the beings that are 
always there.”296 Herein the experience of artisan production is exemplary. 
Just as the artisan takes his cue from ideal and stable models in order to be 
able to produce concrete particular artifacts, sofia is enacted as a pure 
observation of the readily available and constant eidē determining what we 
may experience as particular meaningful beings.  
      According to Heidegger, Aristotle’s suppression of phronēsis and his 
elevation of sofia as our primary access to being inaugurate the domination 
of the theoretical attitude as the experiential basis of Western philosophy. 
It is on this basis that Aristotle articulates the basic sense of being as ousia, 
which Heidegger two years later explicates as pure and constant 
“presence.”297 This understanding of being as presence, he claims, 
determines the horizon and course of the subsequent philosophical 
tradition. 
      In short: What Heidegger finds in Aristotle is nothing less than a 
qualified and unsurpassed analysis of the basic synthetic as-structure of 
phenomenal experience, to the effect that we can only experience 
particular beings as meaningful phenomena on the basis of a preceding 
understanding of our historical contexts of meaning. This historical 
                                         
296 GA 62, p. 386: “Eigentliches Sein des Menschen zeitigt sich im reinen Vollzug der 
σοφία als dem unbekümmerten, zeithabenden (σχολή), rein vernehmenden Verweilen 
bei den ἀρχαί des immer Seienden.” 
297 Cf. Kisiel 1993, p. 491.  
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understanding is, in its turn, guided by an understanding of the different 
modes of being and, ultimately, of the sense of being as such. It is 
precisely this hierarchical structure of phenomenal understanding – 
according to which our historical understanding of meaning/being 
determines our experience of beings – that Heidegger will five years later 
name the “ontological difference” (ontologische Differenz).298  
      As we shall see, Heidegger’s quasi-Aristotelian analysis of 
phenomenality constitutes the systematic center that sustains and opens 
up his new philosophical approach. First, through its account of the 
historical structure of phenomenality it induces a radical historicization of 
the phenomenological method of investigation.  If our phenomenal access 
to beings is fundamentally determined by our prior understanding of 
historical meaning, then we cannot hope to critically examine this 
understanding by way of direct phenomenological intuition and 
description of the matters; rather, the only way to critically delimit our 
received understanding is through a destructive return to its historical 
origins. Second, it allows Heidegger to give a new account of the task of 
philosophy in terms of the question of being. If our understanding of 
beings is always already guided by an understanding of being, which is 
normally unthematic and prejudiced, then the philosophical task of 
clarifying the sense of being becomes decisive for our possibilities of 
understanding the world and ourselves.  
      Heidegger’s new quasi-Aristotelian conception of the structure of 
factical life also leads him to appropriate the word “phenomenon” as a key 
concept of his own thinking. In his earliest Freiburg lectures, he had 
primarily preferred to talk about the “givenness” or “manifestation” of the 
matters in our pre-theoretical experience. The term “phenomenon” 
surfaces in Heidegger’s last Freiburg lecture course “Ontologie – The 
Hermeneutics of Facticity” from the summer of 1923 soon after his 
                                         
298 Cf. GA 24, pp. 22, 102, 109, 454. Heidegger introduces the term “ontological 
difference” in his 1927 lecture course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Die 
Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24). However, as many commentators have 
pointed out, this notion is already at the center of Heidegger’s thinking in Being and 
Time although he does not yet label it the “ontological difference.” Cf., e.g., Rosales 
(1970); Marion (1998), pp. 108-140; Overgaard, pp. 69-103. My suggestion here is that 
it is already in the context of his reading of Aristotle in 1922 that Heidegger articulates 
– at least in a rough and provisional way – the hierarchical structure of phenomenality 
that he will come to call the “ontological difference,” and which sets the stage for all 
his subsequent thinking.  
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rediscovery of Aristotle.299 In the autumn of 1923, he begins his first 
Marburg lecture course, “Introduction to Phenomenological Research,” by 
offering an explication of the word “phenomenology” by tracing it back to 
its Greek roots in Aristotle’s analysis of factical life.  
      In the last-mentioned course Heidegger notes that the expression 
“phenomenology” is composed of the two Greek words “phainomenon” 
and “logos.” Phainomenon means “something that shows itself” and 
constitutes a nominalization of the verbs “phainomai,” to show oneself, and 
“phainō,” to bring something to light.300 For Aristotle, Heidegger argues, 
the word phainomenon does not refer to the data of simple sense 
perceptions, but to the significant things we encounter in the world.301 
The possibility of experiencing entities as significant phenomena depends 
on the structural fact that our perception essentially involves a “logos tis,” a 
kind of speech. This logos does not primarily take the form of explicit 
utterances but rather has the character of an implicit speech which, like 
the light, illuminates and lets us see the beings we experience: “Aisthēsis is 
present in the sort of being that has language. Whether or not it is 
vocalized, it is always in some way speaking. Language speaks not only in 
the course of the perceiving, but even guides it; we see through language.”302 
Logos here shoulders the role that nous had in “Indication of the 
Hermeneutic Situation,” both terms designating the preceding 
understanding of the eidē – looks or “viewpoints” – which we do not 
obtain “purely from the thing,” but which we “already know,” and which 
allow us to identify and see particular beings as meaningful phenomena in 
the first place: this as a house, this as a tree, this as a human being.303   
                                         
299 Cf. “Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität),” GA 63, pp. 67ff. (the lecture course 
is henceforth referred to as “Ontology” in the main text).   
300 GA 17, pp. 6f.  
301 Cf. GA 17, pp. 11, 13.  
302 GA 17, p. 30: “Die αἴσθησις ist in einem solchen Wesen, das die Sprache hat. Mit 
oder ohne Verlautbarung ist es immer in irgendeiner Weise Sprechen. Die Sprache 
spricht nicht nur mit beim Vernehmen, sondern führt es sogar, wir sehen durch die 
Sprache.” 
303 GA 17: p. 33: “Solche λόγοι nun, bei denen ich eine Sache so anspreche, daß ich 
das, als was ich sie anspreche, nicht rein aus ihr selbst gewinne, sondern in Hinsicht 
auf ein anderes, was ich schon kenne, – diese Hinsichten selsbst, in denen ich in 
vielfacher Weise eine Sache ansprechen kann, liegen außerhalb.” Cf. also GA 17, pp. 
24, 28, 40f. 
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      Heidegger’s appropriation of the notion of “phenomenon” and his 
explication of the conceptual pair phenomenon-phenomenology by 
reference to its Greek roots is not philosophically innocent. On the one 
hand, it is a token of his belief that he has achieved a new understanding 
of phenomenality that fundamentally challenges Husserl’s as well as his 
own earlier conception of the nature of self-showing; on the other hand, it 
opens up the strategic possibility of construing Husserl’s phenomenology 
as a fall away from the more originary Greek understanding of 
phenomenality that Heidegger has taken upon himself to retrieve and 
radicalize. 
 
Heidegger’s Renewed Critique of Husserl 
 
Heidegger, as we know, dedicates Being and Time to Husserl. In a footnote 
he also states that in so far as the investigations of his book are able to 
make some headway towards elucidating the “matters themselves,” this is 
thanks to the “personal guidance” into phenomenology that he received 
from his former teacher.304 However, notwithstanding these gestures of 
thanks, there is no doubt that Heidegger’s attitude to Husserl’s 
phenomenology in Being and Time is extremely ambivalent. Towards the 
end of his introductory treatment of the phenomenological method of his 
investigations, in which Husserl’s name is not mentioned at all, Heidegger 
sums up the ambivalence in the following dense passage:  
 
The following investigations have become possible only on the 
basis prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose Logical Investigations 
phenomenology achieved a breakthrough. Our elucidations of the 
preliminary concept of phenomenology show that what is essential 
in it does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical “movement” 
(Richtung). Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can understand 
phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility.305 
                                         
304 SZ, p. 38. 
305 SZ, p. 38: “Die folgenden Untersuchungen sind nur möglich geworden auf dem 
Boden, den E. Husserl gelegt, mit dessen ‘Logischen Untersuchungen’ die 
Phänomenologie zum Durchbruch kam. Die Erläuterungen des Vorbegriffes der 
Phänomenologie zeigen an, daß ihr Wesentliches nicht darin liegt, als philosophische 
‘Richtung’ wirklich zu sein. Höher als die Wirklichkeit steht die Möglichkeit. Das 
Verständnis der Phänomenologie liegt einzig im Ergreifen ihrer als Möglichkeit.” 
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The passage contains two claims. First, it states that Heidegger’s 
philosophical project has becomes possible only “on the basis” of 
Husserl’s phenomenology. Second, it asserts that phenomenology here has 
to be understood not as an “actuality” but as a pure “possibility.” That is 
to say, in so far as Husserl’s phenomenology constitutes the basis of 
Heidegger’s thinking it does so in the form of a possibility that Husserl 
opens up but which he, due to his basic theoretical orientation, fails to 
bring to fruition in a radical manner. Heidegger thus understands his own 
thinking as an attempt to seize upon and develop the latent and so far 
distorted potential of Husserl’s phenomenology.  
      In Being and Time Heidegger’s relationship to Husserl largely remains 
implicit, although it can to some extent be glimpsed indirectly through his 
discussions of other thinkers of the theoretical tradition, in particular 
Descartes and Kant. Hence, to be able to explicate his attitude to Husserl 
we need to turn to the preceding Marburg-lecture courses in which this 
attitude is elaborated in much greater detail. 
      It is plain from the biographical record that Heidegger’s explication of 
Aristotle in the early 1920s goes hand in hand with a renewed effort to 
critically distance himself from Husserl. Having just completed a seminar 
on Husserl’s Ideas I in the winter semester of 1922/23, Heidegger writes 
the following lines to his student Karl Löwith: “In the final hour of the 
seminar, I publicly burned and destroyed the Ideas to such an extent that I 
dare say that the essential foundations for the whole [of my work] are now 
cleanly laid out. Looking back from this vantage to the Logical Investigations, 
I am now convinced that Husserl was never a philosopher, not even for 
one second in his life. He becomes ever more ludicrous...” Then, in a 
subsequent letter to Löwith Heidegger again states that the lecture course 
he is currently delivering – i.e. Ontology from the summer of 1923 – 
“strikes the main blows against phenomenology. I now stand completely 
on my own feet. […] There is no chance of getting an appointment. And 
after I have published, my prospects will be finished. The old man will 
then realize that I am wringing his neck – and then the question of 
succeeding him is out. But I can’t help myself....”306 
                                                                                                                      
 
306 Both of the above quotes are from Kisiel & Sheehan [eds.] 2007, p. 372. They are 
also found, e.g., in Kisiel 1997, p. 335, and Sheehan & Palmer [eds.] 1997, p. 17. 
142 The Historical Structure of Phenomenality
  
 
 
   Hard words indeed. Still, I think there is no reason to take Heidegger’s 
harsh rhetoric as straightforward evidence of the philosophical depth of 
his critique of Husserl. Taken at face value, the quotations above hardly 
convey much more than Heidegger’s profound ambition to dethrone his 
living philosophical mentor – whose influence is thus confirmed – and 
assert himself as an independent philosopher under the banner of the 
dead and, hence, liberating father figure of Aristotle. The only way to 
judge the systematic philosophical sense of Heidegger’s renewed critique 
of Husserl is, needless to say, to closely attend to and analyze his concrete 
philosophical work itself.   
      I will begin by outlining the basic scheme of Heidegger’s critique of 
Husserl as it is developed in the lecture courses “Introduction to 
Phenomenological Research” and “Prolegomena.” I will then go on to 
explicate how Heidegger in “Prolegomena” articulates his own historicized 
phenomenological stance through a peculiar kind of critical-transformative 
appropriation of Husserl’s concept of “categorial intuition.”  
      So what is the “possibility” of phenomenology according to 
Heidegger? The philosophical potential of Husserl’s phenomenology, 
Heidegger claims, above all lies in his insistence on the need for 
philosophy to go to the matters themselves as they are concretely given in 
our experience, and in his fundamental discovery of intentionality: 
 
The intentionality of consciousness is not some sort of condition of 
the ego; rather, in this “directing itself-at” (Sichrichten-auf) that at 
which it is directed (das Worauf des Gerichtetsein) is also given. 
Intentionality is not to be construed as a peculiarity of mental 
processes; instead it is to be given as a manner in which something 
is encountered, in such a way that what is encountered comes into 
view along with the encountering: the “directing itself-at” in unison 
with its specific at-which (Worauf). [...] With this discovery of 
intentionality, for the first time in the entire history of philosophy, the way is 
explicitly given for a radical ontological research.307 
                                         
307 GA 17, p. 260: “Die Intentionalität selbst des Bewußtseins ist nicht irgendein 
Zustand des ego, sondern in diesem ‘Sichrichten-auf’ ist das Worauf des 
Gerichtetseins mitgegeben. Die Intentionalität soll nicht als eine Eigenart psychischer 
Vorgänge betrachtet werden, sondern sie soll als eine Weise gegeben werden, in der 
etwas begegnet, so, daß das, was begegnet, mit dem Begegnen in den Blick kommt: 
das Sichrichten-auf in eins mit seinem spezifischen Worauf. [...] Mit dieser Entdeckung 
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According to Heidegger, Husserl’s discovery of intentionality amounts to 
nothing less than the insight that our acts of consciousness are 
fundamentally directed towards the intended matters themselves – not 
toward some kind of inner representations or sense-data – and, 
conversely, that these matters are concretely given and intelligible as what 
they are only in our correlative experiences of them. Husserl’s concept of 
intentionality thus for the first time opens the way to “radical ontological 
research”: it is only through strict reflexive explication of “the object in 
the manner of its being meant”308 that is becomes possible to 
phenomenologically investigate the being-senses that things really have 
and show up for us without falling back either into metaphysical idealism 
or realism.  
      So far, Heidegger’s assessment of the possibility of Husserl’s 
phenomenology is very much the same as it was in his earlier Freiburg 
lectures. Aside from the discovery of intentionality Heidegger also, in 
“Prolegomena,” hails Husserl’s discoveries of, first, the “categorial 
intuition” and, second, the “a priori.” Still, as we shall see, the import 
Heidegger ascribes to the two latter discoveries is to a great extent based 
on his own critical-transformative elaboration of these Husserlian notions. 
      Heidegger’s central critical thesis is that Husserl, despite his 
phenomenological breakthrough, repeats the basic theoretical orientation 
which has dominated the history of Western philosophy since Aristotle, 
something that leads him to squander and misconstrue the possibility of 
phenomenology that he opens up. Like his precursors, Husserl’s thinking 
is said to be driven by an “anxiety in the face of existence.”309 In its 
anxious flight from the temporal-historical finitude of factical life, 
theoretical philosophy sets as its guiding motive “care about knowledge 
known,”310 i.e., the hope of achieving an absolutely justified and 
universally binding knowledge of life. Turning away from life, Husserl 
never radically poses the question of the being of the human Dasein, nor, 
for that matter, the question of the sense of being as such, which, 
according to Heidegger, ultimately organizes our understanding of the 
                                                                                                                      
der Intentionalität ist zum ersten Mal in der ganzen Geschichte der Philosophie ausdrücklich der 
Weg für eine radikale ontologische Forschung gegeben.” 
308 GA 17, p. 263: “den Gegenstand im Wie seines Gemeintseins.” 
309 GA 17, p. 97: “Angst vor dem Dasein.” 
310 GA 17, p. 101: “Sorge um erkannte Erkenntnis.” 
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world and ourselves.311 Instead, Husserl unwittingly adopts the traditional 
understanding of being as Vorhandenheit – “presence-at-hand” for a 
theoretical seeing – and of the human being as a theoretically knowing 
subject, both of which are modeled on the paradigm of theoretical 
observation. 
      According to Heidegger, Husserl determines the basic character of 
phenomenal givenness as “bodily presence” (Leibhaftigkeit), which is 
nothing but a rearticulation of the traditional understanding of being as 
presence-at-hand: 
 
Bodily presence is a character of encounter of world-things, in so 
far as the world is still encountered solely in a pure apprehension, a 
pure perception. It is a character of encounter of reality to the 
degree the our preoccupation denies the world its full possibility of 
encounter; it is a specific environmental character which shows 
itself only when concern, concerned being-in-the-world, is a 
particularly conditioned mere looking at the world, only when the 
primarily given and experienced world is in a certain way 
excluded.312 
 
In short, to be phenomenally given is for Husserl to be present for pure 
theoretical observation. Hence, Heidegger insists, Husserl is bound to 
construe our primary intentional experience as a pure seeing of objects 
and conceive of the phenomenological reflection as an intuitive reflection 
on that primary intentionality.  
      Against this, Heidegger argues that Husserl’s basic notion of 
phenomenal givenness as bodily presence builds on a repression of what is 
primarily there and given in our pre-theoretical experience. The bodily 
presence of an object for our thematic seeing, he writes, is a “founded 
presence,”313 such that our intuitive seeing of particular objects is always 
                                         
311 Cf. GA 20, p. 140. 
312 GA 20, p. 265: “Die Leibhaftigkeit ist ein Begegnischarakter von Weltdingen, 
sofern die Welt lediglich noch einem puren Vernehmen, einem puren Wahrnehmen 
begegnet. Sie ist ein Begegnischarakter der Realität, sofern der Umgang der 
begegnenden Welt die volle Begegnismöglichkeit versagt – ein spezifischer 
Umweltcharakter, der sich nur dann zeigt, wenn das Besorgen, das besorgende In-der-
Welt-sein, ein bestimmt geartetes Nur-noch-hinsehen auf die Welt ist, die primär 
gegebene und erfahrene Welt in gewisser Weise ausgesperrt ist.” 
313 GA 20, p. 264: “fundierte Präsenz.” 
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already determined by our preceding unthematic pre-understanding of the 
historical contexts of significance making up our world: “every worldly 
being, and precisely the very nearest real being, is taken ‘in itself’ on the 
basis of this primary presence, which, in its primacy, is a non-objective 
presence.”314 Husserl’s blindness to the historical structure of our 
phenomenal experience in turn effects an inability to account for the 
historical character of the phenomenological explication itself: 
 
Within phenomenology [it hardly suffices] to appeal to merely 
looking at and devoting oneself to the matters. It could be that all 
that is burdened with a plethora or prejudices. In order to get at the 
matters themselves, they must be freed up and the very process of 
freeing them up is not one of a momentary exuberance, but of 
fundamental research. The seeing must be educated and this is a task so 
difficult that it is hard for it to be overemphasized since we are, like 
no other time, saturated by history and are even aware of the 
manifoldness of history. 315 
 
That is to say, in so far as Husserl conceives of phenomenal givenness in 
terms of intuitive seeing he becomes unable to recognize the way in which 
his own, supposedly direct phenomenological seeing, is mediated by the 
historical tradition of theoretical philosophy in a naive and prejudiced 
manner. However, Heidegger argues, given the historical structure of 
phenomenality, the method of phenomenology must itself become 
historical. Since our direct seeing is fundamentally determined by the 
historical patterns of meaning we live in, the only way for phenomenology 
to attain a free and unprejudiced grasp of the matters is through a 
destructive retrieval of the historical sources of our factical understanding: 
                                         
314 GA 20, p. 268: “alles weltlich Seiende und gerade das allernächste Reale [ist] von 
dieser primären und in ihrem Primat ungegenständlichen Präsenz ‘an sich’ 
genommen.”  
315 GA 17, p. 275: “[Es genügt nicht] innerhalb der Phänomenologie, wenn man sich 
auf ein bloßes Schauen und Sichhingeben an die Sachen beruft. Es könnte sein, daß all 
das mit einer Unsumme von Vorurteilen belastet ist. Um zu den Sachen selbst zu 
kommen, müssen sie freigegeben werden, und die Freigabe selbst ist nicht die eines 
momentanen Aufschwunges, sondern fundamentaler Forschung. Das Sehen muß 
ausgebildet werden, und diese Aufgabe ist eine so schwierige, daß sie nicht leicht 
übersteigert werden kann, weil wir wie keine andere Zeit von der Geschichte 
durchsetzt sind und auch ein Bewußtsein von der Mannigfaltigkeit der Geschichte 
haben.” 
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“As research work, phenomenology is precisely the laying open and letting be seen, 
understood as the methodologically directed dismantling of 
concealments.”316 
      Husserl’s theoretical orientation, Heidegger maintains, also in the end 
hampers and distorts his articulation of intentionality.317 He sums up 
Husserl’s conception of the structure of intentional experience as 
“reciprocal belonging-together of intentio and intentum.”318 However, although 
Husserl opens up the possibility of phenomenological research he is 
fundamentally unable to account for the correlation between intentio and 
intentum – or noesis and noema –, i.e., for how these aspects belong together 
in our primary experience of significant phenomena: “It must therefore be 
flatly stated that what the belonging of the intentum to the intentio implies 
is obscure. How the being-intended of an entity is related to that entity 
remains puzzling. It is even questionable whether one may question in this 
way at all.”319 Taking his starting point in the paradigmatic experience of 
theoretical observation, Husserl – so Heidegger claims – is in the end led 
to ground the being-sense of the objects in the absolute region of pure 
transcendental consciousness: “Consciousness, immanent and absolutely 
                                         
316 GA 20, p. 118: “Die Phänomenologie ist gerade als Forschung die Arbeit des 
freilegenden Sehenlassens im Sinne des methodisch geleiteten Abbauens der 
Verdeckungen.” 
317 Cf. GA 62, p. 361: “mit der bekannten Intentionalität ist nur ein ‘Zunächst’ 
getroffen – in einem verfallenden Hinsehen auf und hinsehenden Mitgehen mit 
‘Erlebnissen’.” Cf. also GA 17, p. 82; GA 20, p. 162. 
318 GA 20, p. 61: “gegenseitige Zugehörigkeit von Intentio und Intentum.” 
319 GA 20, p. 63: “Daher ist unumwunden zu sagen: was die Mitgehörigkeit des 
Intentum zur Intentio besagt, bleibt dunkel. Wie das Intendiertseins eines Seienden 
sich zu diesem Seienden verhält, bleibt rätselhaft; es bleibt auch fraglich, ob überhaupt 
so gefragt werden darf.” According to Heidegger, the theoretical bias of Husserl’s 
analysis of intentionality also gives rise to a peculiar layer-ontology on Husserl’s part: 
on the one hand, Husserl determines the basic layer of the intentional object as 
consisting in its  perceptible material substance, whereby the material object may also, 
in addition, be – and is in fact for the most part – experienced as carrier of 
supplementary layers of meaning: values, purposes, aesthetic qualities, etc.; on the 
other hand, Husserl takes the theoretically signifying acts to constitute the basic way of 
intentional intending common to all intentional experiences, so that “each judgment, 
each instance of wanting, each instance of loving is founded upon a presenting that 
provides in advance what can be wanted, what is detestable and loveable” (jeder Urteil, 
jedes Wollen, jedes Lieben auf ein Vorstellen fundiert ist, das überhaupt das Wollbare, das Haß- 
und Liebbare vorgibt) (GA 17, p. 272). For an incisive treatment of Heidegger’s critique 
of Husserl’s layer-ontology, see Overgaard 2004, pp. 173-183. 
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given being, is that in which every other possible entity is constituted, in 
which it truly ‘is’ what it is.”320 
      What has changed in Heidegger’s attitude to Husserl since his earliest 
Freiburg lectures?  On a formal level, both Heidegger’s positive 
assessment and negative critique of Husserl appear to be roughly the 
same. Now as then he praises Husserl for opening up the possibility of 
reflectively describing the objects of our experience according to how they 
are given in particular acts; now as then he criticizes Husserl for neglecting 
and theoretically distorting the being of our pre-theoretical experience of 
the world, and for grounding the being-senses of beings  in transcendental 
subjectivity. Nevertheless, the critical edge and positive direction of 
Heidegger’s critique have changed significantly. 
      Heidegger’s early Freiburg critique basically took the form of an 
immanent critical elaboration of Husserl’s phenomenological project. 
While dismissing Husserl’s theoretical conception of phenomenology 
Heidegger accepted the key idea that phenomenology must proceed by 
way of intuitive reflection. On this basis, he rearticulated phenomenology 
in terms of an explication – guided by love and sympathy, and expressing 
itself with the aid of formal indications – of the originary structures of our 
primary pre-theoretical experience. Against Husserl’s tendency to infer the 
full sense of the experienced objects from the act-structures of 
transcendental subjectivity, he insisted on the unity of our pre-theoretical 
experience-of-significance, arguing that this experience was centered in the 
particular historical self.  Now, by contrast, the main thrust of Heidegger’s 
critique is directed precisely at the idea of direct intuitive givenness which 
he previously accepted. Hence, the basic problem of Husserl’s 
phenomenology is not that it is unable to see and describe factical life in a 
primordial manner. Instead, Heidegger now maintains that the very idea of 
intuitive givenness governing Husserl’s phenomenology is a symptom of 
his basic inability to account for the temporal-historical being of Dasein, 
and, hence, for the historical nature of phenomenology. Moreover, 
whereas Heidegger earlier tried to overcome Husserl’s theoretical concept 
of intentionality by stressing the primary unity of our pre-theoretical 
                                         
320 GA 20, p. 144: “Das Bewußtsein, das immanent, absolut gegebene Sein, ist das, in 
dem jedes mögliche andere Seiende sich konstituiert, in dem es eigentlich ‘ist’, was es 
ist.”  
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experience, he now tries to account for that unity by anchoring it in our 
preceding understanding of our historical contexts of being.   
      In my treatment of Heidegger’s early Freiburg critique of Husserl, I 
took some steps towards assessing and delimiting the systematic force of 
Heidegger’s criticisms, such as these transpired within a basically shared 
phenomenological framework. However, as concerns Heidegger’s new 
critique – which dismisses the crucial idea of intuitive givenness in favor 
of a radically historical thinking – we are not yet in a position to critically 
clarify and assess the philosophical sense and force of this critique. This 
would not only require a thorough explication of Heidegger’s attempt to 
develop a historical thinking – and we are still at the beginning of this 
journey – but also, ultimately, a systematic philosophical clarification of 
the relationship between direct intuitive experience and history in our 
understanding of meaning. Hence, such an assessment must wait. In the 
next section I will turn to examining how Heidegger develops his 
historicized phenomenology though a critical appropriation of Husserl’s 
notion of “categorial intuition.” This will also allow us to pinpoint more 
sharply how Heidegger and Husserl part ways as regards the central issue 
of intuitive givenness.  
 
The Categorial Intuition – in Heidegger 
 
Heidegger’s main strategy during these years is, as we have seen, to hail 
Husserl’s phenomenology as a possibility that Husserl opens up but fails 
to realize in a radical manner, and which Heidegger undertakes to develop 
in a more primordial way by retrieving the insights he finds in Aristotle. 
However, in the lecture course “Prolegomena” Heidegger’s critical 
engagement with Husserl follows a somewhat different route. Although 
his critique ultimately remains the same, he here tries to develop his own 
new conception of phenomenality through a kind of critical-
transformative appropriation especially focusing on Husserl’s notion of 
“categorial intuition.”  
      As Heidegger several decades later, in the autobiographical sketch “My 
Way into Phenomenology” from 1963, accounts for the role of Husserl in 
his philosophical development, he highlights precisely Husserl’s analysis of 
the categorial intuition in the Logical Investigations as crucial for his effort to 
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articulate his guiding question concerning the sense of being.321 Similarly, 
in his last seminar, held in Zähringen in 1973, Heidegger writes: “Husserl 
touches slightly, brushes the question of being in the sixth chapter of the 
sixth logical investigation, with the concept of ‘categorial intuition.’”322 
Following Heidegger’s own retrospective remarks, many commentators 
have stressed Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition as the most 
important influence of Husserl on the development of Heidegger’s 
thought. As it happens, these same commentators generally tend to read 
Heidegger as a hermeneutic-deconstructive thinker of finitude and 
historicity, downplaying any possible reliance of his on Husserl’s 
phenomenological method of intuitive reflection. Conversely, those 
commentators favoring a phenomenological reading of Heidegger have 
tended to give little or no attention to Husserl’s idea of categorial intuition. 
Dismissing the importance often attributed to this notion, Søren 
Overgaard writes: “Husserl’s doctrine of categorial intuition might be a 
source of inspiration to Heidegger, but I find it hard to see how Heidegger 
could feel truly indebted to Husserl on this point.”323 As we shall see, this 
organization of the debate is no coincidence, since what is at stake in 
Heidegger’s explication of this notion is precisely the question to what 
extent our understanding of categorial meaning can be based on direct 
intuition and to what extent it is determined by our historical 
conceptuality.324 
      Heidegger’s explication of Husserl’s phenomenology is organized as a 
transition through Husserl’s three “fundamental discoveries”: 
intentionality, the categorial intuition, and the sense of the a priori. As 
compared with Heidegger’s normal mode of historical explication, in 
                                         
321 GA 14, pp. 93-98.  
322 GA 15, p. 373: “Und doch, darauf weist Heidegger hin, berührt oder streift Husserl 
die Frage nach dem Sein im sechsten Kapitel der sechsten ‘Logischen Untersuchung’ 
mit dem Begriff der ‘kategorialen Anschauung’.” 
323 Overgaard 2004, p. 80.  
324 For studies emphasizing the paramount importance of Husserl’s notion of 
categorial intuition for Heidegger’s philosophical development, cf. Taminiaux 1977; 
1991, pp. 1-54; Wanatabe 1993; van Buren 1994, pp. 203-219; Critchley 2008. By 
contrast, Steven Crowell and Søren Overgaard – cf. Crowell 2001 and Overgaard 2004 
– defend the view that Husserl’s main influence on Heidegger’s thinking is to be 
found in his basic phenomenological method of reflection on the structures of our 
intentional experience. In so doing, they largely downplay or ignore the importance of 
Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition.   
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which his driving systematic interest is palpable, his explication of Husserl 
at first gives a rather indefinite and ambiguous impression. Heidegger’s 
strategy consists in explicating Husserl’s discoveries in their original 
conceptual context and defend them against common misunderstandings, 
while simultaneously pushing Husserl’s thinking in the direction of his 
own conception of phenomenology. Hence, his explication takes on a 
peculiar indeterminate status, pointing  forward and backward at the same 
time: on the one hand, it is clear that Heidegger through his focus and 
personal accentuations bends Husserl’s conceptuality towards its 
possibilities of expressing what he himself conceives as the primary 
structure of phenomenality; on the other hand, Heidegger is convinced 
that Husserl’s concepts remain fatally bound up with the paradigm of 
theoretical observation as their limiting and distorting ground.325 
      Above I already dealt with Heidegger’s explication of Husserl’s 
discovery of intentionality. Now I will focus on his treatment of the 
notion of categorial intuition, and also, on that basis, on his explication of 
the a priori. Let us, however, begin by taking a look at Husserl’s 
conception of the categorial intuition.  
    
Husserl’s treatment of the categorial intuition in the sixth investigation of 
the Logical Investigations takes its starting point in the distinction between 
“signifying” acts – primarily acts of linguistic expression – in which we 
merely signify or intend a matter, and “fulfilling” acts in which the matter 
is intuitively given in the way we intended it, and which thus constitute the 
source of truth of all our intentional comportments.326 Husserl’s question 
is this: How can the categorial elements of our intentions be intuitively 
fulfilled? 
      According to Husserl, those parts of our signifying acts that merely 
signify sensory “material” can find evident fulfillment in simple sense 
perceptions. But what about the categorial “form” of these acts, what 
about the categorial elements that structure our expressions, e.g., the 
copula, the conjunctions and disjunctions, the articles, and the terms 
designating general classes or universals?327 These categorial forms cannot, 
                                         
325 As regards the ambiguity of Heidegger explication of Husserl in Prolegomena, cf. 
Bernet 1990, pp. 136-137; von Herrmann 1981, p. 8; Dahlstrom 2001, p. 52. 
326 Cf. Hua XIX, pp. 44ff. 
327 Cf. Hua XIX, pp. 663f., 657ff. 
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Husserl claims, be given in sense perceptions: we can perceive, with our 
eyes, the color “green” but there is nothing in this perception 
corresponding to the different categorial elements of sentences such as 
“the tree is green” or ”flamingos are pink birds.” Hence, as concerns the 
categorial elements of our intentions “a surplus (Überschuß) of meaning 
remains over, a form which finds nothing in the appearance itself to 
confirm it.”328 Husserl’s doctrine of the categorial intuition is an attempt 
to account for the kinds of fulfilling acts in which the excessive categorial 
meaning is evidently given.   
      As Heidegger notes in his commentary, Husserl’s notion of categorial 
intuition occupies a systematically crucial place in his phenomenology. It is 
this notion, Heidegger maintains, which gives “concretion” to the concept 
of intentionality, and makes it possible to “seize more sharply the apriori,” 
thus forming the center of Husserl’s three discoveries.329 As such, the 
discovery of the categorial intuition “for the first time” opens “the 
concrete way for a genuine categorial research proceeding by way of 
demonstration.”330 What Heidegger here indicates is that Husserl’s notion 
of categorial intuition is decisive for understanding the sense of 
intentionality and phenomenology. For one thing, although Husserl has 
indeed shown that our acts of consciousness – whether signitive or 
fulfilling – are essentially directed towards the matters they intend, the 
sense of this directedness remains unclear as long as we do not know what 
it means that our emptily signifying intentions are intuitively fulfilled. 
After all, these fulfilling acts determine what it means to truly see and 
experience the matters themselves. Given that all acts in which we intend 
meaningful matters are categorically structured, the answer to the question 
concerning the intuitive basis of our intentional experience lies in the 
notion of categorial intuition. Moreover, Husserl’s analysis of categorial 
intuition is decisive for what it means to phenomenologically see and 
describe the categorial forms and structures of our intentional experience. 
      What is more, the notion of categorial intuition also poses a 
fundamental challenge to Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl’s analysis of 
                                         
328 Hua XIX, p. 660: “es bleibt ein Überschuß in der Bedeutung, die in der 
Erscheinung selbst nichts findet, sich darin zu bestätigen.” 
329 GA 20, pp. 63, 98. 
330 GA 20, pp. 97f.: “Mit der Entdeckung der kategorialen Anschauung ist zum 
erstenmal der konkrete Weg einer ausweisenden und echten Kategorienforschung 
gewonnen.” 
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the categorial intuition is sparked by the insight that the categorial 
elements of our intentions constitute a “surplus” that has no counterpart 
in our sense perception. Hence, the question of the possibility of a 
categorial intuition becomes acute: Are there categorial acts of fulfillment 
that in some sense give us direct intuitive access to categorial meanings, 
acts that thus transcend and provide the ground for our categorially 
formed intentions? Or does the categorial form of our signifying acts 
determine our intuitive experience of things to such a degree that our 
direct intuitions can do nothing more than confirm or not-confirm, but 
never ground and critically modify the categorial form of our intentions?  
      The aim of Husserl’s investigation is to show that there is a categorial 
intuition which constitutes “the analogon of the common sensuous 
intuition.”331 Although the categorially fulfilling act is no simple sense 
perception, Husserl maintains that it nevertheless deserves the name 
“intuition,” since in it the categorial is given and appears as “real” (wirklich) 
and “self-given” (selbst gegeben).332 But how? 
      According to Husserl, the object of a sensuous intuition is given 
“simply,” by which he means that it is given “at one level of act” (in einer 
Aktstufe): it appears directly as a unified object and is not in need of 
further higher level acts in order to appear as itself.333 The categorial 
intuition is founded on the sensuous intuition in such a way that it, 
through various “acts of relating and connecting” (beziehende, verknüpfende 
Akte), constitutes a new kind of categorial objectivity that was not 
previously given in the sensuous intuition:334 “[Acts arise] which, as we 
said, constitute new objects, acts in which something appears as actual and 
self-given, which was not given, and could not have been given, as what it 
now appears to be, in these foundational acts alone. On the other hand, the 
new objects are based on the old ones, they are related to what appears in the basic 
acts.”335  
                                         
331 Hua XIX, p. 670: “das Analogon der gemeinen sinnlichen Anschauung.” 
332 Hua XIX, p. 672. 
333 Hua XIX, p. 674. 
334 Hua XIX, p. 674. 
335 HUA XIX, p. 675: “[Es erstehen] Akte, welche, wie wir sagten, neue Objektivitäten 
konstituieren; es erstehen Akte, in denen etwas als wirklich und als selbst gegeben erscheint, 
derart, daß dasselbe, als was es hier erscheint, in den fundierenden Akten allein noch 
nicht gegeben war und gegeben sein konnte. Andererseits aber gründet die neue 
Gegenständlichkeit in der alten.”  
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      Yet how should we understand these acts of relating and connecting 
which, on the basis of sense perceptions, make categorial meanings 
appear? 
      Husserl distinguishes between two kinds of categorial intuition: “acts 
of synthesis” and “acts of ideation.” Of these two, the latter acts are of 
particular importance for Heidegger, who emphasizes the crucial role of 
”ideation” both for clarifying the ”genuine sense of intentionality” and for 
grasping the ”a priori” in terms of the question of the ”being of 
beings.”336 The function of the “acts of synthesis” is to bring out and 
explicate the logical-semantic relations between different sensuously 
perceived objects – the relations corresponding to terms such as “is” (in 
the sense of the copula), “all,” “some,” “and,” “or,” “not,” “the,” and “if 
– so.” From a Heideggerian perspective, these acts do not seem decisive 
for how we primarily grasp the meaning of things; indeed, it seems that 
such an explication of the relations between different sensuous objects 
already presupposes an understanding of the conceptual contexts 
determining the possible meanings and relations of such objects. The 
function of the “ideation” or “general intuition” is, by contrast, precisely 
to grasp the general “ideas,” the essences or concepts, which the particular 
objects instantiate.337 As such, the question concerning the general 
intuition appears crucial for how we should understand both 
phenomenality and phenomenology: given that our intentional experience 
of phenomenal meaning is always already guided by our general ideas and 
concepts, the question of the general intuition concerns the very 
phenomenal basis of that experience; moreover, since phenomenology 
itself has the character of a science of essences the question is decisive for 
how we should conceive of phenomenology itself. 
                                         
336 GA 20, pp. 102f.   
337 HUA XIX, p. 690. Arguing that Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition is irrelevant 
for understanding Heidegger’s question of being, Søren Overgaard writes: “However, 
it would seem to me that Husserl’s problem of how, e.g., the ‘is’ in the claim ‘The 
paper is white’ can find intuitive fulfillment, given that it cannot be intuited through 
the senses like ‘paper’ and ‘white,’ is something quite different indeed from 
Heidegger’s inquiry into modes of being” (Overgaard 2004, p. 80). However, what 
Overgaard describes here is only one aspect of Husserl’s categorial intuition, namely 
the “acts of synthesis.” Although I agree with Overgaard that these acts could hardly 
have been of crucial importance to Heidegger, I think it is quite clear that Husserl’s 
“acts of ideation” play a central role for Heidegger as a kind of critical starting point 
for his articulation of the primacy of our understanding of historical meaning.   
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      In Logical Investigations Husserl’s conception of the general intuition still 
remains undeveloped, vague, and quite ambivalent. On the one hand, 
Husserl – as we have seen – stresses that there is a primary level of 
sensuous intuition at which the objects are given without the aid of 
higher-level categorial acts. The objects of the categorial intuition, e.g., the 
general essences, are said to be based on what appears in the primal 
sensuous intuition. On the other hand, Husserl’s brief outline of the 
process of “ideation” does not bear out or clarify the idea that the general 
intuition would be based on – and receive its possible truth from – our 
direct intuitive experience of sensuous objects. On the contrary, in 
Husserl’s description the “ideation” basically emerges as a kind of 
conceptual analysis. Characterizing the general intuition as an “ideational 
abstraction” (ideierende Abstraktion) through which the general categorial 
meaning “is brought to consciousness and achieves actual givenness,” 
Husserl writes:338 “We must presuppose such an act in order that, as 
against the manifold single moments of one and the same kind, this very 
kind may come before us precisely as one and the same. For we become 
aware of the identity of the general through the repeated enactment of 
such acts on the basis of several individual intuitions, and we plainly do so 
in an overreaching act of identification which brings all such single acts of 
abstraction into one synthesis.”339 That is, we enact the ideation by 
moving through a manifold of individual intuitions with the aim of 
identifying – in a way that still remains quite obscure – the identity of the 
general that the intuited objects exemplify. In this, the general idea does 
not seem to be grounded in our intuitive experience of particulars. 
Instead, the particular cases – intuited or imagined – merely figure as 
examples the only function of which is to allow us to bring out the 
essential features of the general idea or concept under investigation.340 
                                         
338 HUA XIX, p. 690: “zum Bewußtsein, zum aktuellen Gegenbensein kommt.” 
339 HUA XIX, pp. 690f.: “Dieser Akt ist vorausgesetzt, damit uns gegenüber der 
Mannigfaltigkeit von einzelnen Momenten einer und derselben Art diese Art selbst, und 
zwar als eine und dieselbe vor Augen stehen kann. Denn wir werden uns im wiederholten 
Vollzuge eines solchen Aktes auf Grund mehrerer individueller Anschauungen der 
Identität des Allgemeinen bewußt, und dies offenbar in einem übergreifenden, alle 
einzelnen Abstraktionsakte zur Synthesis bringenden Akte der Identifizierung.” 
340 Cf. HUA XIX, p. 661: “The intuited individual is not, however, what we mean 
here; it serves at best only as an individual case, an example, or only as the rough 
analogue on an example, for the general which alone interests us” (Aber das anschaulich 
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This, however, implies that the ideation must be understood as a 
procedure which basically relies on and explicates – but is unable to 
transcend or question the truth of – the factical concepts we always 
already live by. It is precisely this tendency of Husserl’s analysis of ideation 
to unsettle the supposed primacy of sensuous intuition, which is seized 
upon by Heidegger in his effort to establish the historical structure of 
phenomenal understanding.  
      Later in his career Husserl goes on to develop his idea of a general 
intuition which he renames “essential intuition” or “eidetic variation” 
along the way. The theme is above all elaborated in Husserl’s 1925 lecture 
course Phenomenological Psychology (Phänomenologische Psychologie), the relevant 
parts of which are included in the posthumously published volume 
Experience and Judgment (Erfahrung und Urteil). However, his later of account 
of the intuition of general essences basically repeats the ambivalences of 
Logical Investigations.  
      According to Husserl, our perception of individual entities is always 
already guided by our grasp of general “empirical types” that allow us to 
apprehend the entities we encounter in terms of these types.341 We thus 
from the outset perceive entities as this or that: as dogs, mountains or cars 
with their typical characteristics. The empirical types, Husserl maintains, 
are formed on the basis of our actual sensuous experiences of particular 
entities, and our passive association of the similarities obtaining between 
them. This means that the general empirical types thus formed through 
“empirical induction” basically have the character of presumptive 
concepts that are open to further determination by our future experience: 
“Thus […] a presumptive idea arises, the idea of a universal, to which belongs, 
in addition to the attributes already acquired, a horizon, indeterminate and 
open, of unknown attributes (conceptual determinations).”342 Moreover, 
the empirical types are essentially fallible classifications and 
characterizations of the objects in question, and they are grounded in our 
                                                                                                                      
Einzelne ist hierbei nicht das Gemeinte, es fungiert bestenfalls als singulärer Fall, als Beispiel oder 
nur als rohes Analogon eines Beispiels, des Allgemeinen, auf das es allein abgesehen ist). 
341 Husserl, E&U, p. 386. Husserl’s concept of “type,” and its relation to his concept 
of “essence,” is treated in Schutz 1966. See also Kasmier 2010. 
342 Husserl, E&U, p. 401: “So erwächst […] eine präsumptive Idee, die Idee eines 
Allgemeinen, zu welchem neben den schon gewonnenen Merkmalen noch ein 
unbestimmt offener Horizont unbekannter Merkmale (begrifflicher Bestimmungen) 
gehört.”  
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actual experiences of these objects. In so far as we classify entities in 
accordance with superficial characteristics, which cover up factical inner 
relations, Husserl speaks of “nonessential types” (außerwesentliche Typen). 
For example, the fact that the whale belongs to the class of mammals is 
hidden by the exterior analogy to the way of life the animal shares with the 
fishes. By contrast, in so far as the empirical types are formed in 
accordance with genuine empirical knowledge of the inner characteristics 
and relations of the objects Husserl uses the term “essential types” 
(wesentliche Typen). 
      The general empirical types just described are essentially dependent on 
our actual experience of particular entities. They are formed on the basis 
of this experience and their truth is rooted in the properties of the entities. 
In addition to such knowledge of empirical generalities, Husserl suggests 
that it is also possible to grasp pure essences, i.e., to grasp necessary 
structures that are not bound to particular cases, but which a priori  
determine “what must necessarily belong to an object in order that it can 
be an object of this kind.”343 Phenomenology itself strives to attain 
precisely such knowledge of essences.  
      According to Husserl, we can grasp essences by using the method of 
“free variation.” Let me quote a lengthier passage in which Husserl 
articulates how a free variation is carried out:  
 
[The essential seeing] is based on the modification of an 
experienced or imagined objectivity, turning it into an arbitrary 
example which, at the same time, receives the character of a guiding 
model (Vorbild), a point of departure for the production of an 
infinitely open multiplicity of variants. It is based, therefore, on a 
variation. In other words, for its modification in pure imagination, 
we let ourselves be guided by the fact taken as a model. For this it is 
necessary that ever new similar images be obtained as replications, 
as images of the imagination, which are all concretely similar to the 
original image. Thus by an act of volition we produce free variants, 
each of which, just like the total process of variation itself, occurs in 
the subjective mode of the “arbitrary.” It then becomes evident 
that a unity runs through this multiplicity of successive figures, that 
in such free variations of an original image, e.g., of a thing an 
                                         
343 Husserl, E&U, p. 426: “was einem Gegenstand notwendig zukommen muß, wenn 
er ein Gegenstand dieser Art soll sein können.”  
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invariant is necessarily retained as the necessary general form, without 
which an object such as this thing, as an example of its kind, would 
not be thinkable at all. While what differentiates the variants 
remains indifferent to us, this form stands out in the practice of 
voluntary variation, and as an absolutely identical content, an 
invariable What, according to which all the variants coincide: a 
general essence.344 
 
In short, we start with an – actual or imagined – arbitrary example of the 
general type under investigation and let it serve as the guiding model. We 
then go on to produce, through imagination, an open multiplicity of 
variants which are similar to the original model. By enacting this variation 
it becomes possible to see and determine the invariant necessary form 
without which the arbitrarily chosen example would not be thinkable as an 
example of the sort under investigation. For example, we could grasp the 
essence of the concept of “animal” by imagining a multiplicity of arbitrary 
animals and related beings, thus assessing what must and what need not 
belong to an animal in order for it to remain an animal. In so doing, we 
are supposed to be able to grasp the general essence of “animal.”  
      Now, in Husserl’s description the eidetic variation basically emerges as 
a kind of conceptual analysis. The very possibility of producing variants of 
the general type under investigation, and of determining which variants 
count as examples of the type and which do not, presupposes that we 
already have an implicit grasp of the type. Whereas our factical pre-
understanding of the type provides our sole measure for distinguishing 
                                         
344 Husserl, E&U, pp. 410f.: “[Die Wesenserschauung] beruht auf der Abwandlung 
einer erfahrenen oder phantasierten Gegenständlichkeit zum beliebigen Exempel, das 
zugleich den Charakter des leitenden ‘Vorbildes’ erhält, des Ausgangsgliedes für die 
Erzeugung einer offen endlosen Mannigfaltigkeit von Varianten, als auf einer 
Variation. M. a. W. wir lassen uns vom Faktum als Vorbild für seine Umgestaltung in 
reiner Phantasie leiten. Es sollen dabei immer neue ähnliche Bilder als Nachbilder, als 
Phantasiebilder gewonnen werden, die sämtlich konkrete Ähnlichkeiten des Urbildes 
sind. Wir erzeugen so frei willkürlich Varianten, deren jede ebenso wie der ganze 
Prozeß der Variation selbst im subjektiven Erlebnismodus des ‘beliebig’ auftritt. Es 
zeigt sich dann, daß durch diese Mannigfaltigkeit von Nachgestaltungen eine Einheit 
hindurchgeht, daß bei solchen freien Variationen eines Urbildes, z.B. eines Dinges, in 
Notwendigkeit eine Invariante erhalten bleibt als die notwendige allgemeine Form, ohne die 
ein derartiges wie dieses Ding, als Exempel seiner Art, überhaupt undenkbar wäre. Sie 
hebt sich in der Übung willkürlicher Variation, und während uns das Differierende der 
Varianten gleichgültig ist, als ein absolut identischer Gehalt, ein invariables Was 
heraus, nach dem hin sich alle Varianten decken: ein allgemeines Wesen.” 
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between proper and improper examples, the function of the examples is 
none other than to bring out the essential features of this pre-
understanding. This, however, implies that the method of free variation is 
unable to account for the possibility of phenomenologically seeing and 
describing – independently of our factical concepts – necessary structures 
and traits of our experience. It provides no clue as to what it means to 
intuitively describe necessary structures as the source of truth of our 
factical concepts. Instead, the eidetic variation ultimately amounts to a 
method for explicating the factical conceptual pre-understanding we 
already happen to live.345  
      We can now see more clearly the ambivalence of Husserl’s view of 
general intuition. On the one hand, he conceives of the empirical types 
linking our experience as open fallible concepts grounded in our 
experience and knowledge of particular entities. While this conception 
provides an account of the empirical-phenomenal basis of such concepts, 
it does not explain the possibility – crucial to phenomenology – of 
intuitively describing the necessary sense-structures of our experience. 
Moreover, it must be said that Husserl does not sufficiently address the 
question – and this would be Heidegger’s challenge – to what extent our 
intuitive experience must always already be guided by our factical 
conceptual pre-understanding as that which allows us to see entities as 
meaningful phenomena and identify their relevant features and relations. 
On the other hand, Husserl offers a description of the method of eidetic 
variation, which depicts this method as a way of explicating the necessary 
features defining our factical concepts. However, this description does 
nothing to account for the phenomenal basis – and truth – of our 
understanding of general essences. As a result, the eidetic variation 
depicted by Husserl is doomed to confirm and explicate our factical 
concepts, thereby dogmatically postulating the basic traits of these 
concepts – with all their possible flaws and imperfections – as the 
necessary a priori framework organizing our experience of particular 
entities.  
                                         
345 This criticism – that Husserl’s method of free variation is circular in the sense that 
it can only explicate our prior factical understanding of the general types or ideas 
under investigation – has been voiced many times before. See, e.g., Levin 1968; Zaner 
1973a; 1973b; Mohanty 1989, pp. 25-38. For a recent attempt to defend Husserl’s 
notion of free variation, see Kasmier 2010.   
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      As far as I can see, Husserl will always remain trapped in the 
ambivalence between his account of the knowledge of empirical types, and 
his account of the explication of pure essences through free variation – 
none of which is able to illuminate the method of his own 
phenomenology.346 Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Husserl 
basically understands and practices his phenomenology as intuitive 
reflection on the essential and necessary structures of our de facto 
experiences. It is palpable that the bulk of Husserl’s phenomenological 
investigations are not thought to have – and do not have – the character 
of conceptual analyses, but rather aim to describe – independently of our 
factical concepts – the basic sense-structures characterizing our 
experiences. While these reflective descriptions furnish the 
phenomenological concepts with their concrete content, the sense-
structures themselves constitute the ultimate source of their possible truth 
and clarificatory power.  
  
Heidegger’s treatment of Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition might at 
first glance appear as a decidedly affirmative explication of this discovery. 
Still, Heidegger at crucial points chooses to stress and rearticulate aspects 
                                         
346 In his later thinking Husserl increasingly stresses the historical character of our 
intentional experience by exploring the way in which this experience is always already 
guided by sedimented historical meanings and concepts that have been handed down 
through history. Ultimately, he claims, all historically sedimented meanings refer back 
to a Urstiftung – a “primal institution” – by which he means the event when a meaning 
is constituted for the first time as an “abiding possession” (Hua I, p. 95; cf. Hua IV, p. 
311). However, notwithstanding Husserl’s deepened appriciation of the historical-
genetic dimension of our experience of meaning, he is never willing to absolutize our 
factical sedimented meanings as the ungroundable ground determining our 
possibilities of intuiting the matters in question. Although the somewhat enigmatic 
notion of Urstiftung might seem to imply as much, there is no indication that Husserl 
would have wanted to give up his basic phenomenological impulse and conceive of 
the Urstiftung either in terms of a creative act  on the part of subjectivity or in terms of 
an appropriation of a pregiven historical destiny. Even though the Urstiftung signifies 
the primal institution of historical meanings and types that will henceforth guide the 
experience of the historical community in question (and which over time might 
undergo various forms of Nachstiftung, Neustiftung and Umstiftung) these meanings and 
types are still conceived of as based on some sort of passive intuitive experience of the 
matters themselves – however this experience is to be understood. Husserl articulates 
his notion of Urstiftung in, e.g., Hua I, pp. 118, 143-146; Hua IV, p. 117; Hua XI, pp. 
203-207; Hua XXXIX, pp. 1-6. Cf. also Steinbock 1995, p. 41f.; Miettinen 2013, pp. 
162ff. 
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of Husserl’s conception in a way that critically modifies its sense and 
points the way towards his own project. Here is how he articulates the 
import of Husserl’s notion: 
 
The discovery of the categorial intuition is the demonstration, first, 
that there is a simple apprehension (Erfassen) of the categorial, such 
constituents in entities which in traditional fashion are designated 
as categories and were seen in crude form quite early. Second, it is 
above all the demonstration that this apprehension is invested in 
the most everyday of perceptions and in every experience.347 
 
To begin with, Heidegger underscores that Husserl’s discovery that there 
is a “simple apprehension” of the categorial as the object of certain acts 
allows us to overcome the traditional tendency – which goes back at least 
to Locke and which is fundamental for Kant and German idealism – to 
deduce the categorial form of the objects of our experience through a 
reflection on the acts of the subject. Since the categorial form does not 
reside in the objects of our sense perception, such has been the standard 
argument, it must originate in the subject and its ways of perceiving the 
objects. Against this Heidegger – with Husserl – claims that we cannot 
grasp categorial forms either through sense perception or through 
reflection on our inner acts of consciousness; rather, the categorial is 
essentially given as the object of specific acts of categorial perception. He 
quotes Husserl: “Not in reflection upon judgments or even upon 
fulfillments of judgments, but in the fulfillments of judgments themselves lies the 
true source of the concepts ‘state of affairs’ and ‘being’ (in the copulative 
sense). Not in these acts as objects, but in the objects of these acts, do we have 
the abstractive basis which enables us to realize the concepts in 
question.”348 The categorial intuition is thus the possibility of experiencing 
                                         
347 GA 20, p. 64: “Die Endeckung der kategorialen Anschauung ist der Nachweis, 
erstens daß es ein schlichtes Erfassen des Kategorialen gibt, solcher Bestände im 
Seienden, die man traditionellerweise als Kategorien bezeichnet und in roher Form 
sehr bald gesehen hat. Zweitens ist sie vor allem der Nachweis, daß dieses Erfassen in 
der alltäglichsten Wahrnehmeung und jeder Erfahrung investiert ist.” 
348 HUA XIX, pp. 669f.: “Nicht in der Reflexion auf Urteile oder vielmehr auf 
Urteilserfüllungen, sondern in den Urteilserfüllungen selbst liegt wahrhaft der Ursprung 
der Begriffe Sachverhalt und Sein (im Sinne der Kopula); nicht in diesen Akten als 
Gegenständen, sondern in den Gegenständen dieser Akte finden wir das 
Abstraktionsfundament für die Realisierung der besagten Begriffe.” 
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and grasping non-subjective categorial meanings as the ultimate ground 
for all categorial understanding. 
      So far, the presentation is basically affirmative. However, Heidegger’s 
main thesis, that Husserl’s discovery “above all” lies in the insight that the 
categorial intuition is “invested in the most everyday of perceptions and in 
every experience” already anticipates the basic path of his critical 
transformation of Husserl. 
      How runs this path? 
      Husserl would certainly agree with Heidegger that our everyday 
perceptions and experiences of the world contain and are intermingled 
with categorial acts that allow us to grasp the categorial elements of our 
intentions. However, as we have seen, he fundamentally describes the 
relationship between sense perceptions and categorial intuitions in terms 
of a strict hierarchy. Whereas sensuous perceptions grasp their object 
“simply” – on one level of acts and without the need for further higher 
level acts to constitute the object – categorial intuitions are conceived as a 
new level of acts, which, on the basis of sense perceptions, constitute a 
new kind of categorial objects. To account for how we perceive the 
sensuous object as a unified object – e.g. this house – through the 
manifold of single perceptive acts, Husserl employs the notion of “fusion” 
(Verschmelzung): “The unity of perception comes into being as a simple 
unity, as an immediate fusion of the partial intentions, without the addition of new act-
intentions.”349 Still, Husserl in Logical Investigations leaves it quite unclear how 
such a fusion occurs. Must it not be guided by a categorial concept of 
what the object – e.g. a house – is? Yet if so, would not this unsettle the 
hierarchy between the sensuous and the categorial?350 As we have seen, 
                                         
349 HUA XIX, p. 677: “Die Wahrnehmungseinheit kommt als schlichte Einheit, als 
unmittelbare Verschmelzung der Partialintentionen und ohne Hinzutritt neuer 
Aktintentionen zustande.” 
350 However, as Daniel Dahlstrom and others have pointed out – cf. Dahlstrom 2001, 
pp. 84-88; Dastur 1991, pp. 45-50; Mulligan 1995, pp. 183-191 – Husserl’s conception 
of the founding relationship between sensuous and categorial intuition is not without 
ambivalence. For example, in the first edition of the Logical Investigations Husserl writes: 
“It is part of perception that something appears in it, but the interpretation makes out 
what we call appearance, be it right or not […]. The house appears to me – in no other 
manner than that I interpret actually perceived sense-contents in a certain fashion. I 
hear a barrel-organ – the sounds that I hear are interpreted by me precisely as sounds of a 
barrel-organ” (Zur Wahrnehmung gehört, daß etwas in ihr erscheine; aber die Apperzeption 
macht aus, was wir Erscheinen nennen, mag sie unrichtig sein oder nicht […]. Das Haus 
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Husserl will later think that it is our prior grasp of general empirical types 
that allows us to perceive things as unified objects with their typical 
general characteristics. Even then, however, he continuous to hold that 
these types are grounded in our sensuous experience of particular objects.  
      Heidegger for his part accounts for the unity of our everyday 
perceptual experience of meaningful things by firmly anchoring it in a 
preceding categorial understanding of general “ideas” or “eidē”:  
 
The acts of general intuition give what we first and simply see in 
the matters. When I perceive simply, moving about in my 
environmental world, when I see houses, for example, I do not first 
see houses primarily and expressly in their individuation, in their 
differentiation. Rather, I first see generally: this is a house. This as-
what, the general character of house, is not expressly apprehended 
in what it is, but is already coapprehended in simple intuition as 
that which here, as it were, illuminates what is given.351 
 
In short, it is only because we always already live in an understanding of 
general ideas or meanings that we can experience particular objects as 
unified meaningful phenomena. Hereby Heidegger stresses the linguistic 
and unthematic character of this understanding. To begin with, the 
preceding general understanding is constituted by the way in which we 
always already – implicitly or explicitly – talk about things: “It is also a 
matter of fact that our simplest perceptions and constitutive states are 
already expressed, even more, are interpreted in a certain way. It is not so 
much that we see the objects and things but rather that we first talk about 
them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but rather the 
                                                                                                                      
erscheint mir – wodurch anders, als daß ich die wirklich erlebten Sinnesinhalte in gewisser Weise 
interpretiere. Ich höre einen Leierkasten – die empfundenen Töne deute ich eben als 
Leierkastentöne) (HUA XIX, p. 762). In the second edition of Logical Investigations the 
terms “interpretation” and “interpret” have been replaced with “apperception” 
(Apperzeption) and “apperceive” (apperzipieren).  
351 GA 20, p. 91: “Die Akte der allgemeinen Anschauung geben das, was man 
zunächst und schlicht an den Sachen sieht. Wenn ich schlicht wahrnehme, mich in 
meiner Umwelt bewege, so sehe ich, wenn ich Häuser sehe nicht Häuser zunächst und 
primär und ausdrücklich in ihrer Vereinzelung, Unterschiedenheit, sondern ich sehe 
zunächst allgemein: das ist ein Haus. Dieses Als-was, der allgemeine Charakter von 
Haus, ist selbst nicht ausdrücklich in dem, was er ist, erfaßt, aber schon in der 
schlichten Anschauung miterfaßt als das, was hier gewissermaßen das Vorgegebene 
aufklärt.”  
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reverse, we see what one says about the matter.”352 What is more, the 
categorial understanding guides our primary experience of meaning in an 
unthematic manner:353 as we see a house, we see it appear as a house on 
the basis of our unthematic understanding of what a house is without 
being thematically conscious of the general essence of house. 
   What Heidegger does here is basically that he inverts Husserl’s hierarchy 
between sensuous and categorial intuition, submitting that our sensuous 
perception is fundamentally determined by our preceding unthematic 
categorial understanding of general meanings. Given that this categorial 
understanding is prior to and cannot be grounded on our sense 
perceptions, the passage is opened up to Heidegger’s own analysis of the 
historical as-structure of understanding: the view that it is our prior 
understanding of the historical contexts of meaning in which we live that 
grounds our intuitive experience of beings as meaningful phenomena.  
      Heidegger’s accentuation of the implicit character of the categorial 
intuition always already guiding our sight allows him to distinguish clearly 
– something that Husserl was unable to do in his Logical Investigations due 
to his basic definition of categorial acts as higher lever thematizing acts – 
between this implicit understanding and the possibility of thematically 
explicating its contents and structure: “The ideal unity of the species is 
thus also already there in every concrete apprehending, although not 
expressly as that toward which the regard of comparative consideration 
looks. That toward which I look in comparing, the regard of the 
comparable, can in its own right be isolated in its pure state of affairs. I 
thus acquire the idea.”354 Our preceding unthematic understanding of our 
historical contexts of meaning thus constitutes the basis both for our 
immediate experience of meaningful phenomena as well as for the 
thematic investigations of philosophy. To carry out a phenomenological 
                                         
352 GA 20, p. 75: “Faktisch ist es auch so, daß unsere schlichsten Wahrnehmnungen 
und Verfassungen schon ausgedrückte, mehr noch, in bestimmter Weise interpretiert sind. 
Wir sehen nicht so sehr primär und ursprünglich die Gegenstände und Dinge, sondern 
zunächst sprechen wir darüber, genauer sprechen wir nicht das aus, was wir sehen, 
sondern umgekehrt, wir sehen was man über die Sache spricht.” 
353 GA 20, p. 65. 
354 GA 20, pp. 91f.: “Die ideale Einheit der Spezies ist so auch schon in jedem 
konkreten Erfassen da, obzwar nicht ausdrücklich als das, worauf die Hinsicht des 
vergleichenden Betrachtens sieht. Das, worauf ich im Vergleichen als die Hinsicht des 
Vergleichbar sehe, kann seinerseits in seinem reinen Sachverhalt isoliert genommen 
werden, damit gewinne ich die Idee.” 
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explication is according to Heidegger – thus transforming phenomenology 
into a radically historical endeavor – precisely to critically explicate and 
dismantle our implicit historical understanding of being.  
      On the basis of his treatment of the categorial intuition, Heidegger 
ends by briefly discussing Husserl’s third discovery: the a priori. As 
concerns this discovery he maintains that Husserl’s phenomenology, 
although it opens up the possibility of grasping the originary sense of the a 
priori, nevertheless remains unclear and beset with traditional prejudices 
regarding this issue. As a result, Heidegger’s explication of the a priori is 
basically an articulation of his own conception. The following quote sums 
up his view: “The a priori is not only nothing immanent, belonging 
primarily to the sphere of the subject, it is also nothing transcendent, 
specifically bound up with reality. [...] Instead, the a priori is a character of the 
structural progression in the being of beings, in the being-structure of being.”355 That is, 
the a priori is located neither in the immanent – or otherwise prior and 
separable – sphere of our subjective experience nor in the particular 
objects of our experience. Rather, for Heidegger the a priori must be 
sought in our basic historical understanding of being which ultimately 
guides our understanding of our historical world and its beings. Hence, the 
fundamental task of philosophy, as he conceives it, is none other than to 
historically explicate the basic sense of being as such.  
   
Although Heidegger’s commentary basically presents itself as an 
affirmative reading of Husserl, it has, on crucial points, broken with and 
transcended Husserl’s conception. How should we assess the distance 
between Heidegger and Husserl as concerns the question of the intuitive 
givenness of meaning?356 
                                         
355 GA 20, pp. 101f.: “Das Apriori ist nicht nur nichts Immanentes, primär der 
Subjektsphäre zugehörig, es ist auch nichts Transzendentes, spezifisch der Realität 
verhaftetes. [...] Das Apriori ist vielmehr Charakter der Aufbaufolge im Sein des Seienden, in 
der Seinsstruktur des Seins.”  
356 In Dahlstrom 2001, pp. 48-174, Daniel Dahlstrom offers an extended and detailed 
treatment of Heidegger’s explications of Husserl in the Marburg years, in which he 
also assesses – in a thorough and well-balanced manner – the force of Heidegger’s 
criticisms, tracing the points where Heidegger simplifies or distorts Husserl’s 
conception. However, although I mostly agree with Dahlstrom’s comments it seems 
that his effort to do justice to both Heidegger and Husserl, emphasizing the continuity 
between them, makes him lose sight of the fact that Heidegger appropriation of the 
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      According to Heidegger, Husserl, although opening the gateway 
towards his own hermeneutic phenomenology, ultimately conceives of 
phenomenality as bodily presence for a theoretical observation and of 
phenomenology as a reflective categorial intuition of the structures of 
transcendental consciousness. Thereby, Heidegger argues, Husserl makes 
himself blind to the temporal-historical nature of life and to the true task 
of phenomenology: to destruct and critically appropriate the factical pre-
understanding of being that we always already live in.  
      However, although I believe that Heidegger is in the end right in 
claiming that there is a decisive gap between him and Husserl as concerns 
their conceptions of phenomenality his critique clearly simplifies and 
covers up the complexity of Husserl’s account. As regards Heidegger’s 
thesis that Husserl understands phenomenality as presence for a direct 
thematic intuition, it is good to begin by noting that Husserl in fact does 
not picture our intuitive experience as a one-dimensional straight focusing 
on the sensuous object.  On the contrary, Husserl maintains that even our 
simple sensations involve both an unthematic grasp of the typifications 
and historically sedimented meanings guiding our experience as well as an 
unthematic consciousness of the horizons of expectation belonging to the 
experience in question. Moreover, he ascribes a central role both to the 
body and to intersubjectivity in the constitution of our object-experience. 
However, even though Husserl’s analysis of the categorial intuition of 
essences takes its starting point in the insight that our intentional acts of 
signifying the world are beset with categorial meanings that cannot find 
fulfillment in our sense perceptions, he never – like Heidegger – considers 
absolutizing the categorial content of our empty significations as the 
ungroundable understanding of historical meaning grounding all our 
intuitive experience. Although Husserl’s account for what it means to 
grasp general meanings remains ambivalent and insufficient, he will always 
remain convinced that our understanding of such meanings is ultimately 
grounded in some sort of direct intuitive experience of the matters in 
question.  
      From the vantage point we have reached we can say that the 
commentators stressing the crucial importance of Husserl’s concept of 
categorial intuition for Heidegger are right in the following respect: 
                                                                                                                      
”categorial intuition” opens a basic rift between the two philosophers as concerns the 
question about the nature of intuitive givenness.   
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Heidegger does in fact attempt to articulate his new conception of the 
historical nature of phenomenality/phenomenology as well as his question 
of being through a critically transformative appropriation of Husserl’s 
doctrine of the categorial intuition. To neglect this – as the 
phenomenological commentators tend to do – is to neglect the 
historicization of phenomenality that Heidegger undertakes and the 
challenge that this poses to any idea of an intuitively reflective 
phenomenology.  However, this is not the whole truth. As I have tried to 
show, Heidegger’s early Freiburg thinking essentially develops as a faithful 
elaboration of Husserl’s phenomenological method. Moreover – as I will 
argue in the following – even though Heidegger from 1922 onwards 
projects his program of hermeneutic-destructive phenomenology, he – in 
a deeply ambivalent manner – continues to make use of intuition-based 
phenomenological descriptions as the basic method of his concrete 
philosophical work. Hence, despite Heidegger’s own later emphasis on the 
categorial intuition – which one-sidedly highlights those aspects which 
lead up to his late historical thinking – I think it is quite clear that it is 
Husserl’s basic phenomenological impulse to reflect on and describe the 
experientially given that constitutes the decisive basis for Heidegger’s 
thinking in these years.357  
                                         
357 The fact that Heidegger in “Prolegomena” articulates his new philosophical 
program through an appropriation of Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition still 
leaves open the question of the role of the categorial intuition in his philosophical 
development. Heidegger’s later claims about the importance of the categorial intuition 
cannot be taken as indubitable evidence of the magnitude of this influence given that 
they are written from the perspective of his late historical thinking and depict 
Husserl’s phenomenology in so far as it contributed to the development of this 
thinking. What we know for sure is that Heidegger showed a keen interest in Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations in the years 1921-1924, giving many seminars on the book and also 
discussing it in smaller study groups (Cf. Kisiel 1985, p. 196). However, it is also clear 
that Heidegger’s first concrete attempts to explicitly elaborate his new historical 
conception of phenomenality/phenomenology take place in his lectures and texts on 
Aristotle. So, the question is: To what extent should we understand Heidegger’s 
analysis of the categorial intuition in “Prolegomena” as an alternative articulation of 
the insights he had already achieved through his work with Aristotle? And to what 
extent were these insights already prepared or brought about by his reflections on 
Husserl’s concept of categorial intuition? Moreover, to what extent are Heidegger’s 
interpretations of both Husserl and Aristotle guided by his formative readings of 
Dilthey? This must remain an open question. However, since it primarily concerns the 
factual development of Heidegger’s thinking rather than its philosophical sense I do 
not think it is so relevant for understanding the philosophical issues at stake here. 
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      Above I have tried to encircle the philosophical crossroads at which 
Husserl and Heidegger part ways concerning the question of 
phenomenality/phenomenology. However, it might be good to emphasize 
at this point that this question, seen from the present stage of this 
investigation, is still far from settled – for example in favor of Heidegger’s 
historicism. Husserl, as we have seen, insists that our understanding of 
meaning – although primarily guided by historically sedimented types and 
meanings – ultimately receives its truth from some kind of transhistorical 
intuition as its source and ground. However, although he provides an 
account of the empirical-phenomenal ground of “empirical types,” his 
conception of the eidetic variation is unable to illuminate the phenomenal 
basis of the understanding of necessary essential structures that 
phenomenology itself is concerned with. Heidegger sees the problems of 
Husserl’s account and tries to overcome them by anchoring our intuition 
in our understanding of historical meaning. However, although the 
problems attaching to the idea of direct intuition are thus put aside, 
Heidegger’s historicization of phenomenal understanding will – as we shall 
see – give rise to new problems, problems that Heidegger’s later thinking 
will revolve around: What allows us to distinguish between prejudice and 
truth within our historical understanding? What is it, if anything, that 
grants to our historical destiny its right and its binding force? 
      Much of the remainder of this thesis will be devoted to following and 
critically questioning Heidegger’s struggle to articulate and implement his 
vision of a radically historical thinking. In the epilogue I will provide a 
more independent and systematic discussion of how I think we should 
conceive of the relation between direct intuition and historical pre-
understanding in our experience and understanding of meaning.  
 
2.3 The Project of Fundamental Ontology  
 
Heidegger’s continuous effort during the 1920s to explore the temporal-
historical structure of phenomenal experience within the framework of the 
question of being culminates in the publication of Being and Time in 1927.  
Heidegger had not published anything since his Habilitationsschrift in 1916, 
and his philosophical development since his breakthrough in 1919 had 
basically taken place in his lecture courses and seminars. Under acute 
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external pressure to publish something, he eventually pens down Being and 
Time in the winter of 1926 on the basis of his lecture notes. The book 
gained instant and lasting fame on the philosophical scene and has since 
been read as Heidegger’s magnum opus and as the paradigmatic 
manifestation of his early thought. 
      There is no doubt that Being and Time in many ways constitutes the 
central point of Heidegger’s philosophical production. It is here that his 
early thinking receives its final and most systematically elaborated 
expression. The book also forms the point of departure for Heidegger’s 
later thought, which basically unfolds as an attempt to critically overcome 
the inner limits and ambiguities which made him renounce the project of 
fundamental ontology, and to develop a thinking which is able to answer 
more consistently to what he conceives as the radical historicity of being. 
Still, considering the central role of Being and Time in Heidegger’s 
Gesamtausgabe it bears noting that this powerful book is something of an 
anomaly in his production. In contrast to the provisionally searching style 
and open terminology of his earlier lecture courses, he here endeavors to 
carry out a massive and systematically unified ontological investigation 
into the sense of being, deploying a rigid and complex network of 
technical concepts to achieve this end. Moreover, the book is fraught with 
deep tensions and ambiguities stemming from his overall ambition to 
carry out an investigation of the temporal-historical sense of being by way 
of a phenomenological explication of the structures of Dasein.  
      In the end, these tensions made Heidegger abandon the project of 
fundamental ontology, leaving the published portion of Being and Time a 
torso. According to the plan sketched in the introduction, the book was to 
consist of two parts, each part comprising three divisions:  
 
Part One: The Interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and 
the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the 
question of being. 
   
      1. The preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein. 
      2. Dasein and temporality. 
      3. Time and being. 
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Part Two: Basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the 
history of ontology, on the guideline of the problem of 
Temporality. 
    
      1. Kant’s doctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary   
         stage of the problem of Temporality. 
      2. The ontological foundation of Descartes’ cogito sum, and how     
         the medieval ontology has been taken over into the   
         problematic of the res cogitans. 
      3. Aristotle’ essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating  
         the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology.358  
 
However, the published book contains only the first two divisions of the 
first part. The first division, “The preparatory fundamental analysis of 
Dasein,” articulates the basic structure of Dasein as “being-in-the-world” 
and “care.” The second division, “Dasein and temporality,” has two main 
aims: first, it analyses Dasein’s possibility of authentic self-understanding; 
second, it explicates temporality as the ultimate unifying structure of 
Dasein. Here the book ends and Heidegger never publishes the remaining 
divisions, the task of which would have been to explicate the sense of 
being as time on the basis of the preceding analysis of the temporality of 
Dasein, and to carry out a destruction of the history of ontology according 
to its three main stages: Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle. After the 
publication, Heidegger continues working on the project, attempting to 
pursue the crucial turn from the analytic of Dasein to an explication of the 
sense of being. However, after a few years he eventually gives up his plan 
to complete the book. The reason for this is that he becomes convinced 
                                         
358 SZ, pp. 39f: “Erster Teil: Die Interpretation des Daseins auf die Zeitlichkeit und die 
Explikation der Zeit als des transzendentalen Horizontes der Frage nach dem Sein. 
Zweiter Teil: Grundzüge einer phänomenologischen Destruktion der Geschichte der 
Ontologie am Leitfaden der Problematik der Temporalität. Der erste Teil zerfällt in 
drei Abschnitte: 1. Die vorbereitende Fundamentalanalyse des Daseins. 2. Dasein und 
Zeitlichkeit. 3. Zeit und Sein. Der zweite Teil gliedert sich ebenso dreifach: 1. Kants 
Lehre vom Schematismus und der Zeit als Vorstufe einer Problematik der 
Temporalität. 2. Das ontologische Fundament des ‘cogito sum’ Descartes’ und die 
Übernahme der mittelalterlichen Ontologie in die Problematik der ‘res cogitans’. 3. 
Die Abhandlung des Aristoteles über die Zeit als Diskrimen der phänomenalen Basis 
und der Grenzen der antiken Ontologie.” 
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that the project of fundamental ontology contains deep inner problems 
that cannot be overcome but which demand a new approach. 
      The rest of this part of my thesis is devoted to an explication of Being 
and Time, especially focusing on how the problem of 
phenomenality/phenomenology is played out at the very center of this 
treatise. The aim of the present chapter is to present Heidegger’s basic 
conception of the project of fundamental ontology.  
 
The Question of the Sense of Being  
 
Heidegger begins Being and Time by introducing its guiding question 
concerning the sense of being: What does it mean to be? How should we 
understand the modes of being characterizing different kinds of being – 
e.g. human beings, plants, artefacts – as well as basic sense of being 
charactering all beings as beings?  
   According to Heidegger, the question of being is nothing but the basic 
question that originally put Greek philosophy into motion, only to fall into 
a deep, more than two thousand years long forgetfulness still dominating 
us today. As he sees it, the Greek philosophers became aware of the 
ontological difference between beings and their being, so that Aristotle 
was able to articulate the basic question of his Metaphysics as the question 
concerning beings as beings. However, although the Greeks thus opened 
up the principal possibility of investigating the ontological categories of all 
beings, they were never able to radically pose the question of the sense of 
being, a task which would have required an exploration of the temporal-
historical structure of Dasein’s understanding of being. Instead, Greek 
philosophy – paradigmatically Aristotle – basically determined being as 
presence-at-hand for a theoretical seeing. This determination was not only 
biased; it also made philosophy lose sight of and cover up the question of 
being as a thematic question. As a result, Heidegger argues, philosophy has 
henceforth been dominated by the Greek understanding of being as 
presence-at-hand in a prejudiced and nearly autistic manner. To reawaken 
and elaborate the question of the sense of being anew is the fundamental 
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task of Being and Time:  “Our aim in in the following treatise is to work out 
the question of the sense of ‘being’ and to do so concretely.”359 
      Heidegger for the first time presents the question of the sense of being 
as the guiding question of his thought in the lecture course 
“Prolegomena” in 1925.360 Still, the question of being by no means 
introduces an altogether new theme for Heidegger, but rather amounts to 
a rearticulation of the basic direction of questioning charactering his 
thinking from the outset. According to Heidegger’s own later testimony, 
his philosophical interest was originally sparked, in his student years, by 
Franz Brentano’s doctoral dissertation On the Manifold Meaning of Being in 
Aristotle (Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles). Reading 
the dissertation, the question of being dawned upon him: what is the 
unifying sense of being?361 Still, as Heidegger achieves his philosophical 
breakthrough in his early Freiburg lecture courses, the question of being is 
absent as an explicit theme. In fact, within the framework of his attempt 
to realize phenomenology as an originary science of life, the term 
“ontology” is primarily used as a pejorative designation of the traditional 
bent of philosophy to examine theoretical objects detached from our pre-
theoretical experience. However, although avoiding the term “ontology” 
as a title for his own project, it is clear that Heidegger’s ambition, already 
in these years, is “ontological” in the broad sense that he later gives to this 
word. Ultimately, the aim of his originary science is none other than to 
discover “the basic sense of ‘existence’” on the basis of which “the sense 
of reality in all layers of life” becomes intelligible.362 From this there is but 
a small step to articulating the task of thinking as fundamental ontology: to 
investigate, through an exploration of the human Dasein, the sense of 
being as such, constituting the foundation for all regional ontologies. It is 
around 1921-1922, as a result of his confrontation with Aristotle, that 
Heidegger starts designating his own thinking “ontology.” As he puts it in 
“Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation”: “The problematic of 
philosophy has to do with the being of factical life. In this regard, 
philosophy is fundamental ontology (prinzipielle Ontologie), in such a way that 
                                         
359 SZ, p. 1: “Die konkrete Ausarbeitung der Frage nach dem Sinn von ‘Sein’ ist die 
Absicht der folgenden Abhandlung.” 
360 Cf. GA 20, p. 184. 
361 Cf. GA 14, p. 93. 
362 GA 58, p. 261. 
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the determinate, particular, regional ontologies of the world receive the 
ground and sense of their own problems from the ontology of 
facticity.”363 
      Already in his earliest Freiburg lectures, Heidegger equated the 
question of being with the question of phenomenality or givenness. In 
Being and Time, this identification is carried on and underscored. Having 
just defined the phenomenon as “that which shows itself in itself,”364 Heidegger 
writes: “The phainomena, phenomena, are thus the totality of what lies in 
the light of day or can be brought to light – what the Greeks sometimes 
identified simply with ta onta (beings).”365 In fact, the Greek philosophers 
did not – as Günter Figal has rightly pointed out – equate ta phainomena 
with ta onta in any straightforward way, since they primarily used the word 
phainomenon to refer to how things merely appear to us in contrast to how 
they really are.366 However, the philological violence of the passage only 
underscores its importance for Heidegger himself. What the passage states 
is, in short: the phenomena that show – or can show – themselves as 
themselves are the beings themselves; hence, for something to show itself 
as itself is to be. For Heidegger, then, the question of being is essentially a 
question of phenomenality, of what it means to show up as a meaningful 
                                         
363 GA 62, p. 364. “Die Problematik der Philosophie betrifft das Sein des faktischen 
Lebens. Philosophie ist in dieser Hinsicht prinzipielle Ontologie, so zwar, daß die 
bestimmten einzelnen welthaften regionalen Ontologien von der Ontologie der 
Faktizität her Problemgrund und Problemsinn empfangen.” Cf. also GA 63, pp. 2f. 
364 SZ, p. 28: “das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende.” 
365 SZ, p. 28: “Die φαινόμενα, ‘Phänomene’, sind dann die Gesamtheit dessen, was am 
Tage liegt oder ans Licht gebracht werden kann, was die Griechen zuweilen einfach 
mit τὰ ὄντα (das Seiende) identifizierten.” Cf. also “Introduction to Phenomenological 
Research” where Heidegger articulates the parallelism between phenomena and beings 
in a little more detail. Here he writes that “phainomenon” signifies the “first, and, as such, 
first legitimate (rechtmäßig) way” in which something is encountered: “Phainomenon means 
the existing entity itself; it is a determination of being and is to be grasped in such a 
way that the character of showing itself is expressed. Ta phainomena can be represented 
by ta onta; it is what is always already here, what we encounter the moment we open 
our eyes. It does not need first to be disclosed, but is frequently covered up” 
(Φαινόμενον bedeutet das Daseiende selbst und ist eine Seinsbestimmung und so zu fassen, daß der 
Charakter des Sichzeigens ausgedrückt wird. Τὰ φαινόμενα kann durch τὰ ὄντα vertreten werden 
und ist dasjenige, das immer schon da ist, das im nächsten Augenaufschlag begegnet. Es braucht nicht 
erst erschlossen zu werden, ist aber häufig verdeckt) (GA 17, p. 14). 
366 See Figal 2006, pp. 145-147.  
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phenomenon at all.367 As a result, Heidegger’s entire fundamental 
ontological investigation of the sense of being through an analytic of 
Dasein can be read as one long exploration of the basic structure and 
sense of phenomenal givenness.368  
      Although the ontological problematic is present in Heidegger’s 
thinking right from the start, Heidegger’s explicit elevation of the question 
of the sense of being as the guiding question of his thought is nevertheless 
philosophically vital. As argued in the first part of this thesis, Heidegger’s 
early Freiburg lectures suffered from a deep inability to account for the 
existential motives of the philosophical understanding of origin: What role 
does the question of origin play in our pre-theoretical experience of the 
world? As Heidegger now projects the question of being as the long-
forgotten fundamental question of philosophy, he is inevitably confronted 
with the task of describing how this dangerously general question 
addresses the human being as an essential and fundamental question. 
      According to Heidegger, we make use of an understanding of being in 
all our experience and knowledge of beings. In order to be able to relate to 
an entity we already need to have an understanding of what the entity “is”: 
of the mode of being of the being in question and of the sense of being in 
general. However, our factical understanding of being, which always 
already orients our experience of beings, is first and foremost unthematic 
and nebulous: “in every relation and being towards beings as beings there 
                                         
367 Heidegger’s identification of being with phenomenality has been noted and 
discussed in Figal 2009, pp. 85-87, and Marion 1998, pp. 63-64. 
368 Indeed, in his provisional presentation of the terms “phenomenon” and 
“phenomenology” in the introduction of Being and Time, Heidegger refers to the results 
of the subsequent existential analytic as that which eventually gives concrete meaning 
to these terms. Hence, he writes that in order to understand the concept of 
phenomenon “everything depends on” our seeing the connection between the 
possibility of something showing itself as itself and the possibility of something 
deceptively showing itself as something that it is not (SZ, p. 29). Now, what in the end 
accounts for this connection is nothing else than Heidegger’s basic analysis of the as-
structure of understanding, which both forms the center of his conception of being-
in-the-world and grounds his analysis of the temporality of Dasein: it is only because 
we primarily understand beings as something on the basis of our historical pre-
understanding that we can experience them as something that they are not. Cf. also 
SZ, p. 357, where Heidegger states that the entire “preconception” of phenomenology 
outlined in the introduction only gets concretely elaborated in the course of the 
fundamental ontological investigations of the sense of being.  
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lies a priori an enigma.”369 Yet how should we understand this enigma 
supposedly conditioning our experience of beings?  
      Heidegger tries to lay bare the essential significance and necessity of 
the question of being by arguing for its “ontological” and “ontic” priority. 
By the “ontological priority” of the question of being, Heidegger means its 
systematically primary role in all our scientific knowledge. According to 
Heidegger, the totality of beings is organized into different domains of 
being – e.g. nature, history, human beings – which can be made objects of 
scientific research. To commence at all, he argues, a science must be 
guided by a conception of its domain of being, a conception which 
prescribes the central questions, concepts and methods of the science, 
thus delimiting its field of research. However, the understanding of a 
science’s domain of being cannot be achieved by the science itself that 
depends on it. Should this understanding not remain naive and prejudiced 
what is needed is an ontological investigation: a “productive logic” which 
“leaps ahead, so to speak, into a particular domain of being” and 
“discloses it for the first time in its constitutive being.”370 Still, this 
ontological understanding of the different regions of being needs, in its 
turn, to be guided by a fundamental ontological understanding of the 
sense of being as such:  
 
Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the 
ontic inquiry of the positive sciences. [...] All ontology, no matter 
how rich and tightly knit a system of categories it has at its disposal, 
remains fundamentally blind and perverts its innermost intent, if it 
has not previously clarified the sense of being sufficiently and 
grasped this clarification as its fundamental task.371 
                                         
369 SZ, p. 4: “in jedem Verhalten und Sein zu Seiendem als Seiendem [liegt] a priori ein 
Rätsel.” 
370 SZ, p. 10: “Sie ist produktive Logik in dem Sinne, daß sie in ein bestimmtes 
Seinsgebiet gleichsam vorspringt, es in seiner Seinsverfassung allererst erschließt und 
die gewonnenen Strukturen den positiven Wissenschaften als durchsichtige 
Anweisungen des Fragens verfürbar macht.” 
371 SZ, p.11: “Ontologisches Fragen ist zwar gegenüber dem ontischen Fragen der 
positiven Wissenschaften ursprünglicher. Es bleibt aber selbst naiv und 
undurchsichtig, wenn seine Nachforschungen nach dem Sein des Seienden den Sinn 
von Sein überhaupt unerörtert lassen. […] Alle Ontologie, mag sie über ein noch so reiches 
und festverklammertes Kategoriensystem verfügen, bleibt im Grunde blind und eine Verkehrung ihrer 
eigensten Absicht, wenn sie nicht zuvor den Sinn von Sein zureichend geklärt und diese Klärung als 
ihre Fundamentalaufgabe begriffen hat.” 
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By the “ontic priority” of the question of being, Heidegger means its basic 
existential role for the human being: “[Dasein] is ontically distinguished by 
the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being. [...] 
Understanding of being is itself a determination of the being of Dasein. The ontic 
distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological.”372 According to 
Heidegger, our very basic relation to and understanding of ourselves and 
all the other beings of the world is guided by a pre-ontological 
understanding of being which initially remains vague and obscure. The 
question of being thus not only constitutes a theoretical question relevant 
for scientific research but in the end amounts to a “radicalization of an 
essential tendency of being that belongs to Dasein itself, namely, of the 
pre-ontological understanding of being.”373 
      Heidegger’s argument for the ontic-ontological priority of the question 
of being rests heavily on his quasi-Aristotelian picture of the basic 
hierarchical structure of phenomenal understanding delineated here. The 
picture is this. All our experience and understanding of particular beings as 
meaningful phenomena is determined by our prior understanding of the 
historical contexts of significance – our world – which we always already 
live in; this understanding of the world is, in its turn, guided by our 
understanding of the different kinds or modes of being; this 
understanding is finally guided by our understanding of the sense of being 
as such. Given that these hierarchical strata of understanding essentially 
determine our experience of beings, this means that everything that we 
may experience and identify as meaningful – from the existential 
possibilities of our life to objects of scientific research – is always already 
linked by our understanding of being. To take an example: in order to 
understand what a dog is, i.e. the meaning it has for us, we need to 
understand what animals and human beings are; in order to understand 
this we need to understand what it means to be in general. Should I, for 
instance, happen to live in an understanding of being as presence-at-hand 
objectivity this understanding would divert and hinder me from grasping 
                                         
372 SZ, p. 12: “[Das Dasein] ist [...] dadurch ontisch ausgezeichnet, daß es diesem 
Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht. […] Seinsverständnis ist selbst eine 
Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins. Die ontische Auszeichnung des Daseins liegt darin, daß es 
ontologisch ist.” 
373 SZ, p. 15: “Radikalisierung einer zum Dasein selbst gehörigen wesenhaften 
Seinstendenz, des vorontologischen Seinsverständnisses.” 
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and encountering human beings and animals – but also plants, stones and 
artifacts – in their proper being.  
      We can now see that Heidegger’s picture of the structure of 
phenomenal understanding assigns a basic and decisive role to the 
question of being in human life. Given that our understanding of 
ourselves and our world is essentially conducted by an understanding of 
being that in the first place remains obscure and prejudiced – a life 
determined by wide and dark ontological horizons – then it becomes a 
decisive task for the human being to ask the question of the sense of 
being: “The fact that we already live in an understanding of being and that 
the sense of being is at the same time shrouded in darkness, proves the 
fundamental necessity of repeating the question of the sense of ‘being.’”374 
      At this point, it might be useful to pin down the meaning of 
Heidegger’s central terminology. Whereas “ontological” (ontologisch) inquiry 
or understanding is concerned with the being of beings, “ontic” (ontisch) 
inquiry or understanding is directed at beings and their properties.  Hereby 
Heidegger distinguishes between “ontological” understanding, which 
denotes our explicit research into being, and “pre-ontological” 
(vorontologisch) understanding, which denotes the factical unthematic 
understanding of being in which we always already live. In so far as the 
matter of concern is human existence, Dasein, he uses the term 
“existential” (existenzial) to designate an ontological understanding of the 
being of Dasein and the term “existentiell” (existenziell) to designate 
Dasein’s ontic understanding of its particular situation and possibilities.375 
Moreover, whereas Dasein’s characters of being are called “existentials” 
(Existenzialien) the characters of being of non-human beings are called 
“categories” (Kategorien).376 
      Heidegger’s rendering of the hierarchical structure of phenomenality is 
without doubt one of the most powerful modern attempts to show how 
our human experience and understanding must be constituted in order for 
philosophical ontology to play a necessary and decisive role in life. But is it 
true? Does Heidegger’s picture simply disclose the structure of 
                                         
374 SZ, p. 4: “Daß wir je schon in einem Seinsverständnis leben und der Sinn von Sein 
zugleich in Dunkel gehüllt ist, beweist die grundsätzliche Notwendigkeit, die Frage 
nach dem Sinn von ‘Sein‘ zu wiederholen.” 
375 SZ, pp. 11ff. 
376 SZ, p. 44. 
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understanding or does it involve generalizations and distortions that cover 
up and misrepresent important aspects of our understanding? I will not 
yet attempt to autonomously assess the truth and clarificatory power of 
Heidegger’s question of being. At this point I am content with explicating 
its internal structure and role within Heidegger’ thinking, and insist on its 
philosophical potential, which to some extent is independent of its 
ultimate truth or falsity. 
   To begin with, the question of being is an expression of – and goes hand 
in hand with – Heidegger’s driving effort to radically question and 
examine the most basic structures of our experience and understanding 
without stopping at, and thus implicitly presupposing,  our ostensibly self-
evident traditional concepts concerning being, the human being, 
consciousness, the good, nature, etc. Secondly, the question of being 
harbors a great critical-deconstructive potential in providing Heidegger 
with a guideline for critically questioning the basic ontological concepts 
which tend to organize the systematic projections of philosophy in a 
hidden and prejudiced manner. Thirdly, the question of being constitutes 
the horizon for Heidegger ambitious attempt to explicate the basic 
structures of human experience and understanding, the basic structural 
moments – perception, care, moods, understanding, language, history, etc. 
– which in different constellations organize our experience of meaningful 
phenomena. Even though Heidegger’s guiding understanding of his 
thinking in terms of the question of being would prove misleading and 
obstructing, this does not hinder him from providing forceful 
phenomenological analyses and historical critiques within this framework.  
 
Fundamental Ontology as Existential Analytic  
 
The purpose of Being and Time is to work out and answer the fundamental 
philosophical question concerning the sense of being. But how is this to 
be done? According to Heidegger, the investigation of the sense of being 
must be prepared through an existential analytic of the being of the 
human being, Dasein. Why? 
      Heidegger’s argument for the need to proceed through an analytic of 
Dasein is the following: in order for us to be able to pursue the question 
of being “with complete transparency” (in voller Durchsichtigkeit) it is first 
necessary to clarify what is means to question being: to look at being, to 
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understand and conceptually grasp it, to choose and get access to an 
exemplary being that may inform us about the sense of being. Here is the 
decisive passage: 
 
Looking at, understanding and grasping, choosing, and gaining 
access to, are constitutive attitudes of questioning and are thus 
themselves modes of being of a particular being, of the being we 
questioners ourselves in each case are.  Thus to work out the 
question of being means to make a being – the questioner – 
transparent in its being. [...] The explicit and transparent 
formulation of the question of the sense of being requires a prior 
suitable explication of a being (Dasein) with regard to its being.377 
 
Hence, to be able to understand the sense of being we first need to 
investigate the nature of questioning and understanding, and, since 
questioning and understanding belong to the being of the human being, 
Dasein, the investigation of the sense of being requires a prior analytic of 
Dasein: “Therefore fundamental ontology, from which alone all other 
ontologies can originate, must be sought in the existential analytic of 
Dasein.”378 
      The central strand in Heidegger’s argument is that it is both possible 
and necessary to break down the question of being into its two 
components – question, being – and first investigate the structures of 
understanding as a preparation for an investigation of that which the 
question asks for, namely the sense of being. 
      However, how is it possible to explicate the being of Dasein without 
first having clarified the sense of being as such? Does not the suggested 
trajectory through the existential analytic imply a break with the basic 
notion that our understanding of different modes of being – e.g. the being 
of the human being – is always already guided by our understanding of the 
                                         
377 SZ, p. 7: “Hinsehen auf, Verstehen und Begreifen von, Wählen, Zugang zu sind 
konstitutive Verhaltungen des Fragens und so selbst Seinsmodi eines bestimmten 
Seienden, des Seienden, das wir, die Fragenden, je selbst sind. Ausarbeitung der 
Seinsfrage besagt demnach: Durchsichtigmachen eines Seienden – des fragenden – in 
seinem Sein. […] Die Ausdrückliche und durchsichtige Fragestellung nach dem Sinn 
von Sein verlangt eine vorgängige angemessene Explikation eines Seienden (Dasein) 
hinsichtlich seines Seins.” 
378 SZ, p. 13: “Daher muß die Fundamentalontologie, aus der alle andern erst entspringen 
können, in der existenzialen Analytik des Daseins gesucht werden.” 
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sense of being as such? Heidegger responds to this question by arguing 
that the question of the sense of being is characterized by a 
hermeneutically spiraling movement of thought: “a peculiar ‘relatedness 
backward or forward’ of what is asked about (being) to asking as a mode 
of being of a being.”379 In order to articulate the being of the human 
being, the existential analytic must first proceed on the basis of an 
“antecedent look at being”380 fetched from our factical pre-understanding 
of the sense of being. Hence, the initial analytic of Dasein is essentially 
“preliminary” (vorläufig) and intended to “prepare” the way for an 
explication of the sense of being. Once we have attained an answer to the 
question of the sense of being, “the preparatory analytic of Dasein will 
have to be repeated on a higher and properly ontological basis.”381 
      Still, Heidegger’s articulation of the spiraling relation between the 
question of the sense of being and the question of the being of Dasein is 
far from crystal clear. Indeed, it hides a basic ambivalence. On the one 
hand, Heidegger wants to insist on the provisional and preparatory status 
of the existential analytic – thus heeding his thesis of the principal primacy 
of understanding the sense of being. On the other hand, the whole setup 
of the fundamental ontological project presupposes that the existential 
analytic does not only function as a preparation for the autonomous task 
of examining the sense of being, but rather aims to explicate the basic 
structures of Dasein that are constitutive of this sense. Though Heidegger 
frequently presents the existential analytic as a preparation for the question 
of the sense of being, his formulations often signal much higher 
ambitions. Not only does Heidegger write that fundamental ontology 
“must be sought in in the existential analytic of Dasein,”382 he also 
significantly states that “the ontological analytic of Dasein in general is 
what makes up fundamental ontology.”383 
                                         
379 SZ, p. 8:  “eine merkwürdige ‘Rück- oder Vorbezogenheit’ des Gefragten (Sein) auf 
das Fragen als Seinsmodus eines Seienden.” 
380 SZ, p. 8: ”vorgängige Hinblicknahme of Sein.” 
381 SZ, p. 17: “dann verlangt die vorbereitende Analytik des Daseins ihre 
Wiederholung auf der höheren und eigentlichen ontologischen Basis.” 
382 SZ, p. 13: “Daher muß die Fundamentalontologie [...] in der existenzialen Analytik des 
Daseins gesucht werden.” 
383 SZ, p. 14: “die ontologische Analytik des Daseins überhaupt die Fundamental-
ontologie ausmacht.” 
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      In fact, the primary status of the analytic is inscribed into the very 
concept that organizes the whole fundamental ontological question. The 
purpose of fundamental ontology is to answer the question of the “sense 
of being.” But what is “sense”? According to Heidegger, “sense is that 
wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself“:384 
 
That which can be articulated in a disclosure that understands we 
call sense. The concept of sense comprises the formal framework 
(Gerüst) of what necessarily belongs to that which an understanding 
interpretation articulates. Sense, structured by fore-having, fore-sight, and 
fore-conception, is the upon of which of the projection in terms of which 
something becomes intelligible as something. In so far as understanding and 
interpretation make up the existential constitution of the being of 
the “there” (Da), sense must be conceived as the formal-existential 
framework of the disclosedness belonging to understanding. Sense 
is an existential of Dasein.385    
 
That is to say, by “sense” Heidegger denotes the basic necessary 
“framework” of “structure” of Dasein’s understanding on the basis of 
which something can appear and become intelligible as something. 
However, if “sense” names the basic structure conditioning all 
intelligibility – including our understanding of being – and if this structure 
is found in the understanding of Dasein, then it is clear that the analytic of 
Dasein is not only a preparation for an autonomous investigation of the 
sense of being; rather, by explicating the basic structures of Dasein the 
existential analytic lays bare the ground on the basis of which the sense of 
being can be “read off” (abgelesen).386  
      According to Heidegger, the existential analytic will in the end 
explicate the being of Dasein as temporality, whereby he does not hesitate 
calling temporality the “transcendental horizon for the question of 
                                         
384 SZ, p. 151: “Sinn ist das, worin sich Verständlichkeit von etwas hält.” 
385 SZ, p. 151: “Was im verstehenden Erschließen artikulierbar ist, nennen wir Sinn. 
Der Begriff des Sinnes umfaßt das formale Gerüst dessen, was notwendig zu dem gehört, 
was verstehende Auslegung artikuliert. Sinn ist das durch Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriff 
strukturierte Woraufhin des Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas als etwas verständlich wird. Sofern 
Verstehen und Auslegung die existenziale Verfassung des Seins des Da ausmachen, 
muß Sinn als das formal-existenziale Gerüst der dem Verstehen zugehörigen 
Erschlossenheit begriffen werden. Sinn ist ein Existential des Daseins.”  
386 SZ, p. 7.  
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being.”387 “Sense,” “horizon” – the operative function of both concepts is 
to mark the ultimate transcendental structure which is laid down in the 
understanding of Dasein, and which a priori determine every possible 
understanding of being: “Time must be brought to light and genuinely 
grasped as the horizon of every understanding and interpretation of 
being.”388 Heidegger, to be sure, distinguishes between the “temporality” 
(Zeitlichkeit) of Dasein and the “Temporality” (Temporalität) of being, 
stating that only an explication of the latter provides “the concrete answer 
to the question of the sense of being.”389 However, even though it is not 
the task of the existential analytic to carry out a thematic explication of the 
sense of being, it is all the same capable of providing the transcendental 
structure on the basis of which the sense of being will be thematized. If it 
is the case, as Heidegger tries to show, that the being of the human being 
is temporality, then we can be certain that the sense of being is time. 
      However, Heidegger’s crucial notion that the existential analytic of 
Dasein is to provide the ground for explicating the sense of being is not 
unproblematic but tears up deep ambivalences in his work. Firstly, this 
notion seems to unsettle his thesis about the hierarchical primacy of the 
question of the sense of being, which motivated the entire fundamental 
ontological endeavor. Secondly, the strategy of phenomenologically 
explicating the basic structures of Dasein seems to negate his 
methodological conviction that the investigation of being must take the 
form of a hermeneutic-destructive interpretation of our finite historical 
understanding of being. I will later return to these tensions and examine 
how they operate at the center of Being and Time.  
      The existential analytic of Being and Time falls into two divisions. The 
first division takes its starting point in Dasein’s everyday inauthentic 
existence, explicating the fundamental structure of Dasein as “being-in-
the-world” and “care.” However, right at the start of the second division 
Heidegger raises the question whether the first division was able to offer a 
primordial analysis of the being of Dasein. His answer is no: “One thing 
has become unmistakable: our existential analysis of Dasein up to now cannot lay 
claim to primordiality. Its fore-having never included more than the inauthentic 
                                         
387 SZ, p. 39. 
388 SZ, p. 17: “[die Zeit] muß als der Horizont alles Seinsverständnisses und jeder 
Seinsauslegung ans Licht gebracht und genuin begriffen werden.” 
389 SZ, p. 19: “die konkrete Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins.” 
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being of Dasein, and of Dasein as not-whole.”390 To achieve a primordial 
interpretation of the being of Dasein, Heidegger claims, the analytic 
cannot focus on inauthentic Dasein but must be grounded in Dasein’s 
authentic existence.  
      Heidegger’s thesis about the need to get access to Dasein’s possibilities 
of authentic existence as the proper phenomenal ground of the 
investigation is central to the motivation and ambition of the existential 
analytic. It is one of the basic assumptions of Being and Time that the 
traditional understanding of being as presence-at-hand is based on a 
paradigmatic experience of inauthentic Dasein: the experience of 
objectifying theoretical observation.  According to Heidegger, Dasein is 
essentially confronted with the choice between authentic and inauthentic 
existence: either face up to and transparently take over its existence in its 
mortality and finitude, or flee from this possibility and take refuge in such 
attitudes and interpretations in which it is effectively covered up. 
However, as long as we flee from the possibility of transparently taking 
over our finite existence, we lack the phenomenal ground for a primordial 
explication of the being of Dasein. The existential analytic can only 
articulate what we actually have access to in the explicated experiences, 
which means that it can only explicate the temporal-historical being of 
Dasein on the basis of our personal experiences of life in its finitude and 
temporality. Heidegger thus interprets the ontological struggle to explicate 
the sense of being as dependent on Dasein’s existentiell struggle to achieve 
authentic existence. As a result, the task of getting access to and 
explicating Dasein’s possibility of authentic existence becomes 
methodically crucial, given that it secures “the phenomenally adequate 
basis for a primordial interpretation of the sense of being of Dasein.”391  
      The second division of the Being and Time thus commences with an 
analysis of “anxiety” and “conscience” as qualified experiences which bear 
witness of Dasein’s mortality and finitude, articulating the possibility of 
transparently taking over this predicament as “resoluteness.” On this basis,
                                         
390 SZ, p. 233: “Eines ist unverkennbar geworden: die bisherige existenziale Analyse des 
Daseins kann den Anspruch auf Ursprünglichkeit nicht erheben. In der Vorhabe stand immer 
nur das uneigentliche Sein des Daseins und dieses als unganzes.” 
391 SZ, p. 234: “der phänomenal zureichenden Boden für eine ursprüngliche 
Interpretation des Seinssinnes des Daseins.”  
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then, the primordial sense-structure of Dasein is explicated in terms of 
“temporality” and “historicity.”  
 
2.4 The Basic Structure of Phenomenality 
 
Heidegger’s existential analytic in Being and Time can be read as his most 
ambitious attempt to work out and articulate the basic structure of 
phenomenality. The analytic is meant to provide answers to the following 
questions: What structure allows beings to show up as meaningful 
phenomena? What does it mean to experience and understand such 
phenomena? What does it mean to understand and explicate their sense-
structure and being? 
      The aim of this chapter is to offer an interpretation of the existential 
analytic as an attempt to account for the problem of phenomenality. I will 
begin by explicating Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s fundamental 
structure as “being-in-the-world” in the first division, and then proceed to 
an exposition of his analysis of “temporality” and “historicity” in the 
second division. Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world 
constitutes the hub of his entire account, and forms the basis for his 
analysis of temporality and historicity, which essentially unfold as 
specifications of the ontological sense of being-in-the world.  
      But what is “being-in-the world”? 
      To indicate what he has in mind, Heidegger sets up a contrast to the 
object-ontology, which has characterized Western philosophy since its 
inception, and which he believes has led it to pass by the phenomenon of 
being-in-the-world. According to him, philosophy has always tended to 
understand reality as a totality of thematically present, experience- and 
context-independent objects. On the basis of this understanding of being 
as “presence-at-hand,” philosophy has interpreted the relationship 
between the human being and the world as a spatial or quasi-causal 
relation between two kinds of object. Since Descartes, modern philosophy 
formulates this relation in terms of the epistemological question: “how 
does this knowing subject come out of its inner ‘sphere’ into one that is 
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‘other and external,’ how can knowledge have an object at all?”392 Against 
the backdrop of this traditional theoretical understanding of being, 
Heidegger stakes out his analysis of being-in-the-world as an explication of 
our primary way of “living” and “dwelling” in the world as something that 
we “encounter” and that “concerns” us as meaningful.393 If we look closer 
at this pre-theoretical experience of the world, he argues, we will find that 
it belongs to the very constitution of Dasein that it is open towards its 
world. Dasein’s experience of the world does not arise as a result of an 
isolated inner subject’s being able to transcend itself and coincide with an 
outer object. Quite the opposite, Heidegger claims, it is only because 
Dasein from the outset lives in an open understanding of the meaning-
context of its world that is able to experience beings as meaningful at all.  
      “Being-in-the-world” is Heidegger’s title for the basic structure of our 
primary experience of the world as meaningful. As such, it includes three 
moments: 1. “World” – designating the context towards which Dasein is 
open and on the basis of which it experiences things. 2. “Being-in” – 
designating the different ways in which Dasein is in and understands its 
world. 3. “Who” – signifying the being who understands itself and its 
world in a more or less authentic way.394 Heidegger strongly emphasizes 
that being-in-the-world should be understood as a unitary structure 
consisting of interdependent equiprimordial aspects, and that it cannot be 
split up into independently analyzable and later joinable parts. This, 
however, does not rule out the possibility of focusing on one aspect at a 
time as long as we remember to co-understand the other aspects. In the 
following, I will first expound Heidegger’s concept of “world,” then his 
concept of “being-in,” whereas I will postpone the treatment of the 
“who” to my analysis of Heidegger’s conception of authenticity and 
inauthenticity in the last chapter of this part of the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
                                         
392 SZ, p. 60: “wie kommt dieses erkennende Subjekt aus seiner inneren ‘Sphäre’ 
hinaus in eine ‘andere und äußere’, wie kann das Erkennen überhaupt einen 
Gegenstand haben?” 
393 SZ, pp. 54f. 
394 SZ, p. 53.  
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The World  
 
The “world,” Heidegger writes in a preliminary formal definition, is “that 
‘in which’ a factical Dasein as such ‘lives.’”395 However, the purpose of his 
analysis is not to describe the different contexts in which a human being 
might live, but to explicate the basic ontological structure characterizing all 
such worlds, i.e., what Heidegger calls the “worldliness” of the world.396 
      Heidegger’s analysis of the worldliness of the world takes its point of 
departure in Dasein’s everyday “concern” with its “environing world,” by 
which he means our everyday concerned dealings with the different 
significant beings and tasks of our lives. He asks: What is it that is 
primarily given to us in our everyday concern? How should we understand 
the sense-structure of this given? 
      The philosophical tradition, Heidegger claims, has always tended to 
conceive of the primary given in terms of isolated context- and 
experience-independent objects parading for a theoretical gaze. However, 
he argues, when we turn to look at our everyday pre-theoretical experience 
we see that the phenomena we primarily encounter have the character of 
“equipment” or “tools” (Zeug): 
 
Strictly speaking, there “is” no such thing as an equipment. To the 
being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of 
equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment 
is essentially “something in order to...” The different ways of “in 
order to,” such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, handiness, 
constitute a totality of equipment. In the “in order to” as a structure 
there lies a reference of something to something. [...] Equipment – in 
accordance with its equipmentality – always is in terms of its 
belonging to other equipment: writing materials, pen, ink, paper, 
desk blotter, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room.397 
                                         
395 SZ, p. 65: “das, ‘worin’ ein faktisches Dasein als dieses ‘lebt’.” 
396 SZ, p. 65. 
397 SZ, p. 68: “Ein Zeug ‘ist’ strenggenommen nie. Zum Sein von Zeug gehört je 
immer ein Zeugganzes, darin es dieses Zeug sein kann, das es ist. Zeug ist wesenhaft 
‘etwas, um zu…’. Die verschiedenen Weisen des ‘Um-zu’ wie Dienlichkeit, 
Beiträglichkeit, Verwendbarkeit, Handlichkeit konstituieren eine Zeugganze. In der 
Struktur des ‘Um-zu’ liegt eine Verweisung von etwas als etwas. […] Zeug ist seiner 
Zeughaftigkeit entsprechend immer aus der Zugehörigkeit zu anderem Zeug: 
Schreibzeug, Feder, Tinte, Papier, Unterlage, Tisch, Lampe, Möbel, Fenster, Türen, 
Zimmer.”  
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That is to say, to be given as a piece of equipment is to be given as part of 
a totality of equipment and equipmental relations in which the equipment 
in question plays a role. As such, a piece of equipment has the basic 
structure of “something in order to…”: it is essentially constituted by its 
role in the relational contexts on the backdrop of which it can appear as 
this piece of equipment. Hence, in our everyday concern we do not 
primarily experience isolated objects or some kind of sense data 
possessing these or those traits; rather, the phenomena we primarily 
encounter have the character of equipment which gain their identity and 
significance within the context of meaning we live in and which we must 
always already have understood in order to encounter a particular tool. As 
Heidegger puts it: all the “properties” of the equipment are “bound up in” 
the ways in which it is “appropriate or inappropriate” in relation to some 
task or purpose.398 He calls the mode of being of tools “readiness-to-
hand” (Zuhandenheit) in contrast to the “presence-at-hand” (Vorhandenheit) 
of objects of theoretical observation.  
      In the introduction to Being and Time Heidegger identified 
“phenomena” (ta phainomena) with “beings” (ta onta) through a somewhat 
spurious philological reference to the Greeks. Now he claims that “the 
Greeks had an appropriate term for ‘things,’ pragmata, that is, that with 
which one has to do in one’s concerned dealings (praxis).”399 Whereas ta 
onta were first identified as ta phainomena, both are now – through this 
quasi-philological linkage – determined as pragmata. Heidegger’s analysis of 
the pragmatic character of being as readiness-to-hand should thus not only 
be read as a determination of the being of a certain sort of entities, namely 
tools and other kinds of artifacts, but rather concerns the primary 
being/phenomenality of non-human beings. According to Heidegger, 
even nature originally presents itself to us with reference to its 
instrumental relevance – usefulness, support, resistance – for the purposes 
of the human being: “The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a 
                                         
398 SZ, p. 83: “Zuhandenes hat allenfalls Geeignetheiten und Ungeeignetheiten, und 
seine ‘Eigenschaften’ sind in diesen gleichsam noch gebunden.”  
399 SZ, p. 68: “Die Griechen hatten einen angemessenen Terminus für die ‘Dinge’: 
πράγματα, d.i. das, womit man es im besorgenden Umgang (πρᾶξις) zu tun hat.” 
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quarry or rock, the river is water power, the wind is wind ‘in the sails.’”400 
Hence, for Heidegger the readiness-to-hand of equipment constitutes the 
basic mode of being characterizing non-human entities such as they show 
themselves for the primary concern of the human being: “Readiness-to-hand 
is the ontological categorial definition of beings as they are ‘in themselves.’”401  
      Whereas Heidegger maintains that the beings we primarily experience 
in our pre-theoretical concern have the character of equipment, he names 
the context of reference on the basis of which such concern takes place 
the “world.” So what is the world, and how should we understand its 
worldliness? 
      Heidegger begins his articulation of the ontological structure – the 
worldliness – of the world by introducing the term “relevance” 
(Bewandtnis) as a designation for the basic  character of the references 
constituting the world: “The fact that the being of the ready-to-hand has 
the structure of reference means that is has in itself the character of being 
referred. Beings are discovered with regard to the fact that they are referred, 
as those beings which they are, to something. They are relevant for 
something. The character of being of the ready-to-hand is relevance.”402 
“Relevance” is thus nothing but Heidegger’s general term for designating 
the way in which equipment can appear as somehow relevant or important 
– useful, beneficial, suitable or perhaps useless and obstructive – on 
account of its role in the network of references we occupy. For example, 
                                         
400 SZ, p. 70. “Der Wald ist Forst, der Berg Steinbruch, der Fluß Wasserkraft, der 
Wind ist Wind ‘in den Segeln’.” 
401 SZ, p. 71: “Zuhandenheit ist die ontologisch-kategoriale Bestimmung von Seiendem, wie es ‘an 
sich’ ist.” However, even though Heidegger here tends to conceive of nature as a sort 
of ready-to-hand equipment, there are also passages in Being and Time which suggest a 
concept of nature that does not fit into the dichotomy of presence-at-hand or 
readiness-to-hand.  Hence, Heidegger writes: “‘Nature,’ which ‘surrounds’ us, is indeed 
an innerwordly being; but the kind of being which it shows belongs neither to the 
ready-to-hand nor to what is present-at-hand as ‘things of nature’” (Die “Natur”, die uns 
“umfängt”, ist zwar innerweltliches Seiendes, zeigt aber weder die Seinsart des Zuhandenen noch des 
Vorhandenen in der Weise der “Naturdinglichkeit”) (SZ, p. 211). This passage, which 
threatens to unsettle the ontological framework of Being and Time, points forward to 
Heidegger’s later attempts to reflect on the self-withdrawing material-sensuous aspect 
of the world, which in The Origin of the Work of Art he calls the “earth.” Cf. Overgaard 
2004, pp. 123-126; Dahlstrom 2001, pp. 261-267. 
402 SZ, p. 83f.: “Das Sein des Zuhandenen hat die Struktur der Verweisung – heißt: es 
hat an ihm selbst den Charakter der Verwiesenheit. Seiendes ist daraufhin entdeckt, daß 
es als dieses Seiende, das es ist, auf etwas verwiesen ist. Es hat mit ihm bei etwas sein 
Bewenden. Der Seinscharakter des Zuhandenen ist die Bewandtnis.”   
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the hammer may be relevant for hammering, the hammering may be 
relevant for setting up a windshield, and the windshield may be relevant as 
protection against hard weather.  
      According to Heidegger, the instrumental references obtaining 
between different tools and moments of work – this in order to that – are 
ultimately anchored in the human Dasein and its possibilities to be:   
 
The totality of relevance itself, however, ultimately goes back to a 
what-for, which no longer has relevance, which itself is not a being 
with the kind of being of the ready-to-hand within a world, but is a 
being whose being is defined as being-in-the-world, to whose 
constitution of being worldliness itself belongs. This primary what-
for is not just another for-that as a possible factor in relevance. The 
primary “what-for” is a for-the-sake-of-which. But the for-the-sake-
of-which always pertains to the being of Dasein, which, in its being, 
is essentially concerned about this being.403 
 
Whereas tools always refer to other tasks and purposes in relation to 
which they are relevant, the possibilities of Dasein constitute the “for-the-
sake-of-which” of all relevancies: the ultimate horizon of purposes which 
determines all instrumental references and which cannot be reduced to 
any further purpose.  
      Yet how, more precisely, should the structure of the world be 
understood? How is our understanding of tools and tool-relations 
determined by our understanding of our possibilities? What are these 
possibilities? 
      Heidegger, as we have seen, begins his analysis of the world by 
focusing on how the particular tool always appears as what it is within a 
totality of tools and their instrumental interrelations. As long as we 
concentrate on this analysis, it might seem as if Heidegger’s basic 
philosophical move would consist in replacing the traditional picture of 
our relation to the world as a theoretical seeing of isolated objects with the 
                                         
403 SZ, p. 84: “Die Bewandtnisganzheit selbst aber geht letztlich auf ein Wozu zurück, 
bei dem es keine Bewandtnis mehr hat, was selbst nicht Seiendes ist in der Seinsart des 
Zuhandenen innerhalb einer Welt, sondern Seiendes, dessen Sein als In-der-Welt-sein 
bestimmt ist, zu dessen Seinsverfassung Weltlichkeit selbst gehört. Dieses primäre 
Wozu ist kein Dazu als mögliches Wobei einer Bewandtnis. Das primäre ‘Wozu’ ist 
ein Worum-willen. Das ‘Um-willen’ betrifft aber immer das Sein des Daseins, dem es in 
seinem Sein wesenhaft um dieses Sein selbst geht.”  
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notion that it rather has the character of a practical unthematic 
understanding of the totalities of tools and instrumental relations that we 
find around us. Instead of particular objects, the primarily given would be 
particular totalities of equipmental relations.404  
      Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to interpret being-in-the-world in 
terms of a direct grasp of particular totalities of tools-relations. This 
becomes manifest as Heidegger anchors these totalities in the possibilities 
of Dasein. Dasein, Heidegger argues, discloses and chooses its “factical 
possibilities of authentic existence” from its “heritage” (Erbe),405 whereby 
these historically received “repeatable possibilities” constitute “the only 
authority a free existing can have.”406 It is clear that what Heidegger has in 
mind here are not our possibilities to engage in particular activities – such 
as walking, drinking beer, playing football or philosophizing – given his 
conception of Dasein’s historical possibilities as the ultimate horizon of 
purposes, which allows particular beings and activities to appear as 
significant in the first place. In a telling passage, he writes that Dasein’s 
“authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been” means 
that it “chooses its hero” (sich seinen Helden wählt).407 Hence, the 
                                         
404 It is not uncommon that commentators explicating Heidegger’s concept of “being-
in-the world” attach the greatest weight to Dasein’s unthematic grasp of totalities of 
tools and instrumental relations while largely downplaying the question of how these 
totalities are determined by and receive their significance from the historical 
possibilities of Dasein. Søren Overgaard, for example, argues that the world should 
not be understood as a “totality, or collection of entities” but as a “web of references” 
interconnecting different tools: “a whole web of references (e.g., hammers referring to 
nails referring to wooden boards, etc.) must be understood in order for Dasein to be 
able to interact with the individual entity (e.g., use the hammer for hammering. […] 
On Heidegger’s account, then, the world is a whole of references that, as such, allows 
for individual entities to present themselves” (Overgaard 2004, p. 123). Even though 
Overgaard points out that these webs of references are ultimately anchored in the 
possibilities and purposes of Dasein he nevertheless refrains from explicitly dealing 
with the question of Dasein’s understanding of these possibilities. However, in so 
doing it becomes possible for him to pass over the question of the radical historicity 
of understanding implied by Heidegger’s analysis of Daseins’ possibilities as historical 
heroes and paradigms – a question that would surely be unsettling to his interpretation 
of Heidegger as a transcendental phenomenologist.  
405 SZ, p. 383. 
406 SZ, p. 391: “Die Entschlossenheit konstituiert die Treue der Existenz zum eigenen 
Selbst. Als angstbereitete Entschlossenheit ist die Treue zugleich mögliche Ehrfurcht 
vor der einzigen Autorität, die ein freies Existieren haben kann, vor den 
wiederholbaren Möglichkeiten der Existenz.” 
407 SZ, p. 385. Cf. also SZ, p. 371. 
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possibilities of Dasein have the character of “heroes.” But what does this 
mean? Bearing in mind their systematic place in Heidegger’s thought, I 
think the most compelling and illuminating way to conceive of the heroes 
is to interpret them as concrete historical paradigms of a good and 
meaningful life: as concrete more or less mythical figures (such as Ulysses, 
Jesus or Gandhi) harboring and giving expression to our historically 
received norms and values. These historical paradigms of life constitute 
the horizon of purposes of the world, which organizes and grants 
significance to all its instrumental networks.       
      Since Dasein’s understanding of its paradigmatic historical possibilities 
and of the being of beings determines the whole context of references in 
which it lives – and cannot itself be grounded on any direct grasp of 
particular entities or references – the fundamental layer of Dasein’s 
understanding of the world has a radically historical and quasi-conceptual 
character. That is to say, it has the character of a prior grasp of general 
patterns of meaning which are historical and which determine our 
possibilities of experiencing particular entities as meaningful. This also 
means that our grasp and handling of particular tools always already 
involves and presupposes an understanding of their purposes and being: 
to understand a hammer involves understanding its relevance and being 
within our purposeful lives. If we would only be able to handle a hammer 
more or less skillfully without having a grasp of the possibilities for the 
sake of which we are doing it, we would not understand what we are doing 
or what a hammer is.  
      To sum up then: the “world” is Heidegger’s name for the total context 
of references which Dasein always already understands, and on the basis 
of which beings can show up as relevant and significant phenomena. As 
he puts in a condensed formula: “The within-which of an understanding that 
refers itself – as the upon-which that lets beings be encountered in the kind of being of 
relevance – is the phenomenon of the world.”408 In the end, our understanding of 
the world encompasses all the moments organizing our concern with 
beings: the tools and works, the networks of instrumental references, and 
the horizon of human possibilities for the sake of which all of this is 
relevant. 
    
                                         
408 SZ, p. 86: “Das Worin des sichverweisenden Verstehens als Woraufhin des Begegnenlassens von 
Seiendem in der Seinsart des Bewandtnis ist das Phänomen der Welt.” 
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I will end this section by discussing what I think is a basic ambiguity in 
Heidegger’s account  of the unthematic circumspection guiding Dasein’s 
everyday coping – an ambiguity which has given rise to some 
misinterpretations. 
      According to Heidegger, our primary coping does not transpire as a 
thematic seeing of tools or tool-relations. Our concern is rather guided by 
what Heidegger calls “circumspection” (Umsicht), an unthematic 
understanding which remains absorbed in the contexts of equipment and 
essentially has the character of a practical skillfulness which is sensitive to 
the instrumental relations of the context and answers to the specific 
function and handiness of the tools. As Heidegger explains: 
 
The hammering does not just have a knowledge of the hammer’s 
character as equipment; rather, it has appropriated this equipment 
in a way which could not possibly be more suitable. In dealings 
such as this, where something is put to use, our concern 
subordinates itself to the in-order-to which is constitutive for the 
equipment we are employing at the time; the less we just stare at 
the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the 
more primordial does our relationship to it becomes, and the more 
unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is – as equipment. The 
hammering itself uncovers the specific “handiness” of the hammer. 
The kind of being which equipment possesses – in which it reveals 
itself by itself – we call readiness-to-hand.409 
 
Dasein’s “unthematic, circumspective absorption” thus constitutes the 
primordial way in which the tools are there for us as that what they are.410 
The unthematic absorbed character of our concern, Heidegger claims, is 
even a condition for our being able to handle tools in a smooth and 
skillful way.  
                                         
409 SZ, p. 69: “Das Hämmern hat nicht lediglich noch ein Wissen um den 
Zeugcharakter des Hammers, sondern es hat sich dieses Zeug so zugeeignet, wie es 
angemessener nicht möglich ist. In solchem gebrauchenden Umgang unterstellt sich 
das Besorgen dem für das jeweilige Zeug konstitutive Um-zu; je weniger das 
Hammerding nur begafft wird, je zugreifender es gebraucht wird, um so 
ursprünglicher wird das Verhältnis zu ihm, um so unverhüllter begegnet es als das, was 
es ist, als Zeug. Das Hämmern selbst entdeckt die spezifische ‘Handlichkeit’ des 
Hammers. Die Seinsart von Zeug, in der es sich von ihm selbst her offenbart, nennen 
wir die Zuhandenheit.” 
410 SZ, p. 76: “un-thematische, umsichtige Aufgehen.” 
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      Yet how should this circumspection be understood? 
      Let me begin by taking a look at what Heidegger believes is a central 
methodical difficulty in explicating the world. If Dasein for the most part 
remains absorbed in its unthematic coping with equipment, how shall we 
then be able to detect the world and explicate its structure? To answer this 
question, Heidegger claims that we need to find some basic experience in 
which the world somehow shines forth and becomes discernible. He finds 
such an experience in the different kinds of disturbance that may affect 
our everyday concern: a piece of equipment might be broken, it might be 
lacking or it might just be in the way. In all such cases, Heidegger argues, 
the equipment becomes “conspicuous” in a new way. Through the 
“disturbance of the reference” constituting the tool in question the reference 
becomes explicit in such a way that the equipmental whole also shines 
forth as the familiar context in which the unthematically absorbed 
circumspective concern has been orienting itself all along:411 “The context 
of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality 
constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, 
however, the world announces itself.”412 
      Heidegger’s argument has ordinarily been accepted by his interpreters 
as a basically accurate and trenchant phenomenological description.413 
However, I for my part do not find it very convincing. It seems to me that 
his analysis of the experience of disturbance, conceived as a prerequisite 
for getting the world in view, springs from a confused picture of the 
unthematical, absorbed character of our primary practical concern. 
Although Heidegger is right in claiming that our handling of tools 
generally presupposes a kind of habituated unreflective practical skill in 
order to be performed in a smooth and optimal manner, it is not at all 
clear why this unreflective handling would not allow us to simultaneously 
survey or reflect on our situation.  Indeed, it seems that the acquisition of 
habituated skills tend to free up our attention. We do not need to think 
about what we are doing but are free to let our attention wander: survey 
the context of work, reflect on its goals, think about the structure of the 
                                         
411 SZ, p. 74. 
412 SZ, p. 75: “Der Zeugzusammenhang leuchtet auf nicht als ein noch nie gesehenes, 
sondern in der Umsicht ständig im vorhinein schon gesichtetes Ganzes. Mit diesem 
Ganzen aber meldet sich die Welt.”  
413 Cf., e.g., Overgaard 2004, pp. 121-123; Gorner 2007, pp. 45-46; Mulhall 1996, pp. 
48-50.  
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world – or perhaps about something else. Hence, the unthematic practical 
handiness described by Heidegger does not in any way cancel out – but 
rather facilitates – the possibility of thematically attending to different 
things. Moreover, it seems to me that we are in any case free to disrupt 
our practical coping and reflect on the context of relations and purposes 
we are moving in – if that is what we want to. As a result, the experience 
of disturbance becomes methodically superfluous. In fact, it could even be 
argued that such experiences counteract the purpose ascribed to them by 
Heidegger. To be sure, in encountering a broken or missing tool the tool 
in question – as well as the immediate context of coping – may become 
conspicuous in a certain sense. However, in disrupting our current activity 
the disturbance does not by itself disrupt our interest in the activity, which 
means that in so far as the interest persists the disturbance – just like a 
demanding task – will rather tend to intensify our absorption in the work. 
      My suggestion is that the problems of Heidegger’s analysis stem from 
his tendency to confuse two different kinds of ability in his conception of 
Dasein’s “circumspection.” On the one hand, I think it is clear that 
Heidegger’s conceives of the basic layer of circumspection in terms of 
Dasein’s unthematic “understanding” (this concept will be treated in the 
next section) of the world and its purposes, which guides its grasp of tools 
and allows them to appear as relevant phenomena. On the other hand, it 
seems that Heidegger in his analysis of Dasein’s circumspective handling 
of tools tacitly brings in another kind of unthematic ability, namely the 
kind of habituated practical skillfulness that allows us to carry out different 
activities and tasks in an assured and qualified manner without thinking 
about what we are doing, e.g., walk down the street, drive a car, or read 
the letters on the page in a smooth and unreflective way.   
      These two abilities, however, are not the same even though both of 
them are generally characterized by a strong element of unreflective 
habituatedness, and often interact with each other in intricate ways in the 
same experiences.  One basic difference concerns how they relate to the 
problem of truth. As regards the ability of practical coping, this does not 
in itself involve any claim to be true; rather, its point resides in its 
functional capacity to carry out the task or activity in question: ride a 
bicycle, hammer, turn a doorknob. In addition to this, there is no 
meaningful question to be asked whether the skill in question is true or 
false. By contrast, our understanding of the meaning-relations and 
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purposes of the world essentially seems to involve a claim to truth, a claim 
to exhibit the matters as what they are. Clearly, this understanding cannot 
be true or false in the same sense as empirical propositions – i.e. by 
somehow corresponding to the facts put forward in the proposition – 
given that it conditions all such empirical truth. Nevertheless, it centrally 
belongs to our quasi-conceptual understanding of such different matters 
as cars, dogs, human beings, or being-characters that it can either disclose 
and illuminate it or dissimulate and distort its matter in various ways. It 
can be more or less clear, rich, sharp, wide-ranging or unclear, meager, 
limited, ambivalent. Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s basic tendency to 
slide into prejudices that cover up the phenomena – a tendency which 
ultimately motivates the task of disclosing the phenomena: Dasein’s 
possibilities, the sense of being – shows that he is very much awake to the 
claim to truth inherent in our understanding and in no way wants to 
reduce it to a practical coping-skill.  
      The problems in Heidegger’s account arise when he tacitly fuses these 
different abilities in his analysis of Dasein’s circumspection. We then get 
the confused picture according to which our understanding of the world 
would lie in our practical coping-skill, in such a way that we would 
primarily be absorbed in this coping to be able to encounter and handle 
the ready-to-hand tools properly. As a result, it might seem as if we would 
need special experiences of disturbance to get the world into view.  
      Here it bears noting that the Heidegger-interpretation put forward by 
Hubert Dreyfus in his highly influential book Being-in-the-World to a great 
extent lives on the ambiguities analyzed above. Dreyfus’s basic approach 
to Heidegger is to highlight Dasein’s practical unthematic handling-skills – 
which he calls “background coping”414 – as the fundamental dimension of 
our understanding of the world, which conditions and constitutes the 
background for all thematic understanding and knowledge. As we have 
seen, this interpretation finds some support in Heidegger’s texts and it has 
led Dreyfus into systematically interesting investigations of the important 
role of unreflective practical coping-skills in different activities and 
context. Still, the problem of Dreyfus’ interpretation is that it neglects 
Heidegger’s central claim that our experience and understanding of 
significant phenomena – including our practical coping – is always already 
                                         
414 Dreyfus 1991, p. 105. 
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guided by our basic historical understanding of the being and the 
possibilities of Dasein, an understanding that claims to present the matters 
as what they are, and that can be either disclosive and illuminating or 
dissimulating and distortive. As a result, Dreyfus loses the ability to 
account for Heidegger’s philosophically basic notion of understanding and 
for all the issues it is meant to address: for Dasein’s understanding of 
being and the possibilities of Dasein as the ground for all its relations to 
particular tools and beings; for the truth or untruth of such understanding; 
for its historical character.  
       Moreover, Dreyfus interpretation gives rise to deep philosophical 
difficulties. To the extent that he attempts to reduce Dasein’s 
understanding to practical coping, he is led into a highly problematic 
conception of the collective understanding of the good and meaningful 
that we happen to live in – what Heidegger calls “the They” (das Man) – as 
the “source of significance and intelligibility” of the world.415  If, as 
Dreyfus argues, our understanding of the world basically transpires as an 
appropriation and skillful handling of the norms, roles, and practices of 
the historical society we live, then the very possibility of questioning the 
truth or goodness of these norms by appeal to some sources transcending 
these norms in cancelled out. As a result, Dreyfus cannot but define the 
collective norms and concepts of our society as the ungroundable ground 
of all significance.416 
                                         
415 Dreyfus 1991, p. 161. 
416 Dreyfus 1991, pp. 151-162. For some criticisms of Dreyfus’ interpretation, see 
Olafson 1994a and Overgaard 2004, pp. 178f. Cf. also the debate between Frederick 
Olafson and Taylor Carman (Olafson 1994b; Carman 1994). It seems to me that the 
pragmatic reading of Heidegger – chiefly developed by Carl-Friedrich Gethmann and 
Mark Okrent – suffers from problems very much akin to those of Dreyfus. The 
pragmatic interpretation basically construes Dasein’s understanding in terms of our 
practical skills in handling tools and carrying out tasks within the purposeful contexts 
we are involved in. Hereby, the truth of our understanding is ultimately defined in 
terms of its success or failure in allowing us to carry out these tasks and activities. As 
Okrent puts it: “For Heidegger the fundamental notion of evidence is tied to the way 
in which purposeful, practical activity must be recognizable as successful or 
unsuccessful if the activity it to count as purposeful at all. From this basic pragmatism 
follow his idiosyncratic notions of truth and meaning” (Okrent 1988, p. 128; cf. also 
pp. 4f., 100). Cf. also Gethmann 1989, pp. 115-118. However, even though this 
reading, as we have seen, captures an important aspect of Heidegger’s analysis of 
Dasein’s circumspective concern it ignores and thus misconstrues what for Heidegger 
constitutes the basic and philosophically decisive stratum of understanding: our 
understanding of the being and the purposes of Dasein, which allows particular tool-
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Being-in: Disposition, Understanding, Discourse 
 
Heidegger names “being-in” the “sustaining structural moment” of being-
in-the-world.417 Whereas “world” signified the overarching context of 
meaning in which Dasein lives, “being-in” functions as an umbrella term 
for the different aspects of Dasein’s openness towards the world. Indeed, 
Heidegger’s term for the human being, “Dasein,” designates precisely its 
essential openness:  
 
The being which is essentially constituted by being-in-the-world is 
itself always its “there” (Da) [...]. This being carries in its ownmost 
being the character of not being closed. The expression “there” 
means this essential disclosedness. Through this disclosedness this 
being (Dasein), together with the being-there of the world, is 
“there” for itself.418 
 
The fact that Heidegger calls “being-in” the “sustaining” moment of 
being-in-the-world mirrors the guiding ambition of the existential analytic, 
namely to find in the openness of Dasein the basic structure characterizing 
all understanding and thus eventually determining the sense of being itself. 
Hence, it is through an analysis of being-in that Heidegger hopes to pave 
the way for an explication of the being of Dasein as concern and 
temporality. According to Heidegger, the openness of Dasein is 
constituted by three equiprimordial aspect: disposition, understanding and 
discourse.  
 
Disposition. Heidegger introduces the term “disposition” (Befindlichkeit) 
to articulate the basic ontological character and role of what we normally 
call moods. It is, he maintains, a central feature of our lives that we always 
                                                                                                                      
contexts and activities to appear as relevant and useful in the first place, and the truth 
or untruth of which cannot be determined with reference to any pragmatic criteria. 
For a more detailed critique of the pragmatist reading of Heidegger, see Dahlstrom 
2001, pp. 199-200, 305-306, 423-433. 
417 SZ, p. 131. 
418 SZ, p. 132: “Das Seiende, das wesenhaft durch das In-der-Welt-sein konstituiert 
wird, ist selbst je sein ‘Da’. […] Dieses Seiende trägt in seinem eigensten Sein den 
Charakter der Unverschlossenheit. Der Ausdruck ‘Da’ meint diese wesenhafte 
Erschlossenheit. Durch sie ist dieses Seiende (das Dasein) in eins mit dem Da-sein von 
Welt für es selbst ‘da’.” 
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find ourselves living in certain moods. We are not only occasionally 
overcome by distinct and strong moods such as terror, joy, anticipation, 
shame or anxiety. Even the seemingly passionless dullness of everyday life 
or the distanced tranquility of scientific investigation constitutes specific 
moods. Heidegger maintains that the moods permeating our lives do not – 
as philosophy has traditionally tended to believe – amount to some kind 
of emotional epiphenomena merely adding subjective coloring to and at 
worst distorting our otherwise neutral and objective perceptual access to 
the world. On the contrary, he claims, Dasein’s moods constitute its 
primary passive openness towards itself as being-in-the-world: “In being 
in a mood, Dasein is always already disclosed in accordance with its mood 
as that being to Dasein has been delivered over in its being as the being 
which it, existing, has to be.”419 
      According to Heidegger, Dasein’s moods – especially, as we shall see, 
the mood of anxiety – attests to its essential predicament as “thrownness” 
(Geworfenheit) or “facticity” (Faktizität). Through its moods Dasein has 
always already, prior to and as a condition for any act of understanding or 
interpretation, been opened up to its historical context of possibilities and 
meaning-relations. Given that this passively disclosed context of meaning 
determines and delimits Dasein’s possibilities of understanding itself and 
its world, it ultimately constitutes the ungroundable historical destiny 
which Dasein has been thrown into. As Heidegger puts it: “The mood 
[brings] Dasein before the that-it-is of its there, which, as such, stares it in 
the face with the inexorability of an enigma.”420 In sum, then: Dasein’s 
disposition discloses the world as the ungroundable factical context of 
meaning into which Dasein always already finds itself thrown.  
 
Understanding and interpretation. According to Heidegger, disposition 
and understanding constitute two equiprimordial moments of our 
openness to the world. “Understanding” designates Dasein’s basic ability 
to see and enact its possibilities in a more or less transparent manner. He 
describes the character of understanding as “projection” (Entwurf). 
                                         
419 SZ, p. 134: “In der Gestimmtheit ist immer schon stimmungsmäßig das Dasein als 
das Seiende erschlossen, dem das Dasein in seinem Sein überantwortet wurde als dem 
Sein, das es existierend zu sein hat.”  
420 SZ, p. 136: “Die Stimmung [bringt] das Dasein vor das Daß seines Da […], als 
welches es ihm in unerbittlicher Rätselhaftigkeit entgegenstarrt.” 
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Whereas Dasein’s disposition has always already opened it up to the 
factical possibilities into which is has been thrown, understanding is 
Dasein’s way of projecting itself towards – seeing and being – these 
possibilities: “As projecting, understanding is the mode of being of Dasein 
in which it is its possibilities as possibilities.”421 Here we have to keep in 
mind that by understanding Heidegger always has in mind Dasein’s basic 
orientation towards the ultimate ideal possibilities determining what it can 
be and organizing the referential network of its world. Thus conceived, 
understanding essentially precedes and conditions all our possibilities of 
understanding and attaining knowledge or different kinds of particular 
entities. 
      According to Heidegger, it is an essential feature of Dasein’s 
understanding that it can be either “authentic” or “inauthentic.” On 
account of its mood of anxiety, Dasein has always already been opened up 
to its factical possibilities as its groundless and finite historical lot. This 
means that it is from the outset confronted with the following basic 
existentiell choice: it can either transparently and responsibly choose its 
factical possibilities as what they are, or it can flee from and cover up its 
predicament by lapsing into the customary prejudiced understanding of 
Dasein as a steadily present object.  
      Having presented “understanding” as Dasein’s projective disclosure of 
its possibilities, Heidegger goes on to describe how understanding is 
developed in “interpretation” (Auslegung). By “interpretation,” he does not 
primarily have in mind any specific linguistic – oral or written – activity of 
explicating texts or human actions, but the very basic way in which Dasein 
explicitly appropriates what it understands: “Circumspection discovers, 
that is, the world which has already been understood is interpreted. The 
ready-to-hand comes explicitly into the sight that understands.”422 
According to Heidegger, “that which is explicitly understood” has the 
structure of “something as something”:423  
 
                                         
421 SZ, p. 145: “Das Verstehen ist, als Entwerfen, die Seinsart des Daseins, in der es 
seine Möglichkeiten als Möglichkeiten ist.” 
422 SZ, p. 148: “Die Umsicht entdeckt, das bedeutet, die schon verstandene Welt wird 
ausgelegt. Das Zuhandene kommt ausdrücklich in die verstehende Sicht.” 
423 SZ, p. 149: “das ausdrücklich Verstandene hat die Struktur des Etwas als Etwas.” 
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The circumspectively interpretative answer to the circumspective 
question of what this particular being that is ready-to-hand is runs: 
it is for... Saying what it is for is not simply naming something, but 
what is named is understood as that as which what is in question is 
to be taken. What is disclosed in understanding, what is understood 
is always already accessible in such a way that its “as what” can be 
explicitly delineated. The “as” constitutes the structure of the 
explicitness of what is understood; it constitutes the 
interpretation.424 
 
Heidegger’s thesis is that the synthetic as-structure articulated here from 
the outset determines all understanding and explication. Our experience of 
particular beings as significant phenomena is from the outset based on our 
understanding of the world and its horizon of historical possibilities. 
Interpretation is founded on this understanding, which means that it does 
not change or add anything but only thematically articulates what is 
already there. On the basis of our understanding of particular beings in 
terms of their roles and functions within our historical world, the 
interpretation thematically explicates the beings as the relevant phenomena 
thus understood: this as a car, this as a tree, this as a human being.  
      Heidegger especially emphasizes two basic aspects of Dasein’s primary 
understanding interpretation. To begin with, he maintains that “any simple 
pre-predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is in itself already 
understanding and interpreting.”425 That is, our experience of beings does 
not primarily transpire without as-structure, so that we would first 
experience pure sense perceptions, which we would then actively interpret 
and furnish with sense and value. Such a description, he claims, does not 
capture the phenomenal content of our experience. From the outset, we 
see this as a tree and that as a door, just as we hear this as a car starting 
and that as the wind blowing. Our perception is thus from the very 
                                         
424 SZ, p. 149: “Auf die umsichtige Frage, was dieses bestimmte Zuhandene sei, lautet 
die umsichtig auslegende Antwort: es ist zum… Die Angabe des Wozu ist nicht 
einfach die Nennung von etwas, sondern das Genannte ist verstanden als das, als 
welches das in Frage stehende zu nehmen ist. Das im Verstehen Erschlossene, das 
Verstandene ist immer schon so zugänglich, daß an ihm sein ‘als was’ ausdrücklich 
abgehoben werden kann. Das ‘Als’ macht die Struktur der Ausdrücklichkeit eines 
Verstandenen aus; es konstituiert die Auslegung.” 
425 SZ, p. 149: “Alles vorprädikative schlichte Sehen des Zuhandenen ist an ihm selbst 
schon verstehend-auslegend.” 
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beginning guided by an unthematic understanding of the world which 
allows us to identify particular beings as unities of meaning and which our 
interpretation thematizes and articulates. Experiencing something like a 
pure as-free perception would require that our understanding would 
somehow be put out of play with the result that we would not be able to 
make sense of the experience at all: “When we just stare at something, our 
just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it anymore.”426 
Moreover, Heidegger stresses that Dasein’s interpretation is primarily 
implicit and does not need to take the form of explicit statements: “The 
articulation of what is understood [...] lies before the thematic statement 
about it. The ‘as’ does not first show up in the statement, but is only first 
stated, which is possible only because it already there as something 
expressible.”427 Hence, in order to be able to utter explicit statements 
about things, the world already has to be there and open for us as a 
context of significance which allows of being expressed: we already have 
to have understanding access to chairs, trees, dogs and churches in order 
to be able to speak and write meaningfully about such matters. The 
explicit utterance is “no free-floating comportment which could of itself 
disclose beings in general in a primary way,”428 but rather has to be 
understood as a ”derivative mode” of interpretation which rests on our 
primary implicit interpretation and modifies it in a certain sense.429   
      Heidegger makes a sharp distinction between the “existential-
hermeneutic as” (existenzial-hermeneutische Als) characterizing Dasein’s 
primary concerned interpretation of the world and the “apophantic as” 
(apophantische Als) characterizing theoretical statements. Whereas Dasein’s 
primary interpretation articulates the experienced tools with reference to 
their roles in the referential context of the world, the theoretical statement 
implies that we screen off the present context and focus exclusively on the 
tool as a present-at-hand object with the purpose of determining it 
through a predication of its objective traits: 
                                         
426 SZ, p. 149: “Das Nur-noch-vor-sich-Haben von etwas liegt vor im reinen 
Anstarren als Nicht-mehr-verstehen.” 
427 SZ, p. 149: “Die Artikulation des Verstandenen […] liegt vor der thematischen 
Aussage darüber.  In dieser taucht das ‘Als’ nicht zuerst auf, sondern wird nur erst 
ausgesprochen, was allein so möglich ist, daß es als Aussprechbares vorliegt.” 
428 SZ, p. 156: “kein freischwebendes Verhalten, das von sich aus primär Seiendes 
überhaupt erschließen könnte.” 
429 SZ, p. 157: “abkünftige Modus.” 
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That as which the statement determines what is present-at-hand is 
drawn from that which is present-at-hand as such. The as-structure 
of interpretation has undergone a modification. In its function of 
appropriating what is understood, the “as” no longer reaches out 
into a totality of relevance. As regards its possibilities for 
articulating reference-relations, it has been cut off from that 
significance which, as such, constitutes the character of the 
surrounding world.430    
 
In short, the theoretical statement aims to determine its objects by 
obtaining its predicates purely from the sphere of present-at-hand objects 
with the result that the historical context of significance which ultimately 
determines and gives significance to all beings is passed over and 
neglected.   
      Heidegger’s analysis of the basic “as-structure” of interpretation is 
seconded by an account of what he calls its “fore-structure” (Vor-
struktur).431 The structural fact that we primarily experience beings as 
meaningful phenomena on the basis of a preceding understanding of the 
world implies, he claims, that all interpretation is also essentially 
characterized by a fore-structure. The fore-structure includes three aspects: 
firstly, the interpretation is always grounded in a “fore-having” (Vorhabe), 
i.e., in the unthematic factical understanding of the world in which Dasein 
always already lives; secondly, the interpretation is grounded in a “fore-
sight” (Vorsicht), i.e., in a preceding grasp of the guiding “regard” (Hinsicht) 
– the problem- and being-horizon –  in terms of which the phenomenon 
in question is to be interpreted; thirdly, the interpretation is always 
grounded in a “fore-conception” (Vorgriff), which is to say that it always 
moves within a certain conceptuality which links its articulation of the 
matter.432  
                                         
430 SZ, p. 158: “Das Was, als welches die Aussage das Vorhandene bestimmt, wird aus 
dem Vorhandenen als solchem geschöpft. Die Als-Struktur der Auslegung hat eine 
Modifikation erfahren. Das ‘Als’ greift in seiner Funktion der Zueignung des 
Verstandenen nicht mehr aus in eine Bewandtnisganzheit. Es ist bezüglich seiner 
Möglichkeiten der Artikulation von Verweisungsbezügen von der Bedeutsamkeit, als 
welche die Umweltlichkeit konstituiert, abgeschnitten.” 
431 SZ, p. 151. 
432 SZ, p. 150. 
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      Heidegger’s account of the fore-structure is intended to specify the 
hermeneutical situation regulating all interpretation. As we attempt to 
interpret some phenomenon we always do this on the basis of a certain 
understanding of the world, a certain grasp of the problem- and being-
horizon of the phenomenon in question, and a certain conceptuality – all 
of which we have primarily slid into and uncritically taken over as our 
factical historical tradition. This means that interpretation is never a 
“presuppositionless grasping of something pre-given”;433 rather, what we 
directly see is first and foremost “nothing else than the self-evident, 
undiscussed assumption of the interpreter.”434 However, if our 
interpretation is always already determined by our preceding historical 
understanding of being and the world, then we need to give up the idea of 
a direct intuitive access to the matters themselves and recognize that the 
decisive task of interpretation consists in a critical explication of the 
historical pre-understanding we live in: “the first, constant, and last task 
[of interpretation] is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-
conception to be given to us by whims and popular conceptions, but to 
secure the scientific theme by working out these fore-structures from out 
of the matters themselves.”435  
      But how? According to Heidegger, basic analysis we cannot hope to 
free ourselves from the factical prejudiced understanding in which we first 
and foremost live by appealing to some kind of direct seeing of the 
matters in question – for the simple reason that all seeing of something as 
something has to be grounded in a historical understanding of being and 
the world. Hence, interpretation must essentially take the form of an 
explication of the possibilities inherent in our historical understanding. To 
begin with, the interpretation can proceed as a thematic explication of the 
factical understanding we happen to live in. However, this understanding, 
Heidegger maintain, first and foremost has the character of prejudices 
handed down by the tradition. As a result, he comes to believe that the 
only way to a free and primordial understanding of the matters themselves 
                                         
433 SZ, p. 150: “voraussetzungsloses Erfassen eines Vorgegebenen.” 
434 SZ, p. 150: ”nichts anderes als die selbstverständliche, undiskutierte Vormeinung 
des Auslegers“. 
435 SZ, p. 153: “[die] erste, ständige und letzte Aufgabe [der Auslegung] bleibt, sich 
jeweils Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriff nicht durch Einfälle und Volksbegriffe 
vorgeben zu lassen, sondern in deren Ausarbeitung aus den Sachen selbst her das 
wissenschaftliche Thema zu sichern.” 
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goes through a destruction of the prejudiced tradition: a dismantling 
which exposes the historical sources of the tradition and thereby opens up 
the possibility of retrieving the most originary possibilities of 
understanding harbored by our heritage.   
      Heidegger’s investigation of the as- and fore-structure of 
interpretation thus lies at the basis of his conviction that phenomenology 
must give up its belief in direct seeing as our primary access to the matters 
themselves and instead take the form of a radically historical, hermeneutic-
destructive interpretation.  
 
Discourse, language, idle talk. Heidegger’s account of discourse and 
language in Being and Time remains quite rudimentary and it is marked by 
vagueness and unclarity on many points. I what follows I will try to 
explicate the basic features of the account in so far as they are relevant for 
the problematic of phenomenality.  
      Heidegger’s discussion takes its starting point in his somewhat 
puzzling distinction between “discourse” (Rede) and “language” (Sprache). 
“Discourse” is Heidegger’s name for the third equiprimordial aspect – 
alongside disposition and understanding – of being-in, of Dasein’s 
openness. As such, it constitutes the “existential-ontological foundation” 
of “language.”436 How should this be understood? 
      Heidegger defines “discourse” as the “articulation” (Artikulation) or 
“arrangement” (Gliederung) of the “intelligibility” (Verständlichkeit) of being-
in-the world.437 By this he means the way in which the context we live in is 
always already articulated as a “totality of significations” (Bedeutungsganze), a 
structured whole of distinguishable significances and significance-
relations.438 This discursive articulation of intelligibility pertains to 
Dasein’s primary disclosure of the world in disposition and understanding, 
so that it precedes and conditions all active explicit explication of the 
world. Heidegger spells out five basic aspects of discourse: first, discourse 
is always about something – it has an “about-which” (Worüber), a subject 
matter that it refers to and is concerned with; second, in discourse what is 
talked about is always “addressed” (angeredet) in a particular regard and 
within certain limits; third, in discourse something is said – discourse has a 
                                         
436 SZ, p. 160. 
437 SZ, p. 161f. 
438 SZ, p. 161. 
204 The Historical Structure of Phenomenality
  
 
 
“what-is-said” (Geredetes), the concrete words we utter or write; fourth, 
discourse involves “communication” (Mitteilung) – in discourse the 
intelligibility of the world is shared with and communicated to others; 
fifth, in discourse Dasein’s expresses itself (Sichaussprechen) – not as a 
primarily self-contained subject but as the open existence that it is.439 
      If Heidegger by “discourse” tries to encircle the basic communicative 
character of being-in-the-world, “language” by contrast designates the 
factical “totality of words” (Wortganzheit) in and through which discourse 
expresses itself: “The intelligibility of being-in-the-world – an intelligibility 
which goes with a disposition – expresses itself as discourse. The totality of 
significations of intelligibility is put into words. To significations, words 
accrue. But word-things do not get supplied with significations. The 
expressedness of discourse is language.”440 That is, language – conceived 
as the factical words and grammatical rules and conventions we live in – is 
grounded in discourse, in our primary articulation of being-in-the-world 
into a structured totality of significances. The words do not shape or 
create their significances out of nothing but rather “accrue to” – that is, 
express and mediate – significances that we are always already open to.  
      Heidegger’s distinction between discourse and language in Being and 
Time remains undeveloped and to some extent confusing. As far as I can 
see, what he is basically attempting to do is to distinguish between, on the 
one hand, the basic communicative, mediated, and intersubjectively shared 
character of our primary openness towards the world and, on the other 
hand, the factical words and linguistic conventions that are used to 
communicate the significances we live in.  
      Although Heidegger himself offers almost no argument on this point, 
I think there are in fact good philosophical reasons for making a 
distinction between the meaning and concepts we live in and our linguistic 
means of communicating them. Take, for example, such concepts as 
football, love, promise, dog, or philosophy. Even though we may often 
use corresponding words – “football,” “love,” “dog,” etc. – to 
communicate the matters in question, these concepts are not in 
                                         
439 SZ, p. 161f. 
440 SZ, p. 161: “Die befindliche Verständlichkeit des In-der-Welt-seins spricht sich als 
Rede aus. Das Bedeutungsganze der Verständlichkeit kommt zu Wort. Den Bedeutungen 
wachsen Worte zu. Nicht aber werden Wörterdinge mit Bedeutungen versehen. Die 
Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede ist die Sprache.” 
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themselves linguistic. It is clearly possible to identify and communicate 
different meanings and concepts without using words of one-to-one 
correspondence (“football” for football, “love” for love, “dog” for dog, 
etc.). On the one hand, it is possible to identify and talk about the same 
matters in many ways; on the other hand, our words can have many 
different meanings and functions which are specified only on account of 
the contexts in which we use them and on account of the other words we 
employ. It also seems clear that we may understand and communicate 
concepts and meanings for which we have no particular linguistic 
expression. Consider, for example, the situation of entering a bus and 
looking around for a free seat. In modern urban societies, this is a typical 
situation for many people, involving typical features and possibilities, a 
situation of which we have a general conception that can be identified and 
communicated. Yet we have no word for it – although we could have one. 
In fact, it seems that our understanding of the world is permeated by such 
pre-linguistic general concepts and typifications that orient our lives. Still, 
the basic point of this argument is not that in addition to our linguistic 
concepts we also have pre-linguistic concepts. Rather, it is that our 
understanding of concepts and meanings is primarily a-linguistic in 
character although it is always already to linguistically codified and 
mediated to greater or smaller extent.  
      Furthermore, I think it is phenomenologically right to assert that our 
understanding of a-linguistic meanings and concepts grounds our 
possibilities of meaningful linguistic expression and communications. If 
we would not have an understanding of football, love or of what it means 
to make a promise – an understanding which is not equal to the linguistic 
ability to talk about these matters – it is hard to see how we could ever talk 
about or give expression to these meanings. Indeed, it seems that the basic 
difference between our grasp of a-linguistic meaning and our ability to use 
language conditions the possibility of accounting for how languages arise 
and develop, and of distinguishing between language use that is opening, 
clarifying, or genuinely communicate and language use that is 
dissimulating, distortive, or amounts to empty jargon.  
      According to Heidegger, the analysis of discourse and language in 
Being and Time is “above all” intended as a preparation for his subsequent 
explication of “idle talk” (Gerede) as Dasein’s inauthentic mode of 
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discourse.441 What makes this analysis important for our enquiry into 
phenomenality is that idle talk for Heidegger constitutes the possibility for 
our understanding to become “uprooted” and “cover up” the phenomena 
that it pretends to exhibit, i.e., the possibility of phenomena converting 
into mere appearances: “Only beings, whose disclosedness is constituted 
by disposed and understanding discourse [...] have the possibility of being 
of such uprooting.”442  
      It is, Heidegger claims, a central feature of discourse that it has always 
already expressed itself in a given factical language, which essentially 
harbors a certain understanding and interpretation of the world. Dasein is 
thus from the outset “delivered over” to an “interpretedness” 
(Ausgelegtheit) which “regulates and distributes the possibilities of the 
average understanding and of the disposition belonging to it.”443 This 
factical interpretedness always encompasses Dasein’s understanding of 
being-in-the-world in its entirety as well as of being as such. The 
problematic thing about this interpretedness is, however, that it first and 
foremost takes the form of a prejudiced interpretation which is taken over 
from the tradition and regulates public discourse without any independent 
disclosure of the matters in question. How is this possible?  
      According to Heidegger, our discourse essentially involves a tendency 
to exhibit and communicate the phenomena talked about as what they are. 
However, due to the average intelligibility of language it is to a certain 
degree possible to understand and make use of language regardless of 
whether we have independently seen and understood the matters we are 
talking about. This possibility is easily exploitable if we, as is often the 
case, do not want to achieve an independent understanding of ourselves 
but rather desire to confirm to and excel with regard to the collective 
norms regulating how one ought to think, talk, feel and act. Idle talk is 
born to the extent that Dasein only says and repeats what “one says,” that 
is, what is considered normal and collectively authorized in a given 
historical situation: “Things are so because one says so. Idle talk is 
constituted by such gossiping and passing the word along, a process by 
                                         
441 SZ, p. 166. 
442 SZ, p. 170: “Nur Seiendes, dessen Erschlossenheit durch die befindlich-
verstehende Rede konstituiert ist […] hat die Seinsmöglichkeit solcher Entwurzelung.” 
443 SZ, p. 167f.: “regelt und verteilt die Möglichkeiten des durchschnittlichen 
Verstehens und der zugehörigen Befindlichkeit.” 
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which its initial lack of grounds to stand on increases to complete 
groundlessness. [...] Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything 
without any previous appropriation of the matter.”444 
      According to Heidegger, the possibility of discourse to convert into 
idle talk is nothing else than the possibility of phenomena to convert into 
mere appearances. If in our discourse – to whose essence it belongs to 
pretend to exhibit the matters talked about as what they are – we just 
repeat and alternate the common ways of speaking and thinking without 
independently disclosing the matters in question, then “disclosing” 
changes into a “closing off.”445 As a result, our discourse exhibits the 
matters we talk about not as what they are but as mere appearances.446 
      For Heidegger, idle talk signifies the inauthentic mode of speech and 
understanding in which Dasein’s first and foremost lives, and on account 
of which it has always already been thrown into a particular factical 
interpretedness, a prejudiced tradition that subsists and carries the weight 
of custom and self-evidence even though it has been uprooted from its 
phenomenal sources. It is precisely this captivity in the traditional 
interpretedness – which encompasses both Dasein’s understanding of 
itself and its understanding of being – which motivates the task of 
phenomenology, and on the backdrop of which all phenomenological 
explication has to be carried through:   
 
Dasein can never escape this everyday interpretedness into which 
Dasein has grown initially. All genuine understanding, interpreting 
and communication, rediscovery and new appropriation come 
about in it and out of it and against it. In no case is a Dasein, 
untouched and unseduced by this interpretedness, set before the 
free land of a “world” in itself, so that is just beholds what it 
encounters. The dominance of the public interpretedness has 
already decided upon even the possibilities of being disposed, that 
is, about the basic way in which Dasein lets the world matter to it. 
                                         
444 SZ, p. 168f.: “Die Sache ist so, weil man es sagt. In solchem Nach- und 
Weiterreden, dadurch sich das schon anfängliche Fehlen der Bodenständigkeit zur 
völligen Bodenlosigkeit steigert, konstituiert sich das Gerede. […] Das Gerede ist die 
Möglichkeit, alles zu verstehen ohne vorgängige Zueignung der Sache.” 
445 SZ, p. 169: “Das bodenlose Gesagtsein und Weitergesagtwerden reicht hin, daß 
sich das Erschließen verkehrt zu einem Verschließen.” 
446 Cf. SZ, p. 173. 
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The They prescribes one’s disposition, and determines what and 
how one “sees.”447   
 
There is – as Heidegger maintains – no hope of freeing ourselves from the 
traditional interpretedness in which we live through an appeal to some 
kind of direct seeing of the phenomena, for the reason that all our direct 
feeling and seeing is initially determined by the tradition. Hence, to 
emancipate ourselves from the tradition and access an originary 
understanding of the matters themselves we need to carry out a 
destruction of the tradition and a retrieval of the most primordial 
possibilities of understanding contained by our history. Moreover, every 
expression of existentiell or philosophical insights essentially runs the risk 
of converting into uprooted jargon, which means that the task of opening 
up and keeping open the access to the matters themselves always has the 
character a continuous and infinite struggle.  
      As the explication above has made clear, Heidegger in Being and Time 
ascribes a rather diminutive and mainly negative to language within the 
overall structure of Dasein’s phenomenal understanding. To begin with, 
he maintains that Dasein’s implicit discourse and understanding precedes 
all explicit language and opens up the context of significance which 
language, on this basis, expresses and communicates. Moreover, he 
emphasizes the distortive nature of language: on the one hand, he stresses 
the way in which the theoretical statements modifies our originary 
concerned understanding into determinations of present-at-hand objects; 
on the other hand, he stresses the tendency of all discourse to transpire as 
uprooted and distortive idle talk.  
      Heidegger’s tendency to downplay the import of language in Being and 
Time might seem surprising considering the important role played by 
language in the elaboration of his new concept of phenomenality in the 
previous years. In his 1923-4 lecture course “Introduction to 
                                         
447 SZ, p. 169f.: “Dieser alltäglichen Ausgelegtheit, in die das Dasein zunächst 
hineinwächst, vermag es sich nie zu entziehen. In ihr und aus ihr und gegen sie 
vollzieht sich alles echte Verstehen, Auslegen und Mitteilen, Wiederentdecken und neu 
Zueignen. Es ist nicht so, daß je ein Dasein unberührt und unverführt durch diese 
Ausgelegtheit vor das freie Land einer ‘Welt’ an sich gestellt würde, um nur zu 
schauen, was ihm begegnet. Die Herrschaft der öffentlichen Ausgelegtheit hat sogar 
schon über die Möglichkeiten des Gestimmtseins entschieden, das heißt über die 
Grundart, in der sich das Dasein von der Welt angehen läßt. Das Man zeichnet die 
Befindlichkeit vor, es bestimmt, was man und wie man ‘sieht’.” 
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Phenomenological Research,” Heidegger – through a reading of Aristotle 
– articulated the basic understanding of the human being in terms of “a 
kind of logos”: an implicit speech preceding all seeing and providing the 
light through which it becomes possible to perceive and identify entities as 
meaningful phenomena. This thought is followed up and restated in his 
critical engagement with Husserl in “Prolegomena” where he writes: “It is 
not so much that we see the objects and things but rather that we first talk 
about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but 
rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter.”448 What 
Heidegger then does in Being and Time is that he elaborates this conception 
of phenomenality – which was originally modeled on the paradigm of 
language – in his analysis of being-in-the-world, only that he now largely 
effaces its linguistic character. His main reason for this is, it seems, that he 
wants to emphasize that our primary phenomenal understanding of 
historical meaning and being is not a function of but rather grounds and 
conditions the possibility of meaningful language use. Nevertheless, 
although Heidegger in Being and Time pictures Dasein’s understanding as 
primarily pre-linguistic it still exhibits the basic traits that were decisive for 
his earlier appropriation of language as a paradigm for his new conception 
of phenomenality: first, it presents the general patterns of meaning that 
determine what we can conceive as meaningful phenomena; second, it is 
historically mediated and publicly shared. Heidegger’s analysis of 
“discourse” – conceived as the implicit shared articulation of the world 
that grounds language – indeed does nothing but spell out explicitly these 
proto-linguistic features of Dasein’s understanding. 
      It seems that Heidegger’s historical trajectory in part explains his 
awkward relationship to language in Being and Time. By first using language 
as a paradigmatic basis for his explication of understanding and then 
cleansing understanding of its linguisticality, he initially lacks every ready 
account of how our primary understanding expresses itself in language. As 
it happens, Heidegger’s general strategy will consist in dodging the 
question of language and focusing almost exclusively on the tendency of 
language to deteriorate into theory and idle talk. By contrast, he says very 
little about the positively disclosive possibilities of language.  
                                         
448 GA 20, p. 75: “Wir sehen nicht so sehr primär und ursprünglich die Gegenstände 
und Dinge, sondern zunächst sprechen wir darüber, genauer sprechen wir nicht das 
aus, was wir sehen, sondern umgekehrt, wir sehen was man über die Sache spricht.” 
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      Heidegger’s silence encompasses both the speech of pre-theoretical 
life and the discourse of philosophy itself. Concerning the former he only 
mentions the possibility of a “circumspectively expressed interpretation” 
(umsichtig ausgesprochene Auslegung) which is “not necessarily” already a 
theoretical statement, and which may, e.g., take the form of “statements 
about events in the surrounding world, accounts of the ready-to-hand, 
‘reports on situations,’ recording and fixing the ‘facts of the case,’ 
describing a state of affairs, telling about what has happened.”449 But this 
is all he says. As regards the question of the language of philosophy, 
Heidegger is certainly very much aware of the challenges and problems 
facing philosophical discourse. Yet his positive comments concerning this 
question are scanty. He stresses that the philosophical discourse, like every 
form of explicit speech, always runs the basic risk of losing its footing in 
the matters and so distort and cover up what it pretends to lay bare: “It is 
possible for every phenomenological concept and proposition drawn from 
genuine origins to degenerate when communicated as a statement. It gets 
circulated in a vacuous fashion, loses its autochthony, and becomes a free-
floating thesis.” 450 Heidegger also points out that fundamental ontology 
has to face up to the task of articulating structures of being, which both 
our everyday ontic vocabulary and the traditional philosophical 
conceptuality are prone to deform, and which therefore requires not only 
new words but above all a new grammar.451 Still, apart from these negative 
indications he says almost nothing about the distinctive character of the 
discourse of phenomenological philosophy.  
      In his early Freiburg lecture courses Heidegger characterized 
philosophical concepts as “formal indications”: their meaning cannot be 
inferred from our factical normal concepts; instead, they operate by 
pointing to the particular experiences that constitute their phenomenal 
source of meaning. In Being and Time the term “formal indication” is still 
used on a few occasions, something that has led some commentators to 
                                         
449 SZ, p. 158: “Aussagen über Geschehnisse in der Umwelt, Schilderungen des 
Zuhandenen, ‘Situationsberichte’, Aufnahme und Fixierung eines ‘Tatbestandes’, 
Beschreibung einer Sachlage, Erzählung des Vorgefallenen.” 
450 SZ, p. 36: “Jeder ursprünglich geschöpfte phänomenologische Begriff und Satz 
steht als mitgeteilte Aussage in der Möglichkeit der Entartung. Er wird in einem leeren 
Verständnis weitergegeben, verliert seine Bodenständigkeit und wird zur 
freischwebenden These.” 
451 SZ, p. 39. 
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suggest that Heidegger here continues to conceive of philosophical 
concepts as formal indications in the same sense as in his earlier 
lectures.452 However, I think this suggestion is misguided. In Being and Time 
Heidegger never thematizes or explicates “formal indication” as a central 
concept, and there is no hint that it would function as a basic yet implicit 
operative concept in his account of the nature of philosophical language. 
The philosophical reason for why the concept of formal indication has 
become obsolete is, I think, that Heidegger’s earlier account of this 
concept rested firmly on the idea that philosophical concepts are 
grounded on direct intuitive reflection on experiences. As Heidegger in 
Being and Time grounds our phenomenal experience in Dasein’s prior 
historical understanding of world and being, the notion of formal 
indication becomes insufficient. Given that our phenomenal experience is 
determined by a historical understanding which first and foremost 
dominates us in the form of an uprooted tradition, the phenomenological 
task now consists in carrying out a hermeneutic-destructive retrieval of a 
                                         
452 Cf., e.g., Overgaard 2004, pp. 89-90; Dahlstrom 2001, pp. 242-252. In defending 
the claim that Heidegger in Being and Time basically conceived of philosophical 
concepts as “formal indications” the commentators have invariably been forced to 
resort to the strategy of inferring the sense of this concept from Heidegger’s 
elaboration of it in his early Freiburg lectures. However, if I am right that Heidegger’s 
development from his early Freiburg lectures to Being and Time entails a basic 
systematic shift from an intuition-based phenomenology towards a radically 
hermeneutic phenomenology, and that his early notion of “formal indication” 
essentially rested on the former, then the stratagem of inferring the sense of “formal 
indication” in Being and Time from earlier texts becomes anachronistic. In so far as 
Heidegger continues to employ the term “formal indication” in and beyond Being and 
Time (cf., e.g., SZ, pp. 114, 116f., 313; GA 29/30, pp. 421-435) I think it is clear that 
its meaning has changed, in such a way that it has been neutralized with respects to the 
question of the meaning-sources of philosophical concepts. The most informative 
passage referring to “formal indication” in Being and Time reads: “The word ‘I’ is to be 
understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indication, indicating something 
which may perhaps reveal itself as its ‘opposite’ in some particular phenomenal 
context of being” (Das ‘ich’ darf nur verstanden werden im Sinne einer unverbindlichen 
formalen Anzeige von etwas, das im jeweiligen phänomenalen Seinszusammenhang vielleicht sich 
als sein ‘Gegenteil’ erweist) (SZ, p. 116). The way the term “formal indication” is used here 
and elsewhere in the book is basically as a reminder that the concepts used in the 
project of fundamental ontology are “non-committal” – cannot be inferred in advance 
from our standard ontic or pre-ontological understanding without prejudice – and 
ultimately refer to and receive their meaning from the concrete investigations of the 
matters that they indicate, whereby the nature of these investigations – transcendental 
phenomenological or hermeneutic-destructive – is left undetermined.   
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more originary understanding of being. This task calls for a language that 
does not point toward some supposedly direct intuitions as its ground, but 
which is somehow able to carry and disclose the originary historical 
patterns of meaning in their finitude and groundlessness prior to their 
deterioration into idle talk. What kind of language? Heidegger cannot 
answer this question in Being and Time. Ultimately, it seems, Heidegger’s 
problems with accounting for the nature of philosophical language are 
rooted in his problems with accounting for how the destructive retrieval 
of originary historical meanings is to be pursued, and the deep 
ambivalences in the project of fundamental ontology that this failure gives 
rise to.  
      It is perhaps symptomatic that Heidegger ends his analysis of 
discourse and language in Being and Time by pushing the question of 
language further ahead of himself: “In the end, philosophical research 
must for once decide to ask what mode of being belongs to language in 
general.”453 
 
Groundlessness, Finitude, Historicity 
 
Having reviewed Heidegger’s basic conception of Dasein as being-in-the-
world in the first division of Being and Time we now proceed to examine his 
analysis of temporality and historicity which is developed in the second 
division.  
      In turning from the first to the second division, Heidegger argues that 
the analysis conducted so far has been insufficient since it has only 
focused on everyday inauthentic Dasein, and that we need to get access to 
Dasein’s possibility of authentic existence and self-understanding in order 
to explicate its primordial temporal-historical structure of sense. Given 
that inauthenticity consists in shying away from and covering up the 
temporal-historical character of our guiding possibilities – revealed by 
anxiety and the call of conscience – and that authenticity consists precisely 
in opening up to and transparently taking over this predicament, access to 
the latter becomes a crucial condition for explicating the temporal-
historical sense of Dasein. However, Heidegger’s claim about the 
                                         
453 SZ, p. 166: “Am Ende muß sich die philosophische Forschung einmal entschließen 
zu fragen, welche Seinsart der Sprache überhaupt zukommt.” 
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insufficiency of the first division does not imply that its analysis would be 
false and in need of revision. On the contrary, it is clear that the analysis 
of Dasein as being-in-the-world – and of the as- and fore-structure of 
understanding – constitutes the systematic basis for all the analyses in the 
second division, which basically transpire as an explication of the historical 
and temporal aspects of Dasein’s understanding.454 
      In what follows, I begin by explicating Heidegger’s view of the 
groundless, finite and historical character of Dasein’s possibilities as this is 
elaborated in his analyses of anxiety, the call of conscience and historicity. 
After that, in the next section, I will briefly examine his articulation of 
Dasein’s basic structure of temporality. I will return to discuss Heidegger’s 
account of Dasein’s authentic self-understanding – which is indicated and 
anticipated here – in the last chapter of this part.  
      Whereas Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world focused on how 
Dasein’s primary experience of beings as significant tools is determined by 
its preceding understanding of the world, he now turns to investigating 
Dasein’s understanding of its own possibilities conceived as the ultimate 
horizon of purposes organizing the significance-relations of the world. 
Here it is also good to point out – and we shall come back to this – that 
although Heidegger in the introduction to Being and Time insists that our 
ontic understanding of beings and of the world is guided by a historical 
understanding of being, he almost completely bypasses the question of the 
nature of this understanding in his concrete analyses. As a result, 
Heidegger’s investigation of the historical character of Dasein’s 
understanding of its own possibilities constitutes nothing less than his 
paradigmatic account of what it means to understand and retrieve 
historical meaning in general – including the modes and unifying sense of 
being. 
                                         
454 In fact – given Heidegger’s argument about access to authenticy as a condition for 
explicating of the primordial temporal-historical sense of Dasein – it is hard to see 
how the analysis of being-in-the-world in division one could have been carried out 
without already having the possibility of authentic existence more or less in view. 
After all, the analysis of being-in-the-world opens up and articulates the basic notion 
that our experience of significant phenomena – whether ready-to-hand tools or 
present-at-hand objects – is determined by our preceding unthematic understanding of 
the world as a historical context of significance. Perhaps it would be more accurate to 
say – and I think Heidegger would agree – that the analysis of being-in-the-world 
already anticipates and refers to but does not yet spell out the experience of 
authenticity as its hidden phenomenal ground.   
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      Heidegger’s finds in anxiety and conscience the basic experiences 
which expose Dasein to the groundlessness and finitude of its possibilities, 
and confronts it with the task of facing this predicament in an authentic 
manner. According to Heidegger, anxiety differs from other forms of fear 
and dread in that in anxiety we do not fear anything particular – other 
human beings, animals, natural disasters, diseases etc. – that would 
threaten us. Rather, in anxiety we experience that our entire familiar world 
with all its beings is “of no consequence” and “collapses into itself”: “the 
world has the character of completely lacking significance.”455 As such, 
anxiety robs Dasein of the possibility of understanding itself, in an 
inauthentic and prejudiced manner, on the basis of the received collective 
interpretedness of the world. The “uncanniness” (Unheimlichkeit, which 
literally means “unhomelike”) of anxiety exposes the individual Dasein to 
the basic fact that it is “not-at-home” (Un-zuhause) within the familiar 
world of the one that is has slid into, and confronts it with the task of 
personally facing up to and clear-sightedly choosing its own possibilities. 
      Ultimately, Heidegger claims, that in the face of which Dasein 
experiences anxiety is itself in its essential mortality. Anxiety exposes 
Dasein to its death as its “ownmost, non-relational, unsurpassable 
possibility.”456 That death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility means that Dasein 
is referred to its own possibilities as that which it can be; that death is non-
relational means that it is the individual Dasein itself, and no one else, that 
responsibly has to take over its own possibility of being; finally, that death 
is unsurpassable means that it constitutes the ultimate possible that Dasein 
can never move beyond and which delimits all its finite possibilities to be: 
“This end, which belongs to the potentiality-for-being – that is to say, to 
existence – limits and determines in every case the possible totality of 
Dasein.”457  The existential fact that Dasein is on the way towards its own 
death as its unsurpassable possibility implies that it is faced with task of 
choosing its own finite possibilities from those factical historical 
possibilities available to it.   
       Heidegger supplements his account of anxiety with an analysis of 
what he calls the call of conscience. What does he mean by this? 
                                         
455 SZ, p. 186: “Die Welt hat den Charakter völliger Unbedeutsamkeit.” 
456 SZ, p. 250: “eigenste, unbezügliche, unüberholbare Möglichkeit.” 
457 SZ, p. 234: “Dieses Ende, zum Seinkönnen, das heißt zum Existenz gehörig, 
begrenzt und bestimmt die je mögliche Ganzheit des Daseins.” 
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      According to Heidegger, Dasein has first and foremost lost itself in an 
inauthentic listening to and complying with what the They – the 
normative collective voice – says about things. In order to break this 
listening what is needed is a call that is somehow capable of awaking 
Dasein to its authentic self. This call is the “call of conscience.” The call of 
conscience, as Heidegger depicts it, has nothing new or substantial to tell 
Dasein about how it ought to live its life in accordance with the available 
collective norms and paradigms of value. Instead, the call of conscience 
speaks solely “in the mode of keeping silent”:458 it completely “passes 
over” the interpretedness of the They in terms of which Dasein tends to 
understand itself, whereby it “pushes” the They into “insignificance.”459 
However, although the call of conscience is wordless it is far from 
undetermined. The call of conscience addresses Dasein’s inauthentic self 
as an alien voice that, neither planned nor anticipated, comes at once 
“from me” and “over me.”460 The one calling is Dasein itself in its 
originary uncanny thrownness into the world prior to any possible refuge 
in the They: “It is Dasein in its uncanniness, the primordial thrown being-
in-the-world as not-at-home.”461 In conscience, it is Dasein itself that 
summons itself to authentic existence.  
      But what does the call of conscience give to understand? According to 
Heidegger, the call of conscience says that Dasein is “guilty.” What he has 
in mind here is not a moral guilt that Dasein could incur through its way 
of relating and acting towards others, but a guilt that belongs to Dasein 
prior to and regardless of all its ontic attitudes and actions. Dasein is 
essentially guilty in two respects. Firstly, Dasein is characterized by the fact 
that it is always already thrown into its being. This means that Dasein is 
from the outset delivered over to a possibility to be that it has never been 
in a position to ground or instigate but which it is nevertheless referred to 
as its “thrown ground”: “It [Dasein] is never existent before its ground, but 
only from it and as this ground. Thus being-a-ground means never to have 
                                         
458 SZ, p. 273: “im Modus des Schweigens.” 
459 SZ, p. 273: “Gerade im Übergehen stößt er das auf öffentliches Ansehen erpichte 
Man in die Bedeutungslosigkeit.” 
460 SZ, p. 275. 
461 SZ, p. 276: “Er ist das Dasein in seiner Unheimlichkeit, das ursprüngliche 
geworfene In-der-Welt-sein als Un-zuhause.” 
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power over one’s ownmost being from the ground up.”462 In short, it 
belongs to the being of Dasein that it is always already thrown into a field 
of factical historical possibilities which conditions all meaningful 
experience and understanding, and which constitutes the ungroundable 
ground that it can be. Secondly, in so far as Dasein chooses certain 
possibilities of being it thereby chooses not to be all the possibilities that it 
passes over. Hence, in order for Dasein to be able to choose its own finite 
possibilities it must also be capable of enduring the negativity of letting go 
of all the alternative possibilities of life. Heidegger sums up Dasein’s 
essential being-guilty, implied by its thrownness, in the following 
condensed formula: “Being the (null) ground of a nullity.”463 
      In short: both anxiety and the call of conscience unsettle the collective 
interpretedness that Dasein has normally slid into, thereby confronting it 
with the task of independently grasping and choosing its own possibilities. 
At the same time, anxiety and conscience reveal the basic character of 
Dasein’s possibilities: whereas conscience discloses the groundlessness of the 
historical possibilities into which Dasein is always already thrown and has 
to choose from, anxiety in the face of death exposes the finitude essentially 
characterizing Dasein’s choice of its own possibilities. Authenticity for 
Heidegger names precisely the possibility of transparently answering to the 
predicament revealed by anxiety and the call of conscience: the possibility 
of Dasein to open up to the groundless factical possibilities that it is 
thrown into and, by anticipating its own death as its ultimate delimiting 
possibility, choose its own possibilities as its finite historical lot.   
       In his analysis of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) – which is developed as a 
part of his analysis of temporality – Heidegger further accentuates and 
specifies the historical character of Dasein’s factical possibilities.  
      Heidegger begins his reflection of historicity by noting that all the 
tools we encounter in our world are historical in the sense that they belong 
to a world that is historical. If the world in which the tools play a role 
disappears, the tools will remain as entities belonging to a bygone world.464 
Hence, by world Heidegger essentially refers to specific historical contexts 
                                         
462 SZ, p. 284: “Es [das Dasein] ist nie existent vor seinem Grunde, sondern je nur aus 
ihm und als dieser. Grundsein besagt demnach, des eigensten Seins von Grund auf nie 
mächtig sein.” 
463 SZ, p. 285: “Das (nichtige) Grund-sein einer Nichtigkeit.” 
464 Cf. SZ, p. 380. 
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of significance which arise, persist and vanish. But how should we more 
exactly understand the historical character of the world? As we know, 
Heidegger conceives of the world as a network of instrumental relations 
that are ultimately anchored in Dasein’s possibilities – the concrete 
paradigms of value or heroes organizing and granting purpose to the 
world. The question he now poses is “whence, in general, Dasein can fetch 
those possibilities upon which it factically projects itself”?465 And he 
answers: 
 
The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses 
the current factical possibilities of authentic existing out of the heritage 
(Erbe) that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over. In one’s coming back 
resolutely to one’s thrownness, there is hidden a handing down 
(Sichüberliefern) to oneself of the possibilities that have come down 
to one, but not necessarily as having thus come down. If everything 
“good” is a heritage, and the character of “goodness” lies in making 
authentic existence possible, then the handing down of a heritage 
constitutes itself in resoluteness.466 
 
According to Heidegger, Dasein thus essentially draws its factical 
possibilities from the historical heritage into which it has always already 
been thrown, so that choosing one’s own possibilities in resoluteness 
always means handing down to oneself and taking over some historically 
inherited possibilities. In this, the possibilities of the individual Dasein 
always belong to the “destiny” (Geschick) of the “community” 
(Gemeinschaft) or the “people” (Volk), which “guides” all individual 
“fates” (Schicksal).467  
      Heidegger’s basic analysis of being-in-the-world aimed to show that 
our experience of particular beings as meaningful phenomena is 
conditioned and determined by our preceding understanding of the world, 
                                         
465 SZ, p. 383: “Trotzdem muß gefragt werden, woher überhaupt die Möglichkeiten 
geschöpft werden können, auf die sich das Dasein faktisch entwirft.” 
466 SZ, p. 383f.: “Die Entschlossenheit, in der das Dasein auf sich selbst 
zurückkommt, erschließt die jeweiligen faktischen Möglichkeiten eigentlichen 
Existierens aus dem Erbe, das sie als geworfene übernimmt. Das entschlossene 
Zurückkommen auf die Geworfenheit birgt ein Sich überliefern überkommener 
Möglichkeiten in sich, obzwar nicht notwendig als überkommener. Wenn alles ‘Gute’ 
Erbschaft ist und der Charakter der ‘Güt’ in der Ermöglichung eigentlicher Existenz 
liegt, dann konstituiert sich in der Entschlossenheit je das Überliefern eines Erbes.” 
467 SZ, p. 384. 
218 The Historical Structure of Phenomenality
  
 
 
the organizing stratum of which consists in our understanding of Dasein’s 
possibilities. Now it has becomes clear that he believes these possibilities 
are radically historical in nature. Although it is the task of the individual 
Dasein to choose its own possibilities, it cannot of its own accord create 
or give meaning to its possibilities. Rather, as Heidegger puts it: the 
“repeatable possibilities” provided by the heritage constitute the “sole 
authority (einzige Autorität) which a free existing can have.”468 Dasein is 
thus essentially referred to the collectively inherited historical paradigms of 
value and purpose into which it has been thrown as the basic 
ungroundable possibilities which determine and delimit what it can 
experience and understand as meaningful. Whereas Dasein’s inherited 
factical possibilities constitutes the groundless ground on the basis of 
which it must choose itself, it is the anticipation of its own death as its 
ultimate insurmountable possibility that allows it to choose its ownmost 
finite possibilities.   
 
Temporality 
 
As we know, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology ultimately aims to clarify 
the sense of being as the basic structure organizing our understanding of 
beings in their being, and he hopes to do this through an explication of 
Dasein’s temporality.  
      However, although the analysis of temporality in division two of Being 
and Time is intended to be the highpoint of the existential analytic it is, I 
believe, strictly speaking unable to contribute as much to the philosophical 
substance of the preceding analyses as Heidegger and many commentators 
want to believe. In fact, it is Heidegger’s basic analysis of being-in-the 
world – including the groundless, finite, and historical nature of Dasein’s 
possibilities – that opens up and provides the systematic basis for his 
account of temporality, so that the thematic analysis of temporality 
basically takes the form of a schematic articulation of the temporal aspect 
of Dasein’s understanding.469 Still, it is important to briefly recount the 
                                         
468 SZ, p. 391. 
469 Heidegger, of course, explicitly denies this, claiming that the “‘temporal’ 
interpretation” – i.e. the repetition of the existential analysis conducted so far with the 
aim to disclosing the temporality of the basic structures of Dasein – “will not lead to a 
running through our analyses again superficially and schematically” (SZ, p. 331f.). 
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basic argument of Heidegger’s analysis of temporality given that he tends 
to articulate his entire critical struggle with the traditional understanding of 
being and phenomenality as a struggle with a certain understanding of 
time. 
      What gives Heidegger’s account of temporality its central role in the 
project of fundamental ontology is his conviction that, beginning with the 
Greeks, Western philosophy has understand being in terms of time. The 
basic conception of being as presence – ousia – implies that being is 
determined with reference to a certain dimension of time: to be is to be 
present in the now for an observing subject. According to Heidegger, 
however, this traditional understanding of time as now-time is nothing but 
an articulation of the temporality of inauthentic Dasein, a temporality that 
stems from a fall from the primordial temporality of authentic existence.  
      Heidegger describes the temporality characterizing the resoluteness of 
authentic existence in the following way. In order for Dasein to be able to 
project itself towards its ownmost possibilities, it must be possible for 
these possibilities to “come towards” it; in order for Dasein to be able to 
take over its factical possibilities, it must be possible for it to “come back” 
to itself as that which it always already is; finally, in order for Dasein to be 
able to cope with the tasks and tools of its surrounding world, it must be 
possible for it to “make” the ready-to-hand tools “present” in the current 
situation.470 The interplay between these three dimensions – which 
Heidegger calls the “future” (Zukunft), the “having-been” (Gewesenheit), and 
the “present” (Gegenwart) – constitutes the dynamic unity of primordial 
temporality.471 In this temporality, the future and the past are not defined 
as coming or bygone now-points. On the contrary, it is only Dasein’s 
projection towards its future possibilities as always already having-been 
that determines its present situation: “Coming back to itself futurally, 
resoluteness brings itself into the situation by making present. The 
character of having-been arises from the future, and in such a way that the 
future which has-been (or better, which is-in-the-process-of-having-been) 
releases from itself the present. This phenomenon has the unity of a 
future which makes present in the process of having-been: we designate it 
                                         
470 SZ, pp. 325f. 
471 SZ, p. 328. 
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as temporality.”472 Hence, Dasein is not from the outset encapsulated in a 
punctual now; rather the now is “discharged” from and remains 
“embedded” in the primary interplay between the future and the having 
been.473 Heidegger ascribes a certain priority to the future within the 
unitary dynamics of primordial temporality: it is only by resolutely 
anticipating its own death as its ultimate possibility that it becomes 
possible for Dasein to come back to and choose its ownmost finite 
possibilities.  
       According to Heidegger, the traditional conception of time as now-
time that has dominated philosophy for so long is rooted in and has its 
phenomenal ground in inauthentic existence. In fleeing from the 
possibility of transparently choosing its own groundless and finite 
possibilities to be, Dasein adopts the collective interpretedness of the 
They and becomes submerged in coping with its surrounding world. 
Instead of understanding itself on the basis of the interplay between the 
future and the having-been, inauthentic Dasein turns to focusing on the 
present entities of the world within the contemporary collective horizon 
of understanding. As a result, the originary temporality of existence is 
covered up and the present is privileged as the basis for understanding the 
future and the past: whereas the future is conceived as a “then, when…” 
(dann, wann) – i.e. as a now which is still to come – the past is conceived as 
an “on that former occasion, when…” (damals, als) – i.e. as a now which 
has already passed. The traditional concept of time arises through a 
theoretical interpretation of Dasein’s inauthentic experience of time in 
terms of coming and past now-points, whereby time is in the end 
understood as a “sequence of nows which are constantly present-at-hand, 
simultaneously passing away and coming along.”474 It is, Heidegger claims, 
precisely this conception of time as now-time which since Aristotle 
determines the traditional understanding of being as presence.  
                                         
472 SZ, p. 326: “Zukünftig auf sich zurückkommend, bringt sich die Entschlossenheit 
gegenwärtig in die Situation. Die Gewesenheit entspringt der Zukunft, so zwar, daß 
die gewesene (besser gewesende) Zukunft die Gegenwart aus sich entläßt. Dies 
dergestalt als gewesend-gegenwärtigende Zukunft einheitliche Phänomen nennen wir 
die Zeitlichkeit.” 
473 SZ, pp. 326, 328. 
474  SZ, p. 422: “eine Folge von ständig ’vorhandenen’, zugleich vergehenden und 
ankommenden Jetzt.” 
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      Heidegger’s analysis of temporality allows him to articulate the 
difference between the traditional understanding of being – and 
phenomenality – and his own in terms of a critical transformation of the 
guiding concept of time. In contrast to the customary understanding of 
being as thematic presence in the now for an perceiving subject, 
Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world aims to show that the very 
possibility of thematically perceiving entities is conditioned by Dasein’s 
preceding understanding of the meaning-context of the world. Dasein’s 
understanding of the world transpires unthematically, and it is ultimately 
organized by its grasp of its own possibilities. Hence, the possibility of 
Dasein’s to experience beings as present in the now is essentially 
determined by its being projected towards its non-present future and 
having been – towards the possibility of its own death and towards the 
groundless historical heritage that it always already is.   
 
Reality and Truth 
 
We have now run through Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s constitution as 
temporal-historical being-in-the-world in Being and Time. Taken together, 
the structures thus explicated constitute the basic structure of 
phenomenality. Let us now attempt to summarize the results of 
Heidegger’s analysis and specify its systematic gist by looking at how it 
informs his conception of reality and truth.  
      The basic thrust of Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world is to 
ground the possibility of intuitively experiencing entities as meaningful 
phenomena in Dasein’s preceding understanding of the world. For us to 
be able to see and identify an entity as one thing or the other we first need 
to hold an understanding of the historical context of significance in which 
we live and which prescribes the possible as-whats on the basis of which 
particular entities can show up as significant unities of meaning. There is 
thus a strict hierarchy pertaining between Dasein’s understanding of the 
world and its experience of particular entities: our prior historical 
understanding of the world cannot be grounded in any experience of 
particular entities but determines the possible significances in terms of 
which such entities can show up as meaningful. Moreover, our preceding 
historical understanding of the world is also hierarchically ordered. 
Dasein’s grasp of the instrumental references of the world is determined 
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by its understanding of its own possibilities, conceived as the groundless 
and finite historical paradigms of valuable life – heroes - constituting the 
horizon of purposes of the world. Dasein’s understanding of its world and 
possibilities is in its turn guided by its basic historical understanding of 
being, that is, of the different modes of being and, ultimately, of the sense 
of being as such.     
      In his lecture course “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology”475 – 
delivered in the summer of 1927 and continuing the project of Being and 
Time – Heidegger introduces the “ontological difference” (ontologische 
Differenz)476 between being and beings as his name for the basic 
hierarchical structure of phenomenal understanding: “A being can be 
discovered, whether by way of perception or some other mode of access, 
only if the being of this being is already disclosed – only if I already 
understand it.”477 As Heidegger launches the ontological difference as his 
central philosopheme he is above all focusing on the difference between 
our experience of particular entities and our preceding understanding of 
historical meaning, whereas he tends to assimilate the different strata of 
that preceding understanding – the instrumental references of the world, 
the possibilities of Dasein, and the being of beings - and simply talk about 
understanding of being. The “ontological difference” thus for Heidegger 
names the basic hierarchical difference between our understanding of 
particular beings and our understanding of the quasi-conceptual relations 
of meaning and purpose determining as what particular beings can show 
up for us.478 
                                         
475 “Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie,” GA 24.  
476 GA 24, pp. 22, 102, 109, 454. 
477 GA 24, p. 102: “Seiendes kann nur entdeckt werden, sei es auf dem Wege der 
Wahrnehmung oder sonst einer Zugangsart, wenn das Sein des Seienden schon 
erschlossen ist, - wenn ich es verstehe.”  
478 The question of the sense of the “ontological difference” in Heidegger’s thinking is 
a complex one for many reasons – not least because from the mid 1920s to the end of 
the 1930s (and even to some extent beyond that) he is constantly elaborating and 
revising his conception of the structure of understanding and questioning to which 
this notion refers. What remains the same is his idea of a basic hierarchical difference 
between our understanding of particular beings and our understanding of historical 
meaning. What changes is Heidegger’s analysis of how the latter is built up and which 
questions and what kind of thinking it calls for. Here is a very schematic overview: 1. 
In Being and Time Heidegger distinguishes between the instrumental relations of the 
world and Dasein’s possibilities as its horizon of purposes. These, in turn, are said to 
be guided by an understanding of being – modes of being, the sense of being as such 
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      Toward the end of the first division of Being and Time – in §§ 43 and 44 
– Heidegger makes an attempt to spell out the consequences of his 
analysis for two of the central notions guiding traditional philosophy: 
reality and truth. Let us briefly examine his explications of these two key 
concepts one at a time.   
    
The question of reality. According to Heidegger, philosophy has from 
its very beginning understood reality as presence-at-hand: to be is to be a 
steadily present, experience- and context-independent object for a 
distanced theoretical gaze. Since Descartes, the question of the reality has 
taken the form of a question concerning the existence of the outer world: 
How is it possible for the inner acts of subjective consciousness to reach 
out and establish knowledge of outer reality? The standard strategies of 
modern philosophy to answer this question have been those of realism 
and idealism. Whereas realism attempts to prove that the world really 
exists by demonstrating some causal connection between our inner 
sensations and their outer causes, idealism maintains that “being and 
reality are only ‘in consciousness.’”479 According to Heidegger, however, 
                                                                                                                      
– which it is the task of fundamental ontology to investigate. Hereby Heidegger’s 
account of the mode of the investigation remains deeply ambivalent: on the one hand, 
he proclaims – in line with his analysis of the historical structure of phenomenality – 
that thinking must proceed as a destructive retrieval of historical being-senses; on the 
other hand, his existential analytic basically unfolds as an attempt to clarify the sense 
and modes of being through a reflective phenomenological investigation of the 
universal structures of Dasein. 2. In the years 1928-1933, following the publication of 
Being and Time, Heidegger stops discriminating between the instrumental purposes of 
the world, the possibilities of Dasein, and the modes of being, instead calling our 
understanding of this whole complex of meaning our “understanding of being,” and 
calling the totality of such being the “world.” Hereby – as long as he holds on to the 
project of fundamental ontology – he distinguishes between our understanding of 
being in the first sense – that is, the historical networks of meaning determining as 
what beings can show up –  and our understanding of the sense of being, that is, the 
basic structure of Dasein which is investigated by fundamental ontology. 3. From the 
mid 1930s onwards Heidegger continues to think of the ontological difference as a 
difference between our knowledge of beings and our understanding of being as the 
historical contexts of meaning determining beings. However, the so called “turn” his 
thinking undergoes in these years implies a change in his central question, which from 
now on concerns not the “sense” of being but the “truth” or “openness” of being. 
This means that he gives up his former effort to find the sense of being in the 
structures of Dasein, and instead embarks on a historical questioning of the basic 
event or happening which opens up and sustains historical being, historical worlds.  
479 SZ, p. 207: “Sein und Realität sei nur ‘im Bewußtsein’.” 
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the very effort to prove how the subject can achieve knowledge of the 
outside world is essentially confused and misguided: “The ‘scandal of 
philosophy’ is not that this proof hat yet to be given, but that such proofs are 
expected and attempted again and again.”480 The traditional epistemological 
question, he claims, is founded on the ontological notion of a primarily 
self-contained subject that needs to transcend its closed inner sphere and 
make contact with outer reality – a notion that totally overlooks Dasein’s 
fundamental openness to the world. Nevertheless, Heidegger holds that 
idealism has a basic superiority over realism while, as he argues, the basic 
idea of idealism, namely that being resides in consciousness, expresses an 
implicit understanding that “being cannot be explained through beings.”481 
According to Heidegger, however, all traditional versions of idealism have 
squandered this latent insight by their effort to ground being in 
subjectivity.  
      To understand how Heidegger’s own conception grows forth as an 
elaboration of the dormant insight of idealism means to understand how 
being determines beings and in what sense being is connected to Dasein 
itself.  Heidegger articulates the essential relations in the following dense 
passage:  
 
The fact that reality is ontologically grounded in the being of 
Dasein cannot mean that something real can only be what it is in 
itself when and as long as Dasein exists. Of course only as long as 
Dasein is – that is, only as long as an understanding of being is 
ontically possible – does “it give” being (gibt es sein). When Dasein 
does not exist, “independence” “is” not either, nor “is” the “in-
itself.” In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood 
nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world 
can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be 
said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But now, as 
long as there is an understanding of being and therefore an 
understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that in this 
case entities will continue to be. [...] Only if the understanding of 
being is, do beings as beings become accessible; only if there are 
                                         
480 SZ, p. 205: “Der ‘Skandal der Philosophie’ besteht nicht darin, daß dieser Beweis 
noch aussteht, sondern darin, daß solche Beweise immer wieder erwartet und versucht werden.” 
481 SZ, p. 207: “Sein nicht durch Seiendes erklärt werden kann.” 
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beings of Dasein’s kind of being is the understanding of being 
possible as a being.482 
 
Let us take hold of the three main points of Heidegger’s argument:  
      1. Although the being of beings is grounded in Dasein, this does not 
mean that particular real beings “can only be” what they are in themselves 
“when and as long as Dasein exists.” That is to say, even provided that the 
human race would become extinct this would not imply that the particular 
entities populating the universe would vanish or that their material traits 
would change.  
      2. Then again, “beings as beings” are only “accessible” as long as there 
is “understanding of being.” Hence, particular beings can only show up as 
meaningful phenomena on the basis of Dasein’s prior understanding of 
world and being, in such a way that this understanding is not grounded in 
any knowledge of beings but rather determines in advance the possible 
significances that individual beings can take on. The upshot of the second 
point is that it reduces the first point to a statement of a minimal empirical 
realism: even though the material subsistence and setup of individual 
entities is independent of Dasein’s understanding, these entities receive 
their whole unity and significance from Dasein’s prior understanding of 
being, so that all their material traits gain their possible relevance on the 
basis of this understanding.  
      3. The third point concerns the relationship between Dasein and 
being: “only as long as Dasein is – that is, only as long as an understanding 
of being is ontically possible – does ‘it give’ being (‘gibt es’ Sein).” How 
should this be understood? As concerns the dependence of being on Dasein, 
Heidegger states that being is given only to the extent that Dasein exists. 
                                         
482 SZ, p. 211f.: “Daß Realität ontologisch im Sein des Dasein gründet, kann nicht 
bedeuten, daß Reales nur sein könnte als das, was es an ihm selbst ist, wenn und 
solange Dasein existiert. Allerdings nur solange Dasein ist, das heißt die ontische 
Möglichkeit von Seinsverständnis, ‘gibt es’ Sein. Wenn Dasein nicht existiert, dann ‘ist’ 
auch nicht ‘Unabhängigkeit’ und ‘ist’ auch nicht ‘An-sich’. Dergleichen ist dann weder 
verstehbar noch unverstehbar. Dann ist auch innerweltliches Seiendes weder 
entdeckbar, noch kann es in Verborgenheit liegen. Dann kann weder gesagt werden, 
daß Seiendes sei, noch daß es nicht sei. Es kann jetzt wohl, solange Seinsverständnis ist 
und damit Verständnis von Vorhandenheit, gesagt werden, daß dann Seiendes noch 
weiterhin sein wird. […] [N]ur wenn Seinsverständnis ist, wird Seiendes als Seiendes 
zugänglich; nur wenn Seiendes ist von der Seinsart des Daseins, ist Seinsverständnis 
als Seiendes möglich.” 
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Taken out of context, this statement could be interpreted as making the 
trivial point that in order for being to be understandable there must be a 
human being possessing the ontological optics required for catching sight 
of being. The relation between Dasein’s understanding and being could, 
then, easily be taken to resemble the relation between the human capacity 
for perception and the visible world: our understanding would give access 
to being as a Dasein-independent dimension of meaning existing on its 
own regardless of whether we understand it or not. In fact, however, 
Heidegger’s argument indicates a much stronger and more intimate 
dependence of being on Dasein: since being determines what beings can 
be, and does not exist as a sphere of ideal objects, it has to be something 
that Dasein, in some sense, brings with itself to beings. At the same time, 
however, Heidegger again and again stresses that being is independent of 
Dasein and is not a product of the human subject. To grasp the double 
relation of dependence and independence pertaining between being and 
Dasein, we need to pay close attention to Heidegger’s exact wording and 
read it against the backdrop of his basic account of the structure of 
phenomenal understanding. When Heidegger writes that it is only as long 
as Dasein exists that “es gibt Sein” – i.e., that “it gives being” or “being is 
given” – this should be taken literally: being is thus nothing that Dasein 
produces, but, as soon as Dasein exists, being is given to Dasein as the 
groundless dimension of historical meaning into which Dasein has always 
already been thrown and which determines the possibilities of 
experiencing beings as meaningful phenomena.   
      In short: Dasein from the outset lives in a historical understanding of 
world and being which always already gives itself as its groundless heritage 
on the basis of which particular beings can show up as meaningful 
phenomena. This does not mean that Dasein’s understanding of being 
would create or uphold the material traits of beings, which persist and are 
what they are regardless of our understanding. What it does mean, 
however, is that our historical understanding of world and being 
determines the possible significances that particular beings can have for 
us: when we experience an entity as something we experience it as an 
instantiation of a moment in a pre-understood context of meaning, so that 
the context of meaning prescribes the possible significance of the entity;483 
                                         
483 SZ, p. 83. 
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conversely, the empirical traits of the entity can only confirm or not-
confirm the pre-understood meaning but not change or add anything to its 
core content. According to Heidegger, our primary experience meaning is 
thus not established on the basis of a more basic level of sense-
perceptions of material objects: it does not have the character of our 
interpretation of these objects but rather prescribes what can show up as 
objects in the first place. Hence, what we experience as meaningful 
phenomena on the basis of our historical understanding of world and 
being is nothing but the beings in themselves – the beings in the sense 
they have for us, behind which there is nothing at all. 
  
The question of truth. According to Heidegger, the traditional 
conception of truth dominating the history of philosophy can be 
condensed in the formula: adaequatio intellectus et rei. That is to say, truth is 
conceived in terms of the agreement or correspondence of our 
propositions with the objects that they are about.  
      The point of Heidegger’s discussion of truth in §44 of Being and Time is 
not simply to dismiss the traditional conception of truth; it is rather to 
show how truth as agreement or correspondence is possible only on the 
basis of Dasein’s constitution as being-in-the-world and, in so doing, 
clarify and delimit the sense of this conception. As long as we remain 
within the framework of the traditional notion of truth, Heidegger claims, 
it is impossible to account for the sense and possibility of truth. Given 
that truth is understood as a relation of agreement between two kinds of 
presence-at-hand object – the proposition and its object – it remains 
totally unclear how the agreement between these objects should be 
understood.484 
      In order to clarify the possibility of truth as agreement, Heidegger 
begins by phenomenologically explicating what happens when our 
knowing demonstrates itself as true. His example is the following. 
Someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true assertion “the 
picture on the wall is hanging askew.”485 The assertion demonstrates itself 
as true when the person in question turns around and perceives the 
picture hanging askew on the wall. What happens here? To begin with, 
Heidegger claims, it is essential to note that in making such an assertion 
                                         
484 Cf. SZ, pp. 214ff. 
485 SZ, p. 217: “Das Bild an der Wand hängt schief.” 
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we are not primarily directed towards the content of the assertion or 
towards some inner representation of the picture, but towards the picture 
itself as being so and so. What then happens as we face the picture is that 
we see that the picture shows up precisely in the way that our assertion 
presented it – as hanging askew. In this, the assertion demonstrates itself 
as true, that is, as “being-uncovering”: “To say that an assertion is true 
signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion 
asserts, exhibits, ‘lets’ the entity ‘be seen’ (apophansis) in its uncoveredness. 
The being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as being-
uncovering.”486  
      So far, Heidegger has basically recapitulated in his own words 
Husserl’s account of truth in terms of the interplay between signifying and 
intuitively fulfilling intentional acts: first, it belongs to our intentional 
experiences that we are directed at the matters themselves; second, an 
intention is proved true when the matter intended is intuitively self-given 
in the way we intended it. Significantly, however, Heidegger goes on to 
claim that “the uncoveredness of beings within the world is grounded in the 
disclosedness of the world.”487 That is, it is only on the basis of its prior 
disclosure of its world that Dasein can intend and apprehend particular 
beings as this or that, and, hence, make true or false statements about 
them. As a result, Heidegger names the “disclosedness of Dasein” – 
conceived as the condition of truth of all ontic statements about beings – 
the “most primordial phenomenon of truth.”488 However, Heidegger’s 
grounding of the possibility of true statements in Dasein’s prior 
understanding of the world raises the crucial question how to understand 
the possible truth or untruth of Dasein’s primary world-disclosure? This 
question will, as we shall see, prove a hard one for Heidegger to answer.  
      The viability of Heidegger’s conception of truth has been the subject 
of fierce debate ever since Ernst Tugendhat delivered his classical critique 
                                         
486 SZ, p. 218: “Die Aussage ist wahr, bedeutet: sie entdeckt das Seiende an ihm selbst. 
Sie sagt aus, sie zeigt auf, sie ‘läßt sehen’ (ἀπόφανσις) das Seiende in seiner 
Entdecktheit. Wahrsein (Wahrheit) der Aussage muß verstanden werden als entdeckend-
sein.” 
487 SZ, p. 220: “Die Entdecktheit des innerweltlichen Seienden gründet in der 
Erschlossenheit der Welt.” 
488 SZ, p. 220: “das ursprünglichste Phänomen der Wahrheit.”  
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of this conception in the 1960s.489 The critique was first articulated in a 
lecture entitled “Heidegger’s Idea of truth” (Heideggers Idee von Wahrheit), 
which Tugendhat gave in February 1964 at the University of Heidelberg, 
and it was later elaborated at length in his book The Concept of Truth in 
Husserl and Heidegger (Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger).   
      Let me briefly recount Tugendhat’s central argument. 
      As Tugendhat sees it, the philosophical novelty and potential of 
Heidegger’s thinking in relation to Husserl primarily lies in its effort to 
interrogate the disclosedness of Dasein – its openness for its historical 
world – as the dimension which conditions the possibility of encountering 
beings as this or that, and, also, the possibility of our assertions about 
beings demonstrating themselves as true or false.490 However, Tugendhat 
claims that “Heidegger’s equation of ‘truth’ and ‘disclosedness’ 
(unconcealment) is untenable and even leads to obfuscating the problem 
of truth.”491 According to Tugendhat, Heidegger’s analysis of truth 
unfolds in two basic steps.  
      1. Heidegger, Tugendhat notes, takes his starting point in an analysis 
of propositional truth with the aim of elucidating its ontological 
conditions. Heidegger’s explication of propositional truth as “being-
                                         
489 Tugendhat’s critique has been the subject of controversy up to this day. Among 
Heidegger-scholars, there has from the beginning been a dominating tendency to 
dismiss Tugendhat’s critique. For some examples of this reaction, see, e.g., Gethmann 
1989; Pöggeler 1989; Richter 1989; Wrathall 1999; Dahlstrom 2001; Carman 2003. By 
contrast, some critics have hailed Tugendhat’s critique as pointing to an essential 
problem in Heidegger’s thought. Cf., e.g., Habermas 1985 and Apel 1973. Recently, 
Critina Lafont has taken up and offered a substantial elaboration of Tugendhat’s 
critique in her book Heidegger, Language, and World-disclosure from 2000, a book which I 
will deal with in more detail in the epilogue of this thesis. For a helpful overview of 
the latest developments in the discussion of Tugendhat and Heidegger, see Smith 
2007. As will become evident, I believe that Tugendhat’s critique, nothwithstanding 
some problems and unclarities in his articulation, is basically on target. Hence, I also 
think that the standard dismissals of Tugendhat listed above turn a blind eye and are 
unable to respond to the central thrust of his critique, namely that Heidegger without 
justification cancels out the possibility of questioning the truth or untruth of our 
historical meaning-horizons, and instead sanctions a dogmatic acceptance of these 
horizons as a groundless destiny. For an acute critical diagnosis of the standard way of 
dismissing Tugendhat, cf. Lafont 2000, pp. 115-118. 
490 Cf. Tugendhat 1970, pp. 259-271;Tugendhat 1984, pp. 286f.  
491 Tugendhat 1970, p. 260: “Es wird sich zeigen, daß Heideggers Gleichsetzung von 
‘Wahrheit’ und ‘Erschlossenheit’ (Unverborgenheit) nicht haltbar ist und sogar dazu 
führt, das Wahrheitsproblem zu verdecken.”  
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uncovering” first seems to unfold as a faithful repetition of Husserl’s 
conception of truth, according to which a proposition is true if it intends 
the matter precisely as the matter itself is and shows up, and false if it 
intends the matter in a way that does not comply with how the matter 
itself is. In this spirit, Heidegger writes: “To say that an assertion is true 
signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself.”492 However, as 
Tugendhat points out, Heidegger also uses formulations where the “in 
itself” is left out, so that the truth of propositions is said to consist simply 
in their being “uncovering”: “The being-true (truth) of the assertion must be 
understood as being-uncovering.”493 Only with this crucial reformulation of 
the notion of truth, Tugendhat claims, “does Heidegger explicitly distance 
himself from Husserl and reach his own conception of truth which, from 
now on, he upholds in this formulation alone.”494  
      Heidegger, Tugendhat goes on, uses the word “uncover” in an 
ambiguous way. On the one hand, he uses it in a broad sense to signify 
“showing up” or “exhibiting” in general. “In this sense,” Tugendhat 
writes, “every assertion uncovers, the false just as well as the true.”495 On 
the other hand, Heidegger uses “uncover” in a narrow sense, according to 
which only true assertions are “uncovering” while false assertions merely 
“cover up.” The problem is that Heidegger “does not explicitly 
distinguish” between the two senses of “uncover.”496 While it is only the 
narrow sense that preserves the possibility of accounting for the truth of 
propositions, Tugendhat claims that Heidegger primarily exploits the 
broad sense in his further analyses. This allows Heidegger to describe both 
true and false assertions as “uncovering”: “Heidegger now says that, in the 
false assertion, the entity is ‘in a certain sense already uncovered and still 
not represented.”497 However, Tugendhat claims, Heidegger’s definition of 
truth as uncovering in the broad sense is unjustified and implies that he 
                                         
492 SZ, p. 218: “Die Aussage ist wahr, bedeutet: sie entdeckt das Seiende an ihm selbst.” 
493 SZ, p. 218: “Wahrsein (Wahrheit) der Aussage muß verstanden werden als entdeckend-
sein.” 
494 Tugendhat 1984, p. 289: “Erst mit dieser Wendung hat Heidegger sich deutlich von 
Husserl abgesetzt und seinen eigenen Wahrheitsbegriff gewonnen, den er fortan nur in 
dieser Formulierung festhält.” 
495 Tugendhat 1984, p. 290: “In diesem Sinne ist jede Aussage entdeckend, die falsche 
so gut wie die wahre.” 
496 Tugendhat 1984, p. 291: “nicht ausdrücklich unterscheidet.” 
497 Tugendhat 1984, p. 291: “Statt dessen sagt nun Heidegger, in der falschen Aussage 
sei das Seiende ‘in gewisser Weise schon entdeckt und doch noch verstellt’.” 
 The Basic Structure of Phenomenality 231 
 
 
loses the capacity to distinguish between the truth and falsity of assertions. 
In Husserl, the truth or falsity of a proposition essentially depended on 
how it uncovers the matter in question. Hence, a proposition is true if it 
uncovers the matter as it itself is, and false if it uncovers it as something 
that it itself is not. As Heidegger’s defines truth as “being-uncovering” he 
cannot account for difference between truth and untruth anymore, since 
the fact that a proposition is uncovering in the broad sense is quite 
compatible with its being false, namely in so far as it uncovers the matter 
in a way that does not correspond with how the matter itself is. “It is,” 
Tugendhat writes, “simply not possible to get around the supplement ‘as it 
is itself’ in the course of characterizing the true assertion.”498  
      According to Tugendhat, this first step of Heidegger’s argument is 
decisive. Having defined truth as “uncovering” it is no problem to extend 
the notion of truth to include all Dasein’s comportments towards beings 
as well as its basic understanding of the world. Once it has been conceded 
that the truth of an assertion lies in its being-uncovering “everything else 
follows almost deductively.”499  
      2. Tugendhat then turns to examining how Heidegger extends his 
concept of truth, applying it not only to theoretical propositions about 
present-at-hand entities but also to Dasein’s circumspective concern with 
ready-to-hand tools. Given Heidegger’s basic thesis that Dasein’s 
possibility of relating itself to particular beings is grounded in Dasein’s 
disclosure – its openness to its historical world – Heideggers calls Dasein’s 
disclosure “the most primordial phenomenon of truth.”500 Now, 
according to Tugendhat, Heidegger’s notion of the primacy of Dasein’s 
disclosive understanding of world and being gives rise to the central 
question concerning in what way – if any – we can speak about the truth 
or untruth of this primary understanding itself. However, he argues, by 
defining the disclosedness of the world as primordial “truth,” Heidegger 
covers up and dodges precisely this question:  
 
                                         
498 Tugendhat 1984, p. 291: “Um den Zusatz ‘so wie es selbst ist’ ist also bei der 
Charakteristik des wahren Aussagens nicht herumzukommen.” Cf. Tugendhat 1970, p. 
334. 
499 Tugendhat 1984, p. 287: “Ist das einmal zugestanden, so ergibt sich alles weitere 
dann fast deduktiv.” Cf. also Tugendhat 1970, p. 350. 
500 SZ, p. 220: “das ursprünglichste Phänomen der Wahrheit.”  
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If, namely, every propositional truth about intraworldly beings is 
relative to the historical horizons of our understanding, then the 
entire truth problem is now concentrated upon these horizons, and 
the decisive question would have to be: In what way can one also 
ask about the truth of these horizons, or is it rather the case that 
the question of truth can no longer be applied to the horizons 
themselves? For Heidegger, this question becomes invalid through 
the fact that he already gives the name of truth to the respective 
understanding as a disclosedness in and for itself. Thus, on the one 
hand, this makes it possible for us to still talk of truth in connection 
with understanding and its horizons. On the other hand, it is 
realized that we do not need to ask about the truth of these 
horizons, since that would only mean asking about the truth of a 
truth.501 
 
Heidegger’s equation of disclosedness and truth, Tugendhat claims, not 
only covers up the question of the truth of our historical horizons. By 
calling Dasein’s disclosedness “primordial truth” Heidegger in the end also 
sanctions the dogmatic acceptance of our factical historical horizons in 
their arbitrariness and relativity, thereby renouncing the crucial task of 
critically interrogating these horizons.502 Tugendhat then goes on to argue 
that the problem of Heidegger’s account of truth is solidified and 
aggravated in his later writings, where the clearing of historical being is 
conceived as the primary ungroundable event of truth, which conditions 
the possibility of all ontic truth and untruth. 
      What should we make of this severe critique?    
      As I will argue, I believe Tugendhat is right in what I conceive of as 
the central charge of his critique, namely that Heidegger unjustifiably 
cancels out the possibility of interrogating the truth of our historical 
                                         
501 Tugendhat 1984, p. 295: “wenn nämlich jede Aussagewahrheit über innerweltlich 
Seiendes relativ ist auf die geschichtlichen Horizonten unseres Verstehens, dann 
konzentriert sich jetzt das ganze Wahrheitsproblem auf diese Horizonte, und die 
entscheidende Frage müßte doch nun sein: in welcher Weise kann man auch nach der 
Wahrheit dieser Horizonte fragen, oder aber läßt sich die Wahrheitsfrage auf die 
Horizonte selbst nicht mer anwenden? Diese Frage wird für Heidegger dadurch 
hinfällig, daß er das jeweilige Verstehen als Erschlossenheit schon an und für sich eine 
Wahrheit nennt; so wird einerseits erreicht, daß wir auch beim Verstehen und seinen 
Horizonten noch von Wahrheit sprechen können, andererseits daß wir dessen 
unbedürftig werden, nach der Wahrheit dieser Horizonte zu fragen, denn das hieße ja, 
nach der Wahrheit einer Wahrheit fragen.” 
502 Cf. Tugendhat 1984, pp. 296f. 
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meaning-horizons, and that this leads him to dogmatically postulate our 
historical world as a groundless destiny. Still, it seems to me that 
Tugendhat’s conception of the first step of Heidegger’s analysis and his 
way of articulating the second, central step involve some misconceptions. 
      To begin with, I think it is clear that Heidegger in his basic 
argumentation unequivocally accepts the traditional view that the truth of 
our assertions about beings consists in their agreement or correspondence 
with the beings in question.503 As the example of the assertion about the 
picture on the wall showed, it is quite possible for Heidegger to distinguish 
between true and untrue assertions: whereas the former present the 
entities as something that they themselves are, the latters present them as 
something that they are not. However, what he claims is that it is precisely 
Dasein’s prior understanding of the world that makes both truth and 
falsity possible: it is only in so far as we already possess a pre-
understanding of the meanings in terms of which beings can show up as 
what they are that we can take a being as something that is or mistake it 
for something that it is not.504 Since Heidegger’s systematic argument is 
                                         
503 On this point I agree with Wrathall 1999 and Carman 2003 who both argue – 
against Tugendhat – that Heidegger does not replace the traditional concept of 
propositional truth as correspondence, but rather offers an account of the ontological 
conditions of such correspondence. However, it seems to me that neither of them is 
able to offer a persuasive response to Tugendhat’s central charge that Heidegger 
unjustifiably forfeits the question of the truth/ untruth of Dasein’s primary world-
disclosure. Whereas Wrathall does not recognize the challenge but is satisfied with 
pointing to Dasein’s disclosedness as the condition of propositional truth, Carman 
attempts to articulate the normativity of Dasein’s world-disclosure in terms of what he 
calls “hermeneutic salience,” i.e., “the way in which what we say and think is always 
organized and articulated according to some dominant interpretation of things that 
holds sway in our local discursive community” (Carman 2003, p. 261). However, in so 
writing it seems to me that Carman simply restates Heidegger’s idea that the 
normativity of our open world consists in its factical subsistance as our historical 
context and destiny, and that the truth or untruth of this understanding cannot be 
conceived in terms of a transhistorical relation to the matters themselves. It is 
precisely this idea that Tugendhat – quite rightly – objects to.  
504 This point is accentuated in Heidegger’s lecture course “Logic: The Question of 
Truth” (Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit), delivered in the winter term 1925-26, where 
he develops his analysis of the as-structure of understanding precisely in order to 
account for the possibility of falsity as well as truth: “What makes logos able to be false, 
i.e., able to cover-over at all? The indirect outcome of our explanation so far is that 
logos is not through-and-through true, i.e., uncovering. Rather, it uncovers only in so 
far as it can also cover-over. In a somewhat exaggerated formulation: The statement 
can be true (can uncover) at all, only because it can also cover-over – only because, as 
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perfectly clear on this point is, Tugendhat’s critique of the ambiguity of 
Heidegger’s idea of truth as “being-uncovering” gives us no reason to 
doubt Heidegger’s acceptance of the correspondence theory of truth as 
concerns ontic propositions. In fact, as we shall see, the ambiguity that 
Tugendhat detects stems from another source. 
      This also implies that Heidegger’s rejection of the question of the 
truth of Dasein’s disclosure of the world is not, as Tugendhat claims, the 
result of Heidegger’s supposedly ambiguous definition of propositional 
truth as “being-uncovering,” which would have concealed the decisive 
problematic of truth in advance. Rather, Heidegger’s cancelling out of the 
question of the truth of Dasein’s disclosure stems directly and deliberately 
from his central argument: since Dasein’s prior understanding of its 
historical world determines what it can experience as meaningful beings it 
is no longer possible to conceive of the truth of this understanding in 
terms of a correspondence with beings. Moreover, Heidegger does not call 
Dasein’s disclosure “primordial truth” as a result of a transposition of his 
prior ambiguous notion of truth as “being-uncovering” to Dasein’s 
disclosure. Instead, I think it is much more plausible to assume that 
Heidegger is tempted to call Dasein’s disclosure “truth” precisely to 
accentuate its immunity to the question of truth: it is the primordial truth 
which conditions all ontic truth and untruth.505  
                                                                                                                      
a statement, it operates a priori in the ‘as’” (Was macht es, daß der λόγος falsch sein kann, 
d.h. überhaupt verdecken kann? Aus dem bisher Erörterten geht indirekt hervor: Der λόγος ist 
nicht von Hause aus wahr, d.h. entdeckend, sondern er kann entdecken als etwas, das auch verdecken 
kann. Extrem gormuliert: Die Aussage kann nur überhaupt wahr sein, entdecken, weil sie auch 
verdecken kann, d.h. weil sie qua Aussage a priori im ‘als‘ sich bewegt) (GA 21, p. 135). 
505 Later, in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” (Das Ende der 
Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens) from 1964 Heidegger retracts from his equation 
of “truth” with the “unconcealment” or “clearing” of being. Here he writes: “Insofar 
as truth is understood in the traditional ‘natural’ sense as the correspondence of 
knowledge with beings, demonstrated in beings; but also insofar as truth is interpreted 
as the certainty of the knowledge of being; alētheia, unconcealment in the sense of the 
clearing, may not be equated with truth. Rather, alētheia, unconcealment thought as 
clearing, first grants the possibility of truth. For truth itself, like being and thinking, 
can be what it is only in the element of the clearing. […] Alētheia, unconcealment 
thought as the clearing of presence, is not yet truth” (Sofern man Wahrheit im überlieferten 
‘natürlichen’ Sinn als die am Seienden ausgewiesene Übereinstimmung der Erkenntnis mit dem 
Seienden versteht, aber auch, sofern die Wahrheit als die Gewißheit des Wissens vom Sein ausgelegt 
wird, darf die Ἀλήϑεια, die Unverborgenheit im Sinne der Lichtung, nicht mit der Wahrheit 
gleichgesezt werden. Vielmehr gewährt die Ἀλήϑεια, die Unverborgenheit als Lichtung gedacht, erst 
die Möglichkeit von Wahrheit. Denn die Wahrheit kann selbst ebenso wie Sein und Denken nur im 
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      Against the backdrop of these reflections we can also see that the 
ambivalence in Heidegger’s articulation of truth as “being-uncovering” is 
not really an ambivalence in his notion of propositional truth. What 
Tugendhat interprets as an ambiguity is, I think, better seen as a certain 
unclarity in Heidegger’s way of referring to the different levels – 
ontological/ontical – interacting in every truth-relation to beings. 
According to Heidegger, whether our beliefs or assertions about beings 
are true or false they are always already guided by an understanding which 
presents the possible meanings in terms of which entities can show up, 
and which makes true or false assertions possible. This is why Heidegger 
can say – in a somewhat unclear manner – that even our false propositions 
about beings are always in a certain sense uncovering although they 
misrepresent the particular beings in question.  
      All that said, I agree completely with Tugendhat’s main thesis that 
Heidegger cancels out the possibility of asking about the truth or untruth 
of the historical meaning-horizons into which we are always already 
thrown. Tugendhat’s diagnosis ends with the thesis that Heidegger 
erroneously excludes the question of the truth of our historical world and 
advocates an affirmation of our factical world as a groundless destiny. 
However, although this thesis does contain a lot of truth, it seems to me 
that Tugendhat does not recognize the extent to which the question of the 
“truth” or “bindingness” of historical being remains a decisive 
philosophical problem for Heidegger. Although Heidegger cancels out the 
possibility of conceiving of the truth or untruth of our historical world in 
terms of a correspondence with how the entities themselves are, he 
nevertheless continuous to uphold a difference between the prejudiced 
understanding of being in which we first and foremost live, and the 
possibility of attaining a primordial understanding of being through a 
destructive appropriation of the originary meanings harbored by the origin 
                                                                                                                      
Element der Lichtung das sein, was sie ist. […] Ἀλήϑεια, Unverborgenheit als Lichtung von 
Anwesenheit gedacht, ist noch nicht Wahrheit) (GA 14, pp. 85f.). However, Heidegger’s late 
retraction from his earlier equation of “truth” with Dasein’s “disclosedness” or with 
the “unconcealment” of being, which he now considers misleading, does not imply 
any radical transformation of the substance of his thinking on this point. Indeed, 
Heidegger continues to conceive of the clearing/unconcealment of being – which 
cannot itself be true or false – as the condition of possibility of all ontic truth in the 
sense of correspondence. Cf. Dahlstrom 2007, pp. 72f.; cf. also Lafont 2000, pp. 
116n9, 169-175. 
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of our history. In so doing, he cannot sidestep the question of how to 
distinguish between a prejudiced and a primordial understanding of 
historical being. In what follows, I will try to show how Heidegger’s 
difficulties with addressing this question in Being and Time undercuts both 
his program of historical destruction and his account of authentic 
existence, and gives rise to deep ambiguities in the project of fundamental 
ontology. I will also argue that his later thinking is to a very large extent an 
attempt to address precisely the question of how historical being can be 
given as an ultimate binding destiny beyond our mere prejudices.   
   
2.5 Heidegger’s Method  
 
The question of Heidegger’s method in Being and Time is at bottom the 
question of the fate of phenomenology during this central period of his 
thinking. It is a complex question involving many different aspects: How 
should we understand Heidegger explicit appropriation of phenomenology 
as the method of Being and Time? What about his reinterpretation of 
phenomenology as historical interpretation and destruction? Does his 
program for a historical thinking imply a total break with Husserl’s 
method of intuitive reflection and description? What is the relation 
between Heidegger’s methodological self-understanding and the concrete 
manner in which he pursues his investigations? 
      The aim of this chapter is to unfold and answer these questions. After 
a review of the long-standing debate over the issue of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology in the secondary literature, I will begin my treatment by 
looking at Heidegger’s explicit articulation of his method in the 
introduction to Being and Time. I then go on to explicate what I take to be 
the basic ambiguity between, on the one hand, Heidegger’s program of a 
radically historical thinking and, on the other hand, his de facto 
employment of a phenomenological method of intuitive reflection in his 
concrete investigations. Hereby, I trace the roots of this ambiguity to 
Heidegger’s inability to account for the givenness of originary or true 
historical meanings as something distinct from the prejudices handed 
down by the tradition.  
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Two Interpretations 
 
Since the beginning of Heidegger-research, the question of the method of 
Being and Time has constituted the central stage where the discussion about 
Heidegger’s relation to phenomenology has been played out. The 
discussion has for a long time been characterized by a basic tension 
between two opposed tendencies of interpretations – both of which we 
are by now familiar with. On the one hand, we have the transcendental-
phenomenological interpretation, which holds that Heidegger’s methodological 
approach in the Marburg years and in Being and Time is at bottom a faithful 
continuation of Husserl’s phenomenological method, so that the 
existential analytic basically transpires as an intuitive reflection which 
describes and explicates the essential – universal and necessary – 
structures of Dasein’s experience. On the other hand, we have the 
hermeneutic-deconstructive interpretation, the central claim of which is that 
Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology implies a break with the 
Husserlian belief in intuitive access to the essential structures of 
experience. Instead – such is the thesis – Heidegger develops a radically 
historical mode of thinking, which proceeds through a hermeneutical 
explication of the historical pre-understanding always already guiding our 
experience, and through a destruction of the prejudiced tradition, which 
allows us to access its historical sources and origins. In this, the structures 
and meanings exposed by the hermeneutic-deconstructive approach will 
always be historically situated and finite in character.  
      In what follows, I am going to develop my own explication on the 
backdrop of the above interpretations. Not only do they dominate the 
debate about Heidegger’s phenomenology. They are also – regardless of 
our final assessment of their relative merits – qualified in the sense that 
they answer to and articulate the two basic impulses informing and 
shaping Heidegger’s understanding of his philosophical method. Of 
course, there are also other interpretations available, depicting Heidegger 
argumentative strategy in terms of, e.g., Kantian transcendental 
arguments506 or pragmatist interventions.507 Still, such interpretations 
generally tend to pass over or misinterpret both Heidegger’s 
                                         
506 Cf., e.g., Okrent 1988, pp. 4-9, 242-253; Philipse 1998, pp. 121-144. 
507 Cf., e.g., Rorty 1991, pp. 9-84.  
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methodological self-understanding as well as his concrete way of doing 
philosophy in Being and Time.  
      I will present two representative examples of the opposing 
interpretational tendencies named above. As a qualified example of the 
transcendental-phenomenological reading, I choose Søren Overgaard’s 
recent study Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World which offers a careful 
examination of Heidegger method in Being and Time.508 As a good example 
of the hermeneutic-deconstructive interpretation, I present Charles 
Guignon’s clear and thorough account – more hermeneutic than 
deconstructive – of Heidegger’s method in his book Heidegger and the 
Problem of Knowledge.509 
 
Søren Overgaard’s basic thesis is that “Heidegger (at least the Heidegger 
of SZ) is a transcendental phenomenologist.”510  
      According to Overgaard, the guiding concern of Husserl’s 
phenomenology is not epistemological – to prove that our subjective acts 
of consciousness can reach outer reality – but ontological:  to understand 
the being of the world through investigating how it manifests itself in our 
concrete experiences. Such an investigation becomes possible via the epoché 
and the phenomenological reduction. Overgaard argues that the function of 
Husserl’s epoché is to “lock up” or “bracket”511 – not exclude or ignore – 
our natural unquestioning belief in the existence of the world in order to 
thematize how the world is given in our experience.512 Whereas the epoché 
opens up the possibility of studying the world as noema – as it is 
experienced – the reduction means enquiring back into the structures of 
transcendental subjectivity as the place where the world manifests itself. 
The reduction, Overgaard maintains, does not take the form of a direct 
reflection on the experiences in which the world is given but rather 
proceeds by way of an indirect regressive argumentation, which, taking the 
bracketed object as its “transcendental guiding clue” asks “what […] 
                                         
508 For other representatives of the transcendental phenomenological reading, cf., e.g., 
Gethmann 1974; Crowell 2001; Dahlstrom 2001.  
509 For other texts defending the hermeneutic-deconstructive reading, cf., e.g., Sallis 
1978; Bernasconi 1989; Figal 1992; Ruin 1994; Lafont 2000. 
510 Overgaard 2004, p. 108; cf. also p. 5. 
511 Overgaard 2004, p. 43. 
512 Cf. Overgaard 2004, p. 56. 
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subjectivity must, so to speak, ‘look like’ in order to be the experiencing subjectivity of 
such an object.”513 
      Overgaard goes on to argue that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology 
rests firmly on Husserl’s phenomenological method. Heidegger’s question 
of being involves two parts: first, the question concerning being – the 
different modes of being as well as the unitary sense of being – of all 
beings; second, the question concerning the nature of our understanding 
of being. As concerns the first question, Overgaard argues that Heidegger 
essentially makes use of Husserl’s epoché to gain access to the modes of 
being. It is only by locking up our natural understanding of beings as 
present-at-hand objects that it becomes possible to thematize beings such 
as they manifest themselves in our experience. And, to intuitively explicate 
the modes of “manifestations of beings” of different entities is, for 
Heidegger, precisely to explicate their “modes of being.”514 As to the 
second question, Overgaard maintains that Heidegger investigates the 
conditions for understanding being “in and through a phenomenological 
                                         
513 Overgaard 2004, p. 52. Here I want to note that I find Overgaard’s account of the 
phenomenological reduction as a form of regressive argumentation – not as a direct 
reflection on our experiences – problematic, both exegetically and philosophically. 
What motivates Overgaard’s account is clearly his fear that accentuating the reflective 
character of the reduction would easily lead one to reduce the being of the world to 
the subjective acts of consciousness as something that could be studied directly in 
separation from the objects of these acts. However, although Overgaard’s fear is not 
unfounded, and ultimately springs from the deep ambiguity that we have seen 
characterizing Husserl’s own conception of the correlation between noema and noesis, 
his solution is not very convincing: if the experienced world – the noema – really is the 
sole phenomenal content of our experience, then it is totally unclear how a regressive 
construction of the structures of subjectivity could transpire without any reflective 
seeing. To escape Husserl’s uncontrolled oscillation between the noema and noesis – 
conceived as the overly detached poles of the phenomenal correlation – it does not 
help to insist on the phenomenal primacy of the noema. Instead, I believe we can steer 
clear of the danger of subjectivism if we radically set out from our concrete 
experiences – without any preconception of the general structure of experience in 
terms of subject and object – in order to investigate, through direct reflection, how 
such features as “object,” “act,” and “subject” interact as more or less basic aspects of 
this experience. Here, there seems to be nothing that prevents us from grasping 
subjectivity directly as long as we only attend to it in so far as it shows itself as a 
relevant aspect of the intentional experience under investigation. To call such an 
investigation reflective is no problem if what is meant thereby is merely an explication 
of the structures of our experience – with no claims involved concerning the primacy 
or autonomy of transcendental subjectivity.  
514 Overgaard 2004, p. 82. 
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reduction.”515 Heidegger thus takes his point of departure in an intuitive 
explication of the modes of being of entities, and, taking these as 
transcendental guidelines, carries out a regressive investigation of the 
structures of Dasein that make understanding of being possible.  
      Against this background it is not surprising that Overgaard attributes 
only a secondary role to Heidegger’s program of destruction. According to 
Overgaard, the task of the destruction consists in dismantling our 
traditional understanding of being as presence-at-hand by returning to the 
“original motives and experiences” constituting the experiential basis for 
this understanding.516 However, although it is an important task to 
critically appropriate and delimit the insights of the prevailing tradition, 
Overgaard claims that the destruction does not belong to the 
“methodological core” of Heidegger’s method:517 “The ‘destruction’ is not 
an indispensable methodological component in any investigation of being, at 
least the way the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit understood such an 
investigation.”518 To be able to commence at all, Overgaard argues, the 
destruction presupposes a “phenomenological basic experience” of the 
being of beings as readiness-to-hand as well as a grasp of the traditional 
understanding of being – otherwise it could never even identify the 
tradition as an interpretation of being to be destructed. That is, the 
destruction presupposes that we already have direct phenomenological 
access to the being of beings, such that this access is prior to and 
independent of any historical destruction of the prejudiced tradition we 
live in.519 
                                         
515 Overgaard 2004, p. 94. 
516 Overgaard 2004, p. 97. 
517 Overgaard 2004, p. 100. 
518 Overgaard 2004, p. 98. 
519 In the introduction to his book Overgaard takes up the possible objection that his 
study largely ignores the question of historicity, which according to many 
commentators – including Heidegger himself – constitutes the main theme in regard to 
which Heidegger and Husserl part ways. Overgaard states that he “fully recognizes” 
the importance of the “problems of temporality and historicity” but that the 
importance of the problem in fact constitutes “a reason for setting it apart for discrete 
study, rather than giving it what is bound to be inadequate treatment” (Overgaard 
2004, p. 8). However, although Overgaard claims to endorse the “crucial importance” 
of the problem of historicity, we already know that history and destruction will only 
play a secondary and complementary role in Overgaard’s conception of Heidegger’s 
phenomenological method, and will never enter the independent core of 
phenomenological seeing. Overgaard’s decision to postpone the treatment of history 
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     Although Heidegger basically remains faithful to Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology, Overgaard also claims that he critically 
develops it in two respects. First, Overgaard claims, Heidegger – as 
opposed to Husserl – critically interrogates our natural understanding of 
beings as self-subsisting objects and radically asks the question concerning 
the modes of being of beings. This allows him to make a clean sweep of 
Husserl’s layer ontology and maintain that the experienced meaningful 
object does not consist in an additional layer of meaning and value added 
on to a basic layer of sense perception. Instead, the experienced meaning 
constitutes the object in itself, so that all the sensory or material traits of 
the object appear as what they are only as aspects of this primary meaning. 
Second, Heidegger supplements Husserl’s method with a “terminological 
epoché.”  By this Overgaard means that Heidegger, to a much larger 
extent than Husserl, attends to the relevance of linguistic expression for 
our phenomenological understanding. More specifically, Overgaard argues 
that Heidegger’s method of “formal indication” is designed to shape 
expressions which are able to keep focus on the ontological matter of 
phenomenology and fend off possible misconceptions of the structures of 
being in terms of ontic relations between beings. 
      In contrast to Overgaard, Charles Guignon presents Heidegger’s 
approach in Being and Time as an essentially historical mode of thinking 
determined by and explicating the finite historical contexts of meaning we 
live in. In accord with this, he largely ignores the role of Husserl – whom 
he interprets as engaged in a Cartesian effort to ground our knowledge of 
the world in the “apodictic evidence found in transcendental 
subjectivity”520 – in Heidegger’s development, instead highlighting Dilthey 
and the nineteenth century historical school (Ranke and Droysen) as 
seminal influences on Heidegger.  
      According to Guignon, Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-
world implies a radical break with the traditional picture of the human 
being as an isolated contemplative subject faced with the task of correctly 
representing reality. Against this, Heidegger argues that Dasein is from the 
                                                                                                                      
and temporality thus rests firmly on the basic systematic tendency of his 
interpretation. Were Overgaard to take seriously Heidegger’s basic conviction that 
historical being essentially determines all phenomenological intuition, it would be 
impossible to keep the problem of phenomenology and the problem of history apart. 
520 Guignon 1983, p. 43.  
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outset – and as a condition for all purely theoretical observation and 
knowledge – a being acting with implicit practical competence in a familiar 
world. The historical networks of meaning constituting the world open up 
the possibilities in terms of which Dasein can understand itself and other 
beings: “Dasein is always ‘thrown’ into a world of cultural and historical 
meanings which make up the horizon in which anything is intelligible, but 
which cannot itself be grounded by something beyond that horizon.”521 
Given that all understanding is determined by the historical contexts we 
occupy, Heidegger gives up the Husserlian idea of a direct “intuition of 
meanings and essences presented to consciousness”: “Our understanding 
is always discursive, never intuitive.”522  
      Heidegger’s method in Being and Time, Guignon maintains, involves 
four stages: (1) a descriptive stage in which Dasein’s everyday factical 
understanding of itself and of being is exhibited; (2) a hermeneutic stage in 
which this factical self-understanding, which is first and foremost 
characterized by traditional prejudices and distortions, is interpreted in 
order to find the normally hidden background of practical competence 
and historical understanding that conditions our experience of entities as 
given; (3) a dialectical stage in which we are led back to retrieve the ultimate 
historical origins and sources of our understanding of being which 
constitute the bedrock of all interpretation; (4) a recurrent diagnosis of our 
seemingly self-evident traditional understanding, which exposes its 
historical roots and thereby helps to dissolve the pseudo-problems that 
arise from it.523 
      For Heidegger, Guignon argues, the historical nature of understanding 
implies that the task of destructing the history of ontology takes on a 
primary role in executing the project of fundamental ontology. Since the 
investigation of Being and Time is “embedded in the history of ontology and 
dependent on it for its findings, it must be seen as an unfolding of 
possibilities already implicit in the tradition.”524 The destruction has both a 
diagnostic and a dialectical function: on the one hand, it diagnoses the 
prejudices of the tradition by tracing their roots in Greek ontology; on the 
other hand, it retrieves the most primordial possibilities harbored by our 
                                         
521 Guignon 1983, p. 60.  
522 Guignon 1983, pp. 67, 221; cf. also p. 70.  
523 Guignon 1983, p. 68. 
524 Guignon 1983, p. 225.  
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heritage, which the tradition has forgotten and covered up.525 Whereas the 
transcendental analysis of the temporal structure of Dasein undertaken in 
part one of Being and Time provides the “guideline” for destructing the 
history of ontology, the aim of the destruction – to be undertaken in part 
two – is to “authenticate the finding of the transcendental stage by 
showing their historical origins.” Only thus can we be sure that the results 
of our interpretation really capture the most primordial possibilities of our 
heritage. Hence, Guignon claims, “far from being a historical appendix [...] 
the destruction contains the concrete ontological research that makes up 
fundamental ontology.”526   
      In the end, Guignon believes that Being and Time is doomed to failure 
for the reason that Heidegger is still unable or unwilling to apply – in a 
fully consistent manner – his radical insights into the historical nature of 
understanding to his own project of fundamental ontology. Although 
Heidegger sharply criticizes the traditional aim of philosophy to attain 
universal and ahistorical knowledge, he nevertheless holds on to the hope 
of attaining what Guignon calls a “transhistorical” understanding of the 
essential structures of Dasein and the sense of being.527 This is supposed 
to be possible not through a direct seeing but through a retrieval of “the 
underlying meaning of history” found at the Greek origin of Western 
history and conditioning every subsequent understanding of being.528 
However, Guignon claims, this “transcendental historicism” is unviable – 
as Heidegger himself also later comes to realize. Once we appropriate the 
results of Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s historical being-in-the-world, 
we see that every interpretation is a product of and relative to the specific 
historical context of meanings, values, and interests that it springs from.529 
As a result, it becomes impossible to uphold the guiding ambition of Being 
and Time to uncover once and for all the transhistorical structures of Dasein 
and the sense of being as such. Instead, Guignon suggests, we should 
understand the positive achievements of Heidegger’s magnum opus as 
follows: on the one hand, the analysis of Dasein – situated as it is within a 
specific historical context – offers “an impressive and forceful 
                                         
525 Cf. Guignon 1983, p. 225. 
526 Guignon 1983, pp. 223, 231, 225. 
527 Guignon 1983, p. 215. 
528 Guignon 1983, p. 232. 
529 Cf. Guignon 1983, pp. 217, 233-234. 
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interpretation of our current modes of self-understanding”; on the other 
hand, the account of historicity and of the task of destruction allow us to 
liberate ourselves from the self-evident assumptions of the present, and 
opens us to the range of alternative possibilities contained by our history 
for reinterpreting our current situation.530 
 
Heidegger’s Methodological Self-Understanding 
 
In the introduction to Being and Time Heidegger presents the method of 
the book as phenomenological, whereby he traces the meaning of the 
expression “phenomenology” back to its Greek roots. Whereas 
phainomenon means “that which shows itself, the self-showing, the 
manifest,”531 logos signifies a discourse the function of which is to 
apophainesthai, to “let see” or “make manifest” what the discourse it 
about.532 Hence, he presents the following formal definition of 
phenomenology:  
 
Thus phenomenology means apophainesthai ta phainomena – to let 
that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which 
it shows itself from itself. This is the formal meaning of that branch 
of research which calls itself “phenomenology.” But here we are 
expressing nothing else than the maxim formulated above: “To the 
things themselves!”533 
 
For Heidegger, phenomenology thus signifies a discourse which does 
nothing but attempt to exhibit that which shows itself as the phenomena 
of our concrete experiences. To study the phenomena is to study the 
matters themselves as they are given to us as meaningful and intelligible. 
In reverse, to ask about matters beyond or irrespectively or their 
phenomenal givenness is to resort to groundless construction and 
                                         
530 Guignon 1983, p. 244; cf. also p. 246. 
531 SZ, p. 28: “das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare.” 
532 SZ, p. 32. 
533 SZ, p. 34: “Phänomenologie sagt dann: ἀποφαίνεσϑαι τὰ φαινόμενα: Das was sich 
zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen. Das ist der 
formale Sinn der Forschung, die sich den Namen Phänomenologie gibt. So kommt 
aber nichts anderes zum Ausdruck als die oben formulierte Maxime: ‘Zu den Sachen 
selbst!’” 
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speculation: “‘Behind’ the phenomena of phenomenology there is 
essentially nothing else; on the other hand, what is to become a 
phenomenon can be hidden.”534 
      Yet how should be understand Heidegger’s proclamation of himself as 
a phenomenologist? 
      We already know that Heidegger’s appropriation of the term 
“phenomenology” in the early 1920s, invoking its Greek etymology, goes 
hand in hand with a critical dismissal of Husserl’s belief in intuitive 
givenness, and with the development of a hermeneutic phenomenology 
which understands itself as historical in a radical sense. Indeed, 
Heidegger’s formal definition of phenomenology in Being and Time does 
not imply any recourse to the idea of a direct seeing as he is careful to 
point out: “In giving an existential significance to ‘sight,’ we have merely 
drawn upon the peculiar feature of seeing, that it lets entities which are 
accessible to it be encountered unconcealedly in themselves.”535 Hence, as 
Heidegger presents his method as “phenomenology,” this word must be 
taken formally as signifying a mode of investigation which exhibits its 
matters such as these are concretely given in our experience – whereby the 
nature of this givenness it still left undetermined.  
      Heidegger begins to deformalize his formal concept of 
phenomenology by specifying what constitutes the specific phenomena of 
phenomenology: 
 
What is it that by its very essence is necessarily the theme whenever 
we exhibit something explicitly? Manifestly, it is something that 
proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is 
something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and 
for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is 
something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to 
it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground. Yet that 
which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which relapses and 
gets covered up again, or which shows itself only “in disguise,” is not 
                                         
534 SZ, p. 36: “‘Hinter’ den Phänomenen der Phänomenologie steht wesenhaft nichts 
anderes, wohl aber kann das, was Phänomen werden soll, verborgen sein.” 
535 SZ, p. 147: “Für die existentiale Bedeutung von Sicht ist nur die Eigenschaft des 
Sehens in Anspruch genommen, daß es das ihm zugänglich Seiende an ihm selbst 
unverdeckt begegnen läßt.” 
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just this entity or that, but rather the being of beings, as our previous 
observations have shown.536 
 
In short, the task of Heidegger’s phenomenology is to exhibit being as the 
hidden ground of beings. Since our experience of beings is always already 
guided by an understanding of being, and since this understanding is first 
and foremost unthematic and prejudiced, the task of explicating being 
becomes an essential prerequisite for attaining a transparent understanding 
of ourselves and the world. This implies an intimate relationship between 
phenomenology and ontology: whereas “phenomenology” is “the science 
of the being of beings – ontology,” “ontology is only possible as 
phenomenology.”537 Hence, Heidegger’s claim is not only that 
phenomenology is the qualified method of ontology but also that being is 
essentially the phenomenon of phenomenology. If all our phenomenal 
understanding of beings is ultimately organized by our understanding of 
being, then being constitutes the ultimate stratum of every phenomenon. 
This is why Heidegger can state that “phenomenological questioning in its 
innermost tendency itself leads to the question of the being of the 
intentional and before anything else to the question of the sense of being 
as such.”538 This is also why he maintains that Husserl’s neglect of the 
                                         
536 SZ, p. 35: “Was ist seinem Wesen nach notwendig Thema einer ausdrücklichen 
Aufweisung? Offenbar solches, was sich zunächst und zumeist gerade nicht zeigt, was 
gegenüber dem, was sich zunächst und zumeist zeigt, verborgen ist, aber zugleich etwas 
ist, was wesenhaft zu dem, was sich zunächst und zumeist zeigt, gehört, so zwar, daß 
es seinen Sinn und Grund ausmacht. Was aber in einem ausnehmenden Sinne verborgen 
bleibt oder wieder in die Verdeckung zurückfällt oder nur ‘verstellt’ sich zeigt, ist nichts 
dieses oder jenes Seiende, sondern, wie die voranstehenden Betrachtungen gezeigt 
haben, das Sein des Seienden.” 
537 SZ, pp. 37, 35.  
538 GA 20, p. 184: “Das phänomenologische Fragen führt seinem innersten Zuge nach 
selbst zur Frage nach dem Sein des Intentionalen und vor allem vor die Frage nach 
dem Sinn des Seins als solchem.” Beginning with his early Freiburg conception of 
phenomenology as Ursprungswissenschaft – a science of origins – Heidegger understands 
phenomenology as essentially concerned with that which is basic and determining in 
our experience of phenomenal meaning. On account of his explication of Aristotle, 
Heidegger starts to conceive of this basic determinant in terms of our understanding 
of being. Since this understanding determines all our phenomenal experience, 
Heidegger calls being – or the “archai” as he says in the context of interpreting 
Aristotle – “the primordially evident” (originär evidente) (GA 62, p. 382). In 
“Prolegomena” he explicitly suggests that the question of being grows out of the 
effort to “question to the end” (Zu-Ende-fragen) that belongs to the very sense of the 
principle of phenomenology: “But we come to the question of being as such only if 
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question of being makes his transcendental phenomenology 
“unphenomenological.”539 Provided that our factical understanding of 
being always already links all our seeing of phenomena, we cannot skip the 
question of being without our investigation falling into prejudice. 
Whatever pains we take to look clearly at the matters themselves, our prior 
factical understanding of being will always already have determined what 
we will be able to see and comprehend. 
      But what does the phenomenological exhibition and articulation of the 
being of Dasein and the sense of being amount to more precisely? 
According to Heidegger, the phenomenology of Being and Time is a 
“hermeneutics,” which it to say that it transpires by way of 
“interpretation”: “the meaning of phenomenological description as a 
method is interpretation. [...] The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutics 
in the primordial sense of this word, where it designates the business of 
interpreting.”540 What does this mean?  
      As we have already seen, “interpretation” for Heidegger signifies the 
thematic explication of what we “understand.” In elaborating this notion 
he strongly emphasizes that all direct intuitive seeing is grounded in 
understanding: “By showing how all sight is grounded primarily in 
understanding [...] we have deprived pure intuition of its priority, which 
corresponds noetically to the priority of the present-at-hand in traditional 
ontology. ‘Intuition’ and ‘thinking’ are both derivatives of understanding, 
and already rather remote ones. Even the phenomenological ‘intuition of 
essences’ is grounded in existential understanding.”541 In order to be able 
to see something as a meaningful phenomenon we already need to have a 
preceding understanding of the world and of being that contains the 
                                                                                                                      
our inquiry is guided by the drive to question to the end or to inquiry into the beginning, that 
is, if it is determined by the sense of the phenomenological principle radically 
understood” (Die Frage nach dem Sein als solchem ist aber nur zu gewinnen, wenn das Fragen 
geleitet ist von einem Zu-Ende-fragen, bzw. in den Anfang Hineinfragen, d.h. wenn es 
bestimmt ist von dem radikal ergriffenen Sinn des phänomenologischen Prinzips) (GA 20, p. 186). 
539 GA 20, p. 178. 
540 SZ, p. 37: “der methodische Sinn der phänomenologischen Deskription ist 
Auslegung. [...] Phänomenologie des Daseins ist Hermeneutik in der ursprünglichen 
Bedeutung des Wortes, wonach es das Geschäft der Auslegung bezeichnet.” 
541 SZ, p. 147: “Dadurch, daß gezeigt wird, wie alle Sicht primär im Verstehen gründet 
[…] ist dem puren Anschauen sein Vorrang genommen, der noëtisch dem 
traditionellen ontologischen Vorrang des Vorhandenen entspricht. ‘Anschauung’ und 
‘Denken’ sind beide schon entfernte Derivate des Verstehens. Auch die 
phänomenologische ‘Wesensschau‘ gründet im existentialen Verstehen.”  
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meaning-possibilities in terms of which beings can show up as this or that. 
“Interpretation” signifies the activity of thematically explicating this 
preceding understanding – which is first and foremost unthematic – and 
articulate as what beings are understood: “That which is disclosed in 
understanding – that which is understood – is already accessible in such a 
way that its ‘as which’ can be made to stand out explicitly.”542 As such, 
interpretation is also characterized by a “fore-structure.” Given that all our 
phenomenal experience is guided by the factical pre-understanding that we 
live in, and which cannot itself be intuitively grounded, the interpretation 
must take the form of an explication of our factical historical pre-
understanding. For Heidegger’s project this means that it must take its 
starting point in an explication of the normally hidden and vague factical 
understanding of being – the being of Dasein and the sense of being – 
that we always already live in. It must lay bare and spell out the 
understanding of being guiding us when we experience and talk about 
ourselves and other beings in the world.  
      According to Heidegger, however, our factical understanding of being 
is not only unthematic and hidden; it is also pervaded by the prejudices 
and concealments of the tradition which we primarily tend to grow up into 
and take over in a blind and unquestioning manner. The tradition, he 
writes, “takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-
evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial ‘sources’ from which the 
categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite 
genuinely drawn.”543 The upshot of this tendency to take over the 
tradition as self-evident without questioning its sources, is that the 
tradition of philosophy has been dominated by the original Greek 
ontology in a nearly autistic fashion, so that our whole contemporary 
conceptuality is still determined by the Aristotelian understanding of being 
as presence-at-hand. It is not, then, enough to explicate our factical 
understanding of being since this is fraught with the prejudices of the 
tradition. Hence, Heidegger argues that in order to liberate ourselves from 
the tradition and get access to a more primordial understanding of being – 
                                         
542 SZ, p. 149: “Das im Verstehen Erschlossene, das Verstandene ist immer schon so 
zugänglich, daß an ihm sein ‘als was’ ausdrücklich abgehoben werden kann.” 
543 SZ, p. 21. “Sie [die Tradition] überantwortet das Überkommene der 
Selbstverständlichkeit und verlegt den Zugang zu den ursprünglichen ‘Quellen’, daraus 
die überlieferten Kategorien und Begriffe z.T. in echter Weise geschöpft wurden.” 
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since we cannot rely on any direct seeing of the matters – we need to carry 
out a destruction of the history of ontology: 
 
If the question of being is to have its own history made transparent, 
then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the 
concealments which it has brought about must be dissolved. We 
understand this task as one in which by taking the question of being as 
our clue, we are to destruct the traditional content of ancient ontology 
until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we 
achieved our first ways of determining the nature of being – the 
ways that have guided us ever since.544 
 
In short, the aim of the destruction it so trace our factical traditional 
understanding of being back through the history of ontology to its 
historical sources or origins at the Greek beginning of Western 
philosophy. The destruction has a twofold task. First, the task is to 
dismantle our traditional conception of being as presence-at-hand until we 
arrive at its origin in Aristotle’s thinking. In so doing, we become able to 
grasp the primordial experiences at the basis of this conception and, 
hence, achieve a concrete understanding of it in its limited validity. 
Second, by delimiting the traditional understanding of being it becomes 
possible to “bring ourselves into full possession of our ownmost 
possibilities of questioning.”545 In the end, the decisive methodological 
step of Heidegger’s fundamental ontological investigation consists in a 
“retrieval” or “repetition” (Wiederholung) of the most primordial historical 
possibilities of understanding being harbored by the Greek beginning of 
our heritage.546  
                                         
544 SZ, p. 22: “Soll für die Seinsfrage selbst die Durchsichtigkeit ihrer eigenen 
Geschichte gewonnen werden, dann bedarf es der Auflockerung der verhärteten 
Tradition und der Ablösung der durch sie gezeitigten Verdeckungen. Diese Aufgabe 
verstehen wir als die am Leitfaden der Seinsfrage sich vollziehende Destruktion des 
überlieferten Bestandes der antiken Ontologie auf die ursprünglichen Erfahrungen, in 
denen die ersten und fortan leitenden Bestimmungen des Seins gewonnen wurden.” 
545 SZ, p. 21: “sich in der positiven Aneignung der Vergangenheit in den vollen Besitz 
der eigensten Fragemöglichkeiten zu bringen.” 
546 SZ, p. 26. Here my explication of the role of the destruction in Heidegger’s project 
differs from Guignon's account, which articulates the relation between 
“interpretation” and “destruction” as follows: whereas the interpretation of our 
factical understanding of being explicates – through a kind of transcendental 
argumentation – the more basic understanding of being as ready-to-hand and 
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   According to Heidegger’s original plan – presented in the introduction – 
the destruction of the history of ontology was to be undertaken in the 
second division of Being and Time. It was to take its “guideline” from the 
preliminary analysis of the temporal structure of Dasein and the 
temporality of being in division one, and proceed backwards through the 
main stages of the history of ontology: Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle. 
Given Heidegger’s thesis that the destruction constitutes our basic way of 
access to an originary understanding of the sense of being, he insists that it 
is “only in the carrying out of the destruction of the ontological tradition 
that the question of being achieves its true concreteness.”547 This also 
means that in so far as the existential analytic of Dasein carried out in 
division one is able to articulate the originary structure of Dasein and 
being it is because it already draws on and anticipates the results of the 
destruction as that which makes it possible.  
   Fundamentally, then, phenomenological ontology of Being and Time is 
supposed to have the character of a “‘historical’ interpretation.”548  
 
Between Phenomenology and Historical Thinking 
 
As we have seen, Heidegger’s basic analysis of the historical as-structure of 
phenomenal understanding prescribes a transformation of 
phenomenology into a radically historical mode of thinking. Given that 
our intuitive experience of beings as meaningful phenomena is always 
already determined by our preceding historical understanding of world and 
being, then the investigation of being cannot rely on any direct intuition 
but instead needs to take the form of an explication of historically received 
                                                                                                                      
temporality underlying the traditional conception, the destruction “authenticates the 
findings of the transcendental stage” by showing that they indeed constitute the most 
primordial understanding of being contained by the Western tradition (Guignon 1983, 
p. 231). However, I believe Guignon’s notion that interpretation of our factical 
understanding could by itself achieve a primordial understanding of being is not 
supported by Heidegger’s text. Given that our factical understanding is laden with 
prejudice and at most contains traces of the historical sources which give it its sense, I 
think it is clear that Heidegger believes the function of the destruction is not only to 
authenticate the interpretation but to open up our basic access to the primordial 
sources of understanding.  
547 SZ, p. 26: “Erst in der Durchführung der Destruktion der ontologischen 
Überlieferung gewinnt die Seinsfrage ihre wahrhafte Konkretion.” 
548 SZ, p. 39: “‘historische’ Interpretation.” 
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meanings. In the introduction to Being and Time Heidegger 
programmatically lays down the hermeneutic-destructive method of his 
historical thinking: first, a thematizing interpretation of our factical 
traditional understanding of being; second a destruction of this 
understanding in order to access its historical origin. However, as I shall 
argue, Heidegger’s program for a historical thinking is beset with basic 
problems, which hinder him from implementing it and which force him – 
in an ambivalent way – to have recourse to an intuition-based 
phenomenological method in his concrete positive investigations. 
      To get a grasp of the problems of Heidegger’s hermeneutic-destructive 
program, it is crucial to see that his radical historicization of understanding 
makes the question of the “primordiality” of understanding burning.  
      As noted above, in his well-known critique Ernst Tugendhat argues 
that Heidegger cancels out the possibility of questioning the truth or 
untruth of Dasein’s historical understanding of being. However, although 
it is true that Heidegger claims that we cannot conceive of the truth of this 
understanding in terms of its correspondence with beings, Tugendhat fails 
to  recognize the extent to which the question of how to distinguish 
between prejudiced and primordial understanding of historical being 
remains decisive for Heidegger’s whole philosophical endeavor. Hence, 
Tugendhat does not analyze the way in which Heidegger’s difficulties with 
addressing this question in Being and Time gives rise to deep ambivalences 
in Heidegger’s fundamental ontological program. First, Heidegger’s 
inability to account for the primordiality of historical being forces him to 
abandon his program of philosophical destruction and instead have 
recourse to the method of direct phenomenological description in his 
concrete investigations; second, it drives his analysis of authentic existence 
into an unviable oscillation between collectivism and subjectivism.  
      If we, as Heidegger insists, first and foremost live in a prejudiced and 
distortive understanding of being administered by the They, and if the 
truth of this understanding cannot be measured and delimited by way of a 
direct intuitive explication of the matters in question, then the question 
arises: what is it that allows us to distinguish between historical prejudices 
and a primordial historical understanding? How can our historical 
understanding of being demonstrate itself as true or primordial? Now, 
Heidegger’s ability to answer this question ultimately hinges on his 
account of the ultimate positive stage of the destruction, i.e., for what it 
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means to “appropriate” and “repeat” the primordial meaning-possibilities 
harbored by the historical origin of our heritage.549 So the crucial question 
is: how does historical being give itself as primordial – not just amounting 
to a new set of historical prejudices – and how do we access, understand 
and repeat it as such? 
      The fact of the matter is that Heidegger is unable to answer or even 
clearly raise this question in Being and Time. After his projection of the 
hermeneutic-destructive program, he never returns to the issue what it 
could mean to achieve a primordial explication of the sense of being 
through a repetition of primordial historical meanings. The closest he 
comes to addressing this question is his account of authentic Dasein’s 
resolute choice of its own historical possibilities or heroes, the explicit 
modality of which he calls “repetition.” However, this account is far from 
sufficient. To begin with, Heidegger’s analysis of resoluteness and 
repetition comes far too late in the philosophical systematics. The focus of 
the analysis is not on Dasein’s understanding of being but on its 
transparent choice of its own possibilities, which means that Dasein’s 
resoluteness from the outset appears as the object of an ontological 
analysis of Dasein’s being that cannot account for its own historicity. 
However, could not Heidegger’s analysis of repetition nevertheless 
provide a model for understanding what it means to retrieve primordial 
historical meanings? It could, in principle, yet it does not do it. 
      Heidegger’s defines “repetition” as the explicit enactment of 
“resoluteness,” that is, of authentic Dasein’s transparent choice and 
handing down to itself of its historically inherited possibilities: “repetition 
is explicit handing down.”550 Now, the reason why Heidegger’s analysis of 
resoluteness and repetition cannot shed any light on the understanding of 
primordial historical meanings is that the entire analysis from beginning to 
end focuses on how the particular Dasein chooses its own finite 
possibilities from its historical heritage by anticipating its own death as its 
ultimate possibility. However, in so doing Heidegger totally bypasses the 
question concerning the givenness and accessibility of originary 
possibilities as distinguishable from the prejudiced interpretedness that we 
first and foremost live in. Nothing is said about how Dasein, to becomes 
authentic, is to break free from and dismantle the traditional 
                                         
549 Cf. SZ, pp. 21, 26. 
550 SZ, p. 385: “Die Wiederholung ist die ausdrückliche Überlieferung.” 
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interpretedness, or about how it is to access and grasp originary and 
binding possibilities of existence distinct from the prejudices upheld by 
the They.551 Instead, the heritage is treated as the unproblematically 
available factical reservoir of historical possibilities from which Dasein has 
to choose its own possibilities. 
      In short, Heidegger’s analysis of resolute repetition cannot account for 
what it means to retrieve primordial historical meanings – be it being-
senses or ideal possibilities of existence – in contrast to the prejudices of 
the tradition. 
      Heidegger’ basic inability to account for the givenness and accessibility 
of primordial historical being ultimately gives rise to a deep ambivalence as 
concerns the method of Being and Time.552 The lacuna depicted above 
implies that Heidegger lacks a clear vision of the means to radically 
implement his hermeneutic-destructive program as an appropriation and 
repetition of the originary meanings harbored by our historical heritage. 
This, in turn, means that in order to be able to lay claim to a primordial 
explication of the being of Dasein and the sense of being, which 
transcends and delimits the traditional prejudiced conception of being as 
presence-at-hand, Heidegger in his concrete investigations has recourse to 
a method of intuitive phenomenological reflection of the sort that his 
analysis of the historical structure of phenomenality has strictly speaking 
cancelled out.   
      When we take a closer look at Heidegger’s actual approach in Being and 
Time we see that his hermeneutic-destructive program stands in a much 
looser and more ambivalent relation to his concrete analyses than he 
wants to believe. It is true, to be sure, that his investigations are 
characterized by a sharpened critical attentiveness to the traditional pre-
understandings and concepts which tend to guide our questioning in a 
                                         
551 Charles Guignon has also pointed out this basic deficit in Heidegger’s analysis of 
resoluteness: “Heidegger says that authenticity will lead us into a ‘sober understanding’ 
of the ‘basic possibilities for Dasein’. [...] But there is no clue as to what these ‘basic 
possibilities’ are. Although resoluteness might bring us face to face with our unique 
responsibility for making something of our lives, it does not seem to provide us with 
any indication as to which of the concrete possibilities circulating in the Anyone are 
the ultimate or basic sources for our understanding of being” (Guignon 1983, p. 218). 
552 Heidegger’s inability to account for the givenness of primordial historical 
possibilities also affects his analysis of Daseins’ resolute choice of its own possibilities, 
where – as we shall see in the next chapter – it gives rise to a problematic oscillation 
between collectivism and subjectivism.  
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prejudiced way, and by an ambition to historically dismantle these 
preconceptions in order to access the primordial experiences from which 
they issue. However, it belongs to this ongoing hermeneutic-destructive 
reflection that it constantly converts into the effort to achieve a positive 
understanding of the phenomena through intuitive phenomenological 
reflection on the sense-structures of our experience. Indeed, this work of 
phenomenological reflection is decisive both for delimiting the positive 
meaning of our common prejudices and for achieving a new and better 
understanding of the phenomena in question. Heidegger’s analysis of 
readiness-to-hand is typical. It begins by disclosing our traditional 
conception of beings as present-at-hand objects. Then follows a 
phenomenological description of how we primarily encounter beings as 
ready-to-hand tools against the backdrop of the significance-relations of 
the world. This also allows Heidegger to dismantle and delimit the 
traditional conception by showing that the understanding of being as 
presence-at-hand is expressive of a theoretical attitude in which we 
observe beings as context-independent objectivities. The same 
methodological scheme manifests itself in all of his central analyses, e.g., 
of wordliness, care, disposition, understanding, anxiety, conscience, 
temporality and historicity.  
      There is, I think, no doubt that the concrete positive analyses doing 
the central philosophical work in Being and Time essentially transpire as 
reflective phenomenological descriptions of the basic sense structures of 
Dasein’s factical experiences. These analyses do not have the form of 
interpretations that would merely explicate our implicit historical pre-
understanding, and they do not base their clarificatory force on their 
historical primordiality. Instead, what Heidegger continuously tries to do is 
to describe – through direct intuitive reflection and independently of our 
more or less prejudiced historical pre-understanding – the basic structural 
moments that constitute the meaning of our experiences. Fundamentally, 
the validity and clarificatory force of the phenomenological descriptions 
does not rest on their relation – e.g. dialectical superiority – to the 
historical pre-understanding and heritage we live in, but lies solely in their 
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ability to exhibit and illuminate what is there and reflectively discernible 
for us as the basic structure of our experiences.553  
      Heidegger’s method of direct phenomenological description also 
implies that the structures described in Being and Time essentially have the 
status of universal necessary structures characterizing the human being as 
such. As Heidegger himself writes: “being-in-the-world is an a priori 
necessary constitution of Dasein.”554 Since the positive analyses of the 
existential analytic do not have the character of explications of our 
historical pre-understanding, their validity and scope is not relative to any 
historically and culturally specific pre-understanding. Roughly speaking, 
the analyses focus on two kinds of experience: first, experiences – such as 
anxiety, fear, and conscience – that are common to all human beings 
although their cultural role and interpretedness may vary; second, 
experiences – such as hammering, opening a door, hearing a car – that 
belong to a specific historical-cultural context. However, in both cases the 
aim of Heidegger’s phenomenological descriptions is to explicate 
necessary universal structures that are constitutive of general kinds of 
experience shared by all human beings. Even though the worlds we live in 
vary historically – and thus the ontic content of the experiences 
determined by the significances of such worlds – Heidegger’s approach 
presupposes that it is possible to describe basic structures that are 
constitutive of all such worldly and historically situated experiences: 
readiness-to-hand, being-in-the-world, care, mortality, temporality, and 
historicity.  
                                         
553 It is quite common to characterize Heidegger’s method in Being and Time by saying 
that it explicates what is normally implicit and hidden in our understanding. However, 
it is important to see that this formulation can have – and often vacillates between – 
two quite different meanings. On the one hand, it can mean that the analysis spells out 
and explicates the historical pre-understanding that we always already live in, so that 
its validity and scope remains relative to that finite pre-understanding. On the other 
hand, it can mean that the analysis describes and explicates what it there and 
discernable – although normally unnoticed – in our experiences, in which case the 
description does not rest on our factical historical pre-understandings. What I am 
arguing is that whereas Heidegger proclaims – in his methodological reflections – that 
the existential analytic must proceed by way of the first mentioned approach of 
historical interpretation, his conrete analysis instead makes use of the last mentioned 
approach of phenomenological reflection.  
554 SZ, p. 53: “Das In-der-Welt-sein ist [...] eine a priori notwendige Verfassung des 
Daseins.” 
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      It is important to recognize here that phenomenological descriptions 
of the kind employed by Heidegger ultimately rest on our concrete 
experiences as their factical arbitrary ground. That is, it belongs to the 
sense of phenomenological descriptions that they explicate the structures 
of experiences that are not in themselves necessary but that we, as human 
beings, happen to have (which is not the same as saying that they are 
culturally and historically specific). As Steven Crowell has put it: “The 
hermeneutic exploration of our factical situation suffices for insight into 
necessary connections.”555 Phenomenology is in no position to say that we 
must have certain kinds of experience. For all we know, our experiences 
could have been different or they could change in the future. 
Phenomenology thus accepts our factical experiences as its arbitrary 
ground in order to explicate the necessary and universal structures that 
constitute them.  
      The gap between Heidegger’s hermeneutic-destructive program and 
the phenomenological approach of his concrete investigations is also 
signaled by the original arrangement of Being and Time. According to the 
plan presented in the introduction, the first division of the book was to 
provide “the interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and the 
explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of 
being,” whereas the second division was to offer “basic features of a 
phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology on the guideline 
of the problematic of temporality.”556 Here Heidegger argued that it is 
“only when we carry out the destruction” that the question of being 
“achieves its true concreteness,” such that the “ownmost ontological 
elucidation” of Dasein “necessarily becomes an ‘historical’ 
interpretation.”557 That is, the destruction would belong to fundamental 
ontology as the central methodical vehicle that would open access to the 
primordial understanding of being in such a way that the descriptive 
analyses of the first division would already draw upon and anticipate the 
destruction of the second division as their condition of possibility. In this, 
Heidegger postpones the destruction to the second division with the 
argument that it can only be carried out on the basis of the preliminary 
explication of the temporality of being, which provides the destruction 
                                         
555 Crowell 2002, p. 110.  
556 SZ, p. 39. 
557 SZ, pp. 26, 39. 
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with its “guideline.” However, this argument and arrangement indicate 
that the phenomenological descriptions of the first division are in fact 
independent of and methodologically primary in relation to the 
destruction of the tradition. Not only are the positive analyses of the first 
division carried out as direct descriptions whose force and validity does 
not rely on any hermeneutic-destructive appropriation of our heritage. It 
also seems clear – as Søren Overgaard has noted558 – that the destruction 
is dependent on such descriptions. It is only to the extent that we already 
have phenomenological access to the temporal structure of being that it 
becomes possible to destruct the tradition as a series of interpretations of 
being, and to identify certain historical paradigms as prejudices and 
insights regarding being. Even though Heidegger’s hermeneutic-
destructive reflection certainly can be of help in freeing us from prejudices 
and in appropriating the insights of the tradition, it remains – as concerns 
its systematic function– a secondary aid in relation to the method of 
phenomenological reflection. 
      In short, Heidegger’s magnum opus is characterized by a deep 
ambivalence between, on the one hand, his analysis of the historical as-
structure of phenomenality and his program of a hermeneutic-destructive 
thinking, and, on the other hand, the intuition-based reflective 
phenomenological method of his concrete investigations. Ultimately, this 
ambivalence is elicited by Heidegger’s inability to account for the 
givenness and accessibility of originary historical meanings, which hinders 
his implementation of the hermeneutic-destructive program and occasions 
him to have recourse to reflective phenomenology. Hence, the positive 
analyses making up the bulk of the existential analytic basically transpire as 
intuition-based phenomenological descriptions of the basic structures of 
experience that are exempt from the radical historicity of understanding 
that these analyses claim to uncover. What we get, then, is a reflective 
phenomenological description of temporality and historicity as the 
necessary and universal structures of Dasein. Günter Figal formulates the 
tension at the heart of Being and Time as follows: “[Philosophy] frees itself 
[...] from the tradition in order to exhibit a structure, which, in spite of its 
                                         
558 Overgaard 2004, p. 98. 
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temporality, is not temporal and historical anymore. The structure of 
Dasein persists as long as there is Dasein.”559 
      We should now be able to critically judge and delimit the truth of the 
dominating interpretations of the fate of phenomenology in Being and Time: 
the transcendental-phenomenological interpretation and the hermeneutic-
deconstructivist interpretation. On the backdrop of the explication above, 
we can see that each of the interpretations focuses on one side of the 
ambivalence of the book to the exclusion of the other, accentuating the 
chosen side as Heidegger’s basic methodological stance. 
      The hermeneutic-deconstructivist reading represented by Charles 
Guignon clearly captures the gist of Heidegger’s own methodological self-
understanding. Given that our phenomenal understanding is determined 
by the historical meanings we are thrown into, and given that we first and 
foremost live in a prejudiced tradition, philosophy must take the form a 
hermeneutic-destructive repetition of the most primordial meanings 
harbored by the origin of our history. However, Guignon does not see 
that Heidegger in his concrete investigations essentially makes use of a 
Husserlian method of reflective phenomenological description of the basic 
and necessary structures of Dasein’s experience. This blindness also 
indicates that he does not recognize the systematic motives that pull 
Heidegger back from his program of historical thinking to the practice of 
intuitive phenomenology. The transcendental phenomenological reading 
represented by Søren Overgaard is, by contrast, on the whole a convincing 
interpretation of the concrete methodical approach employed by 
Heidegger in Being and Time. He is thus right in claiming that the 
destructive program does not play an essential methodical role in the 
existential analytic, but instead realizes itself as a heightened readiness to 
critically dismantle and appropriate historical pre-understandings, which 
complements but never breaks with the primary phenomenological 
method of investigation. Still, it has also becomes clear that Overgaard 
bypasses and plays down Heidegger’ explication of the radically historical 
as-structure of phenomenal understanding as well as his explicit 
articulation of his method in terms of the hermeneutic-destructive 
program. This also means that he turns a blind eye to the philosophical 
                                         
559 Figal 1992, p. 94: “[Die Philosophie] macht sich [...] von der Überlieferung frei, um 
eine Struktur aufzuweisen, die trotz ihrer Zeitlichkeit nicht mehr zeitlich und 
geschichtlich ist; die Struktur des Daseins besteht solange es Dasein gibt.” 
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challenge that Heidegger’s conception of the as-structure poses to the 
phenomenological idea of intuitive reflection.  
      The ambivalence of Being and Time has been noted before.560 But what 
to make of this tension? How should we understand and relate to it? 
      At a first glance it might seem as if we were faced with the task of 
choosing the philosophically stronger alternative: either we insist that we 
have intuitive reflective access to the basic structures of our experience; or 
we insist that our intuitive understanding is radically determined by the 
historical pre-understanding and heritage we always already live in. 
However, as Heidegger’s struggle with this ambivalence indicates, the 
alternatives sketched above do not lie there before us as clear possibilities 
to choose between. Hence, our primary task cannot be to argue for or 
against, and then choose or compromise, but must rather be to further 
clarify the sense of the tension: intuitive givenness versus historical 
determination. What is this tension? How should we account for its basic 
opposing moments, which both, in some sense, seem irreducible? Are we 
perhaps here faced with a tension that not only Heidegger struggled with 
all his life but which we still today have serious philosophical difficulties in 
coming to terms with?  
      If we – as I believe we ultimately must – hold on to the ideal that we, 
in some sense, have direct intuitive access to meaning as the basic source 
of truth and significance of our concepts, then we must try to account for 
the nature of this access and for its relation to the historical pre-
understanding and concepts that always already tend to guide our 
intuition. However, as far as I can see, neither the representatives of the 
transcendental-phenomenological reading of Heidegger, nor other 
phenomenologists, have been able to provide a satisfactory response to 
the challenge that Heidegger’s conception of the historical as-structure of 
understanding poses to every notion of intuitive givenness. If we, on the 
contrary, insist that all intuitive experience is radically determined by the 
                                         
560 Cf. Figal 1992, p. 94. Indeed, it seems that the hermeneutic-destructive reading is 
better positioned to recognize the ambivalence of Being and Time and, thereby, to 
account for why Heidegger later abandons the project of fundamental ontology in 
favor of a more radically historical thinking. Once we see how the basic analysis of the 
historicity of understanding motivates Heidegger‘s hermeneutic-destructive program 
we will also be able to see that the ambition of Being and Time to establish the necessary 
and universal sense-structures of Dasein contravenes what the results of the existential 
analytic prescribe as the necessary historical direction of thinking.  
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historical quasi-conceptual contexts of meaning we live, then we are faced 
with the basic question how such contexts address as true or primordial 
beyond historical prejudice, and as significant and binding beyond mere 
collective pressure. I do not believe that the philosophers representing the 
paradigm of hermeneutic-destructive thinking have as yet taken on this 
challenge. However, as we shall see, Heidegger’s later thinking is nothing 
but an attempt to do just that. 
 
2.6 Authenticity and the End of Being and Time 
 
Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity is in many ways central to the problem 
of phenomenality/phenomenology as this is played out in Being and Time. 
As we have seen, Heidegger believes it is only by getting access to 
Dasein’s authentic self-understanding that it becomes possible to explicate 
the basic temporal-historical sense of existence. The analysis of 
authenticity constitutes Heidegger’s basic attempt to describe how Dasein 
discloses and chooses its own possibilities, conceived as the historical 
paradigms of value that guide our lives and grants significance to the 
beings we encounter.  
      Above I argued that Being and Time suffers from a basic inability to 
account for the givenness of historical meaning, which holds Heidegger 
back from implementing his program of a hermeneutic-destructive 
historical thinking and leads him to carry out the existential analytic as an 
intuitive reflection on the structures of Dasein. Now I will examine how 
this same lacuna affects the analysis of authenticity. Here, my basic thesis 
is that Heidegger’s failure to account for the givenness of primordial 
historical possibilities transcending the collective prejudices of the They 
pushes his account of Dasein’s authentic choice of its possibilities into an 
uncontrolled oscillation between collectivism and subjectivism. I also 
argue that Heidegger’s picture of Dasein’s ethical-existential motives is 
basically egoistic-collectivist. I end the chapter by summing up and 
complementing my diagnosis of the philosophical problems that 
eventually lead Heidegger to abandon the project of fundamental 
ontology.  
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The Challenge of Authenticity  
 
According to Heidegger’s analysis of being-in-the-world, Dasein always 
already lives in an understanding of its world, which allows it to 
experience particular beings as meaningful phenomena. The world is 
ultimately anchored in Dasein’s possibilities to be, that is, in the 
historically received paradigms of a meaningful life – the heroes – which 
constitute the horizon of purposes organizing the world. 
      For Heidegger the challenge of authenticity is the challenge of the 
individual Dasein to become itself, to transparently take over its own 
possibilities to be. This, however, is a hard task. Through anxiety and 
conscience, Heidegger argues, Dasein is exposed to the groundlessness 
and finitude of its historical possibilities, and to the possibility of 
independently and responsibly choosing its own possibilities. However, 
Dasein has a basic tendency to flee from and cover up the possibility of 
authentic existence and let itself be governed by the collective prejudices 
of the They in a blind and irresponsible manner. Instead of openly 
choosing itself, inauthentic Dasein thinks and does what “they” do, what 
“they” think, what “they” say.  
      To grasp the philosophical stakes of Heidegger’s analysis of 
authenticity, it is important to see that Dasein’s paradigmatic historical 
possibilities constitute nothing less than the ultimate source of ethical-
existential purpose, which grants significance to our lives and to the beings 
we encounter. However, does not Heidegger’s analysis of what he calls 
“solicitude” (Fürsorge) towards others entail that he also recognizes the 
possibility of a care for other human beings for their own sakes? And does 
not this imply that he recognizes a source of significance that is 
independent of what our historical paradigms of value prescribe as 
important and valuable? Although I cannot argue this exhaustively here, I 
briefly want to indicate why I do not think this is the case.561 
       The chapter of Being and Time thematizing Dasein as being-with others 
– chapter four of division one – no doubt belongs to the weakest parts of 
                                         
561 The critique suggested here – namely that Heidegger fundamentally fails to account 
for the ethical-existential primacy of our relation to the other human being as a you 
that addresses me and claims me as such – was of course originally developed by 
Emmanuel Levinas. I will return to this issue and to Levinas’s critique in the epilogue 
of the thesis.  
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the book. With the exception of Heidegger’s incisive reflections on 
Dasein’s everyday tendency to succumb to the collective They, the 
analyses conducted here on the whole remain philosophically undeveloped 
and ambiguous, having the character of a halfhearted supplement to the 
main description of Dasein as engaged in coping with tools in the world. 
The aim of the chapter is to argue that it belongs to Dasein’s being that it 
is essentially being-with others. Dasein is from the outset open towards 
and has an understanding of other human beings, who do not show up as 
present-at-hand or ready-to-hand entities, but, precisely, as other human 
beings who also have the character of Dasein. Although Heidegger mainly 
focuses on Dasein’s everyday inauthentic being-with others, dominated by 
collective power relations, he also takes up the possibility of a positive 
mode of solicitude towards others. Hereby he states that Dasein as being-
with is “essentially for the sake of others”:562 “This [...] disclosedness of 
the others thus also constitutes significance, i.e., worldliness. As this 
worldliness, disclosedness is anchored in the existential for-the-sake-of-
which.”563 That is, the significance networks of the world are not only 
anchored in Dasein’s own possibilities but also in others and their 
possibilities. However, does this formal definition of Dasein as being for 
the sake of others really imply that Heidegger would introduce the 
possibility of a care for the other individual human being for her own sake 
as a primary source of ethical-existential demand and significance? I do 
not think so. 
      According to Heidegger’s analysis, Dasein primarily encounters others 
“out of the world” with which it is concerned in its everyday coping:564 “In 
what we concern ourselves with in the surrounding the world, the others 
are encountered as what they are; they are what they do.”565 In coping with 
different tools, these tools by themselves refer to other Daseins as their 
users, owners, producers, consumers, etcetera. Also when we face or 
address others directly, they chiefly show up in terms of what they do and 
                                         
562 SZ, p. 123: “Als Mitsein ‘ist’ daher das Dasein wesenhaft umwillen Anderer.” 
563 SZ, p. 123: “Diese mit dem Mitsein vorgängig konstituierte Erschlossenheit der 
Anderen macht demnach auch die Bedeutsamkeit, d.h. die Weltlichkeit mit aus, als 
welche sie im existenzialen Worum-willen festgemacht ist.” 
564 SZ, p. 119: “Sie begegnen aus der Welt her, in der das besorgend-umsichtige Dasein 
sich wesenhaft aufhält.” Cf. SZ, p. 121. 
565 SZ, p. 126: “Im umweltlich Besorgten begegnen die Anderen als das, was sie sind; 
sie sind das, was sie betreiben.” 
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work with, that is, in terms of their social roles within the significance 
networks of the world: “we meet them ‘at work,’ that is, primarily in their 
being-in-the-world.”566 However, in so far as we understand and relate to 
others primarily in terms of their social roles and tasks, we do not care for 
them as individual persons for their own sakes; instead the others get 
whatever import we ascribe to them from their roles within the world and 
its horizon of purposes.  
      There are, Heidegger claims, two “extreme possibilities” of a positive 
care for the other. On the one hand, we have the care which “leaps in” 
(einspringen) for the other and “takes away his care” by performing the 
tasks that originally belong to him: “This kind of solicitude takes over for 
the other that which is to be taken care of. The other is thus thrown out 
of his own position; he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has 
been attended to, he can take it over as something finished and at his 
disposal or disburden himself of it completely. In such caring the other 
can become someone who is dependent and dominated, even if this 
domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him.”567 On the other 
hand, we have the possibility of a positive care which does not “leap in” 
for the other, but which “leaps ahead (vorausspringen) of him [...] not in order 
to take his ‘care’ away from him but rather to give it back to him 
authentically”:568 “This kind of caring for (Fürsorge) pertains essentially to 
authentic care (Sorge) – that is, to the existence of the other, not to a ‘what’ 
with which he is concerned; it helps the other to become transparent to 
himself in his care and free for it.”569  
      As concerns the first kind of care “which leaps in and dominates,” the 
very fact that Heidegger describes the possibility of helping the other with 
                                         
566 SZ, p. 120:  “wir treffen sie ‘bei der Arbeit’, das heißt primär in ihrem In-der-Welt-
sein.” 
567 SZ, p. 122: “Diese Fürsorge übernimmt das, was zu besorgen ist, für den Anderen. 
Dieser wird dabei aus seiner Stelle geworfen, er tritt zurück, um nachträglich das 
Besorgte als fertif Verfügbares zu übernehmen, bzw. sich ganz davon zu entlasten. In 
solcher Fürsorge kann der Andere zum Abhängigen und Beherschten werden, mag 
diese  Herrschaft auch eine stillschweigende sein und dem Beherschten verborgen 
bleiben.”   
568 SZ, p. 122: “vorausspringt, nicht um ihm die ‘Sorge’ abzunehmen, sondern erst 
eigentlich als solche zurückzugeben.” 
569 SZ, p. 122: “Diese Fürsorge, die wesentlich die eigentliche Sorge – das heißt die 
Existenz des Anderen betrifft und nicht ein Was, das er besorgt, verhilft dem Anderen 
dazu, in seiner Sorge sich durchsichtig und für sie frei zu werden.” 
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her concrete tasks and burdens as inherently dominating, that is, as 
constituting a relation of power, shows that he has cancelled out the 
possibility of a loving care for the other which is free of power motives 
and does not necessarily effect relations of domination and subordination. 
However, neither does the depiction of the second kind of care “which 
leaps forth and liberates” introduce a care for the other for her own sake 
as a primary and irreducible source of motivation. Although the aim of 
this care is not to dominate the other but to help her becomes authentic, 
what makes this care so important is that it serves the existentially 
paramount task of becoming authentic. Indeed, the whole point of what 
Heidegger considers to be the highest form of care is to help the other to 
transparently and freely take over her own historical possibilities as the 
ultimate purpose-horizon of her life.  
      But why would we help the other person in the first place? Is it 
because our historical paradigms of meaning and value prescribe such 
behavior as good, virtuous, or honorable? Or is it because we essentially 
encounter the other person as a you who elicits and calls for our personal 
love and care prior to and independently of all such paradigms? Heidegger 
does not say a word concerning this decisive question. In his whole 
analysis there is no account whatsoever of the possibility of encountering 
– in love, sympathy, conscience – the other individual person as a you to 
care for for her own sake. Nor is there any account of the difficulties of 
relating openly and lovingly to the other, or of our strong tendency to 
evade this possibility, to close ourselves to and depersonalize the other.  
      Ultimately, Heidegger’s repression of the possibility of a direct love 
and care for the other as an end in herself shows itself in the lack of 
radical effects that the recognition of this possibility would necessarily 
have had on his philosophical project. Had he recognized this possibility 
for what it is, would he not have had to give up the very notion of 
Dasein’s historical possibilities as our ultimate source of purpose and 
significance? Would he not, as a result, also have had to give up the idea 
that the basic challenge of existence lies in transparently choosing one’s 
own groundless and finite possibilities? In so far as we could still give 
sense to the task of choosing the heroes or value paradigms guiding our 
lives, would not this choice have to be grounded in our direct care for 
others and not the other way around?  Finally, would not recognizing the 
possibility of directly encountering the other as a you to care for unsettle 
 Authenticity and the End of Being and Time 265 
 
 
Heidegger’s basic motivation for the project of fundamental ontology, 
namely the idea that such a project is necessary to make possible an 
unprejudiced and open encounter with meaningful phenomena?  
      Let us, however, put these critical questions aside for now and turn to 
a more detailed examination of Heidegger’s account of how Dasein, to 
become authentic, is to disclose and transparently choose its ownmost 
possibilities.    
 
Collectivism, Subjectivism, Egoism 
    
According to Heidegger, Dasein’s possibility of authentic existence lies in 
transparently choosing its own finite and groundless possibilities from the 
historical heritage into which it is always already thrown. The point of 
departure, however, is that Dasein has first and foremost fled this 
possibility, in such a way that it lives and understands itself on the basis of 
the uprooted and prejudiced interpretedness of the They. Hence, Dasein’s 
way to authenticity essentially goes from the interpretedness of the They 
to an originary disclosure and choice of its own possibilities.  
      We can immediately see that the task of accounting for Dasein’s 
primordial understanding of its possibilities hinges on the same question 
as the task of accounting for what it would mean for a hermeneutic-
destructive thinking to retrieve a primordial understanding of being: how 
are primordial historical meanings – senses of being, paradigmatic heroes 
– given and how do we access and explicate them? However, as we have 
seen, Heidegger is unable to answer this question, or even state it clearly, 
in Being and Time. In his analysis of Dasein’s authentic resolute self-
understanding he does not so much as touch the question how Dasein, 
through some kind of destructive retrieval, is to free itself from the 
possibilities of the They and get access to more primordial possibilities 
harbored by the heritage. Instead, the focus of the analysis is from the 
outset set on the individual Dasein’s choice of its own possibilities from 
the heritage, whereby the question of the originary givenness of the 
heritage – as something transcending the prejudices of the They – is left 
unasked.  
      In what follows I want to suggest that this lacuna leads Heidegger’s 
analysis of authentic resoluteness into an ambivalent oscillation between 
collectivism and subjectivism. In view of this fact it is not surprising that 
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the secondary literature contains opposing interpretations, highlighting 
either one of these aspects. Let us begin by looking at the collectivist 
tendency and then move on to the tendency towards subjectivism. Finally, 
I will suggest that Heidegger’s analysis remains stuck in an egoistic-
collectivist attitude in which collective pressure and egoistic desire figure 
as the ultimate motives determining our experience and understanding of 
meaningful beings.  
      So how is Dasein, who is first and foremost guided by the prejudiced 
interpretedness of the They, supposed to choose its own possibilities?  
      According to Heidegger, the interpretedness of the They is not 
something that Dasein will ever be able to emancipate itself from 
completely. Even when it becomes authentic, Dasein will still be beset by, 
and, to some extent, enmeshed in the They: “Authentic being one’s self does 
not rest upon an exceptional state of the subject, a state detached from the 
They, but is an existentiell modification of the They as an essential existentiale.”570 
But what does it mean that authentic existence is a “modification of the 
They”? Heidegger’s formulation admits, I think, both of a weak and of a 
strong interpretation. The weak interpretation would be that Dasein can 
never hope to free itself completely and definitely from the 
interpretedness of the They. Given Dasein’s tendency towards 
inauthenticity, and given the way our common understanding and 
language is dominated by the They, Dasein’s struggle for authenticity will 
be a constant battle against collective uprootedness and prejudice, a 
struggle whose possible victories will always be provisional and 
incomplete. However, the formulation also allows for the strong 
interpretation that Dasein, in its choice of its own possibilities, is 
fundamentally referred to the world of the They as the ultimate source of 
its possibilities.  
      There are, I submit, many passages in Heidegger’s analysis that speaks 
in favor of the strong interpretation. Heidegger begins his treatment of 
conscience and resoluteness by depicting Dasein’s inauthenticity as the 
state in which the They has always already “decided upon” the possibilities 
of Dasein, and thus “relieved Dasein of the burden of explicitly choosing 
                                         
570 SZ, p. 130: “Das eigentliche Selbstsein beruht nicht auf einem vom Man abgelösten 
Ausnahmezustand des Subjekt, sondern ist eine existentielle Modifikation des Man als eines 
wesenhaften Existentials.” Cf. SZ, pp. 179, 267. 
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these possibilities.”571 He also stresses that Dasein’s authentic choice of its 
possibilities does not imply any transformation of the world that Dasein 
has so far taken over from the They in a blind and prejudiced manner: 
“The ‘world’ at hand does not become another one ‘in its content’; the 
circle of others is not exchanged for a new one, and yet the being towards 
the ready-to-hand which understands and takes care of things, and the 
concerned being-with the others, are now determined in terms of their 
ownmost potentiality-for-being-their-selves.”572 However, if Dasein’s 
authentic choice of itself does not bring with it any change of the content 
of the world dictated by the They – what can this mean, except that the 
prevailing norms and possibilities of the They are taken over and affirmed 
as ultimate and authoritative? A few pages later, this interpretation seems 
to be forcefully confirmed: 
 
Even resolutions remain dependent upon the They and its world. 
The understanding of this is one of the things that a resolution 
discloses, inasmuch as resoluteness is what first gives authentic 
transparency to Dasein. In resoluteness, Dasein is concerned with 
its ownmost potentiality for being, that, as thrown, can project itself 
only upon definite factical possibilities. Resolution does not 
withdraw itself from “reality,” but first discovers what is factically 
possible in such a way that it seizes upon it as this is possible, as its 
ownmost potentiality for being, in the They.573 
 
Here, Heidegger states quite unequivocally that the interpretedness of the 
They provides and determines the possibilities from which Dasein has to 
choose itself. Not only does he write that the “resolutions remain 
dependent upon the They and its world.” He goes so far as to identify the 
                                         
571 SZ, p. 268: “Entlastung von der ausdrücklichen Wahl dieser Möglichkeiten.” 
572 SZ, 297f.: “Die zuhandene ‘Welt’ wird nicht ‘inhaltlich’ eine andere, der Kreis der 
Anderen wird nicht ausgewechselt, und doch ist das verstehende besorgende Sein zum 
Zuhandenen und das fürsorgende Mitsein mit den Anderen jetzt aus deren eigenstem 
Selbstseinkönnen heraus bestimmt.” 
573 SZ, p. 299. “Auch der Entschluß bleibt auf das Man und seine Welt angewiesen. 
Das zu verstehen, gehört mit zu dem, war er erschließt, sofern die Entschlossenheit 
erst dem Dasein die eigentliche Durchsichtigkeit gibt. In der Entschlossenheit geht es 
dem Dasein um sein eigenstes Seinkönnen, das als geworfenes nur auf bestimmte 
faktische Möglichkeiten sich entwerfen kann. Der Entschluß entzieht sich nicht der 
‘Wirklichkeit’, sondern entdeckt erst das faktisch Mögliche, so zwar, daß er es 
dergestalt, wie es als eigenstes Seinkönnen im Man möglich ist, ergreift.”  
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possibilities of the They with Dasein’s factical possibilities in general: that 
authentic Dasein discovers the “what is factically possible” means that it 
discovers and seizes upon it as this is “possible [...] in the They.”  
      All this seems to support an interpretation according to which Dasein 
would be fundamentally referred to the possibilities of the They, so that its 
authentic choice of itself would involve no need and no possibility to 
critically dismantle the common interpretedness of the They in order to 
attain a more originary understanding of the possibilities of a good and 
meaningful life. Hubert Dreyfus has offered a well-known defense of this 
kind of interpretation. His point of departure is the thesis that “Heidegger 
never denies that all significance and intelligibility is the product of the 
one,” and that “Dasein is a more or less coherent pattern of the 
comportment required by public ‘roles’ and activities – an embodiment of 
the one.”574 On this view, inauthenticity would consist in the belief that 
our collective historical norms constitute the universal and timeless truth, 
which is grounded in God or nature. To become authentic, Dreyfus 
claims, is not to attain a more primordial understanding than the one 
provided by the They; instead, it is to “take over the average for-the-sake-
of-which one has in one’s culture just like everyone else.” The difference 
between inauthentic and authentic Dasein is that the latter understands 
that the historical norms of the They are not universal and timeless but 
amount to “what we in the West happen to do.” As a result, Dreyfus 
states: “The only deep interpretation is that there is no deep 
interpretation.”575 
      However, even though there is a tendency in Heidegger’s argument to 
absolutize the collective norms of the They as our ultimate source of 
ethical-existential significance, the interpretation suggested above is 
problematic, both exegetically and – above all – systematically. The basic 
problem is that the interpretation is unable to uphold any distinction 
between collective prejudice and primordial understanding, however such 
a distinction is to be conceived. Heidegger’s notion of the interpretedness 
of the They essentially builds on the thought that Dasein has a strong 
tendency to take over, in a blind and irresponsible way, the traditional and 
collectively sanctioned interpretation of things, which is normally 
prejudiced, so that it covers up and distorts the matters it pretends to 
                                         
574 Dreyfus 1991, pp. 156, 159. 
575 Dreyfus 1991, p. 157. 
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reveal. Hence, it would be absurd to claim that the collective 
interpretedness we happen to live in would constitute our ultimate source 
of truth and significance: it belongs to the very meaning of taking over the 
interpretedness of the They that we do not open ourselves to and disclose 
the matters at stake, just as it belongs to its meaning that it refers to the 
possibility of independently trying to understand the matters. The upshot 
of this interpretation is that Heidegger’s notion of authentic resoluteness 
becomes indistinguishable from an attitude of cynical collectivism: to 
clear-sightedly accept the interpretedness of the They as one’s destiny – 
how could this be anything else than legitimizing one’s thinking by 
referring to what the collective concepts and norms happen to prescribe as 
good and true, even though one knows, in a basic yet more or less 
inarticulate way, that this is bad faith and self-deception?576  
      When we move from the question of the source of Dasein’s 
possibilities to the question of the choice of its own possibilities, the 
collectivist tendency in Heidegger’s account seems to give way to a 
tendency towards subjectivism.  
                                         
576 In contrast to Dreyfus who pointedly equates Dasein’s historical possibilities with 
the interpretedness of the They, there are many commentators who simply emphasize 
that Dasein receives its possibilities from the historical context and heritage into which 
it is thrown. Such a general historicist interpretation is of course exegetically true as far 
as it goes. However, the problem here is that Heidegger in Being and Time is unable to 
account for the difference between blindly taking over the norms that happen to 
dominate the collective context that Dasein identifies with, and attaining a more 
primordial understanding by critically retrieving the most qualified possibilities of 
meaning that our historical tradition harbors within itself. The upshot of this is that 
Heidegger’s notion of the historicity and sociality of Dasein collapses into an 
oscillation between crude collectivism and irrational subjectivism. In so far as the 
historicist interpretation has no better account to offer of the difference between 
prejudice and genuine understanding it is bound to be haunted by the same problems 
as Heidegger himself. In the end, we need to ask whether these problems are just the 
result of the inadequate argumentation in Being and Time, or whether the very idea that 
our historical contexts of meaning determine the possible significances of particular 
beings is not in itself collectivist in a problematic way? To the extent that we cancel 
out the possibility of relating lovingly and caringly to other particular persons for their 
own sake – regardless of historical context – and instead elevate our historical contexts 
of meaning into an absolute source of significance, it seems that the only way in which 
such historical meanings and norms can concern us and bind us is on account of their 
collective power, that is, as manifestations of what the collective group with which we 
identify happens to value and appreciate. I will return to these issues in the last chapter 
as well as in the epilogue of the thesis.  
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      As soon as Heidegger has posed the question of which possibilities 
authentic Dasein will choose – “But to what does Dasein resolve itself in 
resoluteness?”577 – he writes: 
 
Only the resolution itself can give the answer. It would be a 
complete misunderstanding of the phenomenon of resoluteness if 
one were to believe that it is simply a matter of taking up and 
seizing hold of possibilities which have been presented and 
recommended. The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and 
determination of the actual factical possibility. To resoluteness, the 
indefiniteness that characterizes every factically projected potentiality-
for-being of Dasein necessarily belongs. Resoluteness is certain of 
itself only in a resolution. The existentiell indefiniteness of resoluteness 
never makes itself definite except in a resolution; it nevertheless has 
its existential definiteness.578  
 
The same thought is repeated many times: in becoming authentic Dasein 
does not simply take up “possibilities which have been presented and 
recommended,” that is, proposed by the They. Instead, resoluteness 
essentially involves a “disclosive projection and determination” of 
Dasein’s possibilities.   
      But how do we disclose and determine our own possibilities? 
      To begin with, it bears noting that Heidegger rejects the idea that the 
existential analysis could have anything to say – be it de facto or de jure – 
about the specific content of Dasein’s existentiell choice, since this choice 
is always determined by the historical situation of the particular Dasein. 
Still, this “existentiell indefiniteness” has its “existential definiteness.” 
Heidegger thus thinks it is fully possible to explicate the existential 
structures that characterize Dasein’s choice of itself without entering upon 
                                         
577 SZ, p. 298: “Aber woraufhin entschließt sich das Dasein in der Entschlossenheit?” 
578 SZ, p. 298: “Die Antwort vermag nur der Entschluß selbst zu geben. Es wäre ein 
völliges Mißverständnis des Phänomens der Entschlossenheit, wollte man meinen es 
sei lediglich ein aufnehmendes Zugreifen gegenüber vorgelegten und anempfohlenen 
Möglichkeiten. Der Entschluß ist gerade erst das erschließende Entwerfen und Bestimmen der 
jeweiligen faktischen Möglichkeit. Zur Entschlossenheit gehört notwendig die Unbestimmtheit, 
die jedes faktisch-geworfene Seinkönnen des Daseins charakterisiert. Ihrer selbst 
sicher ist die Entschlossenheit nur als Entschluß. Aber die existenzielle, jeweils erst im 
Entschluß sich bestimmende Unbestimmtheit der Entschlossenheit hat gleichwohl ihre 
existenziale Bestimmtheit.” 
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the content of that choice. So how is Dasein’s resolute choice of itself 
carried out? 
      In the quotation above we find the phrase “Resoluteness is certain of 
itself only in a resolution.” Now this phrase and the very word 
“resoluteness” – Entschlossenheit – could easily seem to suggest that 
Heidegger would conceive of Dasein’s choice as a radically free and 
ungroundable decision, in which Dasein projects itself, in a kind of blind 
leap, towards the possibilities that are to guide its life. However, for 
Heidegger the word Entschlossenheit – “entschlossen” literally means “not 
closed off” – signifies both decisiveness and openness. Indeed, the 
passage above describes the resolute choice as a “disclosive projection and 
determination,” that is, as a choice that involves a qualified open 
understanding of Dasein’s possibilities. 
      As far as I can see, Heidegger’s only concrete strategy for accounting 
for Dasein’s disclosure and choice of its possibility consists in referring to 
Dasein’s anticipation of its own death as that which grants light and 
certainty to the choice. Let me quote the two main passages in which this 
notion is elaborated: 
 
The more authentically Dasein resolves itself, that is, understands 
itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost eminent possibility in 
anticipating death, the more unequivocally and unarbitrarily does it 
choose and find the possibility of its existence. Only the 
anticipation of death drives every accidental and “preliminary” 
possibility out.  Only being free for death gives Dasein its goal 
simply and pushes existence into its finitude. The finitude of 
existence thus seized upon tears one back out of the endless 
multiplicity of possibilities offering themselves nearest by – those 
of comfort, shirking and taking things easy – and brings Dasein 
into the simplicity of its fate.579 
 
                                         
579 SZ, p. 384: “Je eigentlicher sich das Dasein entschließt, das heißt unzweideutig aus 
seiner eigensten, ausgezeichneter Möglichkeit im Vorlaufen in den Tod sich versteht, 
um so eindeutiger und unzufälliger ist das wählende Finden der Möglichkeit seiner 
Existenz. Nur das Vorlaufen in den Tod treibt jede zufällige und ‘vorläufige’ 
Möglichkeit aus. Nur das Freisein für den Tod gibt dem Dasein das Ziel schlechthin 
und stößt die Existenz in ihre Endlichkeit. Die ergriffene Endlichkeit der Existenz 
reißt aus der endlosen Mannigfaltigkeit der sich anbietenden nächsten Möglichkeiten 
des Behagens, Leichtnehmens, Sichdrückens zurück und bringt das Dasein in die 
Einfachheit seines Schicksals.”  
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And: 
 
Anticipation discloses to existence that its outmost possibility lies in 
giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one’s clinging to whatever 
existence one has reached. [...] Free for its ownmost possibilities, 
that are determined by the end, and thus understood as finite, Dasein 
prevents the danger that it may, by its own finite understanding of 
existence, fail to recognize that it is getting overtaken by the 
existence-possibilities of others, or that it may misconstrue these 
possibilities and force them back upon its own, thus divesting itself 
of its ownmost factical existence. [...] Because anticipation of the 
possibility-not-to-be-bypassed also discloses all the possibilities 
lying before it, this anticipation includes the possibility of taking the 
whole of Dasein in advance in an existentiell way, that is, the 
possibility of existing as a whole potentiality-for-being.580 
 
Here we find Heidegger’s basic idea that it is “only the anticipation of 
death” that allows Dasein to free itself from the accidental and provisional 
possibilities provided by the They, and makes it possible for it to “choose 
and find” its own possibilities. Yet how does Dasein’s anticipation of its 
death enable its choice of itself? 
      The passages above seem to allow for two interpretations. One the 
one hand Heidegger could be seen as saying that Dasein’s anticipation of 
its death merely opens it up to the finitude of its own factical possibilities. 
Heidegger thus specifies the sense of his claim that Dasein possibilities are 
“determined by the end” by saying that these possibilities are “understood 
as finite.” However, if anticipation of death only discloses the finitude of 
Dasein and confronts it with the task of choosing its own finite 
possibilities – then it does not give any clue at all as to which possibilities 
Dasein is to choose. On the other hand, Heidegger’s formulations also 
                                         
580 SZ, p. 264: “Das Vorlaufen erschließt der Existenz als äußerste Möglichkeit die 
Selbstaufgabe und zerbricht so jede Versteifung auf die je erreichte Existenz. [… ]. 
Frei für die eigensten, vom Ende her bestimmten, das heißt als endliche verstandenen 
Möglichkeiten, bannt das Daseins die Gefahr, aus seinem endlichen 
Existenzverständnis her die es überholenden Existenzmöglichkeiten der Anderen zu 
verkennen oder aber sie mißdeutend auf die eigene zurückzuzwingen – um sich so der 
eigensten faktischen Existenz zu begeben. […] Weil das Vorlaufen in die 
unüberholbare Möglichkeit alle ihr vorgelagerten Möglichkeiten mit erschließt, liegt in 
ihm die Möglichkeit eines existenziellen Vorwegnehmens des ganzen Daseins, das heißt 
die Möglichkeit, als ganzes Seinkönnen zu existieren.” 
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support a stronger reading. He does not only write that death “determines 
the possibilities of Dasein,” but also stresses that anticipation of death 
“gives Dasein its goal” and “brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate.” 
In some sense, Heidegger seems to suggest, Dasein’s anticipation of its 
death as its ultimate limiting possibility grants a measure that enables it to 
disclose and choose its own possibilities. However, Heidegger stops at this 
suggestion and does not give any hint about how Dasein is supposed to 
choose in the light of its mortality.     
      Heidegger’s problems with accounting for the grounds of Dasein’s 
authentic choice of its possibilities has led some commentators – e.g. Karl 
Löwith and Ernst Tugendhat – to criticize his conception of authenticity 
as a sort of “decisionism.”581 The basic argument is that Heidegger’s 
fundamental failure to describe how Dasein is to assess the truth and 
normativity of the factical possibilities provided by the They, implies that 
Dasein’s resolute choice – which is in itself “immediate and without 
perspective”582 – determines the truth of the possibilities it happens to 
choose. As Tugendhat formulates it: “Resoluteness does not conform to 
the truth; instead, the ‘truth’ of the current possibility consists precisely 
therein, that Dasein resolves upon it from out of its authentic being-
itself.”583 I think this critical reading is correct in that it points to the fact 
that Heidegger is unable to account for any ground or measure that would 
allow Dasein to disclose and choose its own possibilities independently of 
the They. In so far as Dasein’s choice of itself is supposed to be 
independent of the They, the only thing left that could guide its choice is 
its own blind whims and impulses (if such are even thinkable apart from 
the They). However, not only does the view here ascribed to Heidegger 
suffer from deep philosophical problems. The interpretation of Heidegger 
as a decisionist or subjectivist is also distortive in so far as it overlooks the 
extent to which Heidegger stresses Dasein’s thrownness into its historical 
heritage as its absolute source of meaning. At no point would Heidegger 
claim that the resolute choice of the individual Dasein could by itself 
determine the truth or significance of its available historical possibilities.  
                                         
581 Cf. Löwith 1960, pp. 93f.; Tugendhat 1970, pp. 360f. Cf. also Wolin 1990, pp. 52ff., 
64ff. 
582 Tugendhat 1970, p. 361: “unvermittelt und hinsichtslos.” 
583 Tugendhat 1970, p. 360: “Die Entschlossenheit richtet sich nicht nach der 
Wahrheit, sondern die ‘Wahrheit’ der jeweiligen Möglichkeit besteht eben darin, daß 
das Dasein sich aus seinem eigentlichen Selbst-sein zu ihr entschließt.” 
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      Recently, Steven Crowell has attempted to counter the above critique 
– that Heidegger’s concept of authenticity excludes critical deliberation – 
by arguing that Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity is not meant to supply 
standards for Dasein’s choice of itself. Instead, the aim of Heidegger’s 
account of conscience is to articulate “our capacity for entering into the 
space of reasons,” which is a prerequisite for all critical deliberation.584 
According to Crowell, the inauthentic They-self acts in accord with the 
factical norms of the They in a “mindless” and “quasi-mechanical 
manner,” such that these norms determine her behavior much in the same 
way as the constraints of nature.585 By contrast, the call of conscience 
opens up Dasein to “a responsiveness to norms as norms,” which also 
means that Dasein is confronted with the task of responsibly accounting 
for itself and giving reasons:586 “what the call of conscience gives to 
understand is that that which I can never get into my power – what 
grounds me beyond my reach – is nevertheless my possibility. This, I 
suggest, can only mean that factic grounds become subject to a choice for 
which I am accountable; they are thereby taken up into the normative 
space of reasons.”587  
      Crowell is, I think, right in claiming that Heidegger’s analysis of 
authenticity is not meant to provide standards for Dasein’s choice but 
rather articulates the possibility of achieving an independent and 
responsible stance towards the norms at our disposal. However, since 
Crowell – like Heidegger – has no account to offer of an alternative source 
of truth and significance beyond the factical norms of the They, it seems 
to me that his interpretation in the end reproduces the oscillation between 
collectivism and subjectivism diagnosed above. To begin with, I believe it 
is misleading to say that the inauthentic self follows the norms of the They 
in a thoroughly quasi-mechanical manner. Heidegger describes – correctly, 
I think – the inauthentic self as being addressed by the norms of the They 
precisely as obligating and normative, more precisely, as the collective 
standards that tell us what we should be and do, and which we feel we 
must conform with in order to feel worthy and honorable and to avoid 
guilt and shame. Indeed, the inauthentic self is also from the outset 
                                         
584 Crowell 2007, p. 49. 
585 Crowell 2007, pp. 52, 54. 
586 Crowell 2007, p. 55. Cf. Crowell 2008, p. 266. 
587 Crowell 2007, p. 57. 
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engaged in giving reasons for and legitimizing its actions with reference to 
what is considered good, honorable, acceptable, etc. However, as soon as 
we recognize this it becomes difficult to give a clear sense to Crowell’s 
thesis that it is only the call of conscience that opens up a “responsiveness 
to norms as norms,” a sense that would account for the possibility of 
breaking with the normativity of the They and of freely assessing the truth 
and moral substance of our factical norms. It would seem that Heidegger’s 
view on this matter is that anxiety and conscience confront Dasein – who, 
as inauthentic, has accepted the norms of the They in an uncritical manner 
as the universal and timeless truth – with the fundamental groundlessness 
and finitude of the factical meaning-context in which it lives. However, 
this does not imply that the factical norms of the They would be 
questioned or that Dasein would get access to some other kind of 
normativity than the collective pressure exerted by the norms of the They. 
On the contrary, Heidegger’s analysis suggests that to become authentic is 
precisely to clear-sightedly and responsibly affirm and take over the 
factical norms of the They as a groundless destiny.   
      The problem with Crowell’s solution is that any description of our 
basic openness to normativity is dependent on some account of what it is 
that obligates and claims us. In so far as there is no other, more primary, 
source of normativity than the collective norms of the They, Dasein’s 
independent and responsible relation to normativity must consist in a 
transparent affirmation of these norms. Heidegger’s analysis of 
authenticity accounts for no such source and neither does Crowell’s.588 As 
                                         
588 In my discussion, I have followed Crowell’s interpretation of Heidegger’s view 
conscience in Being and Time as this is developed in Crowell 2007 and Crowell 2008. 
Towards the end of the latter article Crowell – commenting on Heidegger’s later essay 
“…Poetically Man Dwells…” (…dichterisch wohnet der Mensch…) from 1951 – suggests 
that Heidegger, when reflecting on the character of the normative force that binds us, 
recognizes the claim of the other human being in a manner that mirrors Levinas’s 
proto-ethics: “This does not mean that Heidegger and Levinas are saying ‘the same.’ 
But it does indicate that Heidegger too, when reflecting upon the normative force of 
the originary meaning-event, the orientation toward measure that makes all meaning 
possible, finds his way to relations between human beings” (Crowell 2008, p. 276). 
Philosophically, I have no doubt that this is the right – in fact, the only – way to go if 
we want to understand the sources of genuine ethical normativity and obligation. 
However, as far as I can see Heidegger never recognizes the absolute claim of the 
other person on me beyond every historical norm and value, and it is hard to see that 
the passage quoted by Crowell – in which Heidegger comments on some lines by 
Hölderlin – supports such a radical notion. Indeed, if Heidegger would really 
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a result, Crowell’s interpretation is unable to open a way out of the 
vacillation between collectivism and subjectivism. On the one hand, 
Crowell seems to accept the factical norms of the They as our basic source 
of normativity;589 on the other hand, he argues – following John 
Haugeland – that these norms only gain “normative force” in so far as 
Dasein resolutely “commits” itself to them:590 “It follows that resolve or 
commitment cannot itself be rationally grounded: I can give reasons for 
committing myself to something, but those reasons will be normative only 
to the extent that I have already committed myself to them.”591 What is this 
if not a reiteration of the tension between the belief in the authority of the 
They and the idea of a commitment or choice which, in so far as it is not 
already guided by the factical norms of the They, must remain a blind and 
irrational leap?592 
                                                                                                                      
recognize and understand the claim ascribed to him by Crowell, this would upset the 
basic philosophical framework which motivates and organizes both his thinking of 
authenticity in Being and Time as well as his later conception of the task of thinking.  
589 Cf. Crowell 2007, p. 53. 
590 Crowell 2007, p. 59. 
591 Crowell 2007, p. 59n47. Cf. also Haugeland 1998, pp. 340ff. 
592 Another way of countering the decisionist critique is found in the kind of 
narrativist interpretation of Heidegger’s concepts of authenticity defended by Charles 
Guignon. According to Guignon, Dasein’s authentic choice of itself should not be 
understood as a radically free or arbitrary choice. Becoming authentic, Guignon 
claims, involves understanding that “I [...] find myself enmeshed in a particular 
historical culture that predefines the range of possibilities of action that will make 
sense in my situation” (Guignon 1993, p. 225). On this view, inauthenticity consists in 
becoming dispersed in the latest trends and demands of the public world while 
“lacking any overarching sense of what makes life worth living” (p. 227). Authenticity 
requires that Dasein face its own mortality and finitude, so that it is led to view its life 
as a “coherent story,” and focus itself – with “decisive dedication” – into a finite range 
of possibilities: “Authentic self-focusing, understood as resolute reaching forward into 
a finite range of possibilities, gives coherence, cohesiveness, and integrity to a life 
course” (p. 229). In this, Daseins choice of itself is not completely blind and arbitrary; 
rather, it is guided by certain “metavalues”: becoming authentic requires “resoluteness, 
steadiness, courage, and, above all, clear-sightedness about one’s own life as a thrown 
projection” (p. 232). As far as I can see Guignon – providing no account of a source 
of truth and significance beyond the collective norms of the They – remains firmly 
entrenched in the ambivalence between collectivism and subjectivism. Accepting the 
norms of Dasein’s particular historical culture as that which “predefines the range of 
possibilities,” Guignon focuses solely on how Dasein should choose its possibilities in 
order to shape its life into a coherent narrative. However, the “metavalues” that are 
supposed to guide Dasein’s choice tell us nothing about the truth or moral substance 
of the norms of the They; instead, they only – at most – function as criteria for 
constructing a formally coherent and harmonious life story. As concerns the question 
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      So far, I have focused on Heidegger’s inability to account for a 
measure that would allow Dasein to critically assess the truth or 
primordiality of the factical norms and concepts of the They. However, 
since the aim of Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity is none other than to 
describe Dasein’s access to its sources of ethical-existential significance 
and normativity, what is at stake here is not only the question of critique 
and truth but also the question of what ultimately concerns Dasein as 
binding and significant. Now, since Heidegger cancels out the possibility 
of a direct sympathy for the other person for her own sake, and is unable 
to point to another source of normativity that would transcend the They, 
it seems to me that his vision of our basic ethical-existential motives 
remains pervaded by a simultaneously collectivist and egoistic attitude. 
      As we know, Heidegger suggests that the interpretedness of the They 
constitutes the source from which Dasein receives its possibilities. This 
interpretedness primarily concerns and motivates Dasein in virtue of its 
normality and acceptance by the They; in short, in virtue of the collective 
pressure and force it exerts on us. However, in so far as Heidegger 
attempts to bring in other motives which – beyond the social pressure of 
the They – are to guide Dasein’s choice of its possibilities, he is only 
capable of grounding Dasein’s choice in basically egoistic desires. It is hard 
to see that any of those motives Heidegger and his interpreters present 
would be anything else than modifications of our egoistic self-concern. 
This holds, I think, not only for our concern with our own death and 
finitude, and for our desire to choose and commit ourselves to 
possibilities in order to shape a coherent, meaningful, and psychologically-
existentially healthy life. It seems that even our will to become 
independent, responsible and truthful will only amount to a sublimated 
expression of intellectual and moral narcissism as long as it is not 
anchored in a basic desire to open up to and care for other human beings.  
      The tendency towards egoism is in fact already manifest in Heidegger’s 
basic analysis of Dasein’s being as “care.” As is well known, Heidegger 
claims that the expression “care for the self” (Selbstsorge) would be a 
“tautology,” given that Dasein’s care for other entities is ultimately 
grounded in its care for its own being and possibilities.593 This idea does 
                                                                                                                      
of what we should choose as the content of our lives, Guignon basically presents 
Dasein as faced with a blind and arbitrary decision.  
593 SZ, p. 193. 
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not by itself imply any – at least not any straightforward – egoism. By 
stating that Dasein primarily cares about itself Heidegger wants to say that 
it cares about its being and its paradigmatic possibilities, which do not 
originate in the individual ontic self but which, quite the reverse, 
determine the self and its will.  
      Nevertheless, Heidegger’s concrete analysis is ambivalent on this 
point. As a result of his basic failure to account for how Dasein’s historical 
being and possibilities are given as binding and significant, Heidegger is 
again and again led to ground Dasein’s experience of significance in its 
care for its own ontic self. This tendency comes clearly to the fore in the 
analysis of disposedness. According to Heidegger, Dasein’s ability to 
experience beings as “mattering” to it – as useful, joyful, frightening, tragic 
– is “grounded” in its “disposedness.”594 But how? In his analysis of fear, 
Heidegger specifies the basic role of disposedness in opening up Dasein to 
that which matters: “That about which fear is afraid is the fearful being itself 
– Dasein. Only a being that is concerned in its being about that being can 
be afraid. Fearing discloses this being as endangered and abandoned to 
itself.”595 Hence, it is only because the feeling of fear from the outset 
discloses Dasein to itself as being at stake and exposed that it is able to 
experience different beings as frightening and worrisome.  However, this 
basic analysis is not only meant to account for situations in which we fear 
for our own sake. Concerning the possibility of fearing for someone else’s 
sake Heidegger writes: “But viewed precisely, fearing for . . . is, after all, 
being-afraid-for-oneself. What is ‘feared’ here is the being-with the other 
who could be snatched away from us.”596 The same movement of thought 
is found in Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s experience of loss in the face 
of the death of another human being: “The more appropriately the no-
longer-being-there of the deceased is grasped phenomenally, the more 
clearly it can be seen that in such being-with the dead, the real having-
come-to-an-end of the deceased is precisely not experienced. Death does 
                                         
594 SZ, p. 137. 
595 SZ, p. 141: “Das Worum die Furcht fürchtet, ist das sich fürchtende Seiende selbst, 
das Dasein. Nur Seiendes, dem es in seinem Sein um dieses selbst geht, kann sich 
fürchten. Das Fürchten erschließt dieses Seiende in seiner Gefährdigung, in der 
Überlassenheit an es selbst.” 
596 SZ, p. 142: “Genau besehen ist aber das Fürchten für … doch ein Sichfürchten. 
‘Befürchtet’ ist dabei das Mitsein mit dem Anderen, der einem entrissen werden 
könnte.” 
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reveal itself as a loss, but as a loss such as experienced by those who 
remain.”597 In short, Heidegger basically argues that Dasein’s ability to 
experience things as mattering to it – even in the case of fearing for or 
mourning another person – is grounded in its care for itself and its own 
possibilities.  
      Although ultimately problematic, I think Heidegger’s analysis here 
contains an important yet limited insight: the fact that I am disclosed to 
myself as personally addressed by the situation at hand clearly constitutes a 
basic aspect of our experience of things as mattering and significant. If 
this component were removed, we would only have experiences in which 
we would experience things as important without them addressing us 
personally. But what kind of experience would this be? Would it be an 
experience of the kind we have when we watch human disasters, which 
have taken place far away or a long time ago, on TV or on the Internet? 
But is not even this experience just a modification of the primary 
experience of being personally addressed? Even though the tragedy I am 
witnessing has occurred long ago there seems to be nothing that hinders 
me from feeling personally addressed by the persons I perceive, from 
wanting to talk to them and help them, from mourning them. My lack of 
power to do anything does not mean that the experience loses its character 
of personal address. Should we not rather say that this kind of experience, 
in which we witness the joys and sorrows of other people at great 
distances in time and space (experiences which modern communication 
and media technology has increased ad absurdum) puts us in morally 
demanding situation in which we – as a reaction to our primary experience 
of being personally addressed – are forced to choose between either 
repressing the possibility of personal care, or genuinely caring in spite of 
our having little or no possibilities of concretely encountering or helping 
the people we care for.  
      However, Heidegger’s argument does not only involve the claim that 
experiencing oneself as personally addressed is a central feature of 
Dasein’s experience of significance. It also centrally involves the thesis 
that in experiencing other entities as significant – fearful, joyful, 
                                         
597 SZ, p. 239: “Je angemessener das Nichtmehrdasein des Verstorbenen phänomenal 
gefaßt wird, um so deutlicher zeigt sich, daß solches Mitsein mit dem Toten gerade 
nicht das eigentliche Zuendekommensein des Verstorbenen erfährt. Der Tod enthüllt 
sich zwar als Verlust, aber mehr als solcher, den die Verbleibenden erfahren.” 
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threatening, sorrowful – it is ultimately Dasein’s care for itself, its basic 
egoism, that makes other things and persons appear significant to it. 
However, Heidegger does not offer any phenomenological support for 
this claim but seems to be led into it by the logic of the existential analytic 
itself, that is, by its primal repression of the possibility of a direct loving 
care for the other person as such. 
      In the end, I do not think that collective pressure and egoistic desire 
should be seen as different or opposed motives. Instead, it seems that they 
constitute different complementary aspects of the same egoistic-
collectivist attitude. To the extent that we close ourselves to the possibility 
of relating openly to the other as a you, it seems that the only possibility 
that remains is the possibility of relating to others as a collective “we” or 
“they” – whereby the individual other person basically appears in terms of 
her social role or as a general representative of some group. Now, this way 
of relating to others is essentially characterized by both collectivism and 
egoism. When we – in our desire for honor, esteem, and respect and in 
our fear of shame, disgrace, and humiliation – care about the norms and 
opinions of our collective group, what we essentially care about is 
ourselves: about how I appear in front of the collective I identify with, and 
about how well I manage to realize what the collective happens to find 
honorable, good, and desirable. Conversely, in this attitude the content of 
my will is more or less completely formed by what my collective thinks is 
praiseworthy. Here, everything revolves around how I appear in front of 
my group of impersonal others: I care about the others because I care 
about myself and I desire what I desire because the others seem to desire 
it.  
      But is it not possible to think of a purely egoistic motivation, in which 
the collectivist aspects has been minimized or removed altogether? Is it 
not possible, for example, to ignore or disdain what the collective group 
surrounding me values and thinks about me, and instead be driven by a 
purely narcissistic will to self-affirmation and self-glorification of the kind 
that is so typical of philosophers and intellectuals? Although I cannot 
show this in detail here, I think that what might first appear as an attitude 
that has emancipated itself more or less radically from the pressure of the 
crowd in fact retains its basic collectivist character. As soon as we start 
reflecting on the psychological-existential meaning of the break with the 
collective group, we will invariably discover that the seemingly 
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independent will to self-affirmation hides within itself a secret longing for 
collective affirmation. The only difference is that the group we identify 
with has been modified: either the independent self-affirming individual 
identifies with some existing alternative group, or she identifies – in a 
spirit of resentment and revenge – with a fictitious, dreamt up, group 
which affirms her unconditionally and which she hopes will one day 
materialize as a real collective audience welcoming and praising her as a 
hero.  
      Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity in Being and Time is, in short, 
haunted by severe problems that concern both the criteria and the ethical-
existential motives informing Dasein’s understanding and choice of its 
possibilities. Given Heidegger’s inability to account for the difference 
between collective prejudice and originary understanding a situation arises 
in which, on the one hand, the prejudiced interpretedness of the They 
figures as the basic reservoir from which Dasein has to fetch its 
possibilities, and, on the other hand, Dasein’s only criteria for choosing its 
own possibilities lies in its blind whims and impulses. Moreover, since 
Heidegger rules out the possibility of a direct sympathy for the other 
person for her own sake, his account of Dasein’s basic ethical-existential 
motives is rooted in an egoistic-collectivist attitude. While the collective 
norms of the They constitute the source of all of Dasein’s concrete 
possibilities, it is Dasein’s egoistic care for itself that makes these norms, 
and the pressure they exert, seem important to it in the first place. In his 
later thinking, Heidegger will try get out of this impasse by attempting to 
answer the question that Being and Time opened up and left hanging: How 
can our historical world – with its meanings and norms – address us as 
binding beyond the prejudices of the They? However, given that 
Heidegger will not rehabilitate our relation to the personal other as our 
source of ethical-existential significance, we can expect that it will be 
difficult for him to find a way out of the egoistic-collectivist loop.  
 
The End of Being and Time 
 
Having completed his analysis of the basic structure of Dasein as being-in-
the-world and temporality, Heidegger should, according to his own plan, 
be prepared to take on the remaining tasks of the project of fundamental 
ontology: to explicate the temporal sense of being as such and to destruct 
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the history of ontology. Yet this will never materialize. Heidegger never 
publishes the third division of the first part nor the second part. Instead, 
in the following years he gradually gives up the project of fundamental 
ontology. But why? How should we understand the philosophical 
problems motivating this breakdown and the ensuing turn in Heidegger’s 
thinking? And how are they related to his struggle with the problem of 
phenomenality/phenomenology? 
      Let us begin where the published portion of Being and Time ends.   
      In fact, in the last paragraph of the book it is already possible to notice 
a new and surprisingly fierce tendency towards doubt and self-criticism. 
Having briefly summed up the results of the existential analytic, Heidegger 
writes that the explication of the constitution of Dasein remains only “one 
way” towards the aim of working out the question of being, and that it is 
only after we have gone along this way that it will be possible to decide 
“whether it is the only way or even the right one at all.”598 Heidegger’s 
central worry here is centered on the “fundamental problem which still 
remains ‘veiled’”: “Can ontology be grounded ontologically or does it also 
need for this an ontic foundation, and which being must take over the 
function of providing this foundation?”599 That is to say, can the 
existential analytic of the being of a particular being, Dasein, precede and 
prepare the way for an explication of the sense of being or must the 
explication of being be ontologically grounded; must it, in some sense, 
start directly with questioning being itself? This basic worry is seconded by 
another critical question: “Why does being get ‘conceived’ ‘proximally’ in 
terms of the present-at-hand and not in terms of the ready-to-hand, which 
indeed lies closer to us? Why does this reifying always keep coming back to 
exercise its dominion?”600 That is, can the existential analytic – in 
particular the analysis of Dasein’s authenticity and inauthenticity – account 
for the longstanding tendency of philosophy to conceive of being as 
presence-at-hand?  
                                         
598 SZ, pp. 436, 437. 
599 SZ, p. 436: “läßt sich die Ontologie ontologisch begründen oder bedarf sie auch 
hierzu eines ontischen Fundamentes, und welches Seiende muß die Funktion der 
Fundierung übernehmen?” 
600 SZ, p. 437: “Warum wird das Sein gerade ‘zunächst’ aus dem Vorhandenen 
‘begriffen’ und nicht aus dem Zuhandenen, das doch noch näher liegt? Warum kommt 
diese Verdinglichung immer wieder zur Herrschaft?” 
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      Heidegger’s self-critical queries might in principal be read as rhetorical 
questions, not intended to pose any threat to the project of fundamental 
ontology. However, the fact of the matter is that – regardless of 
Heidegger’s intent at the time – they are astonishingly pertinent and target 
basic problems in the guiding idea that the existential analytic of Dasein 
will lead to an understanding of the sense of being.  
      How? 
      Heidegger began Being and Time by insisting on the ontic-ontological 
priority of the question of being, arguing that we always already live in a 
factical historical understanding of being which organizes our possibilities 
of understanding particular beings as beings. Since this understanding of 
being is first and foremost unthematic and prejudiced, the fundamental 
ontological task of explicating the sense of being emerges as a central 
condition for achieving a clear understanding of ourselves and other 
beings. Now, taken seriously this argument – building on the strict 
hierarchy of the ontological difference – would have two central 
consequences: first, fundamental ontology would have to start by directly 
questioning being as such, conceived as the ultimate dimension of 
meaning which determines our possibilities of grasping and explicating 
different beings, for example the human being, Dasein; second, the inquiry 
would have to take the form of a historical thinking, interpreting our 
factical understanding of being and critically destructing it in order to 
arrive at its historical origin.  
      However, none of this happens. As we have seen, Heidegger’s project 
of fundamental ontology rests on the guiding idea that an existential 
analytic of the being of the human being, Dasein, is needed to prepare the 
way for an explication of the sense of being as such. Indeed, given that the 
“sense” of being signifies the basic “structure” or “framework” (Gerüst)601 
conditioning Dasein’s understanding of intelligible being, Heidegger 
thought that it was both possible and necessary to analyze Dasein’s basic 
structure of understanding – temporality – to be able to explicate, on this 
basis, the sense of being as time. Moreover, he maintained that the analytic 
had to take the form of an analysis of the structures characterizing 
Dasein’s authentic existentiell understanding of itself and its possibilities: 
in order to grasp the primordial temporal structure of Dasein it is first 
                                         
601 SZ, p. 151. 
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necessary to access and explicate the authentic self-understanding in which 
Dasein discloses its ownmost possibilities as its groundless and finite 
historical heritage. By anchoring the ontological understanding of being in 
Dasein’s struggle between authenticity and inauthenticity, he also thought 
it would be possible to diagnose the traditional understanding of being as 
presence-at-hand as a result of philosophy’s taking its starting point in 
inauthentic Dasein’s flight from its primordial temporal existence.  
      Heidegger’s existential-analytical approach implies that he de facto 
foregoes what the argument for the priority of the question of being – the 
ontological difference – establishes as the necessity of proceeding directly 
through a hermeneutic-destructive explication of the factical historical 
understanding of being which always already determines our gaze. Above I 
have already argued that Heidegger’s concrete analyses of Dasein – 
contrary to his hermeneutic-destructive program – basically transpire as 
intuition-based phenomenological reflections on the structures of Dasein’s 
experience. Now we will focus on the other aspect of the ambivalence, 
namely that the methodical approach of the existential analytic 
presupposes that the ontic-existentiell understanding of Dasein can 
function as the autonomous phenomenal ground of the ontological-
existential explication in a way that runs counter to the initial argument for 
the priority of the question of being. Ultimately, this will also explain 
Heidegger’s problems with accounting for the traditional understanding of 
being as presence-at-hand as a symptom of Dasein’s tendency towards 
inauthenticity.   
      The tension I have in mind is signaled by the manifest ambivalence of 
Heidegger’s explicit attempt to articulate the relation between existentiell 
and existential understanding, i.e., between Dasein’s ontic understanding of 
itself and its possibilities and its ontological understanding of its structure 
and sense of being.  As he introduces this distinction, he accentuates the 
autonomy of existentiell understanding: in relating to the basic question of 
existence – to be itself authentically or not be itself – Dasein is said to be 
led by an “existentiell” understanding which is not in need of any 
“theoretical transparency of the ontological structure of existence.”602 Still, 
it does not take more than a few pages until Heidegger feels compelled to 
claim that “existentiell interpretation can require existential analytic” and 
                                         
602 SZ, p. 12: “theoretischen Durchsichtigkeit der ontologischen Struktur der 
Existenz.” 
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that all previous explication of Dasein only receives its “existential 
justification” once the basic structures of Dasein have been worked out in 
the light of the question of being.603 Heidegger’s analysis of conscience 
exhibits the same tension. Having first emphasized that “existence is not 
necessarily and directly impaired by an ontologically insufficient 
understanding of conscience” he immediately continues: “Still, the 
existentially more primordial interpretation also discloses possibilities of a 
more primordial existentiell understanding.”604  
      What is the philosophical ambivalence at the root of these conflicting 
statements? 
      As opposed to Heidegger’s thesis about the hierarchical priority of the 
understanding of being, it belongs to the phenomenological method of the 
existential analytic that it ascribes autonomy and priority to Dasein’s ontic-
existentiell understanding. To phenomenologically explicate the being of 
Dasein is to disclose the ontological structures that characterize Dasein’s 
existentiell experience and understanding. This means that in order to 
explicate the structure of an experience we need to have access to this 
experience and the existentiell understanding that is involves, so that we 
reflectively explicate the basic structures and moments constituting what 
we ontically experience. For example, Heidegger’s analysis of readiness-to-
hand articulates the structure of what we ontically experience in our 
primary practical coping with tools whereas his analysis of conscience 
articulates the structure of what we ontically experience in hearing the call 
of conscience. Heidegger himself formulates this clearly when he writes 
that the existential analytic “only carries out the explication of what 
Dasein itself ontically discloses.”605 Moreover, to the extent that our 
existentiell experience itself involves the alternatives of either transparently 
                                         
603 SZ, p. 16: “Existenzielle Auslegung kann existenziale Analytik fordern, wenn 
anders philosophische Erkenntnis in ihrer Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit begriffen 
ist. Erst wenn die Grundstrukturen des Daseins in expliziter Orientierung am 
Seinsproblem selbst zureichend herausgearbeitet sind, wird der bisherige Gewinn der 
Daseinsauslegung seine existenziale Rechtfertigung erhalten.” 
604 SZ, p. 295: “So wenig die Existenz notwendig und direkt beeinträchtight wird 
durch ein ontologisch unzureichendes Gewissensverständnis, so wenig ist durch eine 
existenzial angemessene Interpretation des Gewissens das existenzielle Verstehen des 
Rufes gewährleistet. [...] Gleichwohl erschließt die existenzial ursprünglichere 
Interpretation auch Möglichkeiten ursprünglicheren existenziellen Verstehens.” 
605 SZ, p. 185: “Sie vollzieht nur die Explikation dessen, was das Dasein ontisch 
erschließt.” 
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encountering what we encounter, of fleeing from it and covering it up, the 
ontological explication necessarily becomes dependent on our capacity for  
existentiell insight: “The ontological ‘truth’ of the existential analysis is 
developed on the ground of the primordial existentiell truth.”606 Hence, 
we can only hope to explicate what we experience in anxiety and 
conscience if we possess the authentic existentiell understanding that 
consists in openly encountering these phenomena. 
      The upshot of this is that Heidegger’s entire fundamental ontological 
project is marked by the following ambivalence. On the one hand, the 
project is motivated by the thesis that our ontological understanding of 
being always already organizes our understanding of beings. On the other 
hand, the existential analytic approach presupposes that Dasein’s 
existentiell experiences and understanding functions as the autonomous 
phenomenal ground of the existential analytic. The analytic explicates the 
structures of phenomena that are already disclosed by our existentiell 
understanding, whereby the existentiell understanding itself does not seem 
to be determined by any existential understanding.  
      The fact of the matter is that Heidegger, after the initial argument for 
the priority of the question of being, makes no attempt to concretely show 
how Dasein’s understanding of being would determine its ontic 
understanding of itself and other entities. The thematic focus of the 
existential analytic constantly lies on the existentiell experience of pre-
philosophical Dasein without referring to the ontological of pre-
ontological understanding of being that is supposed to guide these 
experiences. For instance, in his analysis of authenticity Heidegger 
describes how Dasein through anxiety and conscience is confronted with 
its mortality and with the groundlessness of its historical possibilities, and 
how it can choose – in resoluteness – its ownmost finite possibilities. In 
this, however, he does not say word about how Dasein, in order to be able 
to achieve transparent self-understanding, would have to break free from 
and dismantle the traditional conception of being as presence-at-hand, and 
achieve a more primordial understanding of its own being as temporal 
being-in-the-world, and, ultimately, of the sense of being as temporality. 
Instead, the very possibility of explicating authenticity prior to all ontology 
                                         
606 SZ, p. 316: “Die ontologische ‘Wahrheit’ der existenzialen Analyse bildet sich aus 
auf dem Grunde der ursprünglichen existenziellen Wahrheit.”  
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implies that it is fully possible to attain transparent existentiell 
understanding without primordial ontological understanding.     
      In short, the ontological difference that constituted the motivational 
ground of the project of fundamental ontology is to a great degree 
contravened by the approach of the existential analytic, something that 
undermines Heidegger’s account for the decisive role of philosophy in our 
understanding of the world and ourselves.  
     Heidegger’s inability to handle this ambivalence comes to the fore in 
the late methodological paragraph 63 titled “The hermeneutical situation 
at which we have arrived for interpreting the sense of being of care; and 
the methodological character of the existential analytic in general.”607 The 
paragraph – which is placed between Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity 
and his attempt to explicate, on this basis, the temporality of Dasein –  
begins by reemphasizing that the existential analytic must access Dasein’s 
most qualified existentiell self-understanding as the phenomenal ground of 
the ontological analysis: “Our falling being alongside the things with which 
we concern ourselves most closely in the ‘world’ guides the everyday 
interpretation of Dasein, and covers up ontically Dasein’s authentic being, 
so that the ontology which is directed towards this entity is denied an 
appropriate basis. [...] The laying-bare of Dasein’s primordial being must 
rather be wrested from Dasein in opposition to the falling ontic-ontological 
tendency of interpretation.”608 However – clearly sensing a difficulty – 
Heidegger now raises the question whence the ontological explication is to 
take its own “guidance and regulation”:609 “Ontological interpretation 
projects pregiven beings upon the being that is their own, so as to 
conceptualize it with regard to its structure. Where are the guideposts to 
                                         
607 SZ, p. 310: “Die für eine Interpretation des Seinssinnes der Sorge gewonnene 
hermeneutische Situation und der methodische Charakter der existenzialen Analytik 
überhaupt.” 
608 SZ, p. 311: “Das verfallende Sein beim Nächstbesorgten der ‘Welt’ führt die 
alltägliche Daseinsauslegung und verdeckt ontisch das eigentliche Sein des Daseins, 
um damit der auf dieses Seiende gerichtete Ontologie die angemessene Basis zu 
versagen. [...] Die Freilegung des ursprünglichen Seins des Daseins muß ihm vielmehr 
im Gegenzug zur verfallenden ontisch-ontologischen Auslegungstendenzen abgerungen 
werden.” 
609 SZ, p. 312: “Leitung und Regelung.”  
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direct the projection, so that being will be reached at all?”610 That is, what 
understanding guides the ontological explication and allows it to catch 
sight of and identify Dasein’s basic structures of being: being-in-the-world, 
care, temporality, and historicity? To answer this question Heidegger has 
recourse to his introductory notion that Dasein always already lives in a 
factical pre-ontological understanding of being which ontology explicates 
and radicalizes: “Whether explicitly or not, whether appropriately or not, 
existence is somehow understood too. Every ontic understanding 
‘includes’ certain moments, even if only pre-ontologically, that is, even if 
they are not grasped theoretically or thematically.”611 However, is it really 
possible to rehabilitate, at this stage, the notion of the primacy of our 
factical understanding of being which the concrete methodical approach 
of the existential analytic has bypassed? 
      Heidegger makes the following attempt to specify the nature of 
Dasein’s pre-ontological “self-interpretation”:  
 
Dasein understands itself as being-in-the-world, even if it does so 
without sufficient ontological definiteness. Being thus, it 
encounters beings which have the kind of being of what is ready-
to-hand and present-at-hand. No matter how far removed from an 
ontological concept the distinction between existence and reality 
may be, no matter even if Dasein initially understands existence as 
reality, Dasein is not just present-at-hand but has already understood 
itself, however mythical or magical its interpretations may be. For 
otherwise, Dasein would never “live” in a myth and would not be 
concerned with magic in ritual and cult. 612 
 
                                         
610 SZ, p. 312: “Die ontologische Interpretation entwirft vorgegebenes Seiendes auf 
das ihm eigene Sein, um es hinsichtlich seiner Struktur auf den Begriff zu bringen. Wo 
sind die Wegweiser für die Entwuftsrichtung, damit sie überhaupt auf das Sein treffe?” 
611 SZ, p. 312: “Existenz ist, ob ausdrücklich oder nicht, ob angemessen oder nicht, 
irgendwie mitverstanden. Jedes ontische Verstehen hat seine wenn auch nur vor-
ontologischen, das heißt nicht theoretisch-thematisch begriffenen ‘Einschlüsse’.” 
612 SZ, p. 313: “Das Dasein versteht sich, obgleich ohne zureichende ontologische 
Bestimmtheit, als In-der-Welt-sein. So seiend begegnet ihm Seiendes von der Seinsart 
des Zuhandenen und Vorhandenen. Mag der Unterschied von Existenz und Realität 
noch so weit von einem ontologischen Begriff entfernt sein, mag das Dasein sogar 
zunächst die Existenz als Realität verstehen, es ist nicht nur vorhanden, sondern hat 
sich, in welcher mythischen und magischen Auslegung auch immer, je schon verstanden. 
Denn sonst ‘lebte’ es nicht in einem Mythos und besorgte nicht in Ritus und Kultus 
seine Magie.” Cf. also SZ, p. 321 
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The passage begins by insisting that Dasein always already possesses a pre-
ontological, i.e., unthematic and more or less vague understanding of its 
own being as being-in-the-world. However, Heidegger’s only argument 
here –that “otherwise, Dasein would never ‘live’ in a myth and would not 
be concerned with magic” – is weak and does not show what it is 
supposed to show. The fact that Dasein has always lived in different 
interpretations of being – mythical, magical, religious, philosophical – only 
shows that the human being has a strong tendency to develop general 
ontological interpretations of itself and of the world; it does not show that 
these interpretations build on a pre-ontological understanding of Dasein 
as temporal being-in-the-world. Indeed, it seems that Heidegger’s claim 
that Dasein “understands itself” regardless of whether it misunderstands 
its own being as objective present-at-hand reality suggests the opposite to 
what is intended, namely that Dasein’s ontic-existentiell understanding of 
itself and its possibilities is prior to and independent of its ontological 
understanding of its own being and of being as such.  
      The same tendency of Heidegger’s argument for the priority of 
Dasein’s factical pre-ontological understanding of being to work against 
itself is even more obvious in the following later passage: “In saying ‘I,’ 
Dasein expresses itself as being-in-the-world. But does Dasein, in saying ‘I’ in the 
everyday manner, mean itself as being-in-the-world? Here we must make a 
distinction. When saying ‘I’, Dasein surely means the being that it itself 
always is. The everyday interpretation of the self, however, has a tendency 
to understand itself in terms of the ‘world’ with which it is concerned. 
When Dasein means itself ontically, it fails to see itself in relation to the kind 
of being of that entity which it is itself. And this holds especially for the 
basic constitution of Dasein, being-in-the-world.”613 As Heidegger tries to 
specify the sense in which Dasein expresses itself as being-in-the-world, he 
claims that Dasein in saying “I” means “the being that it itself always.” 
However, when Dasein means itself in this way it “means itself ontically,” 
something that is possible even if Dasein has a distorted ontological 
understanding of its own being. Hence, what Heidegger’s argument 
                                         
613 SZ, p. 321: “Im Ich-sagen spricht sich das Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein aus. Aber meint denn 
das alltägliche Ich-sagen sich als in-der-Welt-seiend? Hier ist zu scheiden. Wohl meint 
das Dasein ich-sagend das Seiende, das es je selbst ist. Die alltägliche Selbstauslegung 
hat aber die Tendenz, sich von der besorgten ‘Welt’ her zu verstehen. Im ontischen 
Sich-meinen versieht es sich bezüglich der Seinsart des Seienden, das es selbst ist. Und 
das gilt vornehmlich von der Grundverfassung des Daseins, dem In-der-Welt-sein.” 
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suggests is that – contrary to his intensions – Dasein can mean itself 
ontically regardless of whether it understands or misunderstands itself 
ontologically.  
      Heidegger’s difficulties with rehabilitating the priority of Dasein’s 
factical pre-ontological understanding of being as that which guides and 
regulates the existential analytic culminates in the following attempt to 
articulate the relation between our pre-ontological understanding of being 
and the existential analytic in terms of a circle where the latter presupposes 
the former:  
 
In positing the idea of existence, do we also posit some proposition 
from which we deduce further propositions about the being of 
Dasein, in accordance with formal rules of consistency? Or does 
this pre-supposing have the character of an understanding 
projection, in such a manner indeed that the interpretation 
developing this understanding lets that which is to be interpreted be 
put into words for the very first time, so that it may decide of its own accord 
whether, as this being, it will provide the constitution of being for which it has 
been disclosed in the projection in a formally indicatory manner? 614 
 
That is, pre-ontological understanding of being guides the existential 
analytic by projecting the being of the entity to be investigated. In this 
way, it makes it possible to interpret the entity in question and let it 
“decide” whether it “provides the constitution of being” projected by the 
pre-ontological understanding. This, however, implies that the 
determining role of the preceding factical understanding of being has 
shrunk to naught: if the pre-ontological understanding of being merely 
guides the investigation as a provisional interpretation of the being of 
Dasein which the phenomenological analysis can either confirm or refute 
– then the preceding understanding of being does not determine our 
possibilities to identify beings and explicate their basic structures. On the 
contrary, in that case it is our direct phenomenological explication of the 
                                         
614 SZ, p. 314f.: “Wird mit der Idee der Existenz ein Satz angesetzt, aus dem wir nach 
den formalen Regeln der Konsequenz weitere Sätze über das Sein des Daseins 
deduzieren? Oder hat dieses Voraus-setzen den Charakter des verstehenden 
Entwerfens, so zwar, daß die solches Verstehen ausbildende Interpretation das 
Auszulegende gerade erst selbst zu Wort kommen läßt, damit es von sich aus entscheide, ob es als 
dieses Seiende die Seinsverfassung hergibt, aus welche es im Entwurf formalanzeigend erschlossen 
wurde? ” 
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structures of Dasein’s experience which constitutes the origin and ground 
of all our historical understandings of being.  
      Heidegger’s effort to rehabilitate, at this late stage, the notion of the 
priority of our factical historical understanding of being fails – and is 
bound to fail. Since the existential analytic transpires as a 
phenomenological explication of the basic structures of Dasein’s 
existentiell experiences, it is impossible to recover this notion without 
radically transfiguring the basic methodical approach of the existential 
analytical, which of itself forces Heidegger to reduce the factical 
understanding of being to a provisional prejudice that gains its truth 
through an intuitive reflection on Dasein’s experiences.615  
      In addition to the above, Heidegger’s existential analytic also runs into 
difficulties as concerns its ambition to diagnose the traditional 
understanding of being as presence-at-hand as a result of its rootedness in 
Dasein’s inauthentic existence. 
      Heidegger is to my mind basically right in assuming – in Being and Time 
–  that the ontological investigations of philosophy cannot but transpire as 
explications of the basic structures of our ontic-existentiell experiences, so 
that the explication is dependent on the sight and understanding of the 
experience under investigation. Given his account of authenticity and 
inauthenticity, it is only in so far as we have access to Dasein’s resolute 
understanding of itself in its groundlessness and finitude that we can hope 
to explicate the originary temporal structure exhibited by this 
understanding. Conversely, as long as we take our starting point in 
Dasein’s inauthentic flight from itself the way is barred to an 
understanding of Dasein’s temporal-historical being. However, it seems 
                                         
615 In view of the fact Heidegger in his later thinking will insist on the priority of our 
historical understanding of being and on the necessity of a radically historical thinking 
it is not surprising that he, in the later handwritten comments found in his copy of 
Being and Time, recurrently decries the book’s tendency to conceive of the method of 
fundamental ontology as that of explicating and reading off ontic experiences. For 
example, as regards the argument in §63 that our inauthentic existence covers up the 
primordial being of Dasein and thus cannot serve as the “appropriate basis” for an 
ontological explication he writes: “Awry! As if one could read off ontology from the 
genuine ontic. What is, then, genuine ontic, if not genuine from out of a pre-
ontological projection” (Schief! Als könnte aus der echten Ontik die Ontologie abgelesen werden. 
Was ist denn echte Ontik, wenn nicht echt aus vor-ontologischem Entwurf) (SZ, p. 311a). See also 
SZ, pp. 12a, 38b, 311a, 325a.  
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that Dasein’s inauthentic existence does not by itself prescribe which 
interpretations of being that will be developed on its basis. It only 
motivates a general type of interpretation of being which in a sufficiently 
convincing way covers up and justifies our flight from ourselves. 
      The upshot of this is that Heidegger in Being and Time cannot account 
for why the understanding of being as presence-at-hand achieves and 
maintains its dominating role in the Western tradition. According to 
Heidegger’s basic argument, inauthentic Dasein tends to understand itself 
on the basis of its experience of the non-human world. Here there are two 
kinds of experience that could serve as paradigms for a distortive, 
inauthenticity-serving, understanding of being: first, Dasein’s practical 
coping with tools; second, its theoretical observation of objects. Both of 
these could, it seems, in principle fulfill the covering-legitimizing function. 
Whereas the conception being as readiness-to-hand would allow Dasein to 
forget the possibility of authentic existence, and relate to itself as an 
instrumentally manageable affair in the world, the conception of being as 
presence-at-hand would allow it to relate to itself as an object of 
theoretical knowledge.  However, there is nothing in Heidegger’s analysis 
of inauthentic existence that would explain why philosophy begins to 
understand being as presence-at-hand and not as readiness-to-hand – or 
perhaps as something else. 
      In short, Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology essentially 
remains trapped in the following ambivalence. On the one hand, the basic 
analysis of the hierarchical as-structure of understanding prescribes the 
need of inquiring directly into being as such as the ultimate determining 
dimension of understanding, and to do this through a hermeneutic-
destructive thinking. On the other hand, the existential analytic unfolds as 
a reflective phenomenological description of the basic necessary structures 
of Dasein’s experiences, so that the ontic-existentiell experiences function 
as the autonomous phenomenal ground of the phenomenological 
description. As we shall see, Heidegger’s later thinking will evolve as an 
attempt to answer more radically to his notion of the historical structure 
of phenomenality. This centrally involves questioning being itself directly 
in a historical way – something that is only possible by developing the 
central question of his later thinking: How does being open up as a 
primordial and binding historical destiny?  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Part Three: The Openness of Being 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The third part of this thesis turns its focus to Heidegger’s later thinking of 
the problem of phenomenality. It asks: What role does the problem of 
phenomenality play in the transformations of Heidegger’s thinking after 
Being and Time? How does the later Heidegger conceive of the dynamics of 
phenomenal shining? What is the nature and rigor of his later thinking and 
its relation to phenomenology?  
      Since the period under consideration is long and complex – stretching 
from the first years after publication of Being and Time in 1927, over the so 
called “turn” of his thinking in the mid 1930s, through the paradigmatic 
years of his later thinking in the 1940s, 1950s and the early 1960s – I will 
begin by briefly recounting the history of Heidegger’s later thinking, thus 
anticipating the analyses to come.  
      During the first years after the publication of Being and Time in 
February 1927 Heidegger continues his attempt to advance and complete 
his guiding project of fundamental ontology. In the introduction to the 
lecture course “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,” delivered in the 
summer term 1927, Heidegger promises to take on the decisive task 
reserved for the suspended third division of the first part of Being and Time, 
namely, to explicate the sense of being as temporality. In his concrete 
lectures, however, he never gets beyond a very rudimentary sketch of this 
theme. Still, in these years Heidegger actually accomplishes major parts of 
his planned destruction of the history of Western philosophy, which was 
to constitute the second part of Being and Time and proceed through 
readings of Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle. To begin with, Heidegger 
works out an explication of the ontologico-temporal problematic in Kant, 
which he publishes in the 1929 book Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.616 
Moreover, in “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology” he offers an 
interpretation of Aristotle’s treatment of the problem of time in the 
                                         
616 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, GA 3. 
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Physics, such as was originally intended to complete the destructive 
program by expounding the phenomenal basis and limits of ancient Greek 
ontology. This is about as far as the project of fundamental ontology will 
ever get. 
      Though Heidegger does not as yet give up his ambition to complete 
Being and Time, his investigations in the years 1928-1933 lead him to results 
that ever more tend to undermine the project of fundamental ontology. In 
a series of intensively probing lecture courses and texts – e.g. “The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic” (1928),617 “Introduction to 
Philosophy” (1928-29),618 “What Is Metaphysics?” (1929),619 “On the 
Essence of Ground” (1929),620 and “The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics” (1929/30)621 – Heidegger increasingly emphasizes the 
fundamental role played by Dasein’s understanding of being. Drawing 
especially on Kant and Plato, Heidegger articulates Dasein’s understanding 
of being in terms of a free projection of being which precedes and 
conditions all Dasein’s knowledge of different beings, including the 
human being. In the end, however, pursuing this line of argument 
unsettles the basic methodological idea of the project of fundamental 
ontology: that it is possible to access the sense of being by way of a 
phenomenological analysis of the structure of the human being. Indeed, 
after the spring of 1929 we do not hear Heidegger talking about a 
continuation of Being and Time anymore.622 Still, although Heidegger’s 
thinking in 1928-1933 relinquishes the fundamental ontological project 
and points the way towards a transformation of his philosophical stance, 
he does not as yet achieve a breakthrough but basically remains stuck in a 
mode of transcendental-phenomenological thinking which is unable to 
answer to and draw the consequences of its own results.  
      In the spring of 1933 Heidegger decides to engage himself politically 
in the Nazi revolution. For Heidegger National Socialism appeared as a 
counterforce against the destructive and leveling tendencies of modernity, 
and as a possible preparation for a philosophical projection of a new 
meaning-laden world for the German people. On April 21 he is elected as 
                                         
617 “Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz,” GA 26. 
618 “Einleitung in die Philosophie,” GA 27. 
619 “Was ist Metaphysik?,” in GA 9. 
620 “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” in GA 9. 
621 “Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik,” GA 29/30. 
622 Cf. Sheehan 1984, p. 186. 
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rector of the University of Freiburg and two weeks later he becomes a 
member of the NSDAP. Having taking over the position as rector with 
enthusiasm, Heidegger within a year grows increasingly frustrated with his 
effort to inject the new revolutionary spirit into the university and to 
become the leading philosopher of Nazi Germany. On April 12 1934 he 
hands in his application to resign – not least for the reason that he had 
made too many academic enemies in his dictatorial role as Führer-rector. 
Following the debacle of the rectorate, Heidegger begins to lose his faith 
in the philosophical potential of the official ideology and politics of 
Nazism, which he in the second half of the 1930s starts to interpret 
critically as a manifestation of the nihilist technical-subjectivist 
metaphysics that he first hoped it would overcome. However, the story of 
Heidegger’s relationship to Nazism does not end here: after his resignation 
from the rectorate Heidegger for many years continues to support Hitler 
and the Nazi regime, and to entertain a belief in the unrealized 
philosophical potential of National Socialism; he remains a member of 
NSDAP until the end of the war; finally, we have what I believe is the 
later Heidegger’s deep failure – despite his critique of Nazism –  to 
respond morally and philosophically to the catastrophe of Nazism and to 
the Holocaust in particular.  
      As Heidegger finds his way back to philosophy after his debacle as 
Nazi rector, he initiates a basic transformation of his philosophical stance. 
The decisive “turn” in Heidegger’s thinking – at least from the point of 
view of the problem of phenomenality – takes place in the mid 1930s.  It 
unfolds in a series of lecture courses and papers – e.g., “Hölderlin's 
Hymns ‘Germanien’ and ‘Der Rhein’” (1934-35),623 “Introduction to 
Metaphysics” (1935),624 “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1936),625 and 
“Basic Questions of Philosophy” (1937-38)626 – as well as in the massive 
self-reflective manuscripts Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)627 written 
in 1936-38 and Mindfulness628 written in 1938-39. Apart from Hölderlin, 
who plays a pivotal role, Heidegger’s main philosophical influences during 
                                         
623 “Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germanien’ und ‘Der Rhein’,” GA 39. 
624 “Einführung in die Metaphysik,” GA 40. 
625 “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” in GA 5. 
626 “Grundfragen der Philosophie,” GA 45. 
627 Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis), GA 65 (henceforth referred to as Contributions in 
the main text). 
628 Besinnung, GA 66.  
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these years are the early pre-Socratic thinkers and Nietzsche. As I will 
argue, Heidegger’s turn basically consists in a redirection of his guiding 
question: whereas Heidegger in Being and Time never radically asked the 
question of how historical being is given to us but instead concentrated on 
phenomenologically describing the basic structures of Dasein – being-in-
the-world, temporality, historicity, freedom – as the basis for explicating 
the sense of being, he now insists that the basic philosophical question 
must concern precisely the givenness or openness of historical being itself: 
how does being open up and address us as our finite but binding historical 
context of meaning? It is no exaggeration to say that Heidegger’s 
transformation of his central question opens up and determines all of his 
subsequent later thinking. As concerns the problem of phenomenality/ 
phenomenology, this has two main consequences: first, the question of the 
openness of historical being leads Heidegger to provide a new account of 
the dynamic happening which allows a historical world to arise and shine; 
second, it brings with it a change in the methodological character of his 
thought, so that the phenomenology of Being and Time gives way to a more 
radically historical reflection tracing the possibilities of understanding 
harbored by our history. 
      Heidegger’s late thinking – stretching from approximately 1935 to his 
death in 1976 – constitutes a vast and multifaceted collection of texts 
which cannot be comprised in a straight narrative. Still, for the sake of 
achieving a preliminary overview, we may note some general lines of 
development.  
   From the mid 1930s until the end of the end of the war in 1945 
Heidegger is primarily occupied with articulating his new guiding question 
of the openness of being – which he primarily names “the event” (Ereignis) 
or the “clearing” (Lichtung) of being – and sketching the historical program 
of his later thinking. This essentially involves elaborating – chiefly through 
a set of extensive courses on Nietzsche – a new explication of the nature 
of metaphysics as well as a diagnosis of how the subjectivist and technical 
understanding of being characteristic of the metaphysical tradition gets 
radicalized into the modern technical understanding of being as a material 
reserve for human desire and manipulation. This destiny, Heidegger 
claims, can only be overcome through a return to the Greek beginning of 
the history of metaphysics, such that we attempt to reflect on the hidden 
and bypassed origin of this first beginning in order, thereby, to open up 
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the basic philosophical possibilities required to prepare the way for a 
second new beginning. During these years – especially in the essay “The 
Origin of the Work of Art” from 1936 – Heidegger also works out an 
analysis of the dynamics which allow a historical world to arise and shine, 
a dynamics which takes the form of an interplay between the “world” and 
the “earth,” and which is primarily realized in the work of art. After the 
war, in 1946, Heidegger publishes his “Letter on Humanism” which is his 
first public written presentation of his late philosophy.629 Heidegger’s 1949 
lectures at the private Club zu Bremen, titled “Insight Into That Which 
Is,”630 mark the beginning of a new phase in Heidegger’s development. 
Here Heidegger introduces a new lapidary and meditative style which from 
now on will characterize his thinking. In contrast to his texts from the 
1930s and 1940s, which were often marked by terminological excess and 
grand historic-apocalyptic visions, Heidegger now attempts to open up the 
questions by pursuing finite paths of thinking which take their point of 
departure in specific contexts of questioning: texts, poems, or some aspect 
of the contemporary situation. Hence, the bulk of Heidegger’s key texts 
from the 1950s onwards consist in shorter essays gathered in anthologies 
such as Lectures and Essays,631 Identity and Difference,632 On the Way to 
Language,633 and On the Matter of Thinking.634 Among Heidegger’s main 
philosophical endeavors in the 1950s we may name his deepened 
reflections on language, poetry and technology as well as his rearticulation 
of the dynamics of shining in terms of what he now calls the “fourfold.”  
Following the end of the teaching ban, to which Heidegger had been 
condemned after the war by the victorious powers, Heidegger also delivers 
two important late lecture courses: “What is Called Thinking?” in 1951-
52635 and “The Principle of Ground” in 1955-56.636 Even as he gets older, 
Heidegger is able to produce texts that shed new light on his basic 
questions. In On the Matter of Thinking, containing texts from 1962-1964, 
Heidegger again takes up the question of phenomenology and delivers one 
                                         
629 “Brief über den ‘Humanismus,” in GA 9. 
630 “Einblick in das was ist,” in GA 79. 
631 Vorträge und Aufsätze, GA 7. 
632 Identität und Differenz, GA 11. 
633 Unterwegs zur Sprache, GA 12.  
634 Zur Sache des Denkens, GA 14.  
635 “Was heißt Denken?,” GA 8. 
636  “Der Satz vom Grund,” GA 10. 
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of his most qualified attempts to articulate the methodological nature and 
rigor of his late thinking. Heidegger’s last seminars and short writings 
from the late 1960s and early 1970s still contain illuminating – and 
sometimes even drastically questioning – reflections on his philosophical 
project. 
    
The question of phenomenality/phenomenology has always been present 
in the discussion of Heidegger’s turn and of the nature of his later 
thinking. Indeed, the fact that William J. Richardson just before its 
publication in 1963 altered the title of his classic study Heidegger: Through 
Phenomenology to Thought – from Heidegger: From Phenomenology to Thought to 
Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought – on Heidegger’s own suggestion 
brings to expression the basic question that will henceforth be at stake:637 
In what sense – if any – does Heidegger’s turn essentially involve a 
departure from phenomenology towards another kind of historical 
thinking?  
      The debate concerning the fate of phenomenology in Heidegger’s later 
thinking by and large exhibits the same tension between a transcendental 
phenomenological and a hermeneutic-deconstructivist line of 
interpretation that characterized the discussion of his earlier production. 
And, as always, such interpretations of the development of Heidegger’s 
thinking are strongly bound up with systematic convictions concerning 
what constitutes the philosophically most basic and potent dimension of 
his thought. In schematic outline, the scene could perhaps be depicted as 
follows: 
      For the transcendental phenomenological interpretation – defended 
by, e.g., Steven Crowell, Søren Overgaard and Daniel Dahlstrom – 
Heidegger’s early production culminating in Being and Time – his so called 
“phenomenological decade” – naturally forms the prime point of focus. 
During these years, so the argument goes, the systematic core of 
Heidegger’s thinking lies in his effort to elaborate Husserl’s 
phenomenology by describing the basic structures characterizing Dasein’s 
pre-theoretical experience of the world. From this point of view 
Heidegger’s turn in the 1930s is prone to emerge as a more or less drastic 
parting with his earlier phenomenology in favor of a radical historical 
                                         
637 Cf. Richardson 1963, pp. ix-xxiii; GA 11, pp. 145-152. 
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thinking, a thinking that, as a consequence, is essentially in jeopardy of 
collapsing into historicism and speculative construction. It is symptomatic 
of this tendency that all the main explications of Heidegger as a 
phenomenologist focus almost entirely on his thinking in the 1920s under 
exclusion of everything else. Although the dominating attitude towards 
Heidegger’s later thinking is clearly skeptical, it has also occasionally been 
claimed that Heidegger’s late thinking, at least in so far as it constitutes 
rigorous philosophy, still includes and rests on traditional 
phenomenological descriptions.  
      From the vantage point of the hermeneutic-deconstructive 
interpretation, by contrast, Heidegger’s development is apt to appear not 
as a drastic disruption but rather as a continuously deepening reflection on 
the finitude and historicity of thinking which reaches its most radical and 
consequent expression in his later writings. As regards the question 
concerning the relation of Heidegger’s later thinking to phenomenology, it 
is possible to discern two main alternative attitudes. On the one hand, we 
have the interpretation, defended by e.g. John van Buren, which views 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as a paramount example of the 
metaphysical yearning for absolute presence. The idea is that Heidegger’s 
attachment to Husserl’s phenomenology in the 1920s hampers his primary 
effort to think the finitude and groundlessness of being, and that he is 
only able to free himself from this influence in the mid 1930s.638 On the 
other hand, we have the interpretation, defended by e.g. Hans Ruin that 
explicates Husserl’s own phenomenology in terms of an intensified 
probing of the conditions and limits of phenomenal evidence, so that 
Heidegger’s thinking is seen as a gradual radicalization of a tendency 
already present in Husserl.639 
      It is obvious that of the two interpretational tendencies mentioned 
above the latter hermeneutic-deconstructive interpretation has strongly 
dominated the debate about Heidegger’s later thinking. This, of course, is 
not surprising given that Heidegger constantly proclaims the radically 
historical character of his later thinking and also in practice attempts to 
make good this claim. However, the upshot of this is that although the 
question of phenomenality/phenomenology has certainly been at stake in 
the discussion, there has been little concrete effort to analyze the role of 
                                         
638 Cf. van Buren 1994a. 
639 Cf. Ruin 1994. 
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the question of phenomenality in Heidegger’s late thinking or the 
phenomenological character of this thought. Whereas the hermeneutic-
deconstructive interpreters have generally dismissed or bypassed this issue, 
the transcendental phenomenological interpreters claiming that 
Heidegger’s late thinking involves phenomenological description have 
rarely substantiated their claims by concrete analyses. Finally, there are 
some interpreters – e.g. Günter Figal, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 
and Andrew Mitchell – who claim that Heidegger’s late thinking is indeed 
a radical realization of phenomenology. However, in arguing that the later 
Heidegger remains a phenomenologist these commentators tend to empty 
the concept of phenomenology of the basic belief in intuitive givenness as 
a measure of understanding, which is definitive of the concept as I use it 
here.   
    
The aim of this part is to explicate Heidegger’s later thinking as a 
continuous effort to come to terms with the problem of phenomenality. 
After an examination of Heidegger’s development in the transitional years 
1928-1933 I turn to investigating the main aspects of his late thinking of 
phenomenality. First, I interpret the turn of his thinking in the mid 1930s 
as a turn to the question of the phenomenality or openness of historical 
being. Second, I explicate his account of the dynamics that let a historical 
world arise and shine forth as a binding destiny. Third, I examine the 
character and rigor of his later historical thinking and its relation to 
phenomenology. Finally, I also make an attempt to critically discuss and 
delimit the explanatory force of Heidegger’s late effort to account for the 
givenness and normativity of historical being. Since my investigation is 
strictly guided by the question of phenomenality, I will have to leave out 
many important themes of Heidegger’s late production, such as his grand 
diagnoses of the history of being, his analysis of the technical nature of 
metaphysics, and his massive work on Nietzsche, Hölderlin, Jünger and 
the pre-Socratic thinkers.  
      Heidegger’s later production contains nothing like a systematic 
phenomenological investigation of the basic structure of the epiphany of 
being. His writings from 1935 onwards constitute a complex and 
continuously shifting network of textual paths which open up and circle 
around his guiding questions from different thematic-conceptual 
viewpoints, without ever being summed up in a general overarching 
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conceptuality. This strategy of writing is ultimately rooted in Heidegger’s 
conviction that the only rigorous way for thinking to answer to its matter 
– i.e. the givenness of historical being – is to take as its starting point the 
factical historical problem-situations in which we live and proceed through 
a kind of internal historical questioning of the hidden grounds and 
presuppositions conditioning these situations. Hence, to the later 
Heidegger the very idea of finding and articulating the general structure of 
phenomenal shining must appear as an illusory attempt to abandon the 
historicity and finitude of thought.  
      However, notwithstanding Heidegger’s insistence on the irreducible 
historical way-character of his thinking, I think it is feasible to explicate 
the basic features recurring through his articulations of the dynamics of 
shining. But does not this mean that I in effect flout Heidegger’s own 
notion of the rigor of thinking? It does. Although Heidegger’s late 
thinking certainly constitutes one of the most qualified efforts ever to 
think and realize the historically finite nature of thought, I believe that, in 
the end, he exaggerates the degree to which our thinking is determined by 
its history. At the end of the day I believe that we – through and beyond 
our historical pre-understandings – have an open experiential access to 
beings which is not necessarily controlled by the pre-understandings 
inherent in our history, and on the basis of which we can develop general 
descriptions of the structures of these experiences. This also implies that 
in my view the later Heidegger himself – to be sure, in an unclear and 
ambiguous manner – is habitually lead to make use of general descriptions 
the sense of which is not only to express the internal logic of our finite 
historical situation but which ultimately aim at nothing less than 
articulating the general transhistorical structure of the epiphany of being 
from different conceptual points of view. Hence, even though my 
ambition to explicate the basic features of Heidegger’s conception of the 
dynamics of shining goes against his self-understanding, I believe it might 
very well do justice to the concrete philosophical work that he actually 
does. Since my methodological decisions rest on answers to questions that 
we are still struggling with, I presently have to refer the reader to my 
critique of Heidegger’s radical historicism in the last chapter of this part of 
the thesis, and to the epilogue in which I provisionally outline my view of 
these issues.  
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      The third part is divided into the following chapters: (3.2) 
Investigations of the Philosophical Nature of Man 1928-33, (3.3) The 
Question of the Openness of Being, (3.4) The Dynamics of Shining, (3.5) 
Heidegger’s Late Historical Thinking, and (3.6) Critical Delimitations. 
  
3.2 Investigations of the Philosophical Nature of Man 
1928-1933 
 
The years 1928-1933 have commonly been treated as a somewhat 
subordinate transitional period in Heidegger’s philosophical production, 
separating the early from the late Heidegger. These are the years when 
Heidegger initially attempts to press on with the project of fundamental 
ontology begun in Being and Time but is gradually forced to give it up – 
without, however, as yet being able to open up a new philosophical stance; 
these are also the years preceding and discharging into Heidegger’s 
appointment as Nazi rector of the university of Freiburg in April 1933. 
      As a result of its intermediary status, this period has not been given 
much independent attention but has often been interpreted 
anachronistically, in such a way that isolated concepts have either been 
read backward as continuations of Being and Time or forward as early 
articulations of his later thought. What is more, some of the central 
philosophical ideas that Heidegger tries out during this period have been 
apt to appear dubious to later commentators, e.g., his new interest in 
metaphysics, his proposal of a metontological task for philosophy, as well 
as his idealistically colored explication of the understanding of being as a 
free world-projection. On the other hand, some interpreters representing 
the hermeneutic-deconstructive reading have saluted these years as the 
true beginning of Heidegger’s turn, seeing in them a departure from the 
transcendentalism of the project of fundamental ontology toward a more 
radical questioning of the finitude and historicity of being, and taking this 
as the start of his later thought.640 
      In this chapter, I offer an outline of the main modifications that 
Heidegger’s thinking undergoes in the years 1928-1933 in so far as they 
are relevant for understanding his struggle with the problem of 
                                         
640 Cf., e.g., Krell 1986; Sallis 1990; Bernasconi 1993; Grondin 1995. 
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phenomenality. At least from this perspective, I think there is good reason 
to view these years as a transitional period rather than as the beginning of 
his late thinking. Even though Heidegger’s investigations involve 
important modifications of the analyses of the structure of phenomenality 
in Being and Time, and lead him to results which undermine the project of 
fundamental ontology and prepare the way for his later thinking, he still 
basically remains stuck in the ambivalences of his old stance. As I will 
argue, it is only in the years following his resignation from the position as 
rector in 1934 that Heidegger is able to carry out the decisive turn of his 
guiding question, a turn which opens up and determines the matter and 
methodological approach of his later thinking.  
 
The Philosophical Nature of Dasein  
 
Günter Figal has characterized Heidegger’s development after Being and 
Time as follows: “Dasein in its everydayness is not separated from 
philosophy anymore, but is essentially philosophical. Only thus can 
Heidegger adhere to a thought that has accompanied his philosophical 
work from the point of its autonomous beginning – namely, the thought 
of a historical philosophy.”641 
      I can only agree.  
      Heidegger entire effort to orient himself after Being and Time revolves 
around his new strong emphasis on the philosophical nature of Dasein. In 
his last Marburg lecture course “The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic” 
from the summer 1928 Heidegger writes: “metaphysics belongs to the 
nature of human beings.”642 A few months later, he begins his first course 
after the return to Freiburg, “Introduction to Philosophy,” by asserting 
that the human being does not, strictly speaking, need to be introduced 
into philosophy since “we always already philosophize”: “We do not 
philosophize every once in a while, but constantly and necessarily, in so 
                                         
641 Figal 1992, p. 93. “Dasein ist nicht mehr als Alltägliches von der Philosophie 
verschieden, sondern ist wesentlich philosophisch. Allein so kann Heidegger an einem 
Gedanken festhalten, der seine philosophische Arbeit von ihrem eigenständighen 
Beginn begleiten hat – dem Gedanken einer geschichtlichen Philosophie.”  
Cf. also Figal [ed.] 2007a, pp. 20f.  
642 GA 26, p. 274: “die Metaphysik gehört zur Natur des Menschen.” Cf. also GA 26, 
p. 18.  
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far as we exist as human beings. To exist as a human being means to 
philosophize. […] Philosophizing belongs to the human Dasein as 
such.”643 Why this renewed emphasis on man’s philosophical nature? 
     Even though Heidegger began Being and Time by pointing to Dasein’s 
factical pre-ontological understanding of being as the motivational ground 
for the entire philosophical question of being, the existential analytic 
approach implied that this pre-understanding of being was passed over. 
Instead of proceeding as a strict hermeneutic explication of Dasein’s 
factical historical understanding of being, the analytic transpired as a 
phenomenological description of the structure of authentic Dasein. In 
this, the focus of the existential analysis lay entirely on the authentic self-
understanding of pre-philosophical Dasein, whereby this understanding 
functioned as the autonomous phenomenal ground for the philosophical 
analysis of the sense of being. This mode of analysis, however, flouted 
Heidegger’s basic notion that our historical understanding of being 
determines our ontic knowledge of beings. Moreover, it made it 
thoroughly unclear how the philosophical question of being is provoked 
by Dasein’s struggle for authenticity.  
         Now Heidegger closes this pre-philosophical clearance by forcefully 
stressing that the human being is always already challenged by the question 
of being as its own basic problem. Since our understanding of being 
precedes and determines our understanding of beings – including 
ourselves and our guiding possibilities – it must be at the basis of all ontic 
understanding. This means that there can be no pre-philosophical, e.g. 
mythical or religious, life-forms prior to or untouched by the philosophical 
problem of being. Instead, all apparently pre-philosophical forms of of 
understanding must be grasped as “different possibilities, multiple levels 
and degrees of wakefulness” in which the human being can “stand in 
philosophy.”644 As a result, philosophy, conceived as the possibility of a 
                                         
643 GA 27, p. 3: “Wir philosophieren nicht dann und wann, sondern ständig und 
notwendig, sofern wir als Menschen existieren. Als Mensch da sein, heißt 
philosophieren. […] Das Philosophieren gehört zum menschlichen Dasein als 
solchem.” 
644 GA 27, p. 3: “Weil nun aber das Menschsein verschiedene Möglichkeiten, 
mannigfache Stufen und Grade der Wachheit hat, kann der Mensch in verschiedener 
Weise in der Philosophie stehen.” Heidegger’s emphasis on the philosophical essence 
of man also prompts him to rethink the relationship between philosophy and religion. 
In the early Freiburg lecture courses Heidegger still basically conceived of philosophy 
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transparent enactment of our understanding of being, emerges as the basic 
and decisive undertaking guiding all our understanding of life and the 
world.   
 
The Priority of the Understanding of Being 
 
Heidegger’s accentuation of the philosophical nature of man essentially 
rests on his modified analysis of the fundamental role played by the 
understanding of being within Dasein’s understanding in general. 
      In Being and Time Heidegger articulated the hierarchical as-structure of 
phenomenal understanding in the following way: our understanding of 
particular entities as meaningful phenomena is conditioned by our 
understanding of the world, i.e., of the instrumental reference-networks in 
which we live and of the historical purposes in which these references are 
ultimately anchored; our understanding of the world is, in its turn, 
conditioned by our understanding of the different modes of being 
characterizing different beings; our understanding of the different 
substantial modes of being is finally conditioned by our understanding of 
the sense of being. However, in the years following the publication of 
Being and Time Heidegger puts a considerable amount of effort into 
specifying and rearticulating the basic structure of phenomenal 
understanding. Let us consider the three main aspects of this rearticulation 
one at a time: 
                                                                                                                      
as an explication of pre-theoretical life in its primary temporal movement. In this, he 
kept open the possibility of an authentic pre-theoretical enactment of life in its 
temporality, and suggested that such an enactment was paradigmatically manifested in 
originary Christianity. In the years following the publication of Being and Time this 
constellation changes as Heidegger starts to view religion as a more or less inferior and 
unclear way of enacting our basic understanding of being. The conflict comes to the 
fore in the following remark from “The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic”: “But 
might not the presumably ontic faith in God be at bottom godlessness? And might the 
genuine metaphysician be more religious than the usual faithful, than the members of 
a ‘church’ or even than the ‘theologians’ of every confession?” (Ob aber nicht der 
vermeintliche ontische Glaube an Gott im Grunde Gottlosigkeit ist? Und der echte Metaphysiker 
religiöser ist denn die üblichen Gläubigen, Angehörigen einer “Kirche” oder gar die “Theologen” jeder 
Konfession?) (GA 26, p. 211). In the end, Heidegger’s explorations of the philosophical 
nature of man set the stage for his later effort to grant to philosophy – and to poetry – 
a decisive role in thinking and salvaging what had previously been the central matters 
of religion and theology: “the gods” and “the holy.”  
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      First, Heidegger accentuates the priority of our understanding of the 
world in relation to our understanding of particular entities. In Being and 
Time Heidegger’s conception of the world grew out of his analysis of 
Dasein’s practical coping with tools, whereby the world was explicated as 
the context of instrumental relations allowing us to grasp the particular 
tool as something-in-order-to-something. However, although Heidegger 
ultimately anchored the instrumental contexts of the world in the 
historical possibilities of Dasein – the historical paradigms of meaningful 
life bequeathed by our heritage – his emphasis on Dasein’s practical 
coping still made it easy to think that his basic move consisted in replacing 
the traditional picture of our relation to the world as a theoretical seeing of 
isolated objects with the notion that Dasein’s primary understanding has 
the character of a practical unthematic understanding of the particular 
totalities of tools and instrumental relations that we find around us. In 
“The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic” and in the subsequent essay 
“On the Essence of Ground” from 1929 Heidegger makes it thoroughly 
clear that our understanding of the world should not be identified with 
our orientation within particular totalities of tools: “If one identifies the 
ontic context of equipment […] with the world” it becomes “hopeless” to 
understand Dasein’s constitution as being-in-the-world.645 
      In order to bring out the priority of our understanding of the world 
over all ontic knowledge Heidegger proceeds through a reflection on the 
concept of “transcendence.” What is crucial, Heidegger claims, is that 
being-in-the-world is not conceived as a new version of Husserl’s concept 
of intentionality with the emphasis on pre-theoretical care rather than 
theoretical observation.646 According to Heidegger, Husserl’s analysis of 
intentionality focuses on the fact that it belongs to the sense of our 
intentional acts to be directed towards the objects intended. By being-in-
the-world, however, Heidegger does not denote the “ontic transcendence” 
of Dasein towards beings but the “originary transcendence” towards the 
world, conceived as the historical context of meaning- and being-
                                         
645 GA 9, p. 155n55: “Wenn man gar den ontischen Zusammenhang der 
Gebrauchsdinge, des Zeugs, mit der Welt identifiziert und das In-der-Welt-sein als 
Umgang mit den Gebrauchsdingen auslegt, dann ist freilich ein Verständnis der 
Transzendenz als In-der-Welt-sein im Sinn einer ‘Grundverfassung’ des Daseins 
aussichtslos.” Cf. also GA 26, pp. 233, 235. 
646 Cf. GA 26, pp. 164-169, 211-215. 
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possibilities which grounds any understanding of beings:647 “Dasein 
surpasses beings, in such a way that it is only in this surpassing that it can 
relate to beings. Only thus can it also relate to itself as a being. […] That in 
the direction of which the transcending Dasein transcends we call the 
world.” 648 
      In short, it is only on the basis of Dasein’s primary transcendence 
towards the world, conceived as its historical context of meaning-
possibilities, that it is able to experience and understand particular entities 
as one thing or the other – be it as theoretical objects or pre-theoretical 
tools. 
      Second, Heidegger undertakes an ontological expansion of his concept 
of world to include the different modes of being of entities. According to 
Heidegger’s analysis in Being and Time, Dasein’s world-understanding 
comprised its context of instrumental relations and its own possibilities as 
the guiding purposes of these relations. This understanding of the world 
was in its turn guided by an understanding of the manifold being-senses of 
beings and of the unifying sense of being as such. However, since the 
analytic focused exclusively on Dasein’s understanding of the world the 
hierarchy above remained unclear: How is our understanding of the world 
determined by our understanding of being? Does our understanding of the 
different substantial being-characters of beings transpire as a retrieval of a 
historical heritage – as does our understanding of our own possibilities – 
or is it rather the product of the analytical explication of the structures of 
Dasein? 
      After 1927 Heidegger begins to insist that our understanding of the 
world also embraces the totality of being-characters determining our 
access to beings. As Heidegger puts it in “Introduction to Philosophy”: 
“The world is the totality of the constitution of being, not only of nature 
and of the historical togetherness, but the specific totality of the manifold 
of being, which is understood in a unified way in being-with others, being 
alongside… and self-world.”649 Hence, Dasein’s understanding of the 
                                         
647 GA 26, p. 194. 
648 GA 27, p. 306f.: “Das Dasein übersteigt Seiendes, so zwar, daß es erst in diesem 
Überstieg zu Seiendem sich verhalten, also auch erst so zu sich als Seiendem sich 
verhalten […] kann. […] Dieses, woraufzu das wesenhaft transzendierende Dasein 
transzendiert, nennen wir Welt.” 
649 GA 27, p. 309: “Welt ist das Ganze der Seinsverfassung, nicht nur der Natur und 
des geschichtlichen Miteinander und des eigenen Selbstseins und der Gebrauchsdinge, 
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world comprises the manifold of different being-modes of beings – their 
“what- and how-being”650 – so that this understanding of being 
constitutes the ultimate organizing layer in our understanding of different 
entities: tools, things, animals, as well as ourselves and our purposes.  
      Heidegger’s ontological broadening of his concept of world also 
allows him to attain a clearer articulation of the relation between our 
understanding of the being-modes of beings and our understanding of the 
sense of being. Whereas our understanding of the substantial being-modes 
of beings is now unequivocally seen as a part of our world-understanding 
– which, as will soon become clear, has the character of a free projection 
of the world and cannot be derived from any analytic of Dasein – the 
explication of the sense of being transpires as an existential analytic of the 
structures of our substantial understanding of being (transcendence, 
freedom, temporality), so that the analytic is supposed to make possible a 
transparent enactment of that understanding. As we shall see, Heidegger’s 
division of the understanding of being brings with it a division of the task 
of philosophy into fundamental ontology and metontology.  
      Third, Heidegger articulates the ontologically broadened world as the 
guiding for-the-sake-of-which of Dasein. One effect of Heidegger’s 
ontological broadening of his concept of “world” is that he thinks he is 
able to overcome the tendency towards egoism that still haunted his 
analysis of authenticity in Being and Time. Earlier I argued that Heidegger’s 
exclusion of the possibility of a direct care for the other human being for 
her own sake, and his inability to account for another source of 
normativity beyond the factical norms of the They, gave rise to an 
oscillation between collectivism and subjectivism and led him to ground 
Dasein’s ethical-existential motives in its basic egoistic self-concern. In 
“The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic” Heidegger directs fierce 
criticism at the charge that Being and Time would contain an egoistic bias:  
“madness” (ein Wahnwitz) he calls the analysis ascribed to him – a result of 
incapability of the “most primitive methodology.”651 However, 
Heidegger’s retrospective condemnations of supposed misinterpretations 
of his earlier work can often be read as self-corrections of ambiguities still 
                                                                                                                      
sondern die spezifische Ganzheit der Seinsmannigfaltigkeit, die im Mitsein mit 
Anderen, Sein bei…und Selbstwelt einheitlich verstanden ist.” 
650 GA 9, p. 131. 
651 GA 26, p. 240.  
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marking the work in question. The fact that Heidegger is especially sour 
this time could be taken as a sign that what he claims is a foolish 
misinterpretation has indeed hit a sore point: a logic that ironically leads 
the existential analytic right back to the egoism that it is so eager to 
overcome.   
      So what has happened?  
      Although Heidegger is still far from having developed a convincing 
account of the givenness of historical meaning, his ontological widening of 
Dasein’s world-understanding makes it difficult to base Dasein’s choice of 
its own possibilities on the egoistic self-concern of the individual. In “The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic” he thus argues as follows. Given that 
the focus of the existential analytic is entirely on Dasein in its 
“metaphysical neutrality,” the notion that Dasein exists for its own sake 
cannot be understood in terms of the human being’s ontic care for itself; 
rather, that Dasein exists for its own sake means that it exists for its own 
sake “qua Dasein.” Moreover, since Dasein is essentially transcendence 
towards the world Heidegger can write:  
 
Dasein is in such a way that it exists for the sake of itself. If, however, 
it is a surpassing in the direction of world that first gives rise to 
selfhood, then world shows itself to be that for the sake of which 
Dasein exists. World has the fundamental character of the “for the 
sake of…,” and indeed in the originary sense that it first provides 
the intrinsic possibility for every factically self-determining “for 
your sake,” “for his sake,” “for the sake of that,” etc. Yet that for 
the sake of which Dasein exists is itself. To selfhood there belongs 
world; world is essentially related to Dasein.652 
 
In short, that Dasein exists for its own sake means that it exists for the 
sake of its world. The world, comprising all the being-modes of beings, 
thus constitutes “the respective totality of that for the sake of which 
                                         
652 GA 9, p. 157: “Das Dasein ist so, daß es umwillen seiner existiert. Wenn aber die Welt 
es ist, im Überstieg zu der sich allererst Selbstheit zeitigt, dann erweist sie sich als das, 
worumwillen Dasein existiert. Die Welt hat den Grundcharakter des Umwillen von … 
und das in dem ursprünglichen Sinne, daß sie allererst die innere Möglichkeit für jedes 
faktisch sich bestimmende deinetwegen, seinetwegen, deswegen usf. vorgibt. 
Worumwillen aber Dasein existiert, ist es selbst. Zur Selbstheit gehört Welt; diese ist 
wesenhaft daseinsbezogen.” 
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Dasein exists in each case.”653 Consider the displacement that allows 
Heidegger to dismiss at least every simple critique of egoism: If Dasein’s 
primary understanding of the world embraces the totality of being-modes 
determining what it means to be a human being at all, and constituting its 
purposes and heroes, then Dasein’s understanding and choice of itself and 
possibilities cannot be founded on any ontic self-relation, but needs to 
involve an understanding of the historical possibilities of being 
determining not only itself but all those human beings sharing the same 
historical world.  
      This argument clearly seems convincing from the viewpoint of 
Heidegger’s idea of the primacy of the historical world and his subsequent 
attempt to account for the binding force of historical being. Ultimately, 
however, the question – to which we will return in due course – is whether 
this attempt succeeds and whether Heidegger’s later notion of the 
bindingness of the historical world is not compatible with and even 
presupposes an attitude which is collectivist and egoistic at the same time.   
 
Understanding of Being as Free World-Projection 
 
Heidegger’s strong emphasis on the transcendence and priority of our 
understanding of being in relation to our knowledge of beings induces a 
new explication of our understanding of being in terms of as a free 
projection of a world.654  
      In Being and Time Heidegger fundamentally neglected the question of 
the phenomenal character of our understanding of being. Having first 
underscored the hierarchically determining role of our understanding of 
being in relation to all ontic understanding, the method of the existential 
analytic implied that Heidegger – in contradiction of the above thesis – 
tried to access the sense of being through a phenomenological description 
of the ontological structures of a certain being: Dasein. In this, Dasein’s 
possibility of authentic ontic self-understanding functioned as the 
autonomous phenomenal ground for the ontological explication. 
Heidegger’s neglect of the question of the understanding of being led Being 
                                         
653 GA 9, p. 158: “die jeweilige Ganzheit des Umwillen des Daseins.” 
654 For a perceptive and more detailed account of Heidegger’s conception of 
philosophy as world-projection see Figal 1992, pp. 94-110. 
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and Time into its basic ambiguities: on the one hand, Heidegger’s inability 
to account for the givenness of historical being and purposes meant that 
his thesis about the priority and historicity of our understanding of being 
was contradicted by his concrete attempt to read off being through a 
phenomenological explication of the transcendental structures of Dasein; 
on the other hand, it meant that he was unable to account for the binding 
force of Dasein’s purposes, which forced him into an uncontrolled 
vacillation between collectivism and subjectivism.    
      As Heidegger after the publication of Being and Time highlights the 
understanding of being as Dasein’s primary transcendence of beings, he is 
faced with the task of providing a new account of the character of this 
understanding. Since our understanding of being precedes and determines 
all our ontic understanding – e.g. of ourselves and our existential 
possibilities – it cannot be attained by way of an explication of the 
authentic self-understanding of Dasein anymore. Hence, the question 
arises: how does our primary understanding of being transpire? 
      Heidegger’s general answer to this question is that we need to 
conceive of our understanding of being as a free projection of world. In 
“On the Essence of Ground” he describes this understanding as follows: 
 
As the respective totality of that for the sake of which Dasein exists 
in each case, world is brought before Dasein through Dasein itself. 
This bringing of world before itself is the originary projection of 
the possibilities of Dasein, insofar as, in the midst of beings, it is to 
be able to comport itself toward such beings. Yet just as it does not 
explicitly grasp that which has been projected, this projection of 
world also always casts the projected world over beings. This prior 
casting-over (Überwurf) first makes it possible for beings as such to 
manifest themselves.655 
 
That is, prior to and as a condition of every experience of beings, Dasein 
throws out a world of being-senses over the totality of beings, on the basis 
                                         
655 GA 9, p. 158: “Die Welt wird als die jeweilige Ganzheit des Umwillen eines 
Daseins durch dieses selbst vor es selbst gebracht. Dieses Vor-sich-selbst-bringen von 
Welt ist der ursprüngliche Entwurf der Möglichkeiten des Daseins, sofern es inmitten 
von Seiendem zu diesem sich soll verhalten können. Der Entwurf von Welt aber ist, 
imgleichen wie er das Entworfene nichts eigens erfaßt, so auch immer Überwurf der 
entworfenen Welt über das Seiende. Der vorgängige Überwurf ermöglicht erst, daß 
Seiendes als solches sich offenbart.”  
314 The Openness of Being 
 
 
of which these beings can appear as one thing or the other. This 
projection of the world does not have the character of a thematic 
discovery of some given essences or purposes but rather proceeds out of a 
“will” which lets the world happen and bind it.656 This originary “will” – 
preceding and conditioning every ontic will – Heidegger calls “freedom”: 
“Surpassing in the direction of world is freedom itself. Accordingly, 
transcendence does not merely come upon the for-the-sake-of as anything 
like a value or end that would be present at hand in itself; rather, freedom 
holds the for-the-sake-of toward itself, and does so as freedom. […] In this, 
however, freedom simultaneously unveils itself as making possible 
something binding, indeed obligation in general. Freedom alone can let a world 
prevail and let it world for Dasein.”657 
      At the outset, Heidegger’s notion of world-projection undeniably 
remains a very abstract figure of thought. It is only in the lecture course 
“The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Parable of the Cave and the 
Theaetetus”658 from 1931-32 that Heidegger tries to describe more 
concretely how the projection of being is carried out in natural science, 
history, art, and philosophy. In Heidegger’s account, these possibilities of 
enacting the projection form a rising hierarchy. The world-projection of 
natural science is exemplified by the scientific revolution of the 17th century. 
Against the common explanation of the scientific revolution as the gradual 
discovery of the causal regularities of nature through the introduction of 
mathematical equations and controlled experiments, Heidegger claims that 
the rise of modern natural science was conditioned by a previous 
projection of being. It was only on the basis of a projection of nature as “a 
spatio-temporally determined totality of movement of masspoints”659 that 
it became meaningful to inquire into the mathematically expressible 
regularities of nature and test them in experiments. Heidegger depicts the 
projection of being at play in the historical sciences by reflecting on the 
                                         
656 Cf. also GA 34, pp. 60f. 
657 GA 9, p. 163f.: “Der Überstieg zur Welt ist die Freiheit selbst. Demnach stößt die 
Transzendenz nicht auf das Umwillen als auf so etwas wie einen an sich vorhandenen 
Wert und Zweck, sondern Freiheit hält sich – und zwar als Freiheit – das Umwillen 
entgegen. […] Hierin erhüllt sich aber die Freiheit zugleich als die Ermöglichung von 
Bindung und Verbindlichkeit überhaupt. Freiheit allein kann dem Dasein eine Welt walten 
und welten lassen.” 
658 “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlenglechnis und Theätet,” GA 34. 
659 GA 34, p. 61: “ein raumzeitlich bestimmter Bewegungszusammenhang von 
Massenpunkten.”   
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peculiar understanding exhibited by an eminent historian like Jakob 
Burckhart. What makes Burckhart a great historian is not that he would 
have been extraordinarily good at collecting historical data, but that he 
possessed “the essential anticipatory regard (vorausgreifenden Wesensblick) for 
the fate, greatness, and misery of man, for the conditions and limits of 
human action, in short, the anticipatory understanding of the happening of 
what we call history, i.e., of the being of this being.”660 Both of the above 
projections – of the being of nature and of the historical being of man  – 
are in turn preceded and linked by the world-projections of art and 
philosophy. The essence of art, Heidegger argues, does not consist in 
expressing the inner experiences of the artist or representing some 
portions of the given totality of beings: “Rather, the artist possesses the 
essential regard (Wesensblick) for the possible; he brings out the hidden 
possibilities of beings in the artwork, and first makes the human beings 
see the really-being, with which they blindly busy themselves.”661 And he 
continues: “What is essential in the discovery of reality happened and 
happens not through science, but through primordial philosophy as well 
as through great poetry and its projections (Homer, Virgil, Dante, 
Shakespeare, Goethe).”662 That is, the projection performed by great art is 
not limited to some sphere of being – e.g. nature or history – but, like that 
of philosophy, consists in freely projecting a finite worldly totality of 
being-possibilities, thus giving us access to beings in their being. Here, 
Heidegger claims, philosophy plays the basic, conditioning role in relation 
to art: it is philosophy that allows us to understand “what the work of art 
and poetry as such are.”663 What makes philosophy fundamental is that it 
carries the principal potential of enacting a transparent projection of being 
                                         
660 GA 34, p. 62: “den vorausgreifenden Wesensblick für Menschenschicksal, 
Menschengröße und Menschenkümmerlichkeit, für Bedingtheit und Grenze des 
menschlichen Handelns, kurz das vorgreifende Verständnis des Geschehens dessen was 
wir Geschichte nennen, d.h. des Seins dieses Seienden.” 
661 GA 34, p. 64: “Das Wesen der Kunst […] besteht […] darin, daß der Künstler […] 
den Wesensblick für das Mögliche hat, die verborgenen Möglichkeiten des Seienden 
zum Werk bringt und dadurch die Menschen erst sehend macht für das Wirklich-
seiende, in dem sie sich blindlings herumtreiben.” 
662 GA 34, p. 64: “Das Wesentliche der Entdeckung des Wirklichen geschah und 
geschieht nicht durch die Wissenschaften, sondern durch ursprüngliche Philosophie 
und durch die große Dichtung und deren Entwürfe (Homer, Vergil, Dante, 
Shakespeare, Goethe).” 
663 GA 34, p. 64: “was das Kunstwerk und die Dichtkunst als solche sei.” 
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on the basis of a basic understanding of the essential freedom and 
temporality of all such projections.  
      However, even though these examples shed some light on Heidegger’s 
view of the hierarchical organization of the projection of being, it says 
almost nothing about its character and structure as free projection. To 
specify the philosophical sense of Heidegger’s conception a little I will 
now look closer at the two basic systematic aspects that it is intended to 
address and articulate. 
      On the one hand, Heidegger’s depiction of the free world-projection is 
an attempt to account for the groundless character of our understanding of 
being. Since the understanding of being precedes and determines all 
understanding of beings it constitutes the ultimate ground for all 
questioning and understanding: “As altogether the most antecedent answer 
the understanding of being provides the primary and ultimate grounding.”664 
As such, the understanding of being is itself characterized by a certain 
groundlessness: it cannot ground itself on any ontic understanding or 
explication of beings and it cannot transpire as a discovery of some kind 
of pre-given ideal senses. This leads Heidegger to describe the 
understanding of being as a projection originating in freedom: “Freedom,” 
Heidegger writes, is the “ground of ground (Grund des Grundes)”; as such, it 
constitutes the “abyss (Ab-grund) in Dasein”: “in its essence as 
transcendence, freedom places Dasein, as potentiality for being, in 
possibilities that gape open before its finite choice, i.e., within its 
destiny.”665 
      In his account of the understanding of being as free projection 
Heidegger also has recourse to what he, at the time being, considers to be 
one of Kant’s fundamental insights, namely, that the ultimate condition of 
possibility for all empirical experience lies in the productive capacity of 
our imagination to form ideas, which always already organize our 
experience without being groundable in the latter. This Kantian notion 
makes itself felt in Heidegger’s explication of the formative character of 
the world-projection: the free projection of being does not take place as a 
                                         
664 GA 9, p. 169: “Das Seinsverständnis gibt als vorgängigste Antwort schlechtin die 
erst-letzte Begründung.” 
665 GA 9, p. 174: “Die Freiheit ist der Grund des Grundes. […] Als dieser Grund aber ist die 
Freiheit der Ab-grund des Daseins. […] die Freiheit stellt in ihrem Wesen als 
Transcendenz das Dasein als Seinkönnen in Möglichkeiten, die vor seiner endlichen 
Wahl, d.h. in seinem Schicksal aufklaffen.” 
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passive observation; rather, in the projection Dasein “gives” itself an 
originary “view (image) (Anblick (Bild))” that functions as “a paradigmatic 
form (Vor-bild) for all manifest beings.”666 Or, to quote another 
formulation: the understanding of being is “a looking in the sense of a 
looking-forth (Er-blicken). This means: first forming what is looked-forth 
(the view) through the looking and in the looking, i.e., forming in advance, 
pre-forming.”667  
      As the above pages have made clear, it is not so hard to see the 
theoretico-dialectical motives driving Heidegger to conceive of the 
understanding of being as a free and creative world-projection. 
Nevertheless, this conception essentially remains an indeterminate 
theoretical construct lacking systematic clarifying force. The simple fact is 
that it is extremely difficult to see how the free projection of world 
described by Heidegger would transpire: How would it be brought about 
concretely – in art or in philosophy? How would it be able to form a 
world – what would give it its direction and illuminating power – if it 
would neither be grounded in any knowledge of beings nor rest heavily in 
its factical historical heritage? 
      As a matter of fact, Heidegger’s extreme emphasis on the 
groundlessness of the being-projection also gives rise to a backlash of 
sorts, a need to anchor the projection of being in the beings themselves. 
In “The Essence of Ground,” having first stressed the priority of the 
projection of being over all understanding of beings, Heidegger qualifies 
this notion in the following way: in the primary projection of the world 
beings are “not yet manifest in themselves,”668 and they could never be so 
“were it not for the fact that Dasein in its projecting is, as projecting, also 
already in the midst of such beings.”669 What Heidegger here has in mind is, 
however, not the trivial fact that Dasein has to be surrounded by entities 
in order to be able to see them; he is rather suggesting that the world-
projection as such refers back to and is grounded in beings: “As disposed, 
Dasein is absorbed by beings in such a way that, in its belonging to beings, it 
                                         
666 GA 9, p. 158.  
667 GA 34, p. 71: “ein Blicken im Sinne des Er-blickens, das will sagen: durch das 
Blicken und im Blicken das Erblickte (den Anblick) allererst bilden, – im voraus bilden, 
vor-bilden.” 
668 GA 9, p. 166: “an ihm selbst noch nicht offenbar.” 
669 GA 9, p. 166: “wenn nicht das entwerfende Dasein als entwerfendes auch schon 
inmitten von jenem Seienden wäre.” 
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is thoroughly attuned by them. Transcendence means world-projection in such a way 
that those beings that are surpassed also already pervade and attune that which projects. 
With this absorption by beings that belongs to transcendence, Dasein has 
taken up a basis within beings, gained ‘ground.’”670 
      Here Heidegger for the first time introduces the idea that the 
projection of being is not a free production of the being-possibilities of 
the world but in some sense needs to be grounded in the totality of 
particular beings whose being it projects. Clearly, this sounds very much 
like a potential breaching of the ontological difference at the basis of his 
conception of the structure of phenomenal understanding. In fact, 
however, I think Heidegger’s idea of the ontic ground of the being-
projection is not meant to radically unsettle the ontological difference 
between our understanding of being and our understanding of beings, but 
is rather motivated by his sharpening of that difference. Again and again 
Heidegger repeats his thesis about the priority of the projection of being 
in relation to all knowledge of beings. Even when he launches the idea of 
the ground of being in beings, he stresses that no beings are “manifest” 
prior to the projection of being since the latter first makes possible all 
experience of beings as beings. Hence, the receptive “pervadedness” or 
“dominatedness” of the projection of being by the totality of beings must 
take place before every possible understanding of beings. Heidegger’s 
central idea is thus that the primary projection of  being essentially takes 
place through some kind of receptive interaction with the totality of 
particular beings – here still pre-phenomenal and undetermined – so that 
this projection first opens up the world of being which determines and 
gives us access to these beings as meaningful phenomena. For the 
moment this idea still remains rudimentary, and it is only later that 
Heidegger will take it up again and elaborate it in more detail in his 
analysis of the interplay between “world” and “earth” in “The Origin of 
the Work of Art.”  
      On the other hand, Heidegger’s notion of the freedom of the 
projection of being is intended to explain the normatively binding character 
                                         
670 GA 9, p. 166: “Das Dasein wird als befindliches vom Seienden eingenommen so, daß 
es dem Seienden zugehörig von ihm durchstimmt ist. Transzendenz heißt Weltentwurf, so 
zwar, daß das Entwerfende vom Seienden, das es übersteigt, auch schon gestimmt durchwaltet ist. Mit 
solcher zur Transzendenz gehörigen Eingenommenheit vom Seienden hat das Dasein im 
Seienden Boden genommen, ‘Grund’ gewonnen.” 
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of the world: how does the world concern us as a for-the-sake-of-which 
that binds us?  
   Here too Heidegger rallies a Kantian motif, namely the thought that the 
human being can only be compelled by laws that she has freely given 
herself. However, whereas Kant locates the origin of the law in reason, 
conceived as the transcendentally universal and necessary legislating 
agency of every particular individual, Heidegger suggests the idea that the 
bindingness of Dasein’s ultimate purposes is dependent on its freely 
binding itself to these purposes. “Freedom alone,” Heidegger writes in 
“The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic,” “can be the origin of 
bindingness”671: “In the projection of the for-the-sake-of-which as such 
Dasein gives itself the primordial bond.”672 Later, in the lecture course 
“The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Parable of the Cave and the 
Theaetetus,” he develops this thought as follows: “Authentic becoming-
free is a projecting binding of oneself – not just a yielding to a captivation, but 
a giving-of-a-bond-to-oneself, such a bond, namely, which remains 
binding from the outset and in advance, so that every subsequent 
comportment can thereby first become free and be free.”673 That is to say: 
in the primary projection of being we do not only throw out a world of 
being-possibilities but we also bind ourselves to this world as the ultimate 
framework of purposes determining what weight and significance 
particular beings and actions can show up and take on for us in our lives.    
      However, even though there obviously truth in the Kantian notion 
that our motivating purposes cannot have the character of external 
reasons but in some sense need to engage us as our personal matters, 
Heidegger’s articulation of the origin of normative bindingness in freedom 
remains vague and unconvincing: he is simply not able to show how any 
act of binding ourselves to certain purposes could ever grant to these 
purposes their binding character and their existential weight.  If we not do 
from the outset encounter the significant matter as a claim which rests in 
                                         
671 GA 26, p. 25: “Nur Freiheit kann Ursprung von Bindung sein.” Cf. GA 9, p. 164.  
672 GA 26, p. 247: “Im Entwurf des Worumwillen als solchem gibt sich das Dasein die 
ursprüngliche Bindung.” 
673 GA 34, p. 59: “Eigentliches Frei-werden ist ein entwerfendes Sich-binden, – kein 
bloßes Zulassen einer Fesselung, sondern das Sich-selbst-für-sich-selbst-eine-Bindung-
geben, und zwar eine solche, die von vornherein im voraus verbindlich bleibt, so daß 
jedes nachkommende Verhalten im einzelnen dadurch erst ein freies werden und sein 
kann.” 
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itself, and which we can either open up to and act upon, or perhaps cover 
up and ignore, it is hard to see how the fact that we bind ourselves to 
different purposes could make them significant. To be sure, it is possible 
to choose and bind oneself to certain significant matters – e.g. particular 
persons, tasks – in such a way that they gain a principal role in our lives. 
But such a choice presupposes rather than produces the significance of 
the matters we choose.  
       It could perhaps be seen as a symptom of the powerlessness of the 
above conception that Heidegger tries to back up his analysis of the freely 
binding world-projection with a second order argument about the finitude 
of Dasein. According to Heidegger, the projection of a world opens up a 
wide field of possibilities, which essentially exceeds the factical possibilities 
that Dasein, due to its finite thrownness among beings, can actually take 
over as its own. The “withdrawal” of excess possibilities effected by 
Dasein’s concrete facticity implies that the “those possibilities of world-
projection that can ‘actually be seized upon’”674 are brought forth towards 
the individual Dasein: “The withdrawal lends precisely the binding 
character of what remains projected before us the power to prevail within 
the realm of Dasein’s existence.”675 That is to say: it is on account of the 
factical finitude of Dasein that the freely projected being-possibilities 
receive their power to prevail.  
       But this argument, too, fails to convince. Just as little as our guiding 
purposes and possibilities can gain their binding force through our act of 
binding ourselves to them, just as little is their supposed bindingness 
sharpened or strengthened by reason of their finitude. It is of course true 
that the finite concretion of life always brings with it a limitation of the 
circle of readily available possibilities. Yet it is utterly unclear why this 
finitude would strengthen the bindingness of our factical possibilities. To 
begin with, the limited character of our factical possibilities is always only 
provisional, such that there is nothing preventing us from looking beyond 
these possibilities towards other possibilities that could in principal 
become our limited factical possibilities. Moreover, even if we would – for 
some reason – be stuck with only certain possibilities, the fact that these 
                                         
674 GA 9, p. 167: “die ‘wirklich’ ergreifbaren Möglichkeiten des Weltentwurfs.” 
675 GA 9, p. 167: “Der Entzug verschafft gerade der Verbindlichkeit des verbleibenden 
entworfenen Vorwurfs die Gewalt ihres Waltens im Existensbereich des Daseins.” 
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are our only possibilities could not account for their significance and 
bindingness.  
 
Fundamental Ontology and Metontology 
 
Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s philosophical nature as a being that 
understands being through projecting a world in the end leads him to 
divide the task of philosophy into fundamental ontology and metontology. 
      Heidegger’s notion of the metontological task of philosophy has given 
rise to diverging interpretations. Steven Crowell has argued that the idea of 
a metontology is expressive of Heidegger’s confused effort to recover a 
more traditional metaphysics in the wake of Being and Time, in the form of 
an inquiry into the totality of beings that would provide an “ontic ground 
of ontology.”676 But, regardless of how we are to understand this 
metontological inquiry – as a study of existing nature, or as a study of the 
factical ontical situation into which Dasein is always already thrown – it 
cannot, Crowell maintains, function as a ground for our ontological 
phenomenological investigation of the sense-structures of Dasein without 
this giving rise to some kind of naturalistic dogmatism: “It is impossible 
that metontology could investigate thrownness – in the sense of 
demonstrating the natural, social, or historical limits of Dasein’s 
understanding of being – since such investigation would already be 
grounded in that very understanding.”677 Crowell’s transcendental-
phenomenological critique stands opposed to the more frequent 
hermeneutic-deconstructivist reading of Heidegger’s metontology 
defended by, e.g., Jean Grondin and Robert Bernasconi.678 According to 
this reading, Heidegger’s project of metontology undermines the priority 
and purity of the project of fundamental ontology by exposing the 
thrownness of Dasein into its factical historical circumstances as the ontic 
ground of all understanding of being. Bernasconi argues that metontology 
implies a “transformation of philosophy’s own highest aspirations when it 
rediscovers its roots in the ontic”;679 hence, “Heidegger is not readily able 
                                         
676 Crowell 2001, p. 240. 
677 Crowell 2001, p. 240. Cf. also p. 237. 
678 For other versions of the hermeneutic-deconstructivist reading see, e.g., Krell 1986, 
pp. 27-46; Sallis 1990, pp. 139-167. 
679 Bernasconi 1993, p. 34. 
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to sustain the purity of the distinction between the ontic and the 
ontological.”680 Grondin for his part reaches the following conclusion: 
“Dasein proves to be too finite and too historically situated to obtain a 
perspective on being which would enable it to derive sub specie aeternitatis 
the transcendental structures of its most fundamental being.”681 
      Although the above interpretations pass opposed judgments on the 
systematic force of Heidegger’s idea of metontology, they all share the 
basic assumption that the task of metontology is to investigate the ontic 
ground of ontology. Now, even if that assumption is not altogether 
mistaken it seems to me that it ignores the extent to which Heidegger’s 
idea of metontology in fact springs forth from his sharpening of the 
ontological difference between ontology and ontics. Against the 
background of my previous analyses, I think it is possible to show 
convincingly that metontology is indeed nothing but the philosophical task 
of enacting a free projection of a world. 
      It is in an appendix to the course “The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic” that Heidegger develops the idea that philosophy is divided into 
two main tasks: fundamental ontology and metontology. By fundamental 
ontology Heidegger means the job of investigating the basic question 
“What does ‘being’ mean?”682 As in Being and Time he insists that 
fundamental ontology must take the form of an analytic of Dasein: the 
only way to shed light on the sense and possibility of our understanding of 
being is to examine the structures of understanding: transcendence, 
projection, freedom, and temporality. However, even though fundamental 
ontology constitutes the ground of all ontology it does not “exhaust the 
concept of metaphysics.”683 According to Heidegger, it would be “fatefully 
misguided” to absolutize the problems of fundamental ontology as the 
sole and eternal task of philosophy, and so “negate them in their essential 
function.”684 Indeed, as fundamental ontology understands and elaborates 
itself radically it does, of inner necessity, effect an “overturning” (Umschlag) 
                                         
680 Bernasconi 1993, p. 33. 
681 Grondin 1995, p. 69. 
682 GA 26, p. 171: “Was besagt ‘Sein’?” 
683 GA 26, p. 199: “die Fundamentalontologie erschöpft nicht den Begriff der 
Metaphysik.” 
684 GA 26, p. 197f.: “[Es wäre] verhängnisvoll irrig […], wollte man gerade diese 
Probleme verabsolutisieren und sie so in ihrer wesentlichen Funktion zunichte 
machen.” 
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– metabolē – into “metontology.” Whereas fundamental ontology 
investigates being as such, metontology has “beings as a whole” (das 
Seiende im Ganzen) as its theme.685 In particular, Heidegger names “space” 
and “existence” as special themes of metontology, and also says it is here 
that the “question of ethics” can be posed.686  
      But how should the necessity of the turnaround into metontology be 
understood? Heidegger gives the following explanation:  
 
Since there is being only insofar as beings are already there, 
fundamental ontology has in it the latent tendency toward a 
primordial, metaphysical transformation which becomes possible 
only when being is understood in its whole problematic. […] there 
is being only when Dasein understands being. In other words, the 
possibility that being is there in the understanding presupposes the 
factical existence of Dasein, and this in turn presupposes the 
factical extantness of nature. Right within the horizon of the 
problem of being, when posed radically, it appears that all this is 
visible and can become understood as being, only if a possible 
totality of beings is already there.687 
 
In short, our understanding of being presupposes the “factical existence of 
Dasein,” which, in turn, presupposed the “factical extantness of nature.” 
Hence, metontology is motivated as an inquiry into the “totality of beings” 
as that which is already presupposed in the fundamental ontological 
understanding of being. At least at a first glance this passage seems to 
offer patent proof of the correctness of the basic presupposition shared by 
Crowell, Grondin, and Bernasconi, namely that Heidegger’s metontology 
aims to ground the understanding of being in an ontic investigation of 
beings. The interpretation seems to get further confirmation as Heidegger 
                                         
685 GA 26, p. 199. 
686 Cf. GA 26, pp. 174, 199. 
687 GA 26, p. 199: “Da es Sein nur gibt, indem auch schon gerade Seiendes im Da ist, 
liegt in der Fundamentalontologie latent die Tendenz zu einer ursprünglichen 
metaphysischen Verwandlung, die erst möglich wird, wenn Sein in seiner vollen 
Problematik verstanden ist. […] es gibt Sein nur, wenn Dasein Sein versteht. Mit 
anderen Worten: die Möglichkeit, daß es Sein im Verstehen gibt, hat zur 
Voraussetzung die faktische Existenz des Daseins, und diese wiederum das faktische 
Vorhandensein der Natur. Gerade im Horizont des radikal gestellten Seinsproblems 
zeigt sich, daß all das nur sichtbar ist und als Sein verstanden werden kann, wenn eine 
mögliche Totalität von Seiendem schon da ist.” 
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formulates the overturning into metontology in terms of “the turn (Kehre), 
where ontology itself expressly runs back into the metaphysical ontic in 
which it implicitly always remains.”688 
      Ultimately, the sense of Heidegger’s notion of metontology seems to 
hinge entirely on what he means by an inquiry into the “totality of beings.” 
To begin with, two remarks in Heidegger’s text speak against reading his 
metontology as an ontic investigation grounding ontology. First, 
Heidegger stresses that “metontology is possible only on the basis and in 
the perspective of the radical ontological problematic and in conjunction 
with it”;689 moreover, that it thematizes beings in their totality “in the light 
of ontology.”690 Second, he points out that metontology should not be 
understood as a “summary ontic” leaning on and summarizing the results 
of the positive ontic sciences into a comprehensive worldview.691  
Moreover, none of the interpreters above is able to provide an account of 
the kind of ontic investigation Heidegger would have in mind, which is 
not ruled out both by the text and by the systematic weakness of the 
account: whether conceived as an investigation into nature,692 into god,693 
or into the factical circumstances of Dasein694 it is very hard to see what 
Heidegger could even have envisioned as a mode investigation that could 
precede and ground our understanding of being. 
      However, if one looks closer at Heidegger’s elaboration of the 
metontological task of philosophy I think it becomes clear that the 
metontological investigation of the totality of beings that he envisions 
should not be understood as an ontic investigation of entities at all, but 
rather as an ontological projection of the world.  
      In his explication of the double task of philosophy, Heidegger has 
recourse to two historical sources: Aristotle and Kant. He opens the 
problem by introducing Aristotle’s distinction between philosophia prōtē, 
which investigates being, and theologikē, whose theme is “aitia tois phanerois 
                                         
688 GA 26, p. 201: “die Kehre, in der die Ontologie selbst in die metaphysische Ontik, in 
der sie unausdrücklich immer steht, ausdrücklich zurückläuft.” 
689 GA 26, p. 200: “Metontologie ist nur auf dem Grunde und in der Perspektive der 
radikalen ontologischen Problematik und einig mit dieser möglich.” 
690 GA 26, p. 200: “im Lichte der Ontologie.” 
691 GA 26, p. 199: “summarische Ontik.” 
692 Crowell 2001, p. 238. 
693 Crowell 2001, p. 239. 
694 Crowell 2001, p. 240; Bernasconi 1993, pp. 33-34. 
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tōn theiōn, the grounds of what is manifesting itself as overwhelming in 
apparent beings […]. To theion means simply beings – the heavens: the 
encompassing and overpowering, that under and upon which we are 
thrown, that which dazzles us and assaults us, the overwhelming.”695 
Though the formulation is certainly somewhat obscure and ambiguous, it 
indicates that Aristotle’s theology, as interpreted by Heidegger, is not a 
science about different particular entities but rather inquires into the 
grounds characterizing the overwhelming totality in which we live. In fact, 
as Heidegger elaborates his reading of Aristotle’s theology through an 
explication of Kant’s notion of metaphysica specialis, it becomes clear that 
the totality in question for Heidegger coincides with world. According to 
Kant, the metaphysica generalis investigating the nature and conditions of 
metaphysics has to be complemented by a metaphysica specialis thematizing 
the “world,” not conceived as the object of an ontic investigation of 
nature, but as “the wholeness of beings in the totality of their possibilities, 
a wholeness which is itself, however, essentially related to human 
existence, and human existence taken in its final goal.”696 Indeed, the final 
part of Heidegger’s lecture course is precisely an attempt to clarify the 
metontological task of philosophy suggested by Aristotle and Kant by 
explicating the “ontological concept of world” constituting the correlate of 
Dasein’s primary free transcendent projection of the world as a binding 
totality of being:697 “Dasein transcends beings, and its surpassing is 
surpassing to the world,”698  whereby “world” signifies “the primordial 
totality of that which Dasein, as free, gives itself to understand.”699  
      A few months later, in the course “Introduction to Philosophy,” 
Heidegger articulates the double task of philosophy in terms of the 
problem “how the problem of being as such unfurls itself into the 
                                         
695 GA 26, p. 13: “αἴτια τοῖς φανεροῖς τῶν ϑείων, die Gründe des am offensichtlichen 
Seienden sich bekundenen Übermächtigen […]. Τὸ ϑεῖον meint: das Seiende 
schlechthin – der Himmel: das Umgriefende und Überwältigende, das worunter und 
woran wir geworfen, wovon wir benommen und überfallen sind, das Übermächtige.” 
696 GA 26, p. 231: “die Ganzheit des Seienden in der Totalität seiner Möglichkeiten, 
diese selbst aber ist wesenhaft bezogen auf menschliche Existenz, und diese 
genommen in ihrem Endzweck.” 
697 GA 26, p. 232. 
698 GA 26, p. 233: “[Dasein] transzendiert das Seiende, und der Übersprung ist 
Übersprung zur Welt.” 
699 GA 26, p. 247: “die ursprüngliche Ganzheit dessen, was sich das Dasein als freies 
zu verstehen gibt.” 
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problem of world.”700  Philosophy is here presented as the basic attitude 
which, on the basis of an explication of our understanding of being as a 
free and groundless world-projection, is able to enact the projection in an 
explicit and transparent manner: “Philosophizing, as explicit transcending, 
is a letting-happen of the transcendence of Dasein from its ground.”701 
      We should now be in a position to sum up the philosophical gist of 
Heidegger division of philosophy into fundamental ontology and 
metontology. Fundamental ontology is the first and basic task to open up 
the question of being as such through an analytic of the structure of 
Dasein as transcendence, and it is this task that all of Heidegger’s lecture 
courses of this period are engaged in. Simultaneously, the results of the 
analytic itself throws out another direction of investigation. By depicting 
the substantial understanding of being as a free projection of a world, 
Heidegger opens the task of realizing this ontological projection as 
transparently as possible. Whereas fundamental ontology clarifies the 
sense of Dasein’s understanding of being, metontology, on this basis, 
enacts the primary projection of a totality of being-characters. Even 
though the thematic field of metontology thus roughly coincides with that 
of Husserl’s regional ontologies,702 there are also important differences. As 
                                         
700 GA 27, p. 391: “wie sich das Seinsproblem selbst zum Weltproblem entrollt.” 
701 GA 27, s. 396: “Das Philosophieren als ausdrückliches Transzendieren ist ein 
Geschehenlassen der Transzendenz des Daseins aus ihrem Grunde.” 
702 Naturally both Crowell and Bernasconi reject the idea that Heidegger’s 
metontology is thematically equivalent to Husserl’s regional ontologies. To my mind, 
however, the reasons they present are not convincing. Crowell gives one structural and 
one substantial argument: first, he claims that Heidegger explicitly integrates the 
regional study of different characters of being into fundamental ontology; second, he 
maintains that metontology cannot be part of Dasein’s understanding of being since it 
is intended to “provide grounds” for this understanding (Crowell 2001, pp. 232f.). The 
first argument builds on a selective reading of the relevant paragraph – GA 26, pp. 
191-194 – in which Heidegger outlines the different problems encompassed by 
fundamental ontology, stating that the fourth basic problem concerns “the regionality 
of being and the unity of the idea of being” (die Regionalität des Seins und die Einheit der 
Idee des Seins). This, however, cannot be taken as a clear statement to the effect that 
fundamental ontology involves regional ontology; it could also be taken – more 
convincingly, I think – as meaning that fundamental ontology explicates the sense of 
the unity of being and its regionality without engaging in a substantial investigation of 
regional being-characters. Moreover, when Heidegger lists the themes studied by 
regional ontology  – nature, history, art, space, number, human existence – these 
happen to include the only two themes explicitly singled out by Heidegger as themes 
of metontology, namely space and existence. The second argument is erroneous in 
view of the thesis I have argued for above: that metontology is not an ontic science 
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concerns its theme the metontological projection is a projection of a 
unified totality of being preceding and determining the interplay between 
different characters and regions of being, which means that the 
understanding of being does not “step out of one region and into 
another” but rather, in a kind of hermeneutic movement, “immediately 
swings back and forth, for example in the understanding of nature and 
history.”703 As concerns its methodological mode, the metontological 
projection of being does not, as by Husserl, have the character of a 
categorial intuition of universal being-senses but transpires as a free and 
groundless projection of a finite totality of being.  
      It should be clear by now that the standard interpretation of 
Heidegger’s metontology as an ontic grounding of ontology is 
problematic. Still, it is not just a cloud-castle. As we have seen, Heidegger 
maintains that our understanding of being precedes and conditions all 
ontic understanding of beings by projecting the being-characters in terms 
of which beings can show themselves as something:704 there can thus be 
no such thing as an ontic investigation of beings functioning as the ground 
for our understanding of being. At the same time, however, Heidegger’s 
articulation of the priority of our understanding of being and its character 
as a free and groundless projection leads him to the idea that the 
projection of being must be anchored in some kind of basic receptivity to 
the manifold of particular material beings among which we live. This idea, 
that being must somehow be grounded in beings, does not imply the 
possibility of an ontic science of beings; rather it must be grasped as an 
interplay between being and beings involved in the being-projection itself, 
thus preceding and conditioning all ontic knowledge. 
                                                                                                                      
but a projection of being. Bernasconi for his part claims that Heidegger’s “references 
to finitude, facticity, and thrownness guard against such a reading [i.e. of metontology 
as a regional science]” (Bernasconi 1993, p. 30). However, Heidegger conception of 
the task of metontology as an an investigation of the totality of being-characters does 
not imply that he would sidestep his conception of the historicity of understanding 
and take over Husserl’s idea of a universal eidetic science. Far from it. According to 
Heidegger, the projection of being enacted by metontology is a finite groundless 
projection of a historical world.  
703 GA 27, p. 322: “Vor allem aber gilt es im faktischen Dasein, im Seinsverständnis 
desselben, die Vielfältigkeit des Seins dieses Seienden zu verstehen, wobei das 
Seinsverständnis aber nicht von einer Region in die andere hinaus- und übertritt, 
sondern gleichsam unmittelbar hin und her schwingt im Verstehen von Natur och 
Geschichte zum Beispiel.” 
704 See, e.g., GA 26, pp. 16, 233, 245. 
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      At the end of the day, Heidegger’s doubling of the task of philosophy 
bears witness to a deep rift in his basic philosophical stance. As a result of 
Heidegger’s radicalized emphasis on the priority and autonomy of our 
understanding of being as world-projection, the following set of questions 
arises: How does the fundamental ontological explication of the sense of 
being qua projection relate to the free projection of being? How can the 
existential analytic of the structures of Dasein precede the substantial 
projection of being? Must not the explication of the basic structures of 
Dasein as transcendence, freedom, and temporality be guided by our 
primary projection of being – e.g. the being of Dasein – rather than the 
other way around? It is clear, I think, that Heidegger’s explication of the 
understanding of being as a free projection unsettles the priority and 
autonomy of the project of fundamental ontology. Indeed, as we have 
noted above, Heidegger’s formulation of the metontological task of 
philosophy contains passages that indicate a reversed order of 
determination, as when he calls the overturning into metontology “the turn 
(Kehre), where ontology itself expressly runs back into the metaphysical 
ontic in which it implicitly always remains,”705 or, as when he begins his 
account by stating the following question: “And to what extent does 
existential analytic as metaphysical history and ‘humanitas’ get its sense 
only from the full concept of metaphysics?”706 Suggested in these passages 
is nothing less than the possibility that fundamental ontology itself might 
be in the end be understood and enacted in the manner of a historical 
projection of being.  
      However, although Heidegger opens up and articulates the mounting 
tension within his philosophical approach he is not yet prepared to let this 
tension free in its potentially revolutionary logic – maybe because his 
analysis of the understanding of being as free world-projection is still too 
weak and too dim to establish a genuinely new approach.  Hence, while 
the years 1928-1933 prepare the way for Heidegger’s later thinking by 
stressing the priority of our understanding of being as a free historical 
                                         
705 GA 26, p. 201: “die Kehre, in der die Ontologie selbst in die metaphysische Ontik, in 
der sie unausdrücklich immer steht, ausdrücklich zurückläuft.” 
706 GA 26, p. 196: “Und inwiefern erfährt erst die existenziale Analytik als 
metaphysische Historie und ‘Humanitas’ aus dem vollen Begriff der Metaphysik ihren 
Sinn?” 
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projection, Heidegger still basically remains stuck in the ambiguity 
between fundamental ontology and metontology.  
 
The Superior Task of Philosophy and the Promise of National 
Socialism 
 
Heidegger’s conception of the metontological task of philosophy also 
brings with it a transformation of his view of the existential purpose and 
import of philosophy. Indeed, it implies a superordination of the task of 
philosophical ontology over all possible ontic ethical-existential concerns 
with particular beings.  
      Here I briefly want to outline how Heidegger’s notion of the primacy 
of ontology develops after Being and Time, and how it acquires an 
exceptionally fierce and dangerous shape in the early 1930s as Heidegger 
combines his apocalyptic vision of the threatening annihilation of the 
meaning of the Western world, generated by the nihilistic metaphysics of 
the modern age, with the hope of a possible projection of a new meaning-
laden world – a projection in which philosophy and politics can join 
forces.   
      Heidegger began Being and Time by insisting that the structure of 
phenomenality be conceived in terms of a strict hierarchy: it is our 
preceding ontological understanding of being that determines our ontic-
existentiell understanding of particular beings as meaningful phenomena. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger’s existential analytic transpired as a 
phenomenological explication of the structure of a particular being, that is, 
authentic Dasein. This implied that Dasein was accorded the possibility of 
an autonomous existentiell understanding of the “question of existence,” 
the choice between inauthenticity and authenticity, so that this existentiell 
understanding constituted the phenomenal ground for the ontological 
explication.707 Hence, the basic question of philosophy was ultimately 
motivated by the basic question of existence: to the extent that our 
understanding of being guides – but does not determine – our existentiell 
understanding, this motivates the task to achieve a clear understanding of 
being, which would not cover up and distort but rather give free passage 
to the existentiell problems of life. 
                                         
707 SZ, p. 12.  
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      However, even though the analysis in Being and Time indeed ascribed a 
systematic priority to Dasein’s existentiell understanding as the ground of 
its ontological understanding of being, Heidegger’s account of the basic 
existentiell conflict between authenticity and inauthenticity already 
expresses a clear prioritization of what we could call a proto-ontological 
problem over every ethical problem. According to Heidegger, what is 
primarily at stake for Dasein is the transparent appropriation of its own 
historical possibilities – its heroes - in their finitude and groundlessness. 
Since these possibilities are supposed to determine the significances and 
roles with reference to which we can experience particular beings – 
including human beings and animals – as meaningful, and since authentic 
existence is supposed to imply that we responsibly appropriate these 
possibilities as our own, the outcome is that our existentiell struggle for 
authenticity conditions our ethical relationship to particular human beings. 
Still, although Heidegger ascribes a clear priority to authenticity over ethics 
he does not yet believe that philosophical ontology has priority over the 
existentiell understanding of the individual, nor, for that matter, that 
ontology could take part in the founding of historical being.  
      After the publication of Being and Time Heidegger’s view of the 
motivation and execution of philosophy undergoes a change. Now 
Heidegger maintains that philosophy is not exhausted by the task of 
explicating the transcendental structures of understanding constituting the 
horizon of our ontic experience, but also essentially involves the task of 
projecting the being-world that allows beings to appear as meaningful in 
the first place. Such a historical projection of being cannot be grounded 
on any direct ontic experience of particular beings as significant, since it is 
only the projection itself that establishes the world on the basis of which 
particular human beings, animals, and things can appear to us as 
important, engaging, morally appealing. In short, the philosophical 
projection of being gives all beings – including our fellow human beings – 
the significance they can have for us. The upshot of this is that the 
philosophical task of performing an originary projection of being takes on 
absolute primacy as the happening which allows a meaningful world to 
emerge and persist at all. This ontological task is placed over every other 
ontic or ethical demand since it first opens up other beings as significant 
in the first place, as possible objects of love, concern, dialogue. 
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      Then, as Heidegger in the early 1930s combines his notion of the 
superordination of ontology over ethics with the apocalyptic idea about 
the historical destruction and leveling of the Western world, the basic 
conflict between ontology and ethics becomes acute: if it is the case, as 
Heidegger believes it is, that our historical world is threatened by total 
destruction of its meaning, then the ontological task to establish a new 
meaningful world becomes pressing as a task which overrides every ontic-
ethical concern should there be a conflict between the two.  
      Driven to its ultimate logical-ethical consequence, this is not only a 
morally perilous thought but a thought that in principal closes the very 
possibility of encountering other human beings as significant in 
themselves. It is quite feasible, I think, to fathom a situation in which the 
institutional and ideological situation we are living in – e.g. a totalitarian 
society, genocide – is so cruel and oppressive, that we are forced to weigh 
the task of forcibly and even violently transforming this general situation 
in order to make possible a better life for the people living there against 
our ethical concern for some particular human beings. Still, what makes 
this a moral problem in the first place is that the ultimate motivation and 
guideline for our action can only lie in our love and concern precisely for 
particular human beings – be they considered as individuals or as a group. 
For Heidegger, however, this way of thinking is excluded for principal 
reasons. Since it is the being-projection of philosophy which first confers 
significance on human beings, it cannot itself be guided by a concern for 
such beings. Hence, Heidegger’s superordination of ontology over ethics 
cannot be taken as more or less temporary suspension of the ethical but 
needs to be understood as an a priori closure of our direct ethical relation 
to the other, transforming the other into a function of our collective 
historical world of meaning.  
      The critique that Heidegger prioritizes ontology over ethics has of 
course been presented before by Emmanuel Levinas, and I will return to 
critically discuss the sense and problems of this prioritization later. What 
we need to see here is that it is precisely the above vision of the task of 
thinking in the face of the impending apocalypse of the Western world 
that centrally pervades Heidegger’s understanding of National Socialism as 
a possible beginning of a philosophical projection of being.   
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      In a letter to Elisabeth Blochmann from the end of March 1933, 
Heidegger sums up his basic view of the Nazi seizure of power in the 
following manner: 
 
For me, the present events – precisely because much remains 
opaque and unmastered – have an unusual gathering power. They 
enhance the will and the certainty of acting in the service of a great 
assignment, and of assisting in the construction of a world 
grounded in the people (volklich gegründete Welt). For some time, the 
pallidness and shadowiness of a mere “culture,” and the unreality of 
so called “values” have sunk down into nothingness for me, 
allowing me to search for the new ground in Dasein. We will find 
this ground, and also the vocation of what is German in the history 
of the occident, only if we expose ourselves to being as such in a 
new manner and appropriation. Hence, I experience the present 
entirely from the future. Only thus can a genuine participation 
grow, and the standing-within (Inständigkeit) our history, which is 
indeed a precondition for true acting. By contrast, we need to 
calmly put up with the overly hurried playing along with the new 
things that is mushrooming all over, that is to say, with the clinging 
to the superficial, which takes anything and everything as “political” 
without taking into consideration that this can only remain one way 
of the first revolution. However, for many people this can become 
and has already become a way of the first awakening – supposing, 
that is, that we are ready to prepare for a second and deeper 
awakening.708 
                                         
708 GA 16, pp. 71f.: “Das gegenwärtige Geschehen hat für mich – gerade weil vieles 
dunkel und unbewältigt bleibt – eine ungewöhnliche sammelnde Kraft. Es steigert den 
Willen und die Sicherheit, im Dienste eines großen Auftrages zu wirken und am Bau 
einer volklich gegründeten Welt mitzuhelfen. Seit langem ist mir die Blässe und das 
Schattenhafte einer bloßen ‘Kultur’ und die Unwirklichkeit sogenannter ‘Werte’ zur 
Nichtigkeit herabgesunken und ließ mich im Dasein den neuen Boden suchen. Wir 
werden ihn und zugleich die Berufung des Deutschen in der Geschichte des 
Abendlandes nur finden, wenn wir uns dem Sein selbst in neuer Weise und Aneignung 
aussetzen. So erfahre ich das Gegenwärtige ganz aus der Zukunft. Nur so kann eine 
echte Teilnahme wachsen und jene Inständigkeit in unserer Geschichte, die freilich 
Vorbedingung für ein wahrhaftes Wirken ist. Demgegenüber muß in aller Ruhe jenes 
überall aufschießende und allzu eilige Mitlaufen mit den neuen Dingen hingenommen 
werden. Jenes Sichankleben an das Vordergründliche, das nun plötzlich alles und jedes 
‘politisch’ nimmt, ohne zu bedenken, daß das nur ein Weg der ersten Revolution 
bleiben kann. Freilich kann das für Viele ein Weg der ersten Erweckung werden und 
geworden sein – gesetzt daß wir uns für eine zweite und tiefere vorzubereiten 
gesonnen sind.” 
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In short, to Heidegger the Nazi accession to power appears as a “first 
revolution” which has the potential of being a “way of awakening” 
towards a “second and deeper” philosophical revolution: it is only if the 
political movement of Nazism can be lead over into the ontological task 
of understanding and appropriating being that it becomes possible to carry 
out an originary and transparent “construction of a world grounded in the 
people.” Hence, Heidegger sees the contemporary politics of Nazism 
“entirely from the future,” as a possible beginning of a future projection 
of being. In his inaugural address as rector of the university of Freiburg, 
“The Self-Assertion of the German University,”709 – which can be read as 
his philosophico-political manifesto – Heidegger repeats the same pattern 
of thought: on the one hand, he welcomes the rise of Nazism and makes it 
the main task of the university to work for this “departure” (Aufbruch)  
towards a new beginning in its “glory” and “greatness”;710 on the other 
hand, he elevates the university, headed by the philosophical questioning 
of being, as the “preeminent school (hohe Schule), which from science and 
through science educates and disciplines the leaders and guardians (Führer 
und Hüter) of the fate of the German people.”711 Hence, Heidegger 
interprets the national socialist revolution as a possible beginning and 
preparation for the basic ontological task of projecting and constructing – 
via the recovery of the Greek origin of philosophy – a “truly spiritual 
world” (wahrhaft geistige Welt) for the German people.712 
      We can thus see how Heidegger’s apocalyptic diagnosis of the Western 
world and his notion of the superior and urgent task of projecting a new 
world prepare the way for his philosophical affirmation of the Nazi 
revolution as the possible dawn of an ontological revolution to come. Of 
course, this explication of Heidegger’s philosophical understanding of 
Nazism does not suffice to answer the question concerning the motives – 
psychological, political, philosophical – that determine the lure that 
Nazism in particular exerted on him. As concerns the loose aggregate of 
ideas making up National Socialist ideology – e.g. the biologism and 
racism, the national revanchism and militarism, the Blut und Boden-
                                         
709 “Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität,” in GA 16.  
710 GA 16, p. 117. 
711 GA 16, p. 108: “die hohe Schule, die aus Wissenschaft und durch Wissenschaft die 
Führer und Hüter des Schicksals des deutschen Volkes in die Erziehung und Zucht 
nimmt.” 
712 GA 16, pp. 111f. 
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romanticism, the cult of health – most of these do not have any 
counterparts in Heidegger’s philosophical thinking, although his deeply 
conservative political worldview certainly made him feel attracted to some 
of them. Indeed, it must be said that some central parts of the Nazi 
doctrine – e.g. the biologistic racism – are clearly at odds with the content 
of Heidegger’s philosophy. Still, I think Heidegger’s dream of an 
ontological revolution taking primacy over our ethical relation to particular 
human beings does shed some light on his penchant for this kind of 
movement: first, Heidegger’s contempt for the contemporary world as 
leveled and futile, and his revolutionary phantasy of founding of new 
meaningful world in which he himself will play a leading role is mirrored 
emotionally in the blend of resentment and anticipation characterizing the 
Nazi scorn of the dirty bourgeois world and the vision of a strong and 
national world; second, his superordination of ontology over ethics makes 
him liable to be attracted by the revolutionary zeal of the Nazis, and to 
explain away their crimes and transgressions as regrettable misfortunes 
counterbalanced by the import of the coming philosophical revolution. 
      In addition to this Heidegger’s philosophy at this time contains a 
central trait which makes him susceptible to conceive of the political 
revolution of Nazism as a possible beginning of a philosophical revolution to 
come.  
      In the beginning of the 1930s Heidegger thinks that the ultimate task 
of philosophy is to carry out a free world-projection, and to do this 
together with the other creators: the poets and the statesmen.713 Now, by 
emphasizing the freedom and creativity of the world-projection Heidegger 
ultimately makes the possibility of performing such a projection 
dependent only on the capacity and resolve of the creators to perform this 
task. This scheme, in turn, opens the possibility of distinguishing between, 
on the one hand, the still uncertain and ontologically undetermined 
preparation for a philosophical projection – in the form of a collective 
political-emotional readiness and resolve – and, on the other hand, the 
philosophical projection itself as a future possibility. In his texts from this 
period, Heidegger persistently characterizes the Nazi takeover over as a 
“first awakening”714: a “departure” (Aufbruch)715 from the old world and a 
                                         
713 Cf., e.g., GA 40, p. 66. 
714 GA 16, pp. 72, 112. 
715 GA 16, pp. 95, 117.  
 Investigations of the Philosophical Nature of Man 1928-1933 335 
 
 
“resolve to stand firm in the face of the German fate in its extreme 
distress.”716 That is, even though Nazism does not yet involve a clear 
understanding of its ontological task – and though it is uncertain if it ever 
will – Heidegger believes that it expresses an awakening to the need to 
depart from the contemporary world and a resolute determination to take 
part in the establishment of a new destiny for Germany. In this situation 
the philosopher sees his chance: to take hold of the intensified mood of 
departure and resolute anticipation pervading the German people and lead 
it over into a new basic projection of being. Hence, we can see how 
Heidegger’s notion of the free world-projection enables him to see in the 
Nazi spirit of revolutionary determination and in its idea of a strong state 
headed by a determined leader a kind of pure potential for a philosophical 
world-projection. 
      In the mid 1930s Heidegger begins to distance himself from the 
official ideology of National Socialism, which he soon starts to interpret as 
a manifestation of the nihilistic technical-subjectivist metaphysics that he 
initially hoped it would be able to resist, a metaphysics which reduces all 
beings into a material reserve for human subjectivity to exploit and 
manipulate.717 In these years, he also gradually abandons his philosophical 
idea of philosophy as a free world-projection and, with it, his notion that 
pre-ontological politics could ever play a central preparatory role for the 
primordial philosophical task of historically thinking the openness of 
being.  
      However – as we shall see – Heidegger never gives up his idea of the 
absolute primacy of the ontological task of thinking over every ontic 
ethical-existential task. In fact, it is precisely the sharp hierarchy between 
ontology and ethics that allows Heidegger to view his Nazi engagement 
not as an ethical failure disturbing the heart of his ontological approach 
but as a reason to radicalize precisely that approach. If Heidegger in 1933 
saw the Nazi revolution as a possible emancipation from the nihilistic 
tendency of modern metaphysics, he now sees it – together with 
                                         
716 GA 16, p. 112: “Entschlossenheit […] dem deutschen Schicksal in seiner äußersten 
Not standzuhalten.”   
717 Cf., e.g., GA 65, pp. 30, 117, 139, 319, 493. 
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communism and world-democracy718 – as a manifestation of this 
tendency. Hence, Heidegger is able to interpret his fall into Nazism as a 
consequence of his inability to free himself radically from the technical-
subjectivist metaphysics of the tradition – in which almost everybody else 
still remains stuck – and to present his own new thinking as a qualified 
stratagem to overcome the destructive metaphysics at the root of Nazism. 
However, I think it is hard not to see Heidegger interpretation of Nazism 
as a species of the technical-subjectivist metaphysics that his own thinking 
is called to overcome as a token of his deep failure to let the human 
disaster of Nazism and the Holocaust touch him deeply enough to force 
him into a radical questioning of his own philosophical project. When 
Heidegger equals Nazism with Communism and world-democracy and 
condemns them all as metaphysical nihilism it is plain that he has dodged 
the hard questions about the difference between metaphysics - be it more 
or less nihilistic – and the leap into ethical closure and murder; about the 
relationship between understanding historical being and relating openly 
and caringly to other human beings; and, hence, about the role of 
philosophy in the ethical-existential struggle of human life. I will return to 
discuss the philosophical and moral problems of Heidegger’s later 
thinking in the last chapter of this part.  
     As stated above, these quick remarks do not offer anything like a 
thorough treatment of Heidegger’s relation to National Socialism. My aim 
has only been to draw attention to some key features of Heidegger’s basic 
philosophical orientation in the early 1930s which make it possible for him 
to greet the politics of Nazism as a possible beginning of a philosophical 
revolution. Finally, I think it is crucial to point out that the even though 
the moral problems at the heart of Heidegger’s philosophical endeavor are 
historically linked to his relationship to Nazism this should not blind us to 
the fact that what is at stake here are deeply human problems that will 
always, no doubt, constitute a great temptation for ourselves and for 
philosophy – for example: the problem of openly encountering and caring 
for other human beings, the problem of political action and democracy, 
the temptation to flee and repress our moral responsibilities and legitimize 
our flight by instead embarking on a supposedly more basic quest for 
                                         
718 GA 16, p. 375: “In dieser Wirklichkeit [der universalen Herrschaft des Willens zur 
Macht innerhalb der planetarisch gesehenen Geschichte] steht heute Alles, mag es 
Kommunismus heißen oder Faschismus oder Weltdemokratie.”      
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ultimate grounds, for certain knowledge, for universal principles, or for 
the openness of being; the lure of the logic of resentment, according to 
which our difficulties in attaining collective self-affirmation make us 
despise the people we secretly envy, and generate phantasies of revenge 
and of a glorious return to our collective circle.  
 
3.3 The Question of the Openness of Being 
 
It is clear that Heidegger’s philosophical approach undergoes a change, or 
a set of changes, in the mid 1930s: a change in the guiding question, in the 
conception of phenomenality, as well as in the way and style of thinking. 
In the Heidegger-literature, this change has commonly been labeled the 
“turn” – following Heidegger’s word “die Kehre” – and has generally been 
seen as the rough dividing line separating the early from the late 
Heidegger. However, it is far from obvious how the philosophical sense 
and import of Heidegger’s alleged turn should be understood, the last fifty 
years having witnessed a massive scholarly debate regarding this issue. 
      In his pioneering work Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought from 
1964 William Richardson established the standard interpretation which, in 
various shapes, has dominated the literature to this very day. According to 
Richardson, Heidegger’s thinking undergoes a turn in the years 1930-1935, 
a turn which consists in a “shift from There-being to Being”:719 whereas 
the early Heidegger primarily focuses on Dasein and basically conceives of 
being as “the project of There-being,”720 the later Heidegger turns his 
principal focus to being itself as something which precedes and, of its own 
accord, gives itself to Dasein’s understanding. This shift of focus, 
Richardson claims, is also linked to an alteration of Heidegger’s 
methodological approach, such that the phenomenological explication of 
the structures of Dasein carried out in Being and Time gives way to a 
historical thinking which articulates being such as it gives itself 
historically.721   
                                         
719 Richardson 1963, p. 624. 
720 Richardson 1963, p. 238. 
721 See Richardson 1963, p. 525. For other more recent interpretations along the same 
line, see, e.g., Guignon 1993, pp. 15f.; Figal [ed.] 2007a, pp. 29ff. 
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      However, for some years now Thomas Sheehan has argued 
emphatically that there never occurred a turn in Heidegger’s central 
question. According to Sheehan, the standard interpretation of the turn 
has failed to distinguish between two quite different matters: on the one 
hand, Heidegger uses the word “turn” (Kehre) to designate the central issue 
of his thinking, namely the movement – characterized by a reciprocal co-
belonging of being and Dasein – through which being is opened up; on 
the other hand, he uses it to name “the shift in the way [he] formulated 
and presented his philosophy beginning in the 1930s.”722 Indeed, in his 
1962 letter to William Richardson Heidegger makes a clear terminological 
distinction between the two turns. Here he contrasts the “turn” (Kehre) as 
a designation of the issue itself with the “change” (Wendung) in his thinking 
of that issue.723 Sheehan argues that the common failure to see that the 
“turn” for Heidegger primarily names his central topic and not some 
reversal of his philosophical standpoint is a consequence of the failure to 
grasp what that topic actually is. Heidegger’s central topic, Sheehan claims, 
is not being but “that which ‘gives’ being”:724 “What produces (poiei, läßt sein) 
givenness? What enables being as parousia or Anwesen to be given at 
all?”725 Once we recognize that Heidegger’s central issue was the event 
that opens up being, more specifically the reciprocity between being and 
Dasein operative in that event, it becomes impossible to interpret the 
changes that Heidegger’s thinking undergoes in the 1930s as a radical turn 
of his guiding question from Dasein to being – as if these could be viewed 
as some kind of separable entities. Instead, Sheehan maintains that 
Heidegger’s central question “remains unchanged,”726 and that the shift 
his thinking undergoes is only one of focus and emphasis. Whereas the 
early Heidegger focused on Dasein’s projective understanding of being, 
the later Heidegger – realizing that “thrownness […] always has priority 
over projection”727 – puts the emphasis “less on man projectively holding 
open the world and more on man’s being required to hold open the 
world.”728 Indeed, one could say that Sheehan ends up reformulating the 
                                         
722 Sheehan 2001b, p. 3.  
723 GA 11, p. 149f. Cf. Sheehan 2010, p. 93. 
724 Sheehan 2001a, p. 192. 
725 Sheehan 2001b, p. 7. 
726 Sheehan 2010, p. 92.  
727 Sheehan 2001b, p. 15. 
728 Sheehan 2010, p. 91. 
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traditional interpretation of the turn as a shift from Dasein to being, only 
that he underlines that this shift is a shift not in Heidegger’s central 
question and interest, but a shift of emphasis between the two reciprocal 
aspects of the dynamics which gives being.  
      Now it is clearly important to distinguish, as Sheehan does, between 
the turn as a name for the internal logic of the matter of Heidegger’s 
thinking and the turn as a change in his strategies for thinking and 
expressing this matter. Also, Sheehan is doubtlessly right in claiming that 
Heidegger’s matter was not being but that which gives being – although it 
seems to me that he exaggerates the extent to which previous 
commentators would have claimed the opposite. Nevertheless, I believe 
Sheehan’s heavy emphasis on the continuity of Heidegger’s central issue is 
apt to blind him to the transformations that Heidegger’s questioning of 
this issue undergoes. The fact that we can and should distinguish between 
the matter of thinking and the thinking of the matter does not imply that 
these aspects would be systematically detachable from each other. Even 
though it is true to say, at a high level of abstraction, that Heidegger’s 
thinking always revolved around the same issue – that which gives and 
opens up being – this does not in any way rule out the possibility that 
Heidegger’s understanding and questioning of this issue as such would 
undergo significant changes – as I believe it does.729  
      The aim of this chapter is to examine the turn that Heidegger’s guiding 
question undergoes in the mid 1930s and show the extent to which this 
transformation is a transformation in his questioning of phenomenality. 
On this basis it also becomes possible to specify in what sense Heidegger’s 
thinking exhibits a shift of focus from Dasein to being. Whereas this 
chapter focuses on Heidegger’s redirection of his guiding question the 
next two chapters will move on to investigate the effects of this 
transformation; first, on his analysis of the dynamics of the event that 
opens up being; second, on his conception of the historical mode of 
thinking required to think and express this event. 
      Heidegger’s struggle to reorient his thinking after 1934 is to a large 
extent carried out in the massive self-reflective manuscripts written in 
1936-1938 and gathered in Contributions. However, my explication will 
primarily make its way through other texts from this period. This is for 
                                         
729 For a similar criticism of Sheehan, see Malpas 2006, p. 152f.  
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essential reasons. The manuscripts of Contributions have the character of 
loosely organized logs, which record Heidegger’s manic and repetitious 
attempts to name and formulate, often in quasi-poetic fashion, the basic 
coordinates organizing his new thinking of the “event” (Ereignis).730 This, 
however, means that Contributions, although containing many sharp and 
valuable formulations, largely renounces the peculiar way-character which 
normally gives Heidegger’s thinking its force: the capacity to trace the 
logic of our philosophical conceptions back to their unthought origins, 
thus opening up new fields of questioning and description. In so far as it is 
this lack of a unifying way of thought which gives rise to the notorious 
difficulty of these manuscripts, we should take their difficulty not as a sign 
of a higher complexity, but rather as a lack of that unity which alone could 
grant them their complexity.  
      I will develop my argument by explicating in parallel fashion 
Heidegger’s lecture courses “Introduction to Metaphysics” from the 
summer of 1935 and “Basic Questions of Philosophy” delivered in the 
winter of 1937-38. Why these texts? Although Heidegger’s lectures on 
Hölderlin from the winter of 1934-35 already bear witness to his effort to 
reorient his thinking after the failure of his rectorate, “Introduction to 
Metaphysics” is his first programmatic attempt to articulate the basic 
philosophical stance that will guide all his later thinking. It is no 
coincidence that Heidegger in the 1953 preface to Being and Time refers 
precisely to “Introduction to Metaphysics” as the text, which, in place of 
the missing second half of Being and Time, provides an “elucidation of this 
question [of being].”731 Even though the presentation still remains groping 
and ambivalent, these lectures provide an exceptional opportunity to 
follow Heidegger’s struggle to move away from the framework of 
fundamental ontology towards a questioning of the opening of being, and 
to see the extent to which this struggle is centered on the problem of 
phenomenality. To specify the philosophical gist of Heidegger’s new 
guiding question I will also draw on “Basic Questions of Philosophy.” 
These lectures record Heidegger’s attempt to guide his students into the 
dimension of thinking which he is simultaneously working out in the 
rambling aphoristic style of the Contributions, and to my mind they offer 
one of his clearest articulations of the question of his later thinking. Then, 
                                         
730 Cf., e.g., Sheehan 2001a, p. 187.   
731 SZ, p. vii: “Erläuterung dieser Frage [nach dem Sein].” 
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in order to specify and summerize the sense of Heidegger’s turn from the 
viewpoint of the problem of phenomenality, I will also take up the “Letter 
on Humanism” from 1946, which contains Heidegger’s paradigmatic 
formulation of what is at stake in the Kehre from the fundamental ontology 
of Being and Time to his later philosophical approach.    
  
The Way to the Question  
 
Heidegger opens his “Introduction to Metaphysics” boldly by stating the 
question: “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?”732 This 
question, Heidegger claims, is the basic question of metaphysics; as such, 
it is nothing but an ambiguous and unclear formulation of the question of 
being. Even so, he lets this question serve as the starting point for his 
attempt to clarify and elaborate the sense of what will be the guiding 
question of his own later thinking.  
      According to Heidegger, the question of being is the “broadest,” the 
“deepest,” and the “most originary” question:733 it is the broadest, since it 
does not stop at any particular being but questions “beings as a whole and 
as such”;734 it is the deepest, since it seeks the “ground for what is, in so 
far as it is in being.”735 So far, everything sounds familiar enough. 
However, in examining in what sense the question of being is the most 
originary question Heidegger reaches the issue that constituted the 
methodological turning point in Being and Time and triggered the whole 
existential analytic: the question of the questioning being itself. Although 
the question of being comprises all beings as beings – and thus does not 
privilege any particular being – Heidegger notes that there is still one entity 
which presses itself upon us in a peculiar way: “the human beings who 
pose this question.”736 By returning to this methodological juncture, 
Heidegger gives himself the opportunity to mark out his critical departure 
from the existential analytic approach. In Being and Time Heidegger had 
argued for the necessity of a preparatory analytic of the being of the 
                                         
732 GA 40, p. 3: “Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?” 
733 GA 40, p. 4: “die weiteste, sodann […] die tiefste, schließlich […] die 
ursprünglichste Frage.” 
734 GA 40, p. 4: “Das Seiende im Ganzen als ein solches.” 
735 GA 40, p. 5: “den Grund für das Seiende, sofern es seiend ist.” 
736 GA 40, p. 5: “die Menschen, die diese Frage stellen.” 
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questioning being, Dasein, in order to make possible a transparent 
investigation of the sense of being. By phenomenologically explicating the 
basic structures of Dasein’s understanding – being-in-the-world, 
temporality – he hoped to disclose the ultimate horizon of sense 
organizing all our understanding of meaningful phenomena. Now, 
however, Heidegger insists on two things that hamper the very possibility 
of a preparatory existential analytic.  
      First, Heidegger stresses that the question of being constitutes the 
most basic question, which is “necessarily co-asked in every question.”737 
If the question of being concerns the ultimate ontological dimension 
which always already conditions and determines all other understanding 
and questioning – e.g. of the human being – then in posing this question 
we are required to address being itself directly. Hence, Heidegger 
characterizes the question of being as an “originary leap” (Ur-sprung),738 
which, devoid of any possible support and preparation through any other 
investigation, first opens up being as the fundamental dimension in which 
all beings can appear as meaningful and be analyzable in the first place. 
Second, Heidegger argues that our immediate access to the question of 
being is radically closed. Everywhere around us we see and experience 
different entities: from trees to motorbikes to works of art. Yet, in so 
doing, we are fundamentally unable to grasp something like the being of 
these entities: “Everything we have mentioned is, after all, and 
nevertheless – if we want to lay hold of being it is always as if we were 
reaching into a void.”739 The reason for this is that we live in a factical 
historical understanding of being which in fact constitutes a “forgetfulness 
of being,”740 determining our gaze in such a way that we are unable to 
fathom what being is all about.  
      Since it is our understanding of being which determines and delimits 
all our subsequent possibilities of understanding different entities, and 
since our preliminary understanding of being is determined by a historical 
logic that has effectively blinded us to the dimension being, there is no 
hope of shedding light on the question of being through a traditional 
                                         
737 GA 40, p. 8: “in jeder Frage notwendig mitgefragt.” Cf. GA 40, p. 7. 
738 GA 40, p. 8. 
739 GA 40, p. 38: “All das, was wir nannten, ist doch, und gleichwohl – wenn wir das 
Sein fassen wollen, wird es immer, als griffen wir ins Leere.“ 
740 GA 40, p. 27: “Seinsvergessenheit.” 
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phenomenological effort to see and describe the basic structures of the 
human being. Hence, Heidegger’s projection of this basic historic-
systematical impasse makes necessary a new form of investigation: our 
only possible access to being now lies in a “reflection on the provenance 
of our concealed history”:741 “The question, ‘How does it stand with being?’ 
must maintain itself within the history of being if it is, in turn, to unfold 
and preserve its own historical scope.”742 That is, philosophy needs to take 
the form of a radically historical questioning, which, maintaining itself 
“within the history of being,” traces our distorted understanding of being 
back to its historical origin in the hope of explicating the historical 
beginning which determines our metaphysical history and also, possibly, 
harbors a more originary understanding of being as such.743   
      Heidegger’s description the historical way of the question is bound up 
with the diagnosis of the historical dynamics of Western metaphysics, 
which he develops in these years. The diagnosis is – in short – the 
following:  
      According to Heidegger, the beginning of Western metaphysics takes 
place as Plato and Aristotle interpret being as presence – ousia – and truth 
as the correct correspondence of our statements with that which is 
present. The early pre-Socratic conception of being as physis still harbored 
a certain understanding of the happening that conditions and opens up 
being as presence – an understanding which is also discernible in the 
Greek word for truth, alētheia, whose literal meaning is uncoveredness. 
However, in the thinking of Plato and Aristotle the roots of ousia in 
physis/alētheia are cut off and being is interpreted as pure presence for the 
human being. This understanding of being – which is also, at the same 
time, a forgetfulness of the origin and nature of being – then determines 
the entire history of metaphysics, which essentially takes the form of an 
ever-increasing subjectification and technification of being. In the modern 
age the basic understanding of being as presence gets radicalized as 
Descartes reinterprets being as objectivity, that is, as the character of being 
an object of the subject’s representations of things. This process reaches 
                                         
741 GA 40, p. 99: “Besinnung auf die Herkunft unserer verborgenen Geschichte.” 
742 GA 40, p. 99: “Die Frage: Wie steht es um das Sein? muß sich selbst in der 
Geschichte des Seins halten, um ihrerseits die eigene geschichtliche Tragweite zu 
entfalten und zu bewahren.” Cf. also GA 40, p. 46. 
743 Cf. GA 40, p. 42. 
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its culmination in Nietzsche’s idea that being is nothing but an expression 
of man’s will to power and domination. Heidegger will later explicate the 
contemporary situation in which we live in terms of a technical-
subjectivist understanding of being as “enframing” (Ge-stell), whereby the 
totality of beings – including the human beings – is understood as a 
standing reserve for the human subject to use and manipulate.744  
      In “Basic Questions of Philosophy” Heidegger – on the backdrop of 
the diagnosis above – elaborates the basic movement of thinking as a 
transition from the “first beginning” (der erste Anfang) to the “other 
beginning” (der andere Anfang). Just as in “Introduction to Metaphysics,” he 
insists that there is only “one way”745 to reopen the question of 
being/truth, and that is through a “historical reflection.”746 By the “first 
beginning,” Heidegger means nothing but the onset of Western 
metaphysics in Plato and Aristotle, which determines the understanding of 
being/truth characterizing the whole tradition of philosophy, and which 
still opens up and delimits our field of comprehension. Given that the first 
Greek beginning harbors within itself all our possibilities of 
understanding, it is only by returning to this beginning and reflecting on 
its ground that we can hope to gain access to a new and more basic 
understanding of being and truth. The opening up of such an 
understanding – which would in effect revolutionize the whole previous 
metaphysical conception of truth/being – through a historical reflection 
Heidegger calls the “other beginning”: “This reflection must show that the 
first beginning, in its uniqueness, can never be repeated in the sense of a 
mere imitation, and that, on the other hand, it remains the only thing 
repeatable in the sense of a reopening of that by which the dispute has to 
commence if a beginning, and thus the other beginning, is to come to be 
historically.”747 
                                         
744 Cf, e.g., GA 7, p. 20. For some texts on Heidegger’s thinking on technology and on 
the technical nature of metaphycics, cf. Fandozzi 1982; Zimmerman 1990; Rojcewicz 
2006; Davis 2007; Ruin 2010.  
745 GA 45, p. 33. 
746 GA 45, p. 35: “geschichtliche Besinnung.” 
747 GA 45, p. 199: “Diese Besinnung muß zeigen, daß der erste Anfang in seiner 
Einzigkeit nie wiederholbar ist im Sinne eines bloßen Nachmachens, daß er 
andererseits jedoch das einzig Wiederholbare bleibt im Sinne der Wiedereröffnung 
von Jenem, womit die Auseinandersetzung anzuheben hat, soll wieder ein Anfang und 
somit der andere Anfang geschichtlich werden.” 
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      This idea – that the only way for thinking to free itself from 
metaphysics and to open up a more originary understanding of being, is 
through a confrontation with the first beginning, and a critical 
appropriation of its unthought possibilities – will henceforth determine 
Heidegger’s conception of the task of thinking. However, even though 
Heidegger never entirely gives up this mythology of beginnings, it 
gradually loses its rigorous hold on his thinking. From around 1950 
onward Heidegger does not find it as necessary to stage his thinking as a 
faceoff with the first beginning, instead putting his trust in the prospect of 
travelling straighter ways from our contemporary metaphysical situation to 
more originary possibilities of understanding. These he does not only find 
in ancient Greece, but also in later thinkers and philosophers such as 
Hölderlin and Goethe as well as in the post-Greek etymological root 
systems of German, English and Latin. 
 
Physis, Alētheia, and the Question of the Openness of Being 
 
Having begun “Introduction to Metaphysics” by sketching the 
hermeneutical situation of his investigation Heidegger turns to the main 
task of the lecture course: to reopen the question of being by explicating 
its Greek origin.   
      According to Heidegger’s historical sketch, the first great beginning of 
our history of being lies hidden in the words and sayings of the pre-
Socratic thinkers and poets: Parmenides, Heraclitus, Pindar, and 
Sophocles. Through a series of violent interpretations of separate textual 
passages, Heidegger advances the thesis that the early Greek thinkers 
understood being itself as physis: “Physis is being itself, by virtue of which 
beings first become and remain observable.”748 But what is physis? 
Heidegger writes: “Now what does the word physis say? It says what 
emerges from itself (e.g. the emergence, the blossoming, of a rose), the 
unfolding that opens itself up, the coming-into-appearance in such 
unfolding, and holding itself and persisting in appearance – in short, the 
                                         
748 GA 40, p. 17: “Die φύσις ist das Sein selbst, kraft dessen das Seiende erst 
beobachtbar wird und bleibt.” 
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emerging-abiding sway.”749 That is, for the early Greeks physis named 
nothing but the happening of phenomenal appearing, opening up, 
emerging, and prevailing in appearance: “Being means appearing. 
Appearing does not mean something derivative, which from time to time 
meets up which being. Being essentially unfolds as appearing.”750 Just as in 
Being and Time751 Heidegger here – via a violent interpretation of the 
Greeks – equates being with phenomenality: to be is to appear and to 
understand being is to understand the nature of appearing. However, 
whereas Heidegger in Being and Time used the Greek word phainomenon as 
the gateway to his analysis of the structure of phenomenal understanding, 
he now opts for the word physis. This change of vocabulary marks a 
redirection of Heidegger’s questioning of phenomenality, such that he 
shifts his focal point from the sphere of experienceable phenomena – 
including particular entities, the worldly context of significance, the 
structures of Dasein – toward that event which first allows the world of 
phenomena to emerge at all, toward what Heidegger calls the “epiphany of 
a world”: “The originarily emergent self-upraising of the violent forces of 
what holds sway, the phainesthai as appearing in the grand sense of the 
epiphany of a world.”752 That is to say: physis, as Heidegger understands it, 
should be conceived neither as an ontic matter, a happening among 
beings, nor as a part or dimension of our understanding of the substantial 
being-relations of the world, but rather names the very emergence of that 
world: the basic epiphanic happening which allows a phenomenal world to 
arise and appear as our historical context of meaning in the first place. 
     So how does physis come to pass?  
     Heidegger’s depiction of the happening of physis in “Introduction to 
Metaphysics” still remains quite rudimentary and he will develop it in 
more depth and detail later in the essay “The Origin of the Work of Art.” 
I will come back to that analysis in the next chapter. However, let me 
                                         
749 GA 40, p. 16: “Was sagt nun das Wort φύσις? Es sagt das von sich aus Aufgehende 
(z.B. das Aufgehen einer Rose), das sich eröffnende Entfalten, das in solcher 
Entfaltung in die Erscheinung-Treten und in ihr sich Halten und Verbleiben, kurz, das 
aufgehend-verweilende Walten.” 
750 GA 40, p. 108: “Sein heißt Erscheinen. Dies meint nicht etwas Nachträgliches, was 
dem Sein zuweilen begegnet. Sein west als Erscheinen.”  
751 Cf. SZ, p. 28. 
752 GA 40, p. 67: “Das ursprünglich aufgehende Sichaufrichten der Gewalten des 
Waltenden, das phainesthai, als Erscheinen im großen Sinne der Epiphanie einer 
Welt.” 
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briefly relate what Heidegger says in “Introduction to Metaphysics” just to 
give a picture of the kind of happening he has in mind.  
      Heidegger describes the epiphanic event which gives rise to a historical 
world of significance as an interplay between two irreducible moments: 
physis and logos. Whereas physis names the self-arising, self-emerging 
movement in which the totality of beings overwhelms and dominates us, 
logos designates the basic activity through which man attempts to join and 
gather together the onslaught of physis into the strained unity of a historical 
world. Heidegger characterizes this gathering activity as a violent strife, a 
polemos:   
 
The strife first projects and develops the un-heard, the hitherto un-
said and un-thought. This strife is then sustained by the creators, by 
the poets, thinkers, and statesmen. Against the overwhelming sway 
they throw the block of their work and capture in this work the 
world that is thereby opened up. With these works, the sway, the 
physis, first comes to a stand in what is present.753 
 
Heidegger’s description of the strife between physis and logos is meant to 
account for the basic tension characterizing the emergence of a world. On 
the one hand, Heidegger underscores that the world is not just the feeble 
result of a free projection of man’s imaginative powers, but rather from 
the outset presses itself upon us as a still untamed, unnamed, 
undetermined power; on the other hand, he maintains that for the world 
to emerge as a unified context of meaning-relations it is essentially in need 
of the gathering activity of the creative individuals of the historical 
community, primarily the poets and the thinkers. Their decisive task it so 
set up concrete works of art and thinking that are able to join together and 
shape the central paths and scales of meaning which determine the 
significances that different beings may take on for us. In so far as such a 
work is able to offer an articulation powerful enough to establish and 
sustain such a paradigmatic gathering understanding it founds a historical 
                                         
753 GA 40, p. 66: “Der Kampf entwirft und untwickelt erst das Un-erhörte, bislang 
Un-gesagte und Un-gedachte. Dieser Kampf wird dann von den Schaffenden, den 
Dichtern, Denkern, Staatsmännern getragen. Sie werfen dem überwältigenden Walten 
den Block des Werkes entgegen und bannen in dieses die damit eröffnete Welt. Mit 
diesen Werken kommt erst das Walten, die φύσις im Anwesenden zum Stand.” 
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world.754 The task of Heidegger’s later thinking will be none other than to 
critically retrieve and explicate what the early pre-Socratic thinkers and 
poets had, in a still unclear and ambivalent manner, called physis.     
 
Let me now attempt to specify somewhat the systematic sense of the 
guiding question of Heidegger’s later thinking by following how he 
elaborates it in the lecture course “Basic Questions of Philosophy.”  
      In “Basic Questions of Philosophy” – as in most of the central texts 
establishing the questioning stance of his later thinking – Heidegger takes 
his point of departure in the question of truth rather than the question of 
being.755 Since the inception of Western philosophy in Plato and Aristotle, 
Heidegger claims, we have tended to understand truth as “correctness” 
(Richtigkeit).756 For us, truth basically materializes as the capacity of the 
human subject to represent beings correctly in explicit or implicit 
utterances. Yet for such representation of beings to be possible in the first 
place, these beings must somehow be open and accessible to us. There 
must, Heidegger claims, prevail an “openness” (Offenheit) which allows the 
human being free access to the totality of beings.757 Since Heidegger holds 
that our contemporary conception of truth as correctness is determined by 
the onset of this conception in Plato and Aristotle, he insists that the only 
way to reopen the question of truth is through a historical reflection on 
this origin. 758  
      As Heidegger returns to the Greek origin of our concept of truth, the 
questioning undergoes a decisive “turn” (Kehre).759 In order to understand 
how Plato and Aristotle determined the essence of truth as correctness we 
are led back to the primary question what it means to understand essences: 
                                         
754 I will not dwell longer on Heidegger’s account of the workings of physis – which is 
still quite vague and undeveloped – here, but will come back to investigate the 
dynamics of shining in the next chapter.   
755 The question of truth emerges as a central point of departure for Heidegger in the 
lecture “On the Essence of Truth” – delivered in 1930 and printed in 1943 in a heavily 
revised version (cf. GA 9, pp. 177-202) – and in the lecture course “On the Essence of 
Truth: On Plato's Parable of the Cave and the Theaetetus” from 1931-32. It also 
constitutes the central question organizing the essay “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 
first published in 1936.  
756 GA 45, p. 14. 
757 GA 45, p. 19.  
758 Cf. GA 45, p. 35. 
759 GA 45, p. 47. 
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“The question of the essence of truth is at the same time and in itself the question 
of the truth of the essence.”760 According to Heidegger, Plato and Aristotle 
basically understood the essence of a thing as “ti einai – the whatness of 
beings.”761 Having the status of the whatness that determines what beings 
can be, the essences are something that must always already be present to 
us in order for us to be able to experience particular beings as meaningful 
phenomena. Hence, the Greeks determined the essences as ideai: “What is 
sighted is as what beings give themselves in advance and constantly. The 
what-it-is, the whatness, is the idea.”762 Even though Heidegger will critically 
revise the Greek understanding of essence as a constantly present and 
independently definable whatness, he unflinchingly endorses the 
hierarchical difference between our understanding of essences and our 
knowledge or particular entities:  
 
If, in our immediate comportment toward individual beings, we did 
not have the essence already in sight, or, Platonically expressed, if 
we did not have the “ideas” of individual things in view in advance, 
then we would be blind and would remain blind, to everything 
these things are as individuals, i.e., as such and such, here and now, 
in these or those relations. And still more: according to the way and 
to the extent that we regard the essence, we are also capable of 
experiencing and determining what is particular in the things. What 
is viewed in advance and how it is in view are decisive for what we 
actually see in the individual thing.763   
 
So how are the essences given and understood? Plato and Aristotle, 
Heidegger claims, conceived of the knowledge of essences in terms of a 
                                         
760 GA 45, p. 47: “Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit ist zugleich und in sich die 
Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesens.” 
761 GA 45, p. 61: “τί εἶναι – das Was-sein eines Seienden.” 
762 GA 45, p. 62: “Gesichtet ist das, als was sich das Seiende im vorhinein und ständig 
gibt. Das Was es ist, das Wassein, ist die ἰδέα.” 
763 GA 45, p. 65: “Wäre in unserem unmittelbaren Verhalten zum einzelnen Seienden 
nicht jeweils im voraus schon das Wesen gesichtet, platonisch gesprochen: Hätten wir 
nicht im voraus die ‘Ideen’ der einzelnen Dinge im blick, dann wären und blieben wir 
blind für alles, was diese Dinge im Einzelnen so und so, hier und jetzt und in ihren 
jeweiligen Beziehungen sind. Mehr noch: Je nach der Weise, wie wir und wie weit wir 
das Wesen erblicken, vermögen wir auch das Einzelne der Dinge zu erfahren und zu 
bestimmen. Das, was im Vorblick steht und wie es im Vorblick steht, entscheidet über 
das, was wir jeweils im Einzelnen tatsächlich sehen.” Cf also GA 45, pp. 62, 79.  
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“bringing forth” (hervor-bringen) of the essences from anonymousness and 
obscurity “into the light” so that we may sight them.764 Such knowledge 
cannot be grounded on any seeing of beings since it precedes and 
conditions all such seeing. According to Heidegger, the Greek conception 
of knowledge of essences in the end refers back to and claims as its own 
ground the basic experience of alētheia: “the unconcealedness of the whatness 
of beings”:765 
 
To productively see (er-sehen) a being as such in its beingness – in 
what it is as being – means nothing else than to encounter it simply 
in its unconcealedness, and, as Aristotle says, thigein, simply touch it, 
bump into it, and in bumping into it and pushing forward toward it, 
to bring it before oneself, to produce and see its look.766  
 
In short, it is nothing but the primordial uncoveredness and openness of 
the essences that makes it possible for us to access them – by a kind of 
simple “touching” or “bumping into” them – and articulate them as the 
historical world guiding all our experience of beings. By explicating the 
ground of the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of truth as correctness 
Heidegger is thus led back to the notion of the uncoveredness of essences 
as that which allows us to grasp particular beings as meaningful 
phenomena and, hence, to utter correct or incorrect statements about 
them.  
      And yet, Heidegger, claims, even though Plato and Aristotle 
experienced the uncoveredness of essences as the ground and essence of 
truth they never asked the question about the nature of uncoveredness as 
such:  
 
And assuming that they [the Greeks] would have established the 
unconcealedness of beings as the ground of the correctness of the 
assertion, is thereby this ground itself – alētheia in its essence – 
sufficiently determined and questioned? Did the Greeks ever ask 
about alētheia as such; did the Greeks make the unconcealedness of 
                                         
764 GA 45, p. 85. 
765 GA 45, p. 97: “die Unverborgenheit des Wasseins des Seienden.” 
766 GA 45, p. 97: “Das Seiende als solches in seiner Seiendheit – in dem, was es als 
Seiendes ist – er-sehen, heißt nichts anderes als: es in seiner Unverborgenheit einfach 
antreffen und, wie Aristoteles sagt, ϑιγεῖν, berühren, einfach darauf stossen un im 
Daraufstossen und dahin Vorstoßen vor sich bringen, den Anblick er-sehen.” 
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beings as such into that which is worthy of questioning? Does this, 
that the Greeks experienced the essence of truth as 
unconcealedness, automatically mean that the unconcealedness of 
beings was what was question-worthy for them? By no means.767   
 
According to Heidegger, the first Greek beginning of philosophy was 
founded on the basic experience of alētheia as the ground which made 
possible all understanding of being and beings but which itself remained 
unquestioned. Plato and Aristotle never radically asked the questions: 
How does the opening up of essences – of being – occur? How do the 
essences give themselves? And what does it mean to come upon – touch 
them, bump into them – and bring them to light? In Heidegger’s view, the 
first Greek beginning in Plato and Aristotle was thus essentially 
ambiguous and fragile: on the one hand, the experience of alētheia 
harbored an intimation –more originarily manifested in the pre-Socratic 
notion of physis – of the epiphanic happening according to which essences 
open up and prevail as uncovered; on the other hand, the fundamental 
lack of questioning and understanding of alētheia as such ultimately led the 
Greeks to interpret the uncoveredness of essences in terms of the stable 
presence – ousia – of the essences – eidos/idea – for the gaze of our 
preceding  understanding.768 According to Heidegger, it is precisely the 
ambivalence of the first beginning which gives rise to the dialectics of 
forgetfulness characterizing the history of Western metaphysics: due to the 
initial ambivalent interpretation of alētheia as ousia, the uncoveredness of 
being is soon forgotten and truth is relocated in the capacity of human 
reason to represent beings in a correct manner.  
      Let me briefly summarize the systematic moments that bear up and 
constitute the systematic sense of the central question of Heidegger’s later 
philosophy: 1. Heidegger reaffirms the ontological difference structuring 
our phenomenal understanding, maintaining that our preceding 
                                         
767 GA 45, p. 111f.: “Und angenommen, sie [die Griechen] hätten die Unverborgenheit 
des Seienden als den Grund der Richtigkeit der Aussage gegründet, ist damit dieser 
Grund selbst – die ἀλήϑεια in ihrem Wesen – hinreichend bestimmt und befragt? 
Haben denn die Griechen jemals nach der ἀλήϑεια als solcher gefragt, haben die 
Griechen die Unverborgenheit des Seienden als solche zu dem gemacht, was des 
Fragens würdig ist? Heißt dieses – daß die Griechen das Wesen der Wahrheit als 
Unverborgenheit erfuhren – schon ohne weiteres, daß ihnen die Unverborgenheit des 
Seienden das Fragwürdige war? Keineswegs.”  
768 Cf. GA 45, p. 68.  
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understanding of historical being – i.e. of the relations of significance and 
being making up our historical world – determines our understanding of 
beings as meaningful phenomena. 2. He insists that, as a consequence, the 
only way to question our received understanding of being/truth is through 
a historical reflection on its historical origin. 3. He projects the shape of 
the history of being as a unified series of events determined by a singular 
Greek beginning containing the basic horizon of our current 
understanding as well as the unthought ground of that understanding. 4. 
In confronting and explicating the Greek beginning Heidegger claims to 
come across precisely the hierarchical structure of understanding 
according to which the possibility of experiencing beings is determined by 
our preceding understanding of being. 5. As the ground of the Platonic-
Aristotelian conception of what it means to understanding being and truth 
Heidegger finds the notion of alētheia, signifying the uncoveredness of 
being. Moreover, in the pre-Socratic notion of physis he finds an even 
more originary conception of the happening that opens up being. 
However, both these Greek notions still remain unclear and largely 
unthought, and it is the central task of thinking to retrieve and explicate 
the matter that they indicate. 
      For Heidegger, then, the decisive task of thinking is clear: “to bring the 
openness itself, in what it is (west) and how it is (west), upon its ground.”769 The 
basic question, which is to guide Heidegger’s later thinking, is none other 
than the question concerning the openness and givenness of historical 
being. 
      The basic phenomenal motif of the later Heidegger’s guiding question 
is clearly recognizable in his various formulations of this question, e.g., as 
the question of “the truth of being” or of “the truth of the essence” – 
where truth means the disclosedness or openness of being/essence – or as 
the question of “being itself,” which should be heard as the question of 
how being itself is opened up and given. The fact that Heidegger’s late 
thinking circles around the question of the openness or phenomenality of 
being is also mirrored in his basic designations of the happening or 
dimension which opens up being, the most central of which are Ereignis 
and Lichtung. Heidegger eventually traces Ereignis back to the old German 
verb eräugen, which he explicates as meaning “to catch sight of, to call 
                                         
769 GA 45, p. 189: “die Offenheit selbst, in dem, als was sie west und wie sie west, auf 
ihren Grund zu bringen.” 
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something to oneself through looking.”770 As such, the word names the 
basic event which opens up and lets being come into view. Lichtung – 
whose roots he finds in the old verb lichten, which he reads as “to make 
something light, free and open”771 – is Heidegger’s name for the clearing 
or openness which allows being to shine forth. In what follows I will 
render Ereignis as the “event” or the “event of appropriation,” whereas I 
will translate Lichtung as the “clearing.” In the late text “Time and 
Being”772 Heidegger simply uses the formula “Es gibt” – literally “it gives” 
– to name this giving of being.773  
 
Heidegger’s Self-Critique: from Eidos/Idea to Alētheia/Physis 
 
In “Introduction to Metaphysics” Heidegger offers a diagnosis of how the 
originary pre-Socratic conception of being as physis collapses in the works 
of Plato and Aristotle, and gives way to a new understanding of being in 
terms of eidos and idea, which determines the metaphysical shape of 
Western philosophy.  
      According to Heidegger, the Greeks named the meaningful 
appearance or look of an entity its eidos, whereas idea signified the general 
pre-understood essence or meaning that presents itself in the eidos: “What 
any being is consists in its look (Aussehen), and the look, in turn, present’s 
the being’s whatness (allows it to come to presence).”774 The phenomenal 
appearing of meaningful entities is thus characterized by a double aspect: 
on the one hand, it refers back to the original emergence of the world in 
the happening of physis; on the other hand, it refers to the very 
phenomenal presence of meanings and entities for our seeing and 
understanding. As per Heidegger, the decisive alienation from the 
originary Greek understanding of being and the birth of metaphysical 
philosophy in Plato and Aristotle occurs at the precise moment when 
philosophy neglects and covers over the question of the origin of the 
                                         
770 GA 11, p. 45: “erblicken, im Blicken zu sich rufen.” Cf. Sheehan (2001a), pp. 196-
198. 
771 GA 14, p. 80: “etwas leicht, etwas frei und offen machen.” 
772 “Zeit und Sein,” in GA 14. 
773 GA 14, p. 9f. 
774 GA 40, p. 190: “Was je ein Seiendes ist, das liegt in seinem Aussehen, dieses jedoch 
praesentiert (läßt anwesen) das Was.” 
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world in the event of physis and starts to focus exclusively on the stable 
phenomenal presence of eidos and idea as the ultimate dimension of being 
as such.775 The basic problem of this shift is that “what is a consequence of 
the essence (Wesensfolge) is raised to the level of essence itself, and thus 
takes the place of the essence.”776 As the origin of eidos/idea in physis is 
covered up, the exclusive focus on eidos/idea gives rise to the basic 
understanding of being as ousia – presence – which has determined the 
fate of philosophy ever since: “In the look, that is present, that which is, 
stands there in its what and its how. It is apprehended and taken, it is in 
the possession of a taking-in, it is the available presence of what comes to 
presence: ousia.”777 By determining being as presence for our intuitive 
seeing, philosophy sanctions its own forgetfulness of the originary event 
which first opens up and sustains our historical world. 
      As I suggested above, Heidegger’s turn from phainomena to physis 
implies a redirection of his guiding question towards the happening that 
opens up being.  However, following this logic, I also think it is possible 
to read his analysis of the degeneration of Greek thinking from an 
originary understanding of being as physis to a metaphysical understanding 
of being as eidos/idea as a self-critical transformation of his earlier 
conception of phenomenality. In this reading Heidegger’s way from Being 
and Time to “Introduction to Metaphysics” emerges as a move from a 
questioning of phenomenality within the paradigm of eidos/idea to a 
questioning of phenomenality with reference to physis. 
      Yet how is it possible to understand Heidegger’s description of the 
relation between physis and eidos/idea as a self-critique? Has not Heidegger 
always, from his earliest Freiburg lecture courses to Being and Time, been 
engaged in a radical critique of the primacy of seeing in general and of the 
theoretical gaze in particular, emphasizing again and again the historically 
conditioned character of all direct intuition? Clearly, this is the case. Still, 
this does not preclude that Heidegger’s early elaboration of his 
hermeneutic phenomenology is itself influenced by a certain paradigm of 
eidos/idea. 
                                         
775 Cf. GA 40, pp. 66f., 189f. 
776 GA 40, p. 191: “was eine Wesensfolge ist, zum Wesen selbst erhoben wird und so an 
die Stelle des Wesens rückt.” 
777 GA 40, p. 190: “Im Aussehen steht das Anwesende, das Seiende, in seinem Was 
und Wie an. Es ist ver-nommen und genommen, ist im Besitz eines Hinnehmens, ist 
dessen Habe, ist verfügbares Anwesen von Anwesendem: οὐσία.” 
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      As we know, Heidegger in the early 1920s develops his analysis of 
phenomenality by way of an interpretation of Aristotle. Going back to that 
analysis we can see that Heidegger has recourse precisely to Aristotle’s 
concepts of nous and eidos to articulate the historical as-structure of 
phenomenality. In his seminal 1922 text, “Indication of the Hermeneutic 
Situation,” Heidegger argues that we do not in the first place perceive 
things by way of simple and immediate sense perceptions. Rather, we 
primarily experience and see beings on the basis of a preceding 
understanding of the “possible as-what-determinations” with reference to 
which particular beings may show up as this or that.778 Heidegger 
discovers this preceding understanding in Aristotle’s concept of nous. And 
what is nous? Heidegger writes: “Nous is aisthēsis tis, an apprehending which 
in each case simply pregives the ‘look’ [i.e. the eidos] of the objects.”779 
Heidegger thus employs a certain notion of noetic-perception-of-eidē precisely 
to articulate the unthematic historical understanding of worldly 
significances, which precedes and determines all immediate seeing of 
meaningful entities.  
      The fact that Heidegger’s originally develops his conception of our 
factical pre-understanding of the world in terms of a kind of unthematic 
eidetic seeing also manifests itself in Heidegger’s deployment of the word 
phainomenon in Being and Time as the master concept regulating everything 
he says about the nature of understanding and explication. Looking back 
at this book it is striking that he from the outset articulates the problem of 
phenomenality entirely in terms of the character of self-showing: a 
phenomenon is “that which shows itself in itself,”780 whereas phenomenology 
means “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows 
itself from itself.”781 Indeed, as Heidegger formalizes the notions of 
“sight” and “seeing” and empties them of their usual references to sense 
perception he retains precisely that aspect which is expressed in the Greek 
words nous and eidos: “The only peculiarity of seeing which we claim for the 
existential meaning of sight is the fact that is lets the beings accessible to it 
                                         
778 GA 62, p. 379: “mögliche ‘Als-Was-Bestimmtheiten’.” 
779 GA 62, p. 381: “Der νοῦς ist αἴσθησίς τις, ein Vernehmen, das das Aussehen der 
Gegenstände jeweils schlicht vorgibt.” 
780 SZ, p. 28: “das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende.” 
781 SZ, p. 34: “Das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm 
selbst her sehen lassen.” 
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be encountered in themselves without being concealed.”782 To be sure, 
Heidegger maintains that it is the task of phenomenology to exhibit “what 
proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all, what, in 
contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself, is 
concealed,” namely the being of Dasein and the sense of being.783 
Nevertheless, he fundamentally determines being and sense as something 
which is capable of being exhibited, and which is in fact always already 
uncovered and seen – although our immersion in the world and our 
historical forgetfulness of being make us unable to grasp it: “The 
phenomenological exhibition of being-of-the-world has the character of 
rejecting distortions and obfuscations because this phenomenon is always 
already ‘seen’ in every Dasein in a certain way. And this is so because it 
makes up a fundamental constitution of Dasein, in that it is always already 
disclosed, along with its being, for the understanding of being in 
Dasein.”784 
      So far, we have seen that the Aristotelian paradigm of eidos/idea at least 
presents the proto-model for Heidegger’s early conception of 
phenomenality, and that his elaboration of this conception in Being and 
Time is dominated by the idea that our primary factical understanding of 
being has the character of an unthematic seeing of uncovered being.785 Let 
                                         
782 SZ, p. 147: “Für die existentiale Bedeutung von Sicht ist nur die Eigentümlichkeit 
des Sehens in Anspruch genommen, daß es das ihm zugänglich Seiende an ihm selbst 
unverdeckt begegnen läßt.” 
783 SZ, p. 35: “solches, was sich zunächst und zumeist gerade nicht zeigt, was gegenüber 
dem, was sich zunächst und zumeist zeigt, verborgen ist.” 
784 SZ, p. 58: “Der phänomenologische Aufweis des In-der-Welt-seins hat den 
Charakter der Zurückweisung von Verstellungen und Verdeckungen, weil dieses 
Phänomen immer schon in jedem Dasein in gewisser Weise selbst ‘gesehen’ wird. Und 
das ist so, weil es eine Grundverfassung des Daseins ausmacht, insofern es mit seinem 
Sein für sein Seinsverständnis je schon erschlossen ist. Das Phänomen ist aber auch 
zumeist immer schon ebenso gründlich mißdeutet oder ontologisch ungenügend 
ausgelegt.” 
785 Cf. also GA 17, p. 24; GA 20, pp. 90f.; SZ, pp. 58, 148. When Heidegger after the 
publication of Being and Time deepens his reflection on the freely projective character 
of Daseins’ understanding of being he, again, repeatedly has recourse to Plato’s theory 
of ideas (cf., e.g., GA 26, pp. 233-238; GA 9, pp. 160f.; GA 27, p. 215). This time, 
however, Heidegger presents Plato’s exemplary articulation of the understanding of 
being in terms of a seeing of ideas – “The look, idea, thus gives what something 
presences as, i.e. what a thing is, its being” (Der Anblick, ἰδέα, gibt also das, als was ein Ding 
anwest, d.h. was ein Ding ist, – sein Sein) (GA 34, p. 51) – precisely in order to to be able 
to confront it and overcome it: “But what kind of looking (Blicken) is this? It is not a 
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us now pay heed to the fact that Heidegger himself later explicitly 
denounces the Platonic character of his earlier stance and his tendency to 
understand being in terms of idea. This happens in two handwritten 
comments to the 1929 essay “On the Essence of Ground,” both 
comments probably written in the later 1930s.   
      The first comment refers to the approach taken in general: “The 
approach in terms of the truth of beyung is undertaken here still entirely 
within the framework of traditional metaphysics and in a straightforward 
retrieval corresponding to the truth of beings, the unconcealment of 
beings, and the unveiledness pertaining to beings. Beingness as idea is itself 
unveiledness.”786 The second comment is directed at a central passage in 
which Heidegger articulates the hierarchically founding relationship 
between our understanding of being and our understanding of beings in 
the following way: “Unveiledness of being first makes possible the manifestness of 
beings. This unveiledness, as the truth concerning being, is termed ontological 
truth.”787 In his later, handwritten comment to this passage Heidegger 
writes: “Unclear! Ontological truth is unveiling of beingness – via the 
categories – but beingness as such is already one particular truth of beyung. 
[...] This distinction between ‘ontic and ontological truth’ is only a 
doubling of unconcealment and initially remains ensconced within the 
Platonic approach.”788  
      But what is the philosophical sense of these remarks?  
                                                                                                                      
staring at something present, not a simple finding of something and receiving of 
something into our vision, but a looking in the sense of looking-forth (Er-blicken). This 
means first forming what is looked-forth (the look) through the looking and in the 
looking, i.e., forming in advance, pre-forming” (Aber was für ein Blicken ist das? Kein An-
blicken, etwa so, wie wir ein Vorhandenes angaffen, nicht ein bloßes Vor-finden und Auf-nehmen in 
den Blick, sondern ein Blicken im Sinne des Er-blickens, das will sagen: durch das Blicken und im 
Blicken das Erblickte (den Anblick) allererst bilden, – im voraus bilden, vor-bilden) (GA 34, p. 
71). 
786 GA 9, p. 126: “Der Ansatz der Wahrheit des Seyns ist hier noch ganz im Rahmen 
der überlieferten Metaphysik vollzogen und in einfacher und wiederholender 
Entsprechung zur Wahrheit des Seienden und Unverborgenheit des Seienden und 
Enthülltheit der Seiendheit. Seiendheit als ἰδέα selbst Enthülltheit.” 
787 GA 9, p. 131: “Enthülltheit des Seins ermöglicht erst Offenbarkeit von Seiendem. Diese 
Enthülltheit als Wahrheit über das Sein wird ontologische Wahrheit genannt.” 
788 GA 9, p. 131: “Unklar! Ontologische Wahrheit ist Enthüllen der Seiendheit – durch 
die Kategorien – aber Seiendheit als solche bereits eine bestimmte Wahrheit des Seyns. 
[…] Diese Unterscheidung ‘ontisch-ontologische Wahrheit’ ist nur eine Verdoppelung 
der Unverborgenheit und bleibt zunächt im Platonischen Ansatz stecken.” 
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      It is significant that the only concrete passage that Heidegger 
comments upon constitutes nothing but an articulation of the basic idea 
that our experience of beings is grounded on a preceding understanding of 
being. Heidegger’s central self-critique is that his earlier conception of the 
understanding of being remains trapped within a Platonic metaphysics 
since it is developed as a “straightforward retrieval” of the phenomenal 
unconcealment and presence pertaining to particular entities; hence, his 
articulation of the basic difference between the unveiledness of being and 
the disclosedness of beings constitutes a “doubling of unconcealment,” 
whereby the prior disclosedness of being is itself conceived as 
“unveiledness of beingness,” i.e. as “idea.”  
      None of Heidegger’s self-critical comments suggests that he would 
dismiss his earlier conception of the understanding of being as some kind 
of naive revival of direct seeing. However, what they do say is that this 
conception conceives of being as a beingness which is somehow accessible 
as present and unveiled. On the basis of Heidegger’s later explication of 
physis we may reckon what this means: it means that being has somehow 
been cut off from its epiphanic origin in physis and grasped as the basic 
phenomenal presence which grounds all subsequent ontic disclosure. 
Hence, according to Heidegger’s own later stance, the problem with his 
early conception of our understanding of being is not that it conceives of 
this understanding as a kind of optical seeing, but rather that it – in a 
certain structural analogy with seeing – grasps precisely our factical 
unthematic understanding of being as a kind of absolute ground: a 
presence which, notwithstanding its unthematic, groundless and finite 
character, operates as the basic given which Heidegger never seriously 
questions.  
      Thus interpreted, Heidegger’s self-critique very much answers to the 
critique I developed above, at the end of part two, of the basic lacuna 
haunting Heidegger’s thinking of phenomenality in Being and Time. As I 
have tried to show, the central aim and achievement of Being and Time was 
to articulate the basic as-structure of phenomenal understanding: it is only 
on the basis of our preceding unthematic historical understanding of being 
and the world that we are able to see particular beings as meaningful 
phenomena, and explicate thematically what we have always already 
implicitly understood. Hence, Heidegger’s analysis ascribed an absolutely 
basic role to our unthematic factical understanding of being as the 
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groundless ground of all direct seeing and reflective explication. However, 
in pursuing his existential analytic Heidegger never radically questioned 
the nature and givenness of this basic historical understanding of being 
and world. He never asked how historical being is given and discernible as 
something true or originary beyond our factical historical prejudices, or 
how it is able to engage us and bind us as our ultimate horizon of 
purposes. The upshot of this is that Dasein’s historical understanding of 
being is presupposed as the basic dimension of understanding which is – 
somehow – always already unthematically there and present, but which at 
the end of the day remains a dogma shielding the critical question 
concerning the phenomenality of historical meaning. This lacuna then 
gives rise to the basic methodological ambiguity tearing up the unity of 
Being and Time: the ambiguity between Heidegger’s program for a radically 
historical – deconstructive and hermeneutically retrieving – thinking, and 
his de facto recourse to an intuition-based method of phenomenological 
explication. 
    
Heidegger’s Turn Reconsidered 
 
So how does Heidegger’s turn appear in the light of the above 
examination of his new guiding question of the openness of being? 
      Let us begin by taking a look at the key passage in “Letter on 
Humanism” in which Heidegger for the first time publicly announces the 
“turn” which is at stake in the transition from Being and Time to his later 
thinking. The passage takes its starting point in the question how we 
should understand the fact that Heidegger in Being and time articulates 
Dasein’s understanding in terms of a “projection”: 
 
If we understand what Being and Time calls “projection” as a 
representational positing, we take it to be an achievement of 
subjectivity and do not think it in the only way the “understanding 
of being” in the context of the “existential analytic” can be thought 
– namely, as the ecstatic relation to the clearing of being. The 
adequate execution and completion of this other thinking that 
abandons subjectivity is surely made more difficult by the fact that 
in the publication of Being and Time the third division of the first 
part, “Time and Being,” was held back. Here everything turns 
around (Hier kehrt sich das Ganze um). The division in question was 
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held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turn 
(Kehre) and did not succeed with the help of the language of 
metaphysics. The lecture “On the Essence of Truth,” thought out 
and delivered in 1930 but not printed until 1943, provides a certain 
insight into the thinking of the turn from “Being and Time” to 
“Time and Being.” This turn is not a change of standpoint from 
Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at 
the locality of that dimension out of which Being and Time is 
experienced, that is to say, experienced in the fundamental 
experience of the forgetfulness of being.789  
 
The quotation contains the following central points: 1. Heidegger states 
that the “turn” is what is at issue in the planned but never realized 
transition from the second to the third division of the first part of Being 
and Time, in which he was to move on to explicate the Temporality 
(Temporalität) of being on the basis of his previous analytic of the 
temporality (Zeitlichkeit) of Dasein. Here, Heidegger writes, “everything 
turns around.” 2. For Heidegger, the “turn” does not signify a “change of 
standpoint” of Being and Time but rather names a logic belonging to the 
question of being itself, a logic which leads into “the locality of that 
dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced.” However, although 
Being and Time already experiences and opens up the “turn” it is unable to 
articulate it since it remains stuck in the “language of metaphysics.” The 
“turn” that Heidegger’s thinking undergoes in the mid 1930s is thus 
nothing but an attempt to say and realize the “turn” which lies in the 
                                         
789 GA 9, pp. 327f.: “Versteht man den in ‘Sein und Zeit’ genannten ‘Entwurf’ als ein 
vorstellendes Setzen, dann nimmt man ihn als Leistung der Subjektivität und denkt ihn 
nicht so, wie ‘das Seinsverständnis’ im Bereich der ‘existentialen Analytik’ des ‘In-der-
Welt-Seins’ allein gedacht werden kann, nämlich als der ekstatische Bezug zur 
Lichtung des Seins. Der zureichende Nach- und Mit-vollzug dieses anderen, die 
Subjektivität verlassenden Denkens ist allerdings dadurch erschwert, daß bei der 
Veröffentlichung von ‘Sein und Zeit’ der dritte Abschnitt des ersten Teilen, ‘Zeit und 
Sein’ zurückgehalten wurde. Hier kehrt sich das Ganze um. Der fragliche Abschnitt 
wurde zurückgehalten, weil das Denken im zureichenden Sagen dieser Kehre versagte 
und so mit Hilfe der Sprache der Metaphysik nicht durchkam. Der Vortrag ‘Vom 
Wesen der Wahrheit’, der 1930 gedacht und mitgeteilt, aber erst 1943 gedruckt wurde, 
gibt einen gewissen Einblick in das Denken der Kehre von ‘Sein und Zeit’ zu ‘Zeit 
und Sein’. Diese Kehre ist nicht eine Änderung des Standpunktes von ‘Sein und Zeit’, 
sondern in ihr gelangt das versuchte Denken erst in die Ortschaft der Dimension, aus 
der ‘Sein und Zeit’ erfahren ist, und zwar erfahren in der Grunderfahrung der 
Seinsvergessenheit.” 
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question of being itself, and which he could not follow through in Being 
and Time. 3. As concerns its content Heidegger only says that the “turn” 
leads into the “clearing of being,” and that the thinking answering to the 
turn leaves subjectivity behind and thinks the openness of being as the 
primary dimension which the human being has to receive and preserve.  
      But how should we understand the systematic sense of the turn? 
      The passage quoted above contains a reference to the paper “On the 
Essence of Truth” which was presented for the first time in 1930 but 
which was published in 1943 in a heavily revised version. Here Heidegger 
begins his pursuit of the question of the essence of truth, which during 
many years will constitute his central way into the dimension of his later 
thinking. The paper also ends with a question, namely “whether the 
question of the essence of truth must not be, at the same time and even 
first of all, the question concerning the truth of essence”?790 In a note at 
the end of the paper – appended in 1949 – Heidegger then offers the 
following retrospective remarks: 
 
The question of the essence of truth finds its answer in the 
proposition the essence of truth is the truth of essence. […] The answer to 
the question of the essence of truth is the saying of a turn within 
the history of beyung. […] Already in the original project, the 
lecture “On the Essence of Truth” was to have been completed by 
a second lecture, “On the Truth of Essence.” The latter failed for 
reasons that are now indicated in the “Letter on Humanism.” The 
decisive question (in Being and Time, 1927) of the sense, i.e., of the 
project-domain, i.e., of the openness, i.e., of the truth of being and 
not merely of beings, remains intentionally undeveloped.791 
 
                                         
790 GA 9, p. 200: “ob die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit nicht zugleich und 
zuerst die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesens sein muß.” 
791 GA 9, p. 201: “Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit findet ihre Antwort in 
dem Satz: das Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Wahrheit des Wesens. […] Die Antwort auf die 
Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Sage einer Kehre innerhalb der 
Geschichte des Seyns. […] Der Vortrag ‘Vom Wesen der Wahrheit’ sollte bereits im 
ursprünglichen Entwurf durch einen zweiten ‘Von der Wahrheit des Wesens’ ergänzt 
werden. Dieser mißlang aus Gründen, die jetzt in dem Brief ‘Über den Humanismus’ 
angedeutet sind. Die entscheidende Frage (Sein und Zeit, 1927) nach dem Sinn, d.h. 
nach dem Entwurfsbereich, d.h. nach der Offenheit, d.h. nach der Wahrheit des Seins 
und nicht nur des Seienden, bleibt absichtlich unentfaltet.” 
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That is to say: The answer to the question about the essence of truth, 
namely that the essence of truth is the truths of the essence, is nothing but 
an articulation of the turn in the history of being which it is the task of 
thinking to realize. And yet, though opening the path of the turn the paper 
“On the Essence of Truth” is still unable to walk it. However it is 
precisely this task which Heidegger later takes up and realizes in “Basic 
Questions of Philosophy,” where he describes the decisive turn of the 
question as follows: “The question of the essence of truth is at the same time 
and in itself the question of the truth of the essence. The question of truth – 
asked as a basic question – turns itself in itself against itself. This turn 
(Kehre), which we have now run up against, is an intimation of the fact that 
we are entering the compass of a genuine philosophical question.”792 
      There is, I think, no doubt that Heidegger’s most central substantial 
description of the “turn” lies in the statement that the “turn” is a shift 
from the question of the essence of truth to the truth of essence. Above I 
have already explicated how Heidegger in “Basic Questions of 
Philosophy” elaborates the question of the truth of the essence in terms of 
the question of the openness of being as the guiding question of his later 
thought: how does historical being/essence/world open up and give itself?  
      Yet how should we understand the turn to this question, the turn out 
of which the question springs forth and comes into view? 
      Heidegger’s paradigmatic formulation of the turn implies that his 
question of the sense of being in Being and time would still be a question of 
the essence of truth which is unable to turn into a question of the truth of 
the essence. To ask for the essence of truth is – to quote “On the Essence 
of Truth” – to ask for “what in general distinguishes every ‘truth’ as 
truth,” 793 i.e., in phenomenological terms, to ask about the basic structures 
which condition and constitute our experience of truth. But is not this 
precisely what Heidegger sets out to do in Being and Time? 
      By articulating the question of fundamental ontology as the question 
of sense of being, Heidegger from the start directs the focus of his question 
towards the basic “structure” or “framework” (Gerüst) which constitutes 
                                         
792 GA 45, p. 47: “Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit ist zugleich und in sich die 
Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesens. Die Wahrheitsfrage – als Grundfrage gefragt – 
kehrt sich in sich selbst gegen sich selbst. Diese Kehre, auf die wir hier gestoßen sind, 
ist das Anzeichen dafür, daß wir in den Umkreis einer echten philosophischen Frage 
kommen.” 
793 GA 9, p. 177: “was jede ‘Wahrheit’ überhaupt als Wahrheit auszeichnet.” 
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Dasein’s phenomenal understanding of things. Hence, fundamental 
ontology is carried out as a phenomenological explication of these 
structures, whereby the guiding presupposition of this methodological 
strategy is that the explication of Dasein’s basic structure as temporality 
(Zeitlichkeit) will offer the phenomenal basis for an explication of the sense 
of being as Temporality (Temporalität). This, however, is to say that 
Heidegger’s pursuit of the question of the sense of being has the form of a 
phenomenological investigation of the essence of phenomenal understanding and 
truth, i.e., of the structures which condition and constitute our experience 
of beings as meaningful phenomena and allow us to express true or false 
judgments about them.  
      Nevertheless, the analysis carried out in Being and Time engenders 
results which undermine and necessitate a turn of the question of 
fundamental ontology. According to Heidegger, the understanding of 
Dasein exhibits a historical structure upheld by the ontological difference: 
our experience of beings as meaningful phenomena is determined by our 
historical understanding of the world, and this, in turn, is determined by 
our historical understanding of being. This analysis implies a prioritization 
of our historically received understanding of being and the sense of being 
as the fundamental stratum determining all our other possibilities of 
experience and understanding. In the end, historical being emerges as the 
basic – finite and groundless – context of meaning which is always already 
open and unthematically understood. However: in Being and Time 
Heidegger never radically asks the question how being is opened up and 
given. This means that the openness of historical being – precisely as 
alētheia in Aristotle – takes on the role as the fundamental condition which 
sustains our entire phenomenal understanding without itself being put into 
question and thought through.  
      One could thus say that the fundamental ontological investigation of 
the sense of being – the essence of truth – gives rise to the question of 
how being is given, i.e., to the question of the truth of the essence, 
without, however, itself being able of carrying out this turn of the 
question. But why not? What is it that hinders Heidegger from completing 
the third division of the first part of Being and time? What is it that prevents 
him from shifting the focus to the question of the openness of being? 
      Here it is important to differentiate. There is, I think, no reason to 
suppose that Heidegger at the time of outlining the composition of Being 
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and Time or even in the wake of its publication would have had a clear 
notion of the turn of the question that he was later to articulate. On the 
contrary – as the years following the publication amply show – 
Heidegger’s abandonment of his plan to complete Being and Time could be 
described as the result of the mounting insight that the radical priority of 
the understanding of being implied by the existential analytic indeed 
undercuts the very ambition to clarify the sense of being through an 
explication of the structure of Dasein. It is only from a later perspective 
that the turn to the question of the openness of being emerges as a 
necessity which Being and Time gives rise to without Heidegger as yet being 
able to see and pursue it. 
      What prevents Heidegger from thinking the turn in the manner of a 
continuation of the project of fundamental ontology in Being and time is 
nothing else than the fact that the perspective of questioning guiding this 
project does not of itself open up the question of the openness of being –  
but rather presupposes that it remains closed. The very notion that there is 
an existential analytic path to the sense of being rests on the idea that it is 
possible to access and explicate the structures of a particular being – the 
human being, Dasein – as the transhistorical phenomenal ground which 
allows us to critically delimit the received traditional understanding of 
being as presence-at-hand, and attain a true phenomenologically grounded 
understanding of being as temporality. This idea, however, is undermined 
by the results of the analytic, which imply that our understanding of 
being/sense is deeply historical, so that any investigation of the structures 
of Dasein or the openness of being would ultimately have to take the form 
of an explication the possibilities of meaning harbored by our history. 
Hence, the very task of asking and pursuing the question of the openness 
of being would have demanded a radical break with the entire perspective 
and methodological approach of Being and time in favor of another kind of 
historical questioning of how historical being is opened up and given to 
us.  
      We should now be able to spell out how this exposition relates to the 
dominating interpretations of Heidegger’s Kehre.  
      As mentioned earlier, Thomas Sheehan has argued that Heidegger’s 
central question concerning that which gives being remains the same from 
beginning to end, that the happening which gives being itself has the 
character of a turn, i.e., of a reciprocal dynamics between being and 
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Dasein, and that the only thing that happens in the mid 1930s is that 
Heidegger’ changes his terminology and shifts his emphasis from Dasein 
to being as the primary pole of this dynamics. However, even though 
Sheehan is right in claiming that Heidegger always asks about the source 
of being – rather than about its highest and most general substantial 
determinations – it seems to me that he is not able to account for what is 
at stake in the turn of Heidegger’s question and thus also underestimates 
the changes that his thinking undergoes. As I have tried to show, 
Heidegger’s turn consists in a shift from a questioning of the basic 
structures of phenomenal understanding – which uncovered the ground of 
this understanding in our historical understanding of being – to a 
historical interrogation of the openness of historical being. This, however, 
means that the same formal question concerning that which gives or 
produces being essentially gets transformed both as concerns the focus 
and sense of the question – from the structure of phenomenality to the 
phenomenality of being – and as concerns the manner of questioning: 
from phenomenological explication to historical reflection.  
      But what about the influential notion – also shared and varied by 
Sheehan – that Heidegger’s turn consists in a shift of focus from Dasein 
to being, so that the earlier Heidegger would have emphasized the 
projective understanding of Dasein whereas the later Heidegger would 
stress the self-givenness of being as something that precedes the 
understanding of Dasein? Although there is clearly some truth to this 
notion, I think the interpretation above gives us reason to specify it a little.  
      To begin with, it is important to see that it is only in the middle of the 
1930s that Heidegger clearly articulates the question about the openness 
and givenness of historical being. Once he has broached this question, he 
also – as we shall see – begins to describe the happening which opens up 
being in terms of a reciprocal relationship between being and the human 
being in which being has priority: it is historical being which gives or 
throws itself to the human being whereby it is the task of the human being 
to say and preserve this arrival of being. In Being and Time, however, this 
question still remained unraised, which implies that the question 
concerning the relationship between being and Dasein – and the question 
of which of them has priority – also remained dormant.  
      The fact that the focus of the existential analytic in Being and Time lay 
on the basic structures of Dasein’s understanding did not in any way entail 
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that being would have been conceived as the product of Dasein’s 
projections. In fact, Heidegger’s analysis gives priority to the thrownness 
of Dasein into its factical historical understanding as that which 
determines its possibilities of projection. However, what the fundamental 
ontological approach does involve – and what the later Heidegger wants 
to overcome – is the guiding idea that it is possible to clarify the sense of 
being through an explication of the structures of Dasein. This idea 
presupposes two things: first, that it is possible to access and 
phenomenologically explicate these structures as the ground for an 
understanding of the sense of being; second, that the structures of Dasein 
constitute the ultimate horizon which organizes our understanding of 
being. From the viewpoint of the later Heidegger, the basic problem of 
the fundamental ontological approach is not that it would reduce being to 
the projections of Dasein but that it sidesteps and is unable to account for 
its own analysis of human understanding as structured by the ontological 
difference, and for the radical historicity of thought that this difference 
opens up. Heidegger’s turn of his questioning from the essence of truth to 
the truth of the essence is indeed nothing but a drawing of the 
consequences of this analysis: the possibility of explicating the structures 
of Dasein as the ahistorical ground for our understanding of the sense of 
being is cancelled out in favor of a thinking which takes its starting point 
in what Being and Time discovered as the basic dimension of all our 
understanding – our factical understanding of being – and unfolds as a 
historical questioning of how historical being is opened up. 
      Hence, we can say that the turn of Heidegger’s question is not 
primarily a shift of emphasis from the projection of Dasein to the self-
givenness of being, but rather a shift from a questioning examining the 
basic structure of Dasein as thrown projection to a questioning 
investigating the happening – characterized by a dynamics between the 
throw of being and counter-throw of the human being – which first 
generates the factical understanding of being into which we are always 
already thrown.  
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3.4 The Dynamics of Shining 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the later Heidegger’s conception of 
the dynamics of the epiphanic happening which lets a historical world 
arise, and which he primarily designates by the names of the “event” 
(Ereignis) and the “clearing” (Lichtung). The question is: What is it that 
allows a historical world of meaning to open up and give itself as an 
originary and binding destiny? How should we conceive of phenomenality 
– something presenting itself as something – on the basis of this 
happening? 
      As we shall see, Heidegger articulates the happening which opens up 
being as a happening in which thinking and art play complementary roles: 
whereas it is the task of thinking to reflect on the basic character of this 
happening, and so prepare the way for a transparent enactment of art, it is 
in and through art in general and poetry in particular that a concrete 
historical world can open up and prevail. It is thus no coincidence that his 
main efforts to articulate the dynamics of shining are found in his texts on 
art and poetry. Hence, my investigation will to a large extent unfold as an 
explication of Heidegger’s long essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” 
from 1936, which, aside from offering his most extended treatment of the 
nature of art, also constitutes his most ambitious attempt to describe the 
happening which lets a world arise. Although written in the early phase of 
his later thinking, the text’s central analysis of the opening of the world as 
a “strife” between the “world” and the “earth” establishes the basic 
scheme which his later texts will elaborate and modify but never radically 
alter. To the central texts which allow us to follow Heidegger’s thinking of 
this issue belong “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” (1936),794 “Letter 
on Humanism” (1946), “The Thing” (1950),795 “Building Dwelling 
Thinking” (1951),796 as well as the later texts on language and poetry 
written in 1950-1959 and gathered in the volume On the Way to Language.797 
From 1949 onwards Heidegger rearticulates the dynamics of shining in 
                                         
794 “Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung,” in GA 4. 
795 “Das Ding,” in GA 7.  
796 “Bauen Wohnen Denken,” in GA 7. 
797 Unterwegs zur Sprache, GA 12. 
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terms of the “fourfold,” which designates the unitary interplay between 
“sky” and “earth,” “divinities” and “mortals.”  
      Even though Heidegger’s account of the dynamics which opens up 
historical worlds constitutes the heart of his later conception of 
phenomenality, it has seldom occupied the center of the more systematic 
attempts to explicate his late thinking. Indeed, Heidegger’s notions of the 
strife between the world and the earth and the fourfold have primarily 
been treated in texts focusing on his thinking about art and poetry or in 
philologically oriented interpretations satisfied with mapping and 
paraphrasing Heidegger’s conceptual pathways. Why this evasion? Apart 
from the obvious reasons that Heidegger’s thinking of the dynamics of 
shining primarily takes place in texts dealing with art and poetry and that 
his explication of especially the fourfold unfolds in a nonstandard 
poetizing discourse, I think there are also philosophical reasons behind 
this avoidance stemming from the difficulty to integrate what Heidegger’s 
says on this point into the guiding systematic visions of what goes on in 
his later thinking. From the point of view of the hermeneutic-
deconstructivist interpretation, Heidegger’s insistence on the material-
sensuous earth as the ground of the historical world, as well as his strong 
emphasis on the capacity of art and poetry to form and gather the world, 
are liable to appear as disturbing or secondary aspects of what is conceived 
as his primary effort to think the historicity, finitude and differentiality of 
being. From the perspective of the transcendental-phenomenological 
interpretation, it is easy to dismiss what Heidegger has to say about the 
world and the earth and the fourfold within the framework of the deeply 
historicist program of his later thinking as peripheral or misleading in 
relation to the project of phenomenologically explicating the basic 
structures of our experience. Moreover, to most contemporary 
commentators Heidegger’s attempt to articulate the binding force of the 
world in terms of a religious rhetoric – holiness, gods, etc. – is bound to 
appear problematic, not only because of the religious rhetoric itself and 
the closeness to the burning issues of Heidegger’s ethics and politics, but 
also because, at the end of the day, the question of how historical 
meanings and values can grip us as holy and binding is still today a hard 
and almost unasked question.  
      There are, of course, also exceptions to this scheme. For example, as 
regards the hub of Heidegger’s conception of the dynamics of shining – 
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namely his account of the strife between the “world” and the “earth” – 
David Espinet has recently suggested that Heidegger’s notion of the 
“earth” can be read as an attempt to salvage a dimension of 
phenomenality both transcending and grounding our historical contexts of 
meaning. Opposed to this interpretation we find Julian Young’s 
interpretation of the “earth” not as a constitutive dimension of materiality-
sensuousness withstanding the hegemony of history, but as a name for the 
hidden and mysterious manifold of other possible historical worlds 
surrounding our own finite world. In what follows, I will use these 
alternative interpretations as a foil against which I try to explicate the 
systematic sense and phenomenological potential of Heidegger’s 
conception: does his notion of the “earth” imply a rehabilitation of 
transhistorical phenomenality, or does it not? In the end, this question is 
decisive for how we should understand the later Heidegger’s account of 
phenomenality. 
      I will begin my examination with an outline of the basic ontological 
setup of Heidegger’s later thinking, focusing on his conception of history, 
language, and the difference between thinking and poetry. I then move on 
to a lengthier explication of Heidegger’s conception of the dynamics of 
shining as this is developed mainly in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” 
After that, I turn to Heidegger’s attempt to provide an account of the 
holiness or bindingness of the historical world. I end the chapter by 
outlining Heidegger’s later rearticulation of the dynamics of shining in 
terms of the “fourfold.”  
 
The Givenness of Being as History and Language 
 
Let me begin by delineating the basic ontological setup of Heidegger’s 
thinking of the dynamics of phenomenal shining. As my starting point I 
choose the opening words of Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism,” which 
in a highly compressed form announce the whole schema of his later 
thought:  
 
We are still far from pondering the essence of action decisively 
enough. We view action only as causing an effect. The reality of the 
effect is valued according to its utility. But the essence of action is 
accomplishment (das Vollbringen). To accomplish means to unfold 
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something into the fullness of its essence, to lead it forth into this 
fullness – producere. Therefore only what already is can really be 
accomplished. But what “is” above all is being. Thinking 
accomplishes the relation of being to the essence of the human 
being. It does not make or cause the relation. Thinking brings this 
relation to being solely as something handed over to thought itself 
from being. Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking being 
comes to language. Language is the house of being. In its home 
human beings dwell. Those who think and those who create with 
words are the guardians of this home. This guardianship 
accomplishes the manifestation of being insofar as they bring this 
manifestation to language and preserve it in language through their 
saying.798 
 
Starting from the question of the essence of action – thus heralding the 
themes of the possibilities and limits of human activity – Heidegger sets 
down three basic claims: first, he emphasizes that thinking does not 
“create” or “cause” the relation of being to man but rather 
“accomplishes” this relation as something which is already “handed over 
to thought itself from being,” thus ascribing a clear priority to being as 
that which of itself gives itself to thinking and to which thinking has to 
respond; second he claims that “language is the house of being,” implying 
that being essentially gives itself in and through language, and that the task 
of accomplishing the relation of being to man consists in bringing the 
“manifestation of being” to language; third, he indicates that this task is 
carried out in two different ways, by the thinkers and by the poets.   
   Let us consider these three claims in turn. 
 
                                         
798 GA 9, p. 313: “Wir bedenken das Wesen des Handelns noch lange nicht 
entschieden genug. Man kennt das Handeln nur als das Bewirken einer Wirkung. 
Deren Wirklichkeit wird nach ihrem Nutzen geschätzt. Aber das Wesen des Handelns 
ist das Vollbringen. Vollbringen heißt: etwas in die Fülle seines Wesens entfalten, in 
diese hervorgeleiten, producere. Vollbringbar ist deshalb eigentlich nur das, was schon 
ist. Was jedoch vor allem ‘ist’, ist das Sein. Das Denken vollbringt den Bezug des Seins 
zum Wesen des Menschen. Es macht und bewirkt diesen Bezug nicht. Das Denken 
bringt ihn nur als das, was ihm selbst vom Sein übergeben ist, dem Sein dar. Dieses 
Darbringen besteht darin, daß im Denken das Sein zur Sprache kommt. Die Sprache 
ist das Haus des Seins. In ihrer Behausung wohnt der Mensch. Die Denkenden und 
Dichtenden sind die Wächter dieser Behausung. Ihr Wachen ist das Vollbringen der 
Offenbarkeit des Seins, insofern sie diese durch ihr Sagen zur Sprache bringen und in 
der Sprache aufbewahren.” 
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Being as history. In his classical study Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to 
Thought William Richardson described Heidegger’s turn as a “shift of focus 
from There-being to Being.”799 Whereas the earlier Heidegger would have 
privileged Dasein’s projective understanding of being, the later Heidegger 
would have emphasized the priority of being as something which is not 
created or projected by the human being but which gives itself to us of its 
own accord. As the quotation above indicates, there is obviously truth in 
this interpretation. Yet how should we understand its systematic sense? 
Having already dealt with this issue in the previous chapter, I will only 
briefly repeat the argument. 
      To grasp what is at stake for Heidegger in stressing the primacy of 
being over the human being it is crucial to see that Heidegger is neither 
simply reiterating the ontological difference nor making a move within the 
traditional conflict between idealism and realism. Already in his analysis of 
the structure of phenomenality in Being and Time, Heidegger made it clear 
that being is not an entity but signifies the basic layer of historical meaning 
conditioning our experience of entities as entities. Moreover, his notion of 
the basic thrownness of Dasein entailed that being is not the result of a 
creative projection by Dasein but must be conceived as the historical 
context of meaning which always already delimits the possibilities of 
Dasein’s understanding.  However, what Heidegger failed to do in Being 
and Time was to radically raise the question concerning the givenness of 
historical being. The upshot of this was that he was unable to start out 
from historical being as the ultimate determinant of his concrete thinking, 
and was instead led to explicate the sense of being by way of 
phenomenological analysis of the structure of the human being. Counter 
to his conception of the structure of phenomenal understanding, the 
strategy of grounding being in an analysis of structure of the human being 
in the end implied both a breach of the ontological difference and a 
prioritizing of the human being. Hence, what is at stake in Heidegger’s 
stressing of the priority of being over the human being is not a drastic 
alteration of the analysis of Being and Time – which already gave priority to 
historical being – but a redirection of the main focus towards the question 
of the givenness of historical being and towards the question of what it 
means to think such givenness. 
                                         
799 Richardson 1963, p. 243. 
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      To understand the sense of Heidegger’s questioning of being itself in 
its priority is basically to understand how is combines the themes of 
phenomenality and historicity. As Heidegger first articulated the epiphanic 
happening of being in terms of physis, and explicated physis as “what 
emerges from itself”800 and as “the unfolding that opens itself up,”801 this 
was nothing but a rearticulation of the question of the self-givenness of 
being: how does being open up and give itself to us prior to and as a 
condition for all our subsequent acts of understanding? This theme is then 
echoed in all of his later descriptions of the self-initiating movement of 
being according to which being “gives itself,” “throws itself,” “sends 
itself” or “says itself” to the human being. Hence, the self-givenness of 
being that Heidegger has in mind is not a direct givenness of entities or 
meanings transcending our factical historical context, but signifies 
precisely the givenness of such contexts: “This ‘it gives / there is’ (es gibt) 
rules as the destiny of being. […] Therefore the thinking that thinks into 
the truth of being is, as thinking, historical.”802 For Heidegger, then, the 
givenness of being is the sending of being as history. 
 
Being as language. In the introductory paragraph of his Letter on 
Humanism Heidegger describes language as the “house of being.” Some ten 
pages later he specifies this claim: “Language is the clearing-concealing 
arrival of being itself.”803 This characterization of language as the “house” 
and “arrival” of being marks a transformation of Heidegger’s analysis of 
language in Being and Time.804 What has happened? 
      In Being and Time Heidegger basically conceived of language in terms of 
the ability of linguistic utterances to express and communicate meaningful 
phenomena, which were primarily supposed to show up and be available 
in Dasein’s implicit pre-linguistic understanding of the world. During the 
1930s this conception undergoes a change. As early as 1931, in the lecture 
course “Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ 1-3. On the Essence and Actuality of 
                                         
800 GA 40, p. 16: “das von sich aus Aufgehende.” 
801 GA 40, p. 16: “das sich eröffnende Entfalten.” 
802 GA 9, p. 335: “Dieses ‘es gibt’ waltet als das Geschick des Seins. […] Darum ist das 
Denken, das in die Wahrheit des Seins denkt, als Denken geschichtlich.” 
803 GA 9, p. 326: “Sprache ist lichtend-verbergende Ankunft des Seins selbst.” 
804 For some more detailed studies of Heidegger’s conception of language see, e.g., 
Bernasconi 1984; Sallis 1990, pp. 168-189; Dastur 1993; Taylor 1995b; Lafont 2000; 
Lysaker 2010; Powell [ed.] 2013. Cf. also Spanos 1979 and Fóti 1992. 
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Force,”805 Heidegger – through an interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of 
logos – intimates a critical reversal of his view: language, he writes, should 
be understood “not merely as a means of asserting and communicating, 
which indeed it also is, but […] as that wherein the manifestness and 
conversance of the world first of all bursts forth and is”806 From 1935 
onwards this conception of language is brought to bear at the heart of 
Heidegger’s thinking.  
      In the 1936 lecture “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” Heidegger 
makes one of his first attempts to spell out his new conception of 
language. Here he states the primacy of language for all phenomenal 
understanding bluntly: “Only where there is language is there world.”807 
But how so? In order to be able to speak with each other about different 
matters at all, Heidegger argues, we first need to able to hear and 
comprehend the common words that carry our speech and understanding: 
“We are a conversation (Gespräch) – and that means we are able to hear 
from one another. We are a conversation, and that also always means: We 
are one conversation. The unity of a conversation, however, consists in one 
and the same thing being manifest in the essential word, something we 
agree upon, and on the basis of which we are united and thus properly 
ourselves. The conversation and its unity support our existence.”808 That is 
to say: it is only on the basis of the primary unity of our language, the 
capacity of our words and expressions to say and present the same 
meanings, that the possibility is opened up to experience and 
communicate the world as a common historical context of significance. 
Elsewhere Heidegger articulates this a priori unity of language through an 
interpretation of logos as the primal “gathering”: “Logos is constant 
gathering, the gatheredness of beings that stands in itself.”809 
                                         
805 “Aristotle, Metaphysik Θ 1-3. Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft,” GA 33. 
806 GA 33, p. 128: “nicht lediglich als Mittel des Aussagens und Mitteilens, was sie 
zwar auch ist, sondern […] als dasjenige, worin die Offenbarkeit und Kundschaft der 
Welt überhaupt aufbricht und ist.” 
807 GA 4, p. 38: “Nur wo Sprache, da ist Welt.” 
808 GA 4, p. 39: “Wir sind ein Gespräch, das bedeutet zugleich immer: wir sind ein 
Gespräch. Die Einheit eines Gesprächs besteht aber darin, daß jeweils im 
wesentlichen Wort das Eine und Selbe offenbar ist, worauf wir uns einigen, auf Grund 
dessen wir einig und so eigentlich wir selbst sind. Das Gespräch und seine Einheit 
trägt unser Dasein.” 
809 GA 40, p. 139: “Λόγος ist die ständige Sammlung, die in sich stehende 
Gesammeltheit des Seienden.”   
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      Later, in the 1950s, Heidegger elaborates his thinking of language in a 
series of essays published in the volume On the Way to Language. “The Way 
to Language” from 1959810 offers a paradigmatic articulation of his train 
of thought. It starts from the observation that we are incessantly talking 
about things, whether noiselessly for ourselves or explicitly in 
communication with others. Moreover, all this speech is characterized by 
the possibility or either exhibiting and making present the matters we talk 
about or covering them up and distorting them.  Still, for our speech to 
able to exhibit and communicate what it talks about it must be “preceded 
by a thing’s letting-itself-be-shown.”811 The argument – that the 
phenomena first have to show themselves in order for us, then, to be able 
to exhibit them – is familiar from Being and Time. Now, however, 
Heidegger gives the argument a different twist as he claims that our 
primary access to the phenomena lies not in a pre-linguistic understanding 
of the world but in a listening to language itself: “Speaking is of itself a 
hearing. It is listening to the language that we speak. Hence, speaking is 
not simultaneously a hearing, but is such in advance. […] We not only speak 
language, we speak from out of it.”812 Why is this so? Heidegger explains: 
 
Language speaks in that it, as showing (die Zeige), reaching into all 
regions of presence, lets whatever is present appear in such regions 
or vanish from them. Accordingly, we listen to language in such a 
way that we let it say its saying to us. No matter what other sorts of 
hearing we engage in, whenever we hear something this hearing is a 
letting-something-be-said-to-us (Sichsagenlassen) that embraces all 
apprehending and representing. In speech, as listening to language, 
we reiterate the saying we have heard.813  
 
                                                                                                                      
Cf. also, e.g., GA 33, p. 128; GA 55, p. 276. 
810 “Der Weg zur Sprache,” in GA 12. 
811 GA 12, p. 243: “geht diesem Zeigen als Hinweisen ein Sichzeigenlassen vorauf.” 
812 GA 12, p. 243: “Das Sprechen ist von sich aus ein Hören. Es ist das Hören auf die 
Sprache, die wir Sprechen. So ist denn das Sprechen nicht zugleich, sondern zuvor ein 
Hören. […] Wir sprechen nicht nur die Sprache, wir sprechen aus ihr.” 
813 GA 12, p. 243f.: “Die Sprache spricht, indem sie als die Zeige, in alle Gegenden des 
Anwesens reichend, aus ihnen jeweils Anwesendes erscheinen und verscheinen läßt. 
Demgemäß hören wir auf die Sprache in der Weise, daß wir uns ihre Sage sagen 
lassen. Auf welche Arten wir auch sonst noch hören, wo immer wir etwas hören, da ist 
das Hören das alles Vernehmen und Vorstellen schon einbehaltende Sichsagenlassen. Im 
Sprechen als dem Hören auf die Sprache sagen wir die gehörte Sage nach.” 
 The Dynamics of Shining 375 
 
 
It is possible to pick out two basic strands of this argument. First, 
Heidegger articulates language as the historical whole of linguistic 
meaning-possibilities which always already harbors the possible meanings 
in terms of which we can experience and express beings as meaningful. 
Language is die Zeige: the fundamental repository of meaning which 
“reaching into all regions of presence, lets whatever is present appear in 
such regions or vanish from them,” that is, which opens up and 
determines our phenomenal experience and lets beings appear as one 
thing or the other. Second, this means that our primary relation to 
language becomes receptive. Given that language is not just a medium 
through which we communicate our pre-linguistic experiences but from 
the outset determines these experiences, then its meanings cannot be 
grounded in the experiences and the expressive acts of the individual 
human being. Rather, in order to experience things, or say something, or 
understand what another person says, we must always already “listen to,” 
i.e. receptively take in, our historical language as the basic element which 
regulates and makes intelligible experience and speech possible.  
      I cannot undertake a critical study of Heidegger’s conception of 
language in this thesis. Still, I briefly want to mention my attitude to this 
question. Whatever be the truth of Heidegger’s fundamental notion that 
our historical pre-understanding determines our phenomenal experience 
of beings – which remains the same in his early and later thought – one 
could ask to what extent it is illuminating to think that our pre-
understanding is determined by and coincides with our ability to speak a 
historical language. Although Heidegger’s analysis of language as the basic 
element of thinking has a wide resonance in today’s philosophy – both in 
the analytic tradition and in the traditions of hermeneutics and 
deconstruction – and although it harbors vital insights into the deep 
linguisticality of our experience, I ultimately believe it dogmatically 
postulates language as the ground of understanding. By contrast, I think a 
phenomenological examination of the historical pre-understanding guiding 
our experience would show that we to a very large extent make use of 
more or less determinate concepts and typifications which are not 
inherently linguistic, without for that matter being either private or 
inexpressible.  Moreover, I think it would be possible to show that the 
capacity of our words and expressions to mean something is generally 
dependent on their ability to express conceptual types and meaning-
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patterns that we must also have a basic translinguistic access to. Hence, in 
my judgment, Heidegger’s earlier conception of language as something 
that does not determine and delimit our possibilities of understanding, but 
which basically remains a medium for expression, communication and 
action, constitutes a more promising starting point for philosophical 
reflection on language. 
      Earlier I suggested that Heidegger diminished the role of language in 
Being and Time in order to account for the concreteness or our primary 
practical grasp of the meaningful world and not reduce it to an effect of 
our linguistic practices. However, his motive for rehabilitating the role of 
language seems to be analogous. For the Heidegger of the mid 1930s his 
earlier separation of the worldly context of meaning from language 
appears as having the effect of transforming the historical world into an 
abstract and ethereal system of ideas. Hence, Heidegger’s introduction of 
language – as well as artworks and concrete things – as the element of 
historical meaning seems to allow for a better account for the 
concreteness and materiality of historical meaning and, ultimately, for the 
dynamics that lets a world arise and bind us. To sum up then: whereas 
Heidegger in Being and Time explicated our phenomenal understanding of 
the world in terms of our pre-linguistic grasp of the historical contexts of 
significance in which we live, he now insists that our primary access to the 
world transpires as a receptive hearing of our historically given language as 
the basic element which opens up the phenomenal world. On the basis of 
this modification we can articulate the guiding question of Heidegger’s late 
philosophy as follows: how is a historical language opened up to us as a 
destiny? 
 
Thinking and poetry. The quoted passage from “Letter on Humanism” 
asserted that although being gives itself to the human being of its own 
accord as historical destiny – and is not created by her – she is 
nevertheless needed in order to accomplish the self-giving happening of 
being. This is the task of the thinkers and the poets who in their different 
ways articulate being in language. 
      In his 1943 postscript to “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger describes 
the difference between thinking and poetry like this: “The thinker says 
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being. The poet names the holy.”814 That is, whereas thinking – i.e. the 
post-metaphysical thinking attempted by Heidegger – reflects on and 
articulates the fundamental ontological status and dynamics of the basic 
happening which opens up the world, art in general and poetry in 
particular establish the world and make it shine forth as a unified and holy 
domain of meaning. Thinking and poetry thus play different yet 
complementary roles in the dynamics that opens the world.  
      As concerns the task of accomplishing the opening of the world, 
Heidegger ascribes a certain priority to thinking. Keeping in mind that 
thinking articulates the openness or truth of being whereas poetry names 
the holy, we can see that the following passage from the “Letter on 
Humanism” presents a clear hierarchy between the two tasks.  
 
In this nearness [to being], if at all, a decision may be made as to 
whether and how God and the gods withhold their presence and 
the night remains, whether and how the day of the holy dawns, 
whether and how in the upsurgence of the holy an epiphany of 
God and the gods can begin anew. But the holy, which alone is the 
essential sphere of divinity, which in turn alone affords a dimension 
for the gods and for God, comes to radiate only when being itself 
beforehand and after extensive preparation has been cleared and is 
experienced in its truth.815 
 
In short, by articulating the happening of being thinking first opens up the 
possibility of a transparent understanding and enactment of poetry. Not 
only does it elucidate the task of poetry for the poet; it also clarifies our 
understanding – i.e. the understanding of the recipients, the ordinary 
people – of poetry as the ultimate and ungroundable source of our 
historical world. On the backdrop of the clarity thus achieved the poet 
opens up the world as a “holy” context of meaning harboring our “gods,” 
                                         
814 GA 9, p. 312: “Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige.”  
815 GA 9, p. 338f.: “In dieser Nähe [zum Sein] vollzieht sich, wenn überhaupt, die 
Entscheidung, ob und wie der Gott und die Götter sich versagen und die Nacht 
bleibt, ob und wie der Tag des Heiligen dämmert, ob und wie im Aufgang des 
Heiligen ein Erscheinen des Gottes und der Götter neu beginnen kann. Das Heilige 
aber, das nur erst der Wesensraum der Gottheit ist, die selbst wiederum nur die 
Dimension für die Götter und den Gott gewährt, kommt dann allein ins Scheinen, 
wenn zuvor und in langer Vorbereitung das Sein selbst sich gelichtet hat und in seiner 
Wahrheit erfahren ist.” Cf. also GA 9, p. 351f. 
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i.e., our highest binding paradigmatic measures and purposes. However, as 
concerns the generation of substantial historical being, Heidegger gives 
priority to poetry: if thinking is more basic in the sense that it clarifies the 
ontological sense of and thus conditions a transparent enactment and 
reception of poetry, poetry is more basic in the sense that it establishes the 
basic historical contexts of being which thinking is always already referred 
to and in which it has to move as its given factical element of historical 
meaning.  
      In the rest of this chapter I will focus on the role of art and poetry in 
the realization of the epiphanic happening of being. Then, in the following 
chapter, I will return to the question of what it means to think this 
happening. 
 
The Strife Between the World and the Earth 
 
Heidegger’s essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” constitutes his most 
elaborate attempt to depict the basic dynamics which, in and through the 
work of art, allows a historical world to open up and shine forth.816 
      The central aim of the essay is none other than to describe how the 
work of art “opens up […] a world” by carrying out the “strife” between 
the historical meaning-context of the “world” and the materiality of the 
“earth.”817 It is important to see from the start that in setting out to 
examine the nature of art, Heidegger is concerned with freeing what he 
calls art from the traditional conception of art as an object of the subject’s 
aesthetic experience, and instead highlight the question of the truth of art. 
However, the truth of the artwork as he conceives of it does not consist in 
its ability to correctly represent any pregiven meanings of the world or in 
                                         
816 Heidegger’s text has a long and thorny history. A first version was initiated and 
worked out somewhere between 1931 and 1935 – the actual text probably stemming 
from the end of this period; a second version was elaborated in 1935; a third version 
was completed in 1935-36 but published only in 1950 in the first edition of Holzwege 
with a new “afterword.” As Heidegger then publishes the text in the Reclam-series in 
1960 he also  adds an “addendum” to the text. I will focus solely on this final 
published version of text, which essentially goes back on the third version from 1935-
36. For a detailed study of the developments and modifications that Heidegger’s 
thinking undergoes in the different versions, see Taminiaux 1993. Cf. also Espinet & 
Keiling 2011, pp. 16-18. 
817 GA 5, p. 28: “eröffnet [...] eine Welt.” 
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expressing the inner life of the artist. Rather, the truth-task of the artwork 
is “the opening up of beings in their being, the happening of truth.”818 His 
model example of an artwork is a Greek temple: 
 
It is the temple work that first fits together and simultaneously 
gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which 
birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, 
endurance and decline acquire for the human being the shape of its 
destiny. The all-governing expanse of these open relations is the 
world of this historical people. […] Standing there, the temple first 
gives to things their look, and to men their outlook on 
themselves.819 
 
As Heidegger’s choice of example indicates he understands the world-
establishing function of the artwork in analogy with how a religious world 
of beliefs, norms and practices is set up and upheld by a compound of 
writings, artworks, music, buildings, and other public installations and 
practices. The task of the work of art is thus none other than to enact the 
epiphanic happening which opens up the world as the unified and binding 
historical context of ideals and purposes determining our possibilities of 
experiencing and grasping ourselves and the entities of the world as 
meaningful. Prior to the work of art we do not have access to a world or 
to meaningful entities; it is only through the work that a world of being 
and meaning opens up and shines forth: “In the work of art the truth of 
beings has set itself to work. ‘To set’ means here: to bring to stand. […] 
The being of beings comes into the constancy of its shining.”820 
      According to Heidegger, poetry constitutes the fundamental level of 
the world-opening event of art.  The function of poetry is to establish the 
                                         
818 GA 5, p. 24: “die Eröffnung des Seienden in seinem Sein: Das Geschehnis der 
Wahrheit.” 
819 GA 5, pp. 27ff.: “Das Tempelwerk fügt erst und sammelt zugleich die Einheit jener 
Bahnen und Bezüge um sich, in denen Geburt und Tod, Unheil und Segen, Sieg und 
Schmach, Ausharren und Verfall – dem Menschenwesen die Gestalt seines Geschickes 
gewinnen. Die waltende Weite dieser offenen Bezüge ist die Welt dieses 
geschichtlichen Volkes. […] Der Tempel gibt in seinem Dastehen den Dingen erst ihr 
Gesicht und den Menschen erst die Aussicht auf sich selbst.” 
820 GA 5, p. 21: “Im Werk der Kunst hat sich die Wahrheit des Seienden ins Werk 
gesetzt. ‘Setzen’ besagt hier: zum Stehen bringen. […] Das Sein des Seienden kommt 
in das Ständige seines Scheinens.” 
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language which first opens up being and guides all other arts.821  In the 
1935 lecture “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” he writes:   
 
The poet names the gods and names all things with respect to what 
they are. This naming does not consist in something previously 
known being merely furnished with a name; rather, by speaking the 
essential word, the poet’s naming first nominates beings to that 
which they are. Thus they become known as beings. Poetry is the 
founding of being in words. […] But because being and the essence 
of things can never be calculated and derived from what is present 
at hand, being and essence must be freely created, posited, and 
bestowed. Such free bestowal is founding.822 
 
Since there are no meaningful phenomena available prior to the 
emergence of language, poetry cannot transpire as an activity of naming or 
description accommodating itself to such phenomena. Rather, by 
establishing the words capable of assembling the significances of the 
world into their unity, the poet appoints the entities to what they are. In 
this way the poet founds the originary language which opens up our 
historical world, guiding all our speech and understanding.   
      Heidegger’s essay takes its starting point in the question concerning 
the character of the artwork as a material thing. Since the “thing” has 
always functioned as the “paradigmatic being,”823 it may seem natural to 
begin by explicating the thingness of the thing in order, then, to go on and 
specify the features that make the thing into an artwork. However, 
Heidegger argues, the traditional conceptions of the thingness of the thing 
are insufficient. He first rejects two concepts of the thing that are 
grounded in the theoretical experience of present-at-hand objects: the 
thing as an underlying substance and the thing as a unity in the stream of 
sensations. He then turns to the notion of the thing as a “synthesis of 
                                         
821 Cf. GA 5, pp. 59-64. 
822 GA 4, p. 41: “Der Dichter nennt die Götter und nennt alle Dinge in dem, was sie 
sind. Dieses Nennen besteht nicht darin, daß ein vordem schon Bekanntes nur mit 
einem Namen versehen wird, sondern indem der Dichter das wesentliche Wort 
spricht, wird durch diese Nennung das Seiende erst zu dem ernannt, was es ist. So 
wird es bekannt als Seiendes. Dichtung ist worthafte Stiftung des Seins. […] Weil aber 
Sein und Wesen der Dinge nie errechnet und aus dem Vorhandenen abgeleitet werden 
können, müssen sie frei geschaffen, gesetzt und geschenkt werden. Solche freie 
Schenkung ist Stiftung.”  
823 GA 5, p. 6: “das maßgebende Seiende.” 
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matter and form,”824 which, he claims, has its origin in our experience of 
tools. It is a basic characteristic of the tool that its material is subordinated 
to its form, so that both the material and the form are ultimately 
determined by their usefulness for human purposes. Yet according to 
Heidegger, the notion of the tool as formed material is unable to account 
either for the peculiar quality of the material thing as something  
“growing-of-its-own” (Eigenwüchsig) or for the “standing-in-itself” (In-sich-
stehen) or “self-sufficiency” (Selbstgenügsamkeit) characteristic of the work of 
art.825  
      Now, if we bear in mind that Heidegger’s own analysis of the structure 
of phenomenal understanding in Being and Time was rooted precisely in the 
experience of tools, we can see that his critique of the model of the tool in 
fact opens up a reassessment of his own conception of phenomenality. 
Not only did the earlier analysis obliterate the material aspect of the 
phenomena by reducing them to instantiations of pre-understood 
significances and purposes. As a result of taking its starting point in the 
experience of the tool and proceeding by explicating the structural ground 
of this experience in Dasein’s understanding of the world, it also failed to 
radically ask the question concerning the openness and givenness of the 
historical world itself. Heidegger’s initial reflections on the thingness of 
the thing thus indicate the philosophical agenda of the essay. To begin 
with, Heidegger’s entire investigation of the nature of art is motivated by 
the hitherto unasked question of how being itself is opened up. Granted 
that the work of art constitutes the site which keeps the world open, the 
question of the phenomenality of being here takes the form of a question 
concerning the “standing-in-itself” of the artwork. Moreover, this 
intensified pursuit of the question of the phenomenality of being gives rise 
to a felt need to account for the material-sensuous aspect of the world. 
What is it, apart from the facticity of history, that grants to the world its 
concretion and specificity? 
      As Heidegger after the publication of Being and Time set his focus on 
our understanding of being, he explicated it terms of a free world-
projection. Even though he put forward the idea that our projections of 
being in some sense need to be grounded in the totality of beings, this idea 
was never developed, and it remained fundamentally unclear how such 
                                         
824 GA 5, p. 11: “Synthesis von Stoff und Form.” 
825 GA 5, pp. 13, 25, 14.  
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projections could ever establish a unitary binding world. Now, however, 
Heidegger stresses that the world-establishing work of art is not the result 
of a free and creative projection on the part of the poet or the artist. In 
“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” he clearly spells out the twin bonds 
to which poetry is subject: “As the founding of being, poetry is bound in a 
twofold sense”:826 on the one hand, poetry is bound by the ”winks of the 
gods,”827 by which Heidegger means the determinations granted by our 
history; on the other hand, it is bound by “the voice of the people,”828 i.e., 
“the tales (die Sagen) in which a people is mindful of its belongingness to 
beings as a whole,”829 by which he indicates what he in the art-essay will 
call the “earth”: the factical material milieu in which we live. To 
understand the dynamics of shining is to understand how the work of art 
founds and gathers a work on the basis of these twin bonds. Let us 
examine them in turn. 
       Firstly, Heidegger claims that the world-founding activity of art is not 
free but bound by the “winks of the gods”: “But the gods can only speak 
if they themselves address us and make a claim on us. The word that 
names the gods is always a response to such a claim. This response always 
stems from the responsibility of a destiny.”830 Hence, as Heidegger 
repeatedly emphasizes, the articulations of poetry must be seen as 
responses, which receive and comply with the relations of being and 
meaning that are already given through our history. Or, as he puts it in 
“The Origin of the Work of Art”: “The poetic projection comes from 
nothing in the sense that it never derives its gift from what is familiar and 
already there. Yet it does not come out of nothing in as much as what it 
projects is but the withheld determination of historical Dasein itself.”831 
                                         
826 GA 4, p. 45: “Die Dichtung ist als Stiftung des Seins zweifach gebunden.” 
827 GA 4, p. 46: “die Winke der Götter.” 
828 GA 4, p. 46: “die Stimme des Volkes.” 
829 GA 4, p. 46: “Die Sagen, in denen ein Volk eingedenk ist seiner Zugehörigkeit zum 
Seienden im Ganzen.” 
830 GA 4, p. 40: “Aber die Götter können nur dann inst Wort kommen, wenn sie 
selbst uns ansprechen und unter ihren Anspruch stellen. Das Wort, das die Götter 
nennt, ist immer Antwort auf solchen Anspruch. Diese Antwort entspringt jeweils aus 
der Verantwortung eines Schicksals.” 
831 GA 5, p. 64: “Der dichtende Entwurf kommt aus dem Nichts in der Hinsicht, daß 
er sein Geschenk nie aus dem Geläufigen und Bisherigen nimmt. Er kommt jedoch 
nie aus dem Nichts, insofern das durch ihn Zugeworfene nur die vorenthaltende 
Bestimmung des geschichtlichen Daseins selbst ist.” 
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But how does the receptive founding take place? Here is Heidegger’s 
attempt to specify: 
 
The poet’s saying is the catching of these winks [of the gods], in 
order to pass them on to his people. This catching of the winks is a 
reception, and yet at the same time a new giving; for in the “first 
signs” the poet already catches sight of the completed whole, and 
boldly puts what he has seen into his word, in order to predict what 
is not yet fulfilled.832 
 
That is, the poet does not only receive and represent the winks of the gods 
as a ready and obvious set of pregiven concepts just lying there in our 
history waiting to be expressed. Rather, in what is first only given as “first 
signs” the poet “catches sight of the completed whole, and boldly puts 
what he has seen into his word.” Hence, at the same time as poet opens 
herself up to the address of history as our as yet undetermined manifold 
of being-possibilities she also through her founding words determines – 
decides and gathers – this manifold into a unified and limited historical 
world. As he writes in “The Origin of the Work of Art”: in “fitting 
together” and “gathering” the “paths and relations”833 of the world the 
work of art puts up for decision “what is holy and what unholy, what is 
great and what small, what is brave and what cowardly, what is noble and 
what fugitive, what is master and what slave.”834  
      Secondly, Heidegger maintains that in order to establish a world the 
artwork has to ground it on the “earth.” But what is the “earth”?  
      As Heidegger’s concept of the earth is linked to his effort to account 
for the phenomenal self-givenness of the world it holds a special 
importance for our investigation. However, the secondary literature 
contains only few attempts to systematically spell out the role of the earth 
in Heidegger’s late thinking – over and above philological paraphrases of 
Heidegger’s general description of the need for the world to be grounded 
                                         
832 GA 4, p. 46: “Das Sagen des Dichters ist das Auffangen dieser Winke [der Götter], 
um sie weiter zu winken in sein Volk. Dieses Auffangen der Winke ist ein Empfangen 
und doch zugleich ein neues Geben; denn der Dichter erblickt im ‘ersten Zeichen’ 
auch schon das Vollendete und stellt dieses Erschaute kühn in sein Wort, um das 
noch-nicht-Erfüllte vorauszusagen.” 
833 GA 5, p. 27f. 
834 GA 5, p. 29: “was heilig ist und was unheilig, was groß und was klein, was wacker 
und was feig, was edel und was flüchtig, was Herr und was Knecht.” 
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on the self-secluding materiality of the earth.  Still, even here it is possible 
to note two interpretational tendencies loosely corresponding to the 
tension between a phenomenological and a hermeneutic-deconstructivist 
reading of Heidegger.    
      Recently, David Espinet has argued that the notion of the earth 
developed by Heidegger in “The Origin of the Work of Art” constitutes a 
phenomenological corrective to his radical conception of the historicity of 
understanding. According to Espinet, the “earth” signifies both our 
material-natural surroundings and the manifold of sensuous qualities: 
colors, sounds, scents, etc.835  In our everyday life, however, there is a 
strong tendency to cover over the sensuous aspect of our experience, and 
grasp things solely in terms of the significance they have in our historical 
world. The upshot of this is that our understanding rigidifies into an 
autistic repetition of received patterns of meaning: “What is silenced 
through the intentional yet distortive transparency of the world, is the 
sensuously experienceable as such, the earth. Thus intelligibility often 
thrusts itself between our listening and seeing and that which shows itself, 
so that we often superimpose fixed patterns of interpretation on the latter 
– on this unexpected, literally unheard-of and, as such, unrepresentable 
sense.”836 It is, Espinet argues, precisely because the work of art merges 
“our experience of sense and our experience of sensuousness”837 in an 
intensified manner that it is able to shatter our common understanding of 
the world and open us up to “a new and unexpected sense.”838 According 
to Espinet, Heidegger’s “earth” thus constitutes nothing but the material-
sensuous ground which at the same time transcends and co-constitutes 
our world: a “constantly historical and, as such, transhistorical ground.”839 
Hence, our experience of the earth – as it is made possible by the work of 
art – has the potential of critically unsettling our factical understanding of 
the world and give us access to new meanings.  Notwithstanding the fact 
                                         
835 Cf. Espinet 2011, pp. 53f., 58.  
836 Espinet 2011, p. 58: “Was durch die intentionale, aber verstellende Transparenz 
von Welt verstummt, ist das sinnlich Erfahrbare selbst, die Erde. So schiebt sich 
Verständlichkeit häufig zwischen unser Hinhören und Hinsehen und jenes, was sich 
zeigt, das wir dann mit festen Deutungsmustern überlagern – ein unerwarteter, 
tatsächlich unerhörter und darin unrepräsentierbarer Sinn.” 
837 Espinet 2011, p. 60: “Sinn und Sinnlichkeitserfahrung.” 
838 Espinet 2011, p. 57: “ein neuer und unerwarteter Sinn.” 
839 Espinet 2011, p. 54: “jederzeit Geschichtlicher und darin transgeschichtlicher 
Grund.” 
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that Heidegger in the end tends to downgrade the role of the material-
sensuous earth in the artwork by overemphasizing its linguisticality and 
historicity, Espinet maintains that Heidegger’s account of the earth 
“systematically” implies “the equal rank of earth and world.”840  
      In Julian Young’s interpretation of Heidegger’s later thinking we find a 
quite different explication of Heidegger’s “earth.” Young provides the 
following affirmative historicist reading of the late Heidegger. As human 
beings we always live in a finite historical world – a “horizon of 
disclosure”841 – which regulates what we can understand as meaningful. 
The world, moreover, does not coincide with “the limits of intelligibility 
per se” but has a “historically and culturally relative character.”842 This 
means that “in addition to what is intelligible to us, reality possesses an 
indefinitely large number of aspects, a ‘plenitude’ of ‘sides’ or ‘facets’ 
which would be disclosed to us were we to inhabit transcendental 
horizons other than the one we do, horizons which, however, we can 
neither inhabit nor even conceive. Truth, then is concealment, ultimate 
truth concealment of the, to us, ineluctably mysterious.”843 According to 
Young, Heidegger introduces the notion of “earth” in “The Origin of the 
Work of Art” precisely to name the self-secluding manifold of meaning-
possibilities encircling our world: “’Earth […] is […] the dark penumbra 
of unintelligibility that surrounds […] and grounds […] our human 
existence.”844 The function of the artwork is to make manifest the earth as 
the mysterious ground of the world which we normally tend to cover over 
and forget. In the end, Young argues, the materialization of the earth in 
the work of art makes the world shine forth as “holy”: “Experienced as 
the self-disclosure of an unfathomable ‘mystery’ it acquires radiance, 
becomes as one might also say, numinous, a ‘holy” place.”845 For Young, 
then, the earth does not signify a sensuousness that would in any way 
disturb Heidegger’s basic view of the hierarchical priority of the historical 
world in relation to every particular material-sensuous being, but rather 
names the origin of our world in a manifold of alternative worlds and 
histories.  
                                         
840 Espinet 2011, p. 64: “die Gleichrangigkeit von Erde und Welt.”  
841 Young 2002, p. 8.  
842 Young 2002, p. 9. 
843 Young 2002, p. 9. 
844 Young 2002, p. 9; cf. also Young 2001, pp. 38-40.  
845 Young 2002, p. 45.  
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      So what does Heidegger mean by “earth”? 
      Let me begin by quoting Heidegger’s description of the Greek temple 
in its groundedness on the earth at length:  
 
Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting 
of the work draws out of the rock the darkness of its unstructured 
yet unforced support. Standing there, the building holds its place 
against the storm raging above it and so first makes the storm 
visible in its violence. The gleam and luster of the stone, though 
apparently there only by the grace of the sun, in fact first brings to 
radiance the light of day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the 
night. The temple’s firm towering makes visible the invisible space 
of the air. The steadfastness of the work stands out against the 
surge of the tide and, in its own repose, brings out the raging of the 
surf. Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter 
their distinctive shapes and thus come to appearance as what they 
are. The Greeks early called this coming forth and rising up in itself 
and in all things physis. It illuminates also that on which and in 
which man bases his dwelling. We call this the earth. What this word 
means here is far removed from the idea of a mass of matter and 
from the merely astronomical idea of a planet. Earth is that whence 
the arising brings back and shelters everything that arises as such. 
In the things that arise the earth occurs as the sheltering one.846 
 
This description already shows that the earth cannot, as Young claims, be 
interpreted as a designation of the hidden plurality of historical 
                                         
846 GA 5, p. 28: “Dastehend ruht das Bauwerk auf dem Felsgrund. Dies Aufruhen des 
Werkes holt aus dem Fels das Dunkle seines ungefügen und doch zu nichts 
gedrängten Tragens heraus. Dastehend hält das Bauwerk dem über es wegrasenden 
Sturm stand und zeigt so erst den Sturm selbst in seiner Gewalt. Der Glanz und das 
Leuchten des Gesteins, anscheinend selbst nur von Gnaden der Sonne, bringt doch 
erst das Lichte des Tages, die Weite des Himmels, die Finsternis der Nacht zum 
Vorschein. Das sichere Ragen macht den unsichtbaren Raum der Luft sichtbar. Das 
Unerschütterte des Werkes steht ab gegen das Wogen der Meerflut und läßt aus seiner 
Ruhe deren Toben erscheinen. Der Baum und das Gras, der Adler und der Stier, die 
Schlange und die Grille gehen erst in ihre abgehobene Gestalt ein und kommen so als 
das zum Vorschein, was sie sind. Dieses Herauskommen und Aufgehen selbst und im 
Ganzen nannten die Griechen frühzeitig die Φύσις. Sie lichtet zugleich jenes, worauf 
und worin der Mensch sein Wohnen gründet. Wir nennen es die Erde. Von dem, was 
das Wort hier sagt, ist sowohl die Vorstellung einer abgelagerten Stoffmasse als auch 
die nur astronomische eines Planeten fernzuhalten. Die Erde ist das, wohin das 
Aufgehen alles Aufgehende und zwar als ein solches zurückbirgt. Im Aufgehenden 
west die Erde als das Bergende.” 
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significance constituting the mysterious source of our finite world. Indeed, 
what Heidegger means by “earth” is “nature,” understood not as the 
theoretical object of natural science, but as the material and sensuous 
setting we inhabit and experience. As such, the “earth” comprises both the 
manifold of sensuous qualities – the “massiveness and heaviness of the 
stone,” the “firmness and pliancy of the wood,” the “brightening and 
darkening of color,” “the clang of tone,” “the naming power of the 
word”847 – as well as the material-organic milieu in which we establish and 
live our lives: the sun, the air, the waters, the climate and the weather, the 
rhythms of the days and the years, the terrain and the soil, the plants and 
the animals, the metals and the minerals.  
      To open up a world, Heidegger argues, the work of art needs to base 
the world on the earth as its material-sensuous ground. Conceived as this 
ground, the earth exhibits two basic traits: first, it is “that which, unforced, 
is effortless and untiring,”848 i.e., it rests in itself irrespective of all human 
purposes and is thus able to function as the concrete ground on which the 
world is set up; second, it is “the essentially self-secluding,”849 i.e., it 
withdraws from the open meaning-context of the world and from all 
attempts to penetrate into it, operating as the hidden and self-secluding 
ground of the world. Eventually, Heidegger describes the interplay 
between the world and the earth as a “strife” (Streit) that the work of art 
enacts: “The earth cannot do without the open region of the world if it is 
to appear as earth in the liberating surge of its self-seclusion. The world in 
turn cannot float away from the earth if, as the prevailing breadth and 
path of all essential destiny, it is to ground itself on something decisive. In 
setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work is an instigation of 
this strife.”850 Hence, in enacting the strife between the world and the 
earth the artwork does not only open the world by grounding it on the 
earth but also sets forth and presents the earth as the hidden material-
                                         
847 GA 5, p. 32: “das Massige und Schwere des Steins,  […] das Feste und Biegsame 
des Holzes, […] das Leuchten und Dunkeln der Farbe, […] den Klang des Tones, […] 
die Nennkraft des Wortes.” 
848 GA 5, p. 32: “das zu nichts gedrängte Mühelose-Unermüdliche.” 
849 GA 5, p. 33: “das wesenhaft Sich-verschließende.” 
850 GA 5, pp. 35f.: “Die Erde kann das Offene der Welt nicht missen, soll sie selbst als 
Erde im befreiten Andrang ihres Sichverschließens erscheinen. Die Welt wiederum 
kann der Erde nicht entschweben, soll sie als waltende Weite und Bahn alles 
wesentlichen Geschickes sich auf ein Entscheidendes gründen. Indem das Werk eine 
Welt aufstellt und die Erde herstellt, ist es eine Anstiftung dieses Streites.” 
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sensuous ground that it is: “The rock comes to bear and to rest and so 
first becomes rock; the metals come to glitter and shimmer, the colors to 
shine, the tones to sing, the word to speak. […] The work lets the earth be an 
earth.”851 
      But what is the systematic sense of Heidegger’s idea that the artwork 
needs to ground the world on the earth? Is Espinet right in claiming that 
the earth signifies a transhistorical ground which co-constitutes our 
historical world as an independent source of meaning? I do not think this 
is the case.  
      To begin with, it is crucial to keep in mind that Heidegger’s essay in 
no way questions the hierarchical ontological difference between our 
preceding understanding of our historical world and our possibility of 
experiencing particular beings as meaningful. This means that prior to the 
artwork’s establishment of a world we do not have access to any 
meaningful phenomena that could function as a measure for our 
understanding. Hence, to the extent that the earth constitutes a 
transhistorical ground it must do so as the material-sensuous aspect of the 
dynamics which establishes the historical world in the first place, prior to 
and as a condition for all particular phenomena. But what about the 
ground-character of the earth in the epiphany of the world?  
      It is, I think, obvious that Heidegger in some sense wants to anchor 
the world in the materiality of the earth in order to ensure that the world 
does not remain a set of abstract and floating conceptual schemata. But 
how? According to Heidegger, the work of art grounds the world on the 
earth as “something decisive”:852 “In the earth, however, as the essentially 
self-secluding, the openness of the open encounters the highest form of 
resistance; it thereby finds the site of its steady stand in which the figure 
must be fixed in place.”853 That is, in order to gather and decide the 
meanings granted by history and make them stand forth in a concrete and 
specific form, the artwork needs to ground them in the material-sensuous 
milieu at hand. Although Heidegger does not spell out how this happens it 
                                         
851 GA 5, p. 32: “der Fels kommt zum Tragen und Ruhen und wird so erst Fels, die 
Metalle kommen zum Blitzen und Schimmern, die Farben zum Leuchten, der Ton 
zum Klingen, das Wort zum Sagen. […] Das Werk läßt die Erde eine Erde sein.”  
852 GA 5, p. 36. 
853 GA 5, p. 57: “An der Erde als der wesenhaft sich verschließenden findet aber die 
Offenheit des Offenen seinen höchsten Widerstand und dadurch die Stätte seines 
ständigen Standes, darein die Gestalt festgestellt werden muß.” Cf. also GA 5, p. 58.  
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is possible to discern two aspects of this grounding, answering to the two 
aspects covered by the notion of earth: on the one hand, the world must 
be grounded in – i.e. specified and fleshed out according to – the natural 
surroundings in which we live and in which the guiding purposes or our 
world can be concretely enacted and instituted; on the other hand, the 
world must be grounded in – i.e. expressed and shaped by – the 
materiality and sensuousness of the medium in and through which the 
artwork projects the world. By anchoring the meanings of history in the 
earth the work of art lets the guiding purposes and meanings making up   
the world arise and shine forth in a concrete and specific paradigmatic 
form.   
      That said, it is clear that the earth throughout Heidegger’s descriptions 
constantly figures as the subordinate pole in a hierarchical relationship: the 
artwork “sets” the world “back” on the earth whereby the earth functions 
as “the sheltering one” (das Bergende).854 Even though the earth constitutes 
a necessary and irreducible moment in the constitution of the world, it 
essentially functions as a receiving dimension which gives concrete and 
specific form to meanings ultimately originating from our historical 
heritage. Indeed, there is nothing in Heidegger’s account that indicates 
how our experience of the materiality and sensuousness of the earth could 
ever constitute the source of those central existential purposes and 
meanings which in the end organize our world and give all things any 
possible significance they might have. The inability of the earth to 
function as an autonomous source of meaning also becomes manifest in 
Heidegger’s claim that it is only the opening of the world through the 
work of art that lets the earth emerge as the earth: “The temple work, 
standing there, opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back 
again upon the earth, which itself only thus emerges as native ground 
(heimatliche Grund).”855 Taken as such – before and irrespective of the 
world – the earth is nothing but a meaningless manifold of material-
sensuous data; then again, to the extent that the world is established in the 
                                         
854 GA 5, p. 28. 
855 GA 5, p. 28: “Das Tempelwerk eröffnet dastehend eine Welt und stellt diese 
zugleich zurück auf die Erde, die dergestalt selbst erst als der heimatliche Grund 
herauskommt.” 
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artwork, the earth shows up as the concrete sensuous-material setting of 
this historical world.856  
      Hence, we must conclude – against Espinet’s suggestion – that 
Heidegger’s earth does not constitute a transhistorical ground capable of 
harboring new meanings. Still, Heidegger maintains that the work of art 
must ground the world on the earth as the material-sensuous milieu that 
informs and specifies the world and gives it its paradigmatic form, 
whereby the ultimate meanings of the world arrive from within our 
historical heritage. This also means that although Young’s reading of the 
earth as the hidden manifold of alternative historical meaning-possibilities 
goes astray and bypasses the constitutive role played by the materiality and 
sensuousness of the earth, his guiding intuition that Heidegger’s notion of 
earth does not shake the primacy of history is basically correct.  
      However, could it not be argued that Heidegger’s conception of the 
earth contains a systematic potential to break the dominance of history – 
even though Heidegger himself is unable to realize and develop it? I do 
not think so. At the end of the day it seems to me that the very idea of 
materiality-cum-sensuousness that Heidegger’s concept of the earth is an 
attempt to grasp and articulate is insufficient for accounting for a 
                                         
856 Hence, I think Espinet is mistaken in his suggestion that Heidegger’s thinking of 
the earth would imply a critical dismissal of the analysis of Being and Time according to 
which we primarily experience things not as sensual data but in terms of their 
significance in our world (Cf. Espinet 2011, pp. 57f.). This analysis essentially remains 
in place. What Heidegger’s thinking of the earth does do is develop the material-sensual 
dimension of the world itself as a dimension specifying and giving the world its 
paradgimatic shape. Espinet’s attempt to argue that the material-sensual “earth” has 
the capacity of harboring new meanings is mirrored in his notion that the 
experienceable manifold of sensual qualities – which Espinet names physis – is played 
out on the “surface” of the earth, the “inner” of which remains concealed: “What 
becomes manifest in the appearing of the earth is an inaccessible interior that is 
concealed by an outer surface, an interior which can only come to fruition as outer 
surface” (Was sich im Erscheinen der Erde zeigt, ist ein unzugängliches, durch eine äußere 
Oberfläche verborgenes Inneres, das nur als äußere Oberfläche zur Geltung kommen kann) (p. 56). 
The idea, however, that the experienceable dimension of sensuality is a manifestation 
of a hidden inner dimension, seems misleading. As I have tried to show Heidegger’s 
“earth” is nothing but the material-sensual setting of the world, and beyond this it is 
just a meaningless abstraction. This also means that the self-secludedness of the earth 
does not signify the hidden interiority of sensuality but sensuality itself in its 
contradistinction to the openness of the world: sensuality as something that does not 
itself radiate phenomenal meaning but which constitutes the specifying and formative 
yet phenomenally inaccessible and closed dimension of the historical world. 
 
 The Dynamics of Shining 391 
 
 
phenomenality that could ground our understanding of ourselves and the 
purposes and significances of the world. If we wanted to radicalize and 
develop the question of sensuality in its full philosophical potential – 
which Heidegger certainly does not do – we could widen the notion of the 
sensuous to include, for example, the whole bodily-sensuous constitution 
of the human being, and we could carry out extensive investigations of the 
constitutive roles played by different material-sensuous aspects in 
structuring the sense of our central experiences and concepts. In fact, this 
has for some time been one of the main concerns of contemporary 
phenomenology. Still, however far we might travel down this road it 
seems fundamentally incomprehensible how the sensuous dimension of 
our experience – although certainly playing a more or less important co-
constituting role in all our experience – could ever emerge as the basic 
phenomenal source grounding and giving sense to our central moral and 
existential concepts: love, justice, courage, honor, friendship, happiness, 
lust, pain, desire, trust, envy, and so on. In order to break the dominating 
idea of the absolute priority of historical meaning when it comes to 
understanding such matters, the concept of sensuality is not enough. In 
the end, this would require nothing less than a radical breach of the 
ontological difference and a rehabilitation of our direct experience of 
particular meaningful people and beings as a phenomenality which 
transcends history and which all historical understanding is an 
understanding of.  
      Anyway, on the basis of the above explication of the interplay between 
the world and the earth we should now be in a position to summarize 
Heidegger’s conception of the dynamics that opens up a world: by 
determining and gathering the meanings handed down by history into a 
paradigmatic shape on the basis of the material-sensuous concretion of the 
earth the work of art opens a historical world as a unified and binding 
destiny. Moreover – as we shall see shortly – the opening of the world is 
conditioned by the work of thinking, which, by articulating this event as 
the origin of the world, makes possible a transparent enactment of art.  
 
The Bindingness of the World 
 
What is at stake in the task of establishing a world is not only the 
determination of the paradigmatic purposes and meaning-relations 
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constituting the world, but also the intensification of their bindingness: the 
power of the world to appeal to us and bind us as a destiny granting the 
significances according to which we live our lives and relate to other 
beings as meaningful. 
      It is – or so I want to suggest – precisely in order to articulate this 
problematic that Heidegger in the mid 1930s introduces a heavy religious 
vocabulary into the very center of his thought. From this time onwards he 
persistently talks about the holy, the god, the divinities, and so forth. As 
late as in the 1966-interview for Der Spiegel – which was not published until 
after his death in 1976 – Heidegger famously states, as a comment to the 
contemporary metaphysical situation, that “Only a god can still save 
us.”857 Heidegger’s rehabilitation of a religious vocabulary to articulate the 
problem of the world’s binding power over us is surely one reason why 
this problem has received little attention in the secondary literature.858 
However, the fundamental philosophical reason for this neglect lies, I 
believe, in the fact that this problem, if touched, brings us face to face 
with questions that threaten to destabilize the basic systematic belief in the 
historicity of meaning shared by most of Heidegger’s interpreters: the 
belief that our ability to experience and grasp entities as significant is 
determined by the historical contexts of meaning and value in which we 
live. The question that Heidegger’s religious rhetoric is meant to address is 
none other than the question how such historical concepts and values can 
ever bind us and give significance to our lives in a way that distinguishes 
them from mere collective prejudices. This question is seldom investigated 
or even asked by the philosophers sharing in the metaphysics of historical 
meaning still governing us today, and Heidegger’s attempt to answer it will 
bear witness to how difficult – and in the end impossible – the question is 
to answer within the framework of that metaphysics. 
      Already a quick glance at the conceptual surface makes it clear that 
Heidegger’s religious discourse is intimately bound up with the problem of 
phenomenality: the holy “is opened up”(eröffnet), “dawns” (dämmert), and 
                                         
857 GA 16, p. 671: “Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten.” 
858 As far as I am aware of, the relation between Heidegger’s religious discourse and 
the problem of phenomenality – in particular, the problem of the bindingness of the 
world – has not been explored in the secondary literature. For some studies of the 
religious dimension and vocabulary of Heidegger’s thought, see Caputo 1990; Kovacs 
1990; Figal 2000; Vedder 2007; Crowe 2008; Fischer & von Herrmann [eds.] 2011. 
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“comes to radiate” (kommt ins Scheinen);859 the gods “appear” (erscheinen), 
and “come to presence” (anwesen) in the “splendor” (Glanz).860 Obviously, 
these religious concepts are expressive of some aspect of the phenomenal 
opening of the world. But what? 
      Let us begin by noting that Heidegger, following Hölderlin, diagnoses 
our present age as “the destitute (dürftige) time”: “the time of the gods who 
have fled and of the god who is coming.”861 According to Heidegger, the 
history of Western metaphysics, characterized by an increasing 
forgetfulness of the openness of being and reaching its peak in the 
modern techno-subjectivist understanding of being as a mere object 
reserve for human manipulation, has effected a situation that he describes 
in terms of a “flight of the gods,”862 a “lack of the power to fashion a 
god,”863 a “closure of the dimension of the hale (des Heilen).”864 This lack 
of holiness and gods is repeatedly equated to a diminishing of the 
luminosity of the world. In “Introduction to Metaphysics” Heidegger 
paraphrases the expression ”flight of the gods” as “the darkening of the 
world.”865 He writes: 
 
Dasein began to slide into a world that lacked that depth from 
which the essential always comes and returns to human beings, 
thereby forcing them to superiority and allowing them to act on the 
basis of rank. All things sank to the same level, to a surface 
resembling a blind mirror that no longer mirrors, that casts nothing 
back.866 
 
The world from which the gods have fled is thus a “darkened” world, a 
“blind mirror.” But what does this mean? As a result of the world’s losing 
its “depth” – i.e., its ground in the openness of being, which constitutes 
                                         
859 GA 5, p. 30; GA 9, p. 338f. 
860 GA 9, p. 339; GA 5, p. 30. 
861 GA 4, p. 47: “Die Zeit der entflohenen Götter und des kommenden Gottes.” 
862 GA 40, p. 48: “die Flucht der Götter.” 
863 GA 45, p. 90: “dieses Aussetzen der Gott-bildenden Kraft.” 
864 GA 9, p. 352: “die Verschlossenheit der Dimension des Heilen.” 
865 GA 40, p. 48: “Weltverdüsterung.” 
866 GA 40, p. 49: “Das Dasein begann in eine Welt hineinzugleiten, die ohne jene Tiefe 
war, aus der jeweils das Wesentliche auf den Menschen zu- und zurückkommt, ihn so 
zur Überlegenheit zwingt und aus einem Rang heraus handeln lässt. Alle Dinge 
gerieten auf dieselbe Ebene, auf eine Fläche, die einem blinden Spiegel gleicht, der 
nicht mehr spiegelt, nichts mehr zurückwirft.” 
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the sole source from which something “essential” can “come to” the 
human being – it is transformed into a weak and leveled phenomenal 
world, incapable of concerning and binding us, and thus of granting 
significance to particular beings. Hence, Heidegger names the predicament 
of our age “nihilism”: a deep “purpose- and meaninglessness of all 
beings.”867  
      It is also in this connection that Heidegger levels his hard and well-
known criticism against the concept of “value.” Nietzsche who, according 
to Heidegger, ranks as the second great diagnostician of the nihilistic 
predicament of modernity alongside Hölderlin, sums up the nihilism of 
our age in the words “God is dead.” By this Nietzsche means that “the 
highest values devalue themselves.”868 The problem that Nietzsche has in 
mind is thus not that the Christian god, for example, would in some sense 
have become unbelievable and obsolete but that all our values – i.e. all our 
goals, ideals, gods, etc. – have lost what Heidegger calls their “effective 
power” (wirkende Kraft).869 Nietzsche hopes to overcome this situation by 
suggesting a “revaluation of all values” (Umwertung aller Werte)870: a clear-
sighted creation of new values on the basis of the insight that all our 
values have their origin in the human subject’s will to power. However, 
Heidegger claims, by appropriating the concept of value as his own 
fundamental ontological concept Nietzsche himself remains the prisoner 
and consummator of nihilism. Nietzsche does not see that nihilism is the 
ultimate symptom of the basic tendency of Western metaphysics to cover 
up the openness of being and reduce being to subjectivity. According to 
Heidegger, every attempt to establish the phenomenal force of our 
historical world and its gods by grounding it in the value-positing capacity 
of the human subject is bound to fail: “Values are the powerless and 
threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that 
has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere 
values.”871  
                                         
867 GA 45, p. 196: “Ziel- und Sinnlosigkeit alles Seienden.”   
868 Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA) 12, p. 350: “was bedeutet Nihilism? – daß 
die obersten Werthe sich entwerthen.” Cf. GA 5, p. 222. 
869 GA 5, p. 217. 
870 Nietzsche, KSA 6, pp. 179, 365. Cf. GA 5, p. 223. 
871 GA 5, p. 102: “Der Wert [ist] die kraftlose und fadenscheinige Verhüllung der platt 
und hintergrundlos gewordenen Gegenständlichkeit des Seienden. Keiner stirbt für 
bloße Werte.”  Cf. also GA 5, pp. 259f. 
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       For Heidegger the only way to establish a forceful world is to anchor 
it in the self-opening happening of being. However, even though 
Heidegger dismisses the concept of value as one of the nastiest products 
of modern metaphysics, it is important to see that our contemporary 
concept of value – which is itself a result of the historicist awakening of 
philosophy that Heidegger played an important role in – is not that far 
removed from what Heidegger prefers to call the “gods,” the “directives” 
(Weisungen),872 the “divine destinings” (göttliche Geschick),873 the “laws” 
(Gesetze),874 or the “measure” (Maß).875 The decisive thrust of Heidegger’s 
critique of the concept of value is that it grounds the being and 
significance of beings in some capacity of the human subject, e.g., in its 
reason or its will to power. However, the concept of value dominating 
contemporary philosophy as well as our everyday discourse does not, I 
think, exhibit this subjectifying trait – at least not as a primal or necessary 
feature. By values we tend to mean the historical notions of what is good, 
virtuous, honorable, meaningful etc. that we receive from our historical 
context, which we cannot create at will, and which determine in advance 
what we can experience and grasp as morally and existentially 
important.876 Here it is, of course, important to attend to differences as 
well, and observe the specificity of Heidegger’s conception of the gods as 
concrete and finite paradigmatic formations of value originating in the 
poetic realization of the strife between world and earth. Still, this does not 
prevent us from translating Heidegger’s question into the question how 
values can concern and bind us: how can our guiding values arise as holy, 
as gods that we are prepared to die for? 
      So how should we interpret the philosophical sense of Heidegger’s 
talk about the gods and the holy?  
      In his “Letter on Humanism” Heidegger asserts the following order of 
determination: on the basis of a thinking of the openness of being, art can 
open up the holy as the essential domain of the god and the gods; on the 
                                         
872 GA 5, p. 30; GA 9, pp. 360f. 
873 GA 7, p. 35. 
874 GA 4, p. 46. 
875 GA 5, p. 30. 
876 For a classical and influential articulation of such a concept of value, which I 
believe largely expresses our pre-philosophical use of this concept today, see Charles 
Taylor’ book Sources of the Self from 1989. 
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basis of this opening of the holy, the god and the gods can appear.877 In 
“The Origin of the Work of Art” he provides a more thorough explication 
of what he means. To begin with, he emphatically stresses that what he 
calls “the gods” should not be conceived as some kind of super-entities 
that the artwork would picture and represent. Instead, the gods are 
intimately bound up with the capacity of the artwork to establish a 
world.878 On the one hand, Heidegger identifies the gods with the highest 
paradigmatic ideals and purposes determined and gathered by the artwork 
as the horizon of our historical world: “In the tragedy,” he writes, “the 
battle of the new gods against the old is being fought.” This means that 
tragedy puts up for decision “what is holy and what unholy, what is great 
and what small, what is brave and what cowardly, what is noble and what 
fugitive, what is master and what slave.”879 On the other hand, he makes 
the presence of these ideals as gods completely dependent on the self-
standing of the artwork. Since it is the successful working of the artwork 
that allows the god to present itself in the first place – and not as a 
representation – the work indeed “is” the god.880 On the next page 
Heidegger goes on to specify the relations between the holy, the god, and 
the world: 
 
Such setting up [of the work of art] is an erecting in the sense of 
dedication and praise. […] To dedicate means to consecrate 
(heiligen) in the sense that in setting up the work the holy (Heilige) is 
opened up as holy and the god is invoked into the openness of its 
presence.  Praise belongs to dedication as doing honor to the 
dignity and splendor of the god. Dignity and splendor are not 
properties beside and behind which there stands, additionally, the 
god. Rather, it is in the dignity, in the splendor, that the god comes 
to presence. In the reflected glory of this splendor there glows, i.e., 
there clarifies, what we called the world. To erect (Er-richten) means: 
to open up the right in the sense of a guiding measure which guides 
us along, in which form that which is essential gives its guidance. 
                                         
877 Cf. GA 9, pp. 338f., 351f. See also GA 4, p. 59. 
878 Cf. GA 5, pp. 29f. 
879 GA 5, p. 29: “In der Tragödie wird […] der Kampf der neuen Götter gegen den 
alten […] gekämpft. […] was heilig ist und was unheilig, was groß und was klein, was 
wacker und was feig, was edel und was flüchtig, was Herr und was Knecht.” 
880 GA 5, p. 29. 
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[…] Towering-up-within-itself the work opens up a world and keeps 
it abidingly in force.881 
 
Let me try to disentangle this convoluted passage: first, the work of art 
involves a “consecration” which opens up “the holy as holy,” i.e., as the 
holy domain of the god; second, it entails a “praising” and “doing honor 
to” the “dignity” and “splendor” in which the god is present; third, this 
opening of the holy and the splendor of the god allows the world to 
appear “in the reflected glory of this splendor.” This line of argument 
makes it clear that Heidegger’s notion of the holy, as well as his notion of 
the splendor and dignity in which the god is present, cannot simply be 
identified with the world’s highest stratum of purposes since they both 
condition the appearance of the world. Rather, the holiness and splendor 
in which the god can be present denotes nothing but the very capacity of 
the world to address and bind us as holy and praiseworthy, as something 
which gives significance to our lives and which we are ready to die for. It 
is, we could say, to the exact extent that the artwork is able to open up the 
world as holy that the highest paradigmatic ideals and values of the world 
can present themselves to us as gods.882   
                                         
881 GA 5, p. 30: “Solche Aufstellung ist das Errichten im Sinne von Weihen und 
Rühmen. […] Weihen heißt heiligen in dem Sinne, daß in der werkhaften Erstellung 
das Heilige als Heiliges eröffnet und der Gott in das Offene seiner Anwesenheit 
hereingerufen wird. Zum Weihen gehört das Rühmen als die Würdigung der Würde 
und des Glanzes des Gottes. Würde und Glanz sind nicht Eigenschaften, neben und 
hinter denen außerdem noch der Gott steht, sondern in der Würde, im Glanz west der 
Gott an. Im Abglanz dieses Glanzes glänzt, d.h. lichtet sich jenes, was wir die Welt 
nannten. Er-richten sagt: Öffnen das Rechte im Sinne des Entlang weisenden Maßes, 
als welches das Wesenhafte die Weisungen gibt. […] In-sich-aufragend eröffnet das 
Werk eine Welt und hält diese im waltenden Verbleib.”  
882 Against the kind of interpretation suggested here, Günter Figal has argued that 
Heidegger does not anticipate anything like a return of the gods: the modern 
“experience of the flight of the gods” explicated by Heidegger “must not turn into an 
expectation of a return of the gods” (Figal 2000, p. 184). According to Figal, the 
experience of the flight of the gods is an “experience of being, inasmuch as being itself 
– or, rather, beyung – in this experience comes to fruition in its basic character of self-
refusal” (Götterflucht ist Seinserfahrung, sofern in ihr Sein selbst – oder eben Seyn – in seinem 
Grundzug des Sichverweigerns zur Geltung kommt) (p. 183). Since the experience of the gods 
as departed and absent is essential for accessing the openness of being as that which 
makes all relations of the human being to the world possible, Figal argues, the return 
of the gods would “immediately cover up the experience of being-possible” (sofort die 
Erfahrung des Möglichseins verdecken) (p. 184). However, it seems to me that Figal too 
strongly identifies the experience of the flight of the gods with the experience of the 
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   At this point I would also like to quote a lengthier passage from “Letter 
on Humanism.” It provides, on the reading suggested here, an alternative 
formulation of the matter in question without deploying the rhetoric of 
holiness and gods:   
 
Only in so far as the human being, ek-sisting into the truth of 
being, belongs to being can there come from being itself the 
assignment of those directives that must become law and rule for 
human beings. In Greek, to assign is nemein. Nomos is not only law 
but more originally the assignment (Zuweisung) contained in the 
dispensation of being (Schickung des Seins). Only this assignment is 
capable of enjoining (fügen) humans into being. Only such enjoining 
is capable of supporting and obligating. Otherwise all law remains 
merely something fabricated by human reason. More essential than 
instituting rules is that human beings find the way to their abode in 
the truth of being. This abode first yields the experience of 
something we can hold on to (Erfahrung des Halts). The truth of 
being offers a hold for all conduct.883  
 
We see and confirm: it is only on the basis of an understanding of the 
openness of being that being – through the work of art and poetry – can 
address us as “directives” and “rules” that are capable of “binding” us – 
that possess “Halt.” Hence, what is at stake in Heidegger’s description of 
                                                                                                                      
openness of being. To be sure, Heidegger believes that the nihilistic experience of the 
departure of the gods is a symptom and an indication of the forgetfulness of the 
openness of being characterizing the tradition of Western metaphysics. Still, as far as I 
can see Heidegger’s later thinking is guided by the notion that it is possible to think 
the clearing/event of being in its very withdrawal and, by thus attending to the source 
of all historical being, to open up the possibility of instituting a holy and binding 
world, a world where our highest values and purposes address us as gods. Hence, 
according to Heidegger, the gods can only return and address us as gods on the 
condition that we receive them as our finite destiny from the self-withdrawing 
clearing/event of being.  
883 GA 9, p. 360f.: “Nur sofern der Mensch, in die Wahrheit des Seins ek-sistierend, 
diesem gehört, kann aus dem Sein selbst die Zuweisung derjenigen Weisungen 
kommen, die für den Menschen Gesetz und Regel werden müssen. Zuweisen heißt 
griechisch νέμειν. Der νομός ist nicht nur Gesetz, sondern ursprünglicher die in der 
Schickung des Seins geborgene Zuweisung. Nur diese vermag es, den Menschen in das 
Sein zu verfügen. Nur solche Fügung vermag zu tragen und zu binden. Anders bleibt 
alles Gesetz nur das Gemächte menschlicher Vernunft. Wesentlicher als alle 
Aufstellung von Regeln ist, dass der Mensch zum Aufenthalt in die Wahrheit des Seins 
findet. Erst dieser Aufenthalt gewährt die Erfahrung des Halt. Den Halt für alles 
Verhalten verschenkt die Wahrheit des Seins.” 
 The Dynamics of Shining 399 
 
 
the epiphanic happening of being is not only a gathering of the substantial 
purposes of the world but also an intensification of the luminosity and 
binding power of the world. Or, as Heidegger puts it in “Basic Questions 
of Philosophy”: “history is the happening” – history here signifying 
precisely the opening up of being – “in which beings through the human 
being become more being.”884 
      Against this background we can also attempt to specify the sense that 
the words “the god,” “the gods” and “the divinities” acquire in Heidegger 
later writings. Heidegger himself never provides a general conceptual 
determination of the senses of these words but continuously adopts and 
deploys them in the course of explicating specific texts by especially 
Hölderlin. Still, I think it is possible to point to at least two aspects of 
meaning that resurface in Heidegger’s deployment of these words. On the 
one hand, Heidegger – especially when he talks about “the gods” or “the 
divinities” in the plural – denotes the concrete paradigmatic ideals that are 
granted by history and founded by the poets, and which constitute the 
holy horizon of purposes of our world.885 These ideals Heidegger also 
names the divine “directives,” “destinings,” or “laws.”886 On the other 
hand, Heidegger – especially when he talks about the “the god” or “the 
last god” in the singular – refers to the hidden source of the unity of the 
world. As we have seen, the work of art does not project the world as a 
paradigm of meaning created by the artist. Rather, it receives and gathers 
the divine winks harbored by our history and grounds them in the 
material-sensuous surroundings of the earth, in such a way that the 
phenomenal world that it sets up emerges as ultimately stemming from a 
                                         
884 GA 45, p. 201: “Denn Geschichte ist jenes Geschehen, in dem durch den 
Menschen das Seiende seiender wird.” 
885 Julian Young makes a similar distinction between “the gods” and “the God” (cf. 
Young 2002, pp. 94-95). I also agree with Young when he notes that “‘the gods’ of the 
late Heidegger” are thus “the reincarnations of early Heidegger’s heroes” (p. 96). He 
then goes on to interpret the gods as “exemplary, charismatic and therefore 
authoritative, figures memorialized in the collective memory of the culture” (p. 33). 
However, it seems to me that what Heidegger has in mind are not necessarily concrete 
historical persons but rather ideals that can be paradigmatically articulated and 
incarnated in different ways: as historical heroes (like e.g. Pericles, Gandhi, Martin 
Luther King), as quasi-mythical figures (like e.g. Odysseus, David or Jesus), or as 
narratives, poems or other artworks in which no single character but rather the work 
as a whole displays ideals, values and virtues in such a way that they appeal to us and 
grip us as our own. 
886 GA 5, p. 30; GA 7, p. 35; GA 4, p. 46. 
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source beyond the artist and the artwork, a source which essentially 
remains hidden and mysterious. This hidden source of the unity of the 
world, which the artwork lets appear precisely as hidden, Heidegger tends 
to call “the god.” Hence, in the 1951 essay “…Poetically Man 
Dwells…“887 he writes: “Thus the unknown god appears as the unknown 
through the manifestness of the sky.” 888 
 
The Phenomenon and the Fourfold 
 
Heidegger’s account of the fundamental dynamics that opens up the 
historical world as a determinate and binding destiny has thoroughgoing 
consequences for his conception of phenomenality.  
      In his analysis of the structure of understanding in Being and Time 
Heidegger grounded the possibility of experiencing particular beings as 
meaningful phenomena on Dasein’s preceding historical understanding of 
world and being: to show up as a phenomenon is to show up as an 
instantiation of the general historical meaning-patterns in which we always 
already live. This hierarchical as-structure – the ontological difference – 
also remains the foundation stone for Heidegger’s later thought. The 
whole line of argument maintaining that we are thrown into a history of 
being harboring our possibilities of understanding, and that the task of 
thinking and poetry is to prepare the opening of a historical world which 
is able to grant significance to being, builds on this difference. Both in his 
early and in his late thinking Heidegger rules out the principal possibility 
that we would possess some kind of direct open access to particular beings 
as the source of meaning that ultimately gives to our understanding of our 
historical meanings and concepts whatever existential weight or  
clarificatory force it might have.  
      However, although Heidegger articulated the historical as-structure of 
understanding in Being and Time, he never pursued the question of how 
historical being is given to us as an origin beyond our factical prejudices. 
This lacuna gave rise to the basic methodological ambivalence of the 
book, inducing Heidegger to pass over his basic conception of the 
                                         
887 “…dichterisch wohnet der Mensch…,” in GA 7. 
888 GA 7, p. 201: ”So erscheint der unbekannte Gott als der Unbekannte durch die 
Offenbarkeit des Himmels.” 
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historical as-structure of understanding, and embarking on a fundamental 
ontological investigation of the sense of being by way of transhistorical 
phenomenological explication of the universal structures of Dasein. Then, 
in the mid 1930s, Heidegger makes the question concerning the openness 
and givenness of historical being his guiding question, and develops an 
analysis of the dynamics which determines whether the world opens up a 
strong and radiant historical destiny or whether it collapses into an 
undecided and irrelevant mass of meaning-possibilities.   
      By firmly grounding all phenomenal givenness in the happening of 
being, Heidegger definitely shuts out the possibilities of understanding 
being either through a direct explication of the meaning-structures of 
beings or through a thematization of what we always already implicitly 
understand. According to the basic analysis that Heidegger elaborates in 
“The Origin of the Work of Art,” our historical world determines our 
access to beings, so that the world itself has its origin in the happening of 
being – the strife between world and earth enacted in the work of art. This 
means that the historical world that is given to us as our destiny is 
essentially grounded in and referred to the three basic phenomenally 
inaccessible aspects of this happening: first, to the undetermined historical 
multitude of meaning-possibilities at the source of our world; second, to 
the dark materiality and sensuousness of the earth; third, to the artwork’s 
creative gathering and determination of these aspects into a unified and 
forceful destiny. Hence, the phenomenon – that which shows itself as 
itself – of itself points to the fundamental happening of being as its 
phenomenally ungroundable ground.  
      Later, beginning with the 1949 lecture cycle “Insight Into That Which 
Is,” Heidegger reformulates his conception of phenomenality in terms of 
what he now calls the “fourfold” (Geviert).889 The notion is developed in a 
number of Heidegger’s later essays, the most important of which are 
perhaps “Building Dwelling Thinking” from 1950 and “The Thing” 
(which constitutes a slightly revised version of the first part of the 
Bremen-lecture cycle) from 1951.890  
                                         
889 For more detailed studies of the fourfold, cf., e.g., Richardson 1963, pp. 566-94; 
Young 2006; Mitchell 2010.   
890 Other texts in which Heidegger treats the “fourfold” are, e.g., “Language” (Die 
Sprache) (1950), “On the Question of Being” (Zur Seinsfrage) (1955), “Hölderlin’s Earth 
and Heaven” (Hölderlins Erde und Himmel) (1959), “Language and Homeland” (Sprache 
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      Heidegger’s thinking of the “fourfold” grows out of his renewed 
attempt to reflect on the “thing.” For him the “thing” is nothing but a 
name for “what is paradigmatically real” (das maßgebende Wirkliche),891 i.e., 
for the exemplary phenomenon or being. His attempt to think the thing is 
thus an attempt to articulate the dynamics constituting those entities 
which we primarily encounter and deal with in our lives. Heidegger 
describes the “thing” as the gathering point of the “fourfold”: the “mirror-
play of the simple onefold of sky and earth, divinities and mortals.” 892 By 
conceiving of the thing as a point of intersection which is constituted by 
the unified interplay of the different relational aspects of the fourfold, 
Heidegger dissolves the idea of the phenomenon as a self-contained 
phenomenal presence. To experience and understand the thing is 
essentially to be opened to the play of the fourfold as the basic happening 
constituting the presence and significance of the thing while itself 
withdrawing from any direct phenomenal access.  
      However, in my view Heidegger’s projection of the fourfold does not 
imply any radical alteration of the analysis of the dynamics of shining as a 
strife between the world and the earth which he developed in “The Origin 
of the Work of Art.” What Heidegger now calls the “earth” (“the building 
bearer, nourishing with its fruits, tending water and rock, plant and 
animal”893) and the “sky” (“the year’s seasons, the light and dusk of the 
day, the gloom and glow of the night, the clemency and inclemency of the 
weather”894) basically name two aspects of our material-sensuous 
surroundings which Heidegger in “The Origin of the Work of Art” 
summed up as the “earth”; the “divinities”(“the beckoning messengers of 
the godhead”895) in turn correspond to what he earlier called the “gods,” 
i.e., the concrete paradigms of value and significance constituting the 
horizon of purposes of the “world”; finally, the “mortals” (“they [the 
                                                                                                                      
und Heimat) (1960), “Summary of a Seminar on the Lecture ‘Time and Being’” 
(Protokoll zu einem Seminar über den Vortrag ‘Zeit und Sein’)(1962), and the “Seminar in 
Zähringen” (1973).   
891 GA 7, p. 172. 
892 GA 7, p. 181: “Spiegel-Spiel der Einfalt von Erde und Himmel, Göttlichen und 
Sterblichen.”   
893 GA 7, p. 179: “die bauend Tragende, die nährend Fruchtende, hegend Gewässer 
und Gestein, Gewächs und Getier.” 
894 GA 7, p. 180: “die Zeiten des Jahres, Licht und Dämmer des Tages, Dunkel und 
Helle der Nachts, die Gunst und das Unwirtliche der Wetter.” 
895 GA 7, p. 180: “die Winkenden Boten der Gottheit.” 
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human beings] are called mortals because they can die”896) is simply a new 
name for the humans beings in their finitude. Although the “fourfold” 
does not – as some commentators would have it – just amount to a dim 
mytho-poetical vision but has a relatively clear sense, it is nevertheless the 
case Heidegger that never offers a substantial analysis of the interplay 
between its different aspects that would raise it to a genuinely autonomous 
and clarifying figure of thought.897 
      Nevertheless, in one respect Heidegger’s thinking of the thing and the 
fourfold entails a critical expansion of his earlier view in that he now, for 
the first time, ascribes to our dealings with particular things an irreducible 
role in the realization of the openness of being.  
      In “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger still elevated the saying 
of being enacted by the thinkers and the poets as the sole essential task in 
the establishing of a historical world, so that the only role that was left for 
the ordinary people – the receivers of the world – was to hearken to the 
thinkers and the poets as the ultimate guides for their lives. Indeed, he 
never gives up his notion of language as the primary reservoir of meaning 
which determines all other forms of experience, understanding, and art. 
Hence, in the 1958 essay “The Word”898 Heidegger affirmatively quotes 
Stefan Georg’s line “Where word breaks off no thing may be,”899 which he 
explicates as follows: “The word’s rule springs to light as that which makes 
the thing be a thing. The word begins to shine as the gathering which first 
                                         
896 GA 7, p. 180: “sie [die Menschen] heißen die Sterblichen, weil sie sterben können.” 
897 In a recent text Andrew J. Mitchell calls the foufold Heidegger’s “most 
phenomenological thought”: “The simple things around us – indeed, the things 
themselves – become the focus of his attention and lead him to a phenomenologically 
more robust sense of the world than heretofore found in his work” (Mitchell 2010, pp. 
208f.). However, as I have argued above, Heidegger’s notion of the fourfold does not 
in any way unsettle the dominance of history in Heidegger’s thought by opening 
access to a phenomenality that would transcend and ground our historical heritage. 
Hence, this notion is not very phenomenological in the sense used here. Still, in calling 
the fourfold “phenomenological” what Mitchell primarily seems to have in mind is not 
its character as something self-given but rather its capacity to account for the rich 
texture of relations – including the earth and the sky – that always makes a thing into 
the thing it is. 
898 “Das Wort,” in GA 12. 
899 GA 12, p. 224: “Kein Ding sei wo das Wort gebricht.” 
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brings what is present to its presence.”900 From this it follows that 
”Poetizing is the basic capacity of human dwelling.”901 
      However, even though our living among things is guided by the 
opening of language, the concrete thing is not reduced to an instantiation 
of prior meaning-relations anymore. Rather, the thing is seen as itself 
gathering and co-constituting the fourfold: “The thing things. Thinging 
gathers. Appropriating the fourfold, it gathers the fourfold’s stay, its while, 
into something that stays for a while: into this thing, into that thing.”902 As 
was the case with the work of art, Heidegger describes the gathering of the 
thing as an interplay between receptivity and creation: for example, in 
building a bridge and thus establishing a concrete place in which the sky 
and the earth, the divinities and the mortals, can interact, the building 
“receives the directive” from the play of the fourfold.903 At the same time, 
however, the place “admits […] and installs the fourfold”904 The things are 
thus the concrete places in which the play of the fourfold gets gathered 
and specified. 
      The upshot of this is that our dwelling among things assumes an 
irreducible role in the   realization of the opening of the world: “Dwelling 
preserves the fourfold by bringing the essence of the fourfold into 
things.”905 But how does this preserving take place? The fact is that 
Heidegger never offers any thorough analysis of this but only provides a 
few abstract mottos and a couple of examples. Here are Heidegger’s 
mottos: “The mortals,” Heidegger writes “dwell in that they save the earth 
[…] in that they receive the sky as sky […] in that they await the divinities 
as divinities […] in that they guide their own essential being – their being 
capable of death – into the use and practice of this capacity, so that there 
                                         
900 GA 12, p. 224: “Das Walten des Wortes blitzt auf als die Bedingnis des Dinges zum 
Ding. Das Wort hebt an zu leuchten als die Versammlung, die Anwesendes erst in sein 
Anwesen bringt.” 
901 GA 7, p. 207: “Das Dichten ist das Grundvermögen des menschlichen Wohnens.” 
902 GA 7, p. 175: “Das Ding dingt. Das Dingen versammelt. Es sammelt, das Geviert 
ereignend, dessen Weile in ein je Weiliges: in dieses, in jenes Ding.” 
903 GA 7, p. 161: “empfängt […] die Weisung.” 
904 GA 7, p. 160: “läßt das Geviert zu und […] richtet das Geviert ein.”   
905 GA 7, p. 153: “Das Wohnen schont das Geviert, indem es dessen Wesen in die 
Dinge bringt.” 
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may be a good death.”906 In ”Building Dwelling Thinking“ he then 
provides the following concrete depiction of a bridge:907 
 
The bridge swings over the stream “with ease and power.” It does 
not just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as 
banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge expressly 
causes them to lie across from each other. […] It brings stream and 
bank and land into each other’s neighborhood. The bridge gathers 
the earth as landscape around the stream. […] Resting upright in 
the stream’s bed, the bridge-piers bear the swing of the arches that 
leave the stream’s waters to run their course. The waters may 
wander on quiet and gay, the sky’s floods from storm or thaw may 
shoot past the piers in torrential waves – the bridge is ready for the 
sky’s weather and its fickle nature. […] The bridge lets the stream 
run its course and at the same time grants mortals their way, so that 
they may come and go from shore to shore. […] Always and ever 
differently the bridge initiates the lingering and hastening ways of 
men to and fro, so that they may get to other banks and in the end, 
as mortals, to the other side. Now in a high arch, now in a low, the 
bridge vaults over glen and stream – whether mortals keep in mind 
vaulting of the bridge’s course or forget that they, always 
themselves on their way to the last bridge, are actually striving to 
surmount all that is common and unsound in them in order to 
bring themselves before the haleness of the divinities. The bridge 
gathers, as a passage that crosses, before the divinities – whether we 
explicitly think of, and visibly give thanks for, their presence, as in the 
figure of the saint of the bridge, or whether that divine presence is 
obstructed or even pushed wholly aside.908  
                                         
906 GA 7, p. 152: “Die Sterblichen wohnen, insofern sie die Erde retten […] insofern 
sie den Himmel als Himmel empfangen […] insofern sie die Göttlichen als die 
Göttlichen erwarten […] insofern sie ihr eigenes Wesen, daß sie nämlich den Tod als 
Tod vermögen, in den Brauch dieses Vermögens geleiten, damit ein guter Tod sei.”  
907 Cf. also GA 7, pp. 174f., for Heidegger’s description of how a jug gather’s the 
elements of the fourfold. 
908 GA 7, p. 154f.: “Die Brücke schwingt sich ‘leicht und kräftig’ über den Strom. Sie 
verbindet nicht nur schon vorhandene Ufer. Im Übergang der Brücke treten die Ufer 
erst als Ufer hervor. Die Brücke läßt sie eigens gegeneinander über liegen. […] Sie 
bringt Strom und Ufer und Land in wechselseitige Nachbarschaft. Die Brücke 
versammelt die Erde als Landschaft um den Strom. […] Die Brückenpfeiler tragen, 
aufruhend im Strombett, den Schwung der Bogen, die den Wassern des Stromes ihre 
Bahn lassen. Mögen die Wasser ruhig und munter fortwandern, mögen die Fluten des 
Himmels beim Gewittersturm oder der Schneeschmelze in reißenden Wogen um die 
Pfeilerbogen schießen, die Brücke ist bereit für die Wetter des Himmels und deren 
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Heidegger’s description presents the bridge in its meaning for us as the 
gathering point of the fourfold. The bridge is what it is as part of a life 
which is essentially referred to the earth and the sky as the material-
sensuous setting we live in, to the divinities as the holy paradigms that 
guide us, as well as to the finitude of our own being. However, at the same 
time as our building of the bridge belongs within the interplay of the 
different aspects of the fourfold it also involves the possibility of caring 
for and gathering these aspects – or refrain from doing it. That is to say: 
the bridge can be built so that it “saves” the earth and “receives” the sky, 
i.e., in such a way that our activity of building attends to and complies with 
our natural surroundings and lets them come forth as our material-
sensuous ground and setting, not just exploiting them as material for our 
needs and desires; moreover, the bridge can be constructed so that it 
“awaits” the divinities, i.e., in such a way that it in some way institutes and 
reminds us of the need to receive the holy ideals that our history harbors, 
and not “make” our own “gods”;909 finally, the bridge can be built so that 
it “guides” us in our mortal being, i.e., in such a way that it serves our 
highest purposes in the best possible way at the same time as it bears 
witness to the finitude of our life. In short, what Heidegger means by 
preserving the fourfold are different ways of instituting and bearing 
witness to the different aspects of the fourfold in our dwelling among 
things. 
      Here I will not enter into a closer discussion of the philosophical sense 
and force of Heidegger’s analysis of the thing and the fourfold. From the 
point of view of our guiding problem the important thing is to see that 
this analysis does not involve any radical transformation of the 
                                                                                                                      
wendisches Wesen. […] Die Brücke läßt dem Strom seine Bahn und gewährt zugleich 
den Sterblichen ihren Weg, daß sie von Land zu Land gehen und fahren. […] Immer 
und je anders geleitet die Brücke hin und her die zögernden und die hastigen Wege der 
Menschen, daß sie zu anderen Ufern und zuletzt als die Sterblichen auf die andere 
Seite kommen. Die Brücke überschwingt, bald in hohen, bald in flachen Bogen Fluß 
und Schlucht; ob die Sterblichen das Überschwingende der Brückenbahn in der Acht 
behalten oder vergessen, daß sie, immer schon unterwegs zur letzten Brücke, im 
Grunde danach trachten, ihr Gewöhnliches und Unheiles zu übersteigen, um sich vor 
das Heile des Göttlichen zu bringen. Die Brücke sammelt als der überschwingende 
Übergang vor die Göttlichen. Mag deren Anwesen eigens bedacht und sichtbarlich 
bedankt sein wie in der Figur des Brückenheiligen, mag es verstellt oder gar 
weggeschoben bleiben. Die Brücke versammelt auf ihre Weise Erde und Himmel, die 
Göttlichen und Sterblichen bei sich.”  
909 GA 7, p. 154. 
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fundamental setup of Heidegger’s later thinking: the ontological difference 
remains in force and the fourfold is nothing but a reformulation of the 
basic aspects of the dynamic which opens historical worlds. Hence, one 
should beware of interpreting Heidegger’s notion of safeguarding the 
fourfold in terms of a care for particular human beings, animals and things 
on account of a significance they would possess prior to and irrespective 
of the opening up the world – even though his descriptions tend to be 
parasitic on our understanding of such a care. Hence, what Heidegger’s 
call to safeguard the fourfold is meant to express is that in all our dealings 
with things we co-realize – foster or hamper – the happening which allows 
these things to be present and engage us as things in the first place, as 
meaningful phenomena.  
 
The Highest Task: To Let Being Be 
 
Heidegger’s turn to the question of the openness of being, and his analysis 
of the dynamics which let a world arise, also implies a transformation of 
his view of the existential motivation and import of thinking. What is 
henceforth at stake in thinking is nothing less than the establishment of a 
binding historical world. 
      The later Heidegger’s central idea that thinking is ultimately motivated 
by the aim of co-realizing the opening of a meaningful world dates back to 
the years after Being and Time. Let me recapitulate the history briefly: Even 
though Heidegger already in Being and Time articulates the structure of 
phenomenality in terms of the ontological difference between 
understanding of being and knowledge of beings, the philosophical task to 
pursue the question of being was ultimately motivated by the need to 
clarify the ontological horizon of Dasein’s primary existentiell self-
understanding. In the years 1928-1933 Heidegger reemphasized the 
priority of our understanding of being over all ontic-existentiell 
understanding, whereby he also proposed that philosophy has a double 
task: first, to explicate the structure of Dasein’s understanding as a free 
projection of a being-world; second, to perform such a projection of a 
world in which beings can have meaning for us. The superordination of 
ontology over ethics implied by the notion of philosophy as world-
projection, when combined with the apocalyptic idea of the threatening 
destruction of the Western world and the belief that the political 
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revolution of National Socialism could be a preparation for a genuine 
ontological revolution, paved the way for Heidegger’s engagement in 
Nazism. In the late 1930s Heidegger gradually departed from his positive 
assessment of Nazism as a counterforce against the destructive forces of 
modernity, and instead began to diagnose Nazism as a symptom of the 
techno-subjectivist understanding of being characteristic of Western 
modernity, which reduces all beings into a material reserve for human 
subjectivity to exploit and manipulate.  
      As we saw earlier, Heidegger’s notion of the ultimate task of 
philosophy as a free world-projection had many weaknesses. Not only did 
Heidegger fail to account for how such a projection could ever establish a 
unified world. He was also unable to tell what motivates and makes a new 
philosophical projection of being better than any other projection – save 
for its sharpened consciousness of its essential freedom and 
groundlessness. If so, however, what then motivates new projections of 
historical worlds at all – why not fall back upon and accept our old factical 
projections facing their groundlessness? As Heidegger elaborates his 
analysis of the dynamics of shining in the late 1930s he is finally able to 
give a consistent answer to the question of the motivation of philosophy: 
it is nothing less than establishing a world that is able to bind us as holy. 
      Heidegger’s conception of the motivation and import of his later 
thinking comes to clear expression in his “Letter on Humanism.” Indeed, 
the first paragraph contains the basic train of thought: 
 
Thinking accomplishes the relation of being to the essence of the 
human being. It does not make or cause the relation. Thinking 
brings this relation to being solely as something handed over to 
thought itself from being. […] Thinking does not become action 
only because some effect issues from it or because it is applied. 
Thinking acts insofar as it thinks. Such action is presumably the 
simplest and at the same time the highest because it concerns the 
relation of being to humans. But all working or effecting lies in 
being and is directed toward beings. Thinking, by contrast, lets 
itself be claimed by being so that it can say the truth of being. 
Thinking accomplishes this letting.910 
                                         
910 GA 9, p. 313: “Das Denken vollbringt den Bezug des Seins zum Wesen des 
Menschen. Es macht und bewirkt diesen Bezug nicht. Das Denken bringt ihn nur als 
das, was ihm selbst vom Sein übergeben ist, dem Sein dar. […] Das Denken wird nicht 
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That is to say, since the possible significance of all particular beings and all 
our actions in relation to such beings is determined by historical being, 
and since thinking plays an essential part in the realization of the 
happening which decides over the occurrence or failure to occur of a 
binding being-world, thinking in effect acquires the absolute dignity of 
“highest action.” What has changed since 1933? 
      We may begin by noting two major alterations. First, Heidegger has 
rejected the idea that the task of opening up a world is carried out through 
a free projection. Instead, he insists that the task of letting being be is 
essentially receptive in relation to the self-giving of historical being. In 
this, thinking and poetry play complementary roles: whereas thinking 
reflects on the happening which opens up being, poetry, on this basis, 
establishes a world by hearkening to and gathering the possibilities of 
meaning always already addressing us out of our history into a strong and 
unified paradigmatic form. Second, by thus deepening his notion of the 
ontological-historical predicament of thinking, Heidegger has cancelled 
out the possibility of thinking that, prior to our philosophical questioning 
of the openness of being, there could be something like a pre-ontological 
state of collective political-emotional preparedness to project new worlds. 
      However, Heidegger elevation of thinking into our highest task is 
nothing but a reformulation of the priority of ontology over all other 
existential-ethical concerns. In fact, in his “Letter on Humanism” 
Heidegger explicitly takes up the question of how his thinking relates to a 
possible ethics. To answer this question, Heidegger returns to Heraclit’s 
use of the word ēthos, which he interprets as signifying the “abode, 
dwelling place […] the open region in which the human being dwells.”911 
Since it is precisely the task of Heidegger’s thinking to reflect on and 
articulate this openness of being he argues that his own thinking is already 
in itself “originary ethics.”912 By calling his own thinking an originary 
                                                                                                                      
erst dadurch zur Aktion, daß von ihm eine Wirkung ausgeht oder daß es angewendet 
wird. Das Denken handelt, indem es denkt. Dieses Handeln ist vermutlich das 
einfachste und zugleich das Höchste, weil es den Bezug des Seins zum Menschen 
angeht. Alles Wirken aber beruht im Sein and geht auf das Seiende aus. Das Denken 
dagegen läßt sich vom Sein in den Anspruch nehmen, um die Wahrheit des Seins zu 
sagen. Das Denken vollbringt dieses Lassen.” 
911 GA 9, p. 354: “ἦϑος bedeutet Aufenthalt, Ort des Wohnens. Das Wort nennt den 
offene Bezirk, worin der Mensch wohnt.” 
912 GA 9, p. 356: “die ursprüngliche Ethik.” 
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ethics, however, Heidegger in no way questions but rather reaffirms the 
radical priority of his thinking of being over ethics. By co-realizing the 
happening of being thinking precedes and determines every possible 
ethics: it not only conditions ethics in the sense of an articulation of the 
principles and norms of our historical world; it also conditions ethics in 
the sense of our primary open experience of other people as meaningful. 
      The superior import that Heidegger ascribes to his thinking of being is 
a direct consequence of  his basic idea that the historical happening of 
being possess the power of granting to the world – and, hence, to the 
particular beings –  any significance they might have, and that thinking 
plays a decisive role in the realization of this happening. What is ultimately 
at stake in the task of thinking is thus not only to clarify the ontological 
horizons of our existential understanding, but also to co-realize –  assist or 
hamper – the happening which decides whether a binding holy world 
arises at all. As a consequence, the task of thinking emerges as the highest 
thinkable task, a task that conditions and thus in principal overshadows 
every other possible existential-ethical concern for particular beings, even 
our concern for other human beings.  
      I will return to discuss the philosophical and moral problems of this 
conception later.   
 
3.5 Heidegger’s Late Historical Thinking 
 
The guiding task of Heidegger’s later thinking is to reflect on the “event” 
or “clearing” that opens up historical being. This turning of the question 
also implies a transformation of his mode of thinking. To the extent that 
the question of thinking concerns the happening which first opens up 
historical being and thus makes it possible for beings to be given as 
meaningful phenomena, this happening cannot be explicated through a 
intuition-based phenomenological investigation but rather needs to be 
approached by way of a historical reflection which takes its starting point 
in historical being itself. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the mode 
and rigor of Heidegger’s late thinking. 
      There is no doubt that the change Heidegger’s thinking undergoes in 
the mid 1930s in some sense involves a break with the phenomenological 
approach employed in the existential analytic of Being and Time. Not only 
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does Heidegger at this time give up the word “phenomenology” as a label 
of his thinking, in favor of such terms as “historical reflection” 
(geschichtliche Besinnung),913 “reflection” (Besinnung),914 “being-historical 
thinking” (seynsgeschichtliches Denken),915 and, finally, just “thinking” 
(Denken).916 In his concrete investigations the effort to articulate basic 
structures of meaning through phenomenological descriptions of our 
experience largely – but perhaps not completely – gives way to a thinking 
which remains radically anchored in particular historical constellations of 
meaning – philosophical texts, concepts, poems, artworks, etymologies – 
and transpires through a reflection on their basic unthought dimensions of 
meaning. 
      Heidegger’s transformation of his thinking is, however, no straight and 
clear event, but exhibits at least the following phases: 
      In his texts from the mid 1930s to the end of the war in 1945 
Heidegger is mainly focused on elaborating his new question concerning 
the openness of being, diagnosing the history of Western metaphysics, and 
explicating the dynamics of phenomenal shining such as it is realized in art 
and poetry. At this time, Heidegger sets up a historical program for 
thought: in order to break free from the Seinsvergessenheit of metaphysics, 
thinking has to take the form of a historical reflection which returns to the 
“first” Greek beginning of metaphysics, and, through a critical questioning 
of its unthought possibilities, opens up the possibility of an “other” 
beginning. However, as concerns the concrete mode and rigor of historical 
thinking, Heidegger is still unable to say almost anything. Nor is he able to 
distinguish sharply between the linguistic activity of poetry and thinking. 
In “Introduction to Metaphysics” he still lumps together the poets, the 
thinkers and the statesmen as the “creators” who “project” the “work” 
which establishes the world.917 This bewilderment also conditions the 
effort to develop a kind of quasi-poetical saying of the event of being in 
the notebooks Contributions and Mindfulness. Apart from these big 
manuscripts Heidegger’s thinking at the time mainly takes the form of 
massive historical explications primarily centered on Nietzsche and 
                                         
913 GA 45, p. 34. 
914 GA 7, p. 64. 
915 GA 65, p. 3. 
916 GA 14, p. 74. 
917 GA 40, p. 66. 
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Hölderlin but also treating, e.g., Hegel, Ernst Jünger, and the pre-Socratics 
thinkers. It is only towards the mid 1940s that Heidegger attains a clear 
articulation of the separate yet complementary tasks of thinking and 
poetry: whereas poetry “names the holy,” i.e., founds our historical world, 
thinking “says being,”918 i.e., reflects on the happening of being as the 
origin of every such world without itself taking part in the founding of the 
world. In the 1949 lecture cycle “Insight Into That Which Is” Heidegger 
for the first time arrives at the style that will henceforth characterize his 
thinking: in lieu of the mighty, almost Hegelian, historical projections of 
the late 1930s Heidegger now develops his thinking in the form of shorter 
texts which, in a lapidary style avoiding the metaphysical conceptuality of 
the tradition and drawing on the resources of everyday language and its 
etymologies, stake out finite paths of thought through limited historico-
textual contexts. In this, the programmatic idea about the necessity for 
thinking to proceed through a transition from the first to the other 
historical beginning – although not absent or discarded – moves into the 
background as Heidegger in his concrete writing tries to find more direct 
ways from the metaphysical meaning-constellations in which we live to 
their origin in the openness of being. However, it is only late – in the 
beginning of the 1960s – that Heidegger takes up and thematizes the 
question concerning the specific mode and rigor of his late thinking, and 
its relation to phenomenology. This happens in the texts gathered in the 
anthology On the Matter of Thinking, above all in the central essay “The End 
of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”919 from 1964. 
      Due to the fact that Heidegger’s late thinking, at least on the 
programmatic level, exhibits a turn from phenomenology to a historical 
mode of thinking, the discussion of the late Heidegger has largely been 
dominated by the hermeneutic-deconstructive line of interpretation. For 
such an interpretation – which certainly has taken many different forms – 
Heidegger later philosophy fundamentally appears as a radicalized attempt 
to answer to the historicity of being by way of a thinking which does not 
base itself on any appeal to phenomenal givenness but which transpires 
through intra-historical interpretation, destruction and retrieval of the 
finite meaning-possibilities contained by factical historical being itself. 
Although most defenders of a transcendental phenomenological reading 
                                         
918 GA 9, p. 312. 
919 “Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens,” in GA 14. 
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tend to focus almost exclusively on the early Heidegger, and view his later 
developments as a more or less drastic break with phenomenology, there 
have also been some attempts to salvage the later Heidegger as a 
phenomenologist. Among these attempts it is possible to distinguish 
between three kinds of claim. 
      The two first claims can be extracted from Steven Crowell’s 
ambivalent comments regarding the later Heidegger. In elaborating his 
transcendental phenomenological reading of Heidegger, Crowell 
concentrates almost solely on Heidegger’s thinking in the 1920s, that is, 
the period when Heidegger “most clearly belongs to [the] 
phenomenological tradition.”920 However, although Heidegger’s later 
thought is said to “contain strong elements of postphenomenological and 
postmodern suspicion”921 Crowell insists that Heidegger never abandons 
the phenomenological impulse. In so insisting Crowell seems to alternate 
between two claims. On the one hand, he maintains that Heidegger 
himself conceives of his late thinking as containing an essential element of 
phenomenology. Quoting a passage from “Letter on Humanism” he 
writes that “Heidegger’s post-metaphysical thinking […] draws upon the 
‘essential help of phenomenological seeing’,”922 and that “even the late 
Heidegger […] remains committed to the possibility of 
phenomenology.”923 On the other hand, he sometimes seems to be 
satisfied with the weaker thesis that the late Heidegger de facto continued 
practicing phenomenology regardless of what he thought he was doing: 
“Heidegger never abandoned [phenomenological seeing and description] 
in practice even if he abandoned it as a designation for his project.”924 
      A third kind of claim is presented by Günter Figal who writes that 
Heidegger’s thinking remains “radical phenomenology […] also after Being 
and Time.”925 This could easily be taken for a bolder version of Crowell’s 
first claim yet it is not for the reason that the phenomenology it ascribes to 
the later Heidegger is not the transcendental phenomenology Crowell has 
in mind. According to Figal, the central matter of Heidegger’s thinking is 
                                         
920 Crowell 2001, p. 204. 
921 Crowell 2001, p. 204. 
922 Crowell 2001, p. 218; Heidegger GA 9, p. 357. Cf. also Crowell 2001, pp. 227f.  
923 Crowell 2001, p. 221. 
924 Crowell 2001, p. 220. 
925 Figal 2009, p. 37: “Radikale Phänomenologie in diesem Sinne bleibt Heideggers 
Denken auch nach Sein und Zeit.” Cf. also p. 45.  
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the disclosedness or openness of phenomena which the later Heidegger 
calls the “clearing.” This means that the task of thinking this “originary 
phenomenon” (Ur-phänomen) – Figal quotes Heidegger who quotes 
Goethe926 – gives thinking its specific phenomenological character. But 
how does this thinking proceed? Figal writes: “[The phenomenological 
interpretation] is not arbitrary. As interpretation, deserving of its name, it 
can only disclose what is contained in the historically transmitted texts. 
However, only it, as interpretation, discloses it. What is phenomenological 
[in the transmitted texts] comes to light only through phenomenology.”927 
That is, what Figal calls Heidegger’s phenomenology is a thinking which 
essentially remains referred to historical possibilities, not in the sense that 
it would repeat an already existent historical understanding but in the 
sense that it autonomously discovers possibilities that have so far 
remained unthought. However, while Figal’s description – as well shall see 
– to a large degree captures the self-understanding of the later Heidegger it 
empties the concept of phenomenology of the central appeal to 
transhistorical intuitive givenness which is constitutive of the concept as 
used in this thesis. Hence, from our point of view, what Figal strictly 
speaking is saying is that Heidegger’s late thinking is deeply historical and 
not phenomenological in our sense of the word.928 
                                         
926 Figal 2009, p. 45; GA 14, p. 81. 
927 Figal 2009, p. 53: “[Die phänomenologische Interpretation] ist nicht willkürlich; als 
Interpretation, die diesen Namen verdient, kann sie nur aufdecken, was in den 
überlieferten Texten enthalten ist. Aber erst sie als Interpretation deckt es auf; […] 
Das Phänomenologische in [den überlieferten Texten] kommt ans Licht allein durch 
die Phänomenologie.” Cf. also Figal 2009, pp. 38f. 
928 In a similar way Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann has argued that Heidegger’s later 
“being-historical thinking” is “phenomenological through and through, that is, it is 
guided solely by the letting-itself-be-shown of the matter itself” (das seinsgeschichtliche 
Denken durch und durch phänomenologisch, d.h. allein vom Sichzeigenlassen der Sache selbst, geleitet 
ist) (von Herrmann 1990, p. 11; cf. also pp. 9f.). However, as far as I can see, von 
Herrmann is unable to give any substantial support for his interpretation. To begin 
with, the interpretation to a very large extent transpires a paraphrase of Heidegger’s 
own late rearticulation of phenomenology in terms of the capacity of thought to 
“correspond” to its “matter” (pp. 12f.), whereby von Herrmann does not seem to 
recognize that what is at stake for Heidegger here is precisely to free the concept of 
phenomenology from Husserls’ guiding notion of intuitive givenness and give it a new 
meaning as a name for the specific rigor of historical thinking. Moreover, to the extent 
that von Herrmann tries to specify the methodological character of Heidegger’s late 
phenomenology he describes it as a thinking which does not come to pass as a 
transhistorical seeing of phenomena: “In listening to the call [of being] thinking 
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      Disregarding the third claim as irrelevant here, the question is: Is 
Heidegger’s late thinking, despite of or in conjunction with its ostensible 
historicity, still phenomenological in some sense, either on the level of its 
conception of the nature of thinking or on the level of its concrete 
enactment, or in both respects? 
      The present chapter will unfold as follows: 
      I begin by briefly recapitulating Heidegger’s view of the task and 
historical predicament of thinking, whereafter I move on to the main 
concern of the chapter: to examine the methodological nature and rigor of 
Heidegger’s late thinking. Taking my textual starting point in the essay 
“The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” I explicate 
Heidegger’s late critique of Husserl’s phenomenology and his attempt to 
elaborate his own thinking as a more rigorous way of answering to the 
matter of thinking, the “event” or the “clearing” of being. In so doing I 
also try to answer the question whether Heidegger’s late thinking totally 
abandons phenomenology or whether it in some sense remains referred to 
phenomenological seeing and description.  
 
History, Metaphysics, Thinking: A Repetition 
 
Let us begin by briefly reiterating Heidegger’s conception of the task and 
historical predicament of thinking as it is developed in the latter part of 
the 1930s. The guiding task that Heidegger sets for his thinking is to 
reflect on and articulate the happening which opens up and gives being. 
But how? 
      Heidegger’s later thinking is to a very large extent an effort to deliver 
on the idea of the radical historicity of thought elaborated in Being and Time 
but not realized in its full consequence: the idea that our experience and 
understanding of beings as meaningful phenomena is determined by the 
meaning-possibilities inherent in the historical understanding of being in 
                                                                                                                      
comports itself phenomenologically in so far as it lets the matter itself, being as such, 
be shown” (Im Hören auf den Zuruf [des Seins] verhält sich das Denken […] phänomenologisch 
insofern es ein Sichzeigenlassen der Sache selbst, des Seins als solchen ist) (p. 25; cf. also p. 36). 
However, if the seeing of phenomenology consists in attending to the historical 
givenness of being this is not phenomenology in our sense of the word, but rather 
some kind of intra-historical thinking. 
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which we always already live.929 For thinking this means that it cannot 
hope to examine or ground our factical understanding of being through 
some kind of direct phenomenological description of the basic universal 
structures of our experiences – since our access to these experiences is 
itself determined by our understanding of being – but rather needs to 
transpire by way of a historical questioning and articulation of the most 
originary possibilities of understanding harbored by our own history. 
However, Heidegger claims, the historical situation in which we today find 
ourselves is characterized by an extreme forgetfulness of being – a basic 
inability to think and express the openness of being as the origin of our 
historical world, which, in turn, is the reason why “the gods” have “fled,” 
i.e., why our world has lost its unity and binding force. According to 
Heidegger, this forgetfulness of the openness of being is the defining 
feature of Western metaphysics, which has determined our history since 
its Greek inception in Plato and Aristotle. Leaving the openness of being 
unthought, metaphysics basically interprets being as presence – ousia – for 
us. As a result, the history of metaphysics exhibits an ever increasing drive 
to ground being in the capacities of the human subject: in the logic of its 
judgments, in its reason, in its seeing, in its will to power, in its 
technologies.  
      When the idea about the radical historicity of thought is supplemented 
by the idea that we live at the end of a long and autistically closed history 
of metaphysical forgetfulness of being, the task to open up the question of 
being anew will necessarily have to take the following form. In order to 
access a more originary understanding of being we need to follow the 
history of metaphysics back to its Greek beginning. Only here, at the 
                                         
929 Heidegger’s late historical approach could in fact be described as a realization of 
the destructive program announced in Being and Time, but never consistently 
accomplished. Already then Heidegger claimed that we, in order to free ourselves 
from our prejudiced traditional understanding of being as presence-at-hand need to 
trace our received conceptions back to their historical origins. And yet, since 
Heidegger was still unable to account for what it would mean to retrieve originary 
historical possibilities as our own historical destiny, he was forced to resort to a 
phenomenological explication of the experiences at the root of our historical 
conceptions. For the later Heidegger this possibility is cancelled out: the only way to 
attain a more originary understanding of being is to keep within and retrieve the 
historical possibilities of our history by thinking the unthought origin of the first 
Greek beginning.  
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instigation of the metaphysical understanding of being as presence, can we 
hope to find qualified possibilities of understanding which metaphysics, in 
founding itself, overlooked and forgot as its own unthought origin. Hence, 
by returning to the “first” Greek beginning of metaphysics and critically 
retrieving its unthought and conditioning possibilities, it becomes possible 
to open up an “other” beginning: a thinking which, by reflecting on the 
openness of being as the source of all presence, opens the way for a 
transparent receptive-gathering founding of new forceful worlds.  
      Heidegger will never give up this idea of a necessary dialectics of 
historical beginnings.930 However, from the beginning of the 1950s 
onwards it will move into the background and play a less determinative 
role in Heidegger’s concrete enactment of his thinking as he tries to open 
up more direct pathways from the metaphysical present to various 
historical sources and paradigms on this side of the first Greek beginning 
capable of granting us access to metaphysics’ unthought origins. 
 
The Question of Phenomenology  
 
Above I outlined the basic schema of Heidegger’s late conception of the 
task and manner of thinking: to articulate the opening of being – event, 
clearing – by way of a historical reflection tracing the possibilities of 
understanding harbored by the metaphysical tradition as its unthought 
origin.  
                                         
930 As late as in 1973, in a seminar in Zähringen, Heidegger is reported to have stated: 
“According to me, the entry into the essential domain of Da-sein, discussed at the end 
of yesterday’s session – that entry which would render possible the experience of the 
instancy in the clearing of being – is only possible through the detour of a return to 
the beginning. But this return is not a ‘return to Parmenides’. It is not a question of 
returning to Parmenides. Nothing more is required than to turn towards Parmenides. 
The return occurs in the echo of Parmeindes. It occurs as that hearing which opens 
itself to the word of Parmenides from out of our present age, the epoch of the 
sending of being as enframing” (Meines Erachtens kann die Einkehr in den Wesensbereich des 
Da-seins, von der am Schluß der gestrigen Sitzung gesprochen wurde, – jene Einkehrt, die die 
Erfahrung der Inständigkeit in der Lichtung des Seins ermöglichen würde, – nur auf dem Umweg 
einer Rückkehr zum Anfang vollzogen werden. Aber diese Rückkehr ist keine ‘Rückkehr zu 
Parmenides‘. Es kommt nicht darauf an, zu Parmenides zurückzukehren. Nicht mehr ist 
erforderlich, als sich Parmenides zuzukehren. Die Rückkehr erfolgt im Echo des Parmenides. Sie 
geschieht als jenes Hören, das sich dem Wort des Parmenides von unsrem heutigen Zeitalter aus 
öffnet, der Epoche der Schickung des Seins als Ge-stell) (GA 15, p. 394).  
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      However, even though it is possible to project such a schema on the 
basis of an explication of Heidegger’s texts its sense and clarificatory force 
are bound to remain unclear as long as we have not specified how 
Heidegger’s concrete thinking of this schema is discharged. How do we 
get access to the happening of being provided that we do not make use of 
a  phenomenological method? What is it that gives Heidegger’s historical 
thinking its possible rigor and truth, and hinders it from deteriorating into 
a dogmatic historico-dialectical postulation of the Ereignis as the origin of 
being – an attempt to outdo the old grounds of metaphysics by fabricating 
a more basic groundless ground? 
      Although Heidegger from the mid 1930s onwards repeatedly 
articulates the task and historical predicament of his late thinking, and tries 
out various concrete strategies for effecting it, it is only relatively late that 
he explicitly takes up the question concerning the methodical mode and 
rigor of this thinking. This principally takes place in the anthology On the 
Matter of Thinking, gathering texts written in 1962-1964, especially in the 
central essay “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” from 
1964. Other texts touching this question are Heidegger’s letter to William 
J. Richardson” from 1962, “On the Question Concerning the 
Determination of the Matter for Thinking”931 from 1965, as well as some 
sections from the four seminars that Heidegger conducted in Le Thor and 
Zähringen 1966-1973. As Heidegger finally undertakes an account of the 
rigor of his late thinking this happens also involves a last confrontation 
with Husserl’s phenomenology. 
      Let us begin by taking a look at Heidegger’s late confrontation with 
Husserl and the concept of phenomenology, and then proceed to examine 
the specific methodological character of his own thinking.  
      Heidegger’s essay “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” 
may be read as one extended attempt to critically re-appropriate Husserl’s 
phenomenological motto “To the matters themselves!” Indeed, the title of 
the book of which it is part – Zur Sache des Denkens, which literally means: 
to the matter of thinking – can be read as  a travesty of this phrase. By 
confronting Husserl’s basic phenomenological demand for rigor and 
claiming to realize this demand in a more originary manner, Heidegger 
                                         
931 “Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens,” in GA 16. 
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gives himself the opportunity of raising the question of the specific rigor 
of his own late thinking. 
      Heidegger begins the essay by diagnosing the contemporary situation 
in which we live as the “end of philosophy.” Philosophy, Heidegger says, 
is metaphysics:  
 
Metaphysics thinks beings as beings in the manner of a 
representational thinking that gives grounds. For since the 
beginning of philosophy, and with that beginning, the being of 
beings has shown itself as the ground (archē, aition, principle). The 
ground is that from which beings as such are what they are in their 
becoming, perishing, and persisting as something that can be 
known, handled, and worked upon. As the ground, being brings 
beings in each case to presencing. The ground shows itself as 
presence. The present of presence consists in the fact that it brings 
what is present each in its own way to presence. […] What 
characterizes metaphysical thinking, which seeks out the ground for 
beings, is the fact that metaphysical thinking, starting from what is 
present, represents it in its presence and thus exhibits it as 
grounded by its ground.932  
 
We have heard it before: metaphysics understands being as presence and 
leaves the openness of being unthought. Now Heidegger specifies the task 
of metaphysics in terms of the activity of grounding. To think the being of 
beings as presence amounts to representing being as the ground which 
makes beings present for us. This happens by leading beings back on their 
being-ground, e.g., on ontic causes, transcendental conditions of 
possibility, dialectical mediations, or the will to power. According to 
Heidegger, the metaphysical impulse to ground all beings in their presence 
reaches its fulfillment – and, in this sense, its end - in the modern 
                                         
932 GA 14, p. 69f.: “Die Metaphysik denkt das Seiende als das Seiende in der Weise des 
begründenden Vorstellens. Denn das Sein des Seienden hat sich seit dem Beginn der 
Philosophie und mit ihm als der Grund (ἀρχή, αἴτιον, Prinzip) gezeigt. Der Grund ist 
jenes, von woher das Seiende als ein solches in seinem Werden, Vergehen und Bleiben 
als Erkennbares, Behandeltes, Bearbeitetes ist, was es ist und wie es ist. Das Sein 
bringt als der Grund das Seiende in sein jeweiliges Anwesen. Der Grund zeigt sich als 
die Anwesenheit. Ihre Gegenwart besteht darin, daß sie das jeweils nach seiner Art 
Anwesende in die Anwesenheit hervorbringt. [...] Das Auszeichnende des 
metaphysischen Denkens, das dem Seienden den Grund ergründet, beruht darin, daß 
es, ausgehend vom Anwesenden, dieses in seiner Anwesenheit vorstellt und es so aus 
seinem Grund her als gegründetes darstellt.” 
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diffusion of philosophy into a manifold of technified sciences, whose one 
and only aim is to plan and manipulate beings.933  
      Heidegger then asks whether there is still a task left for thinking at the 
end of philosophy: does the history of philosophy, apart from the “last 
possibility” just mentioned, harbor within itself a “first possibility” which 
philosophy “had to start out from” but which it was never able to 
“expressly experience and adopt”?934 To ask for the task of thinking is to 
ask for its “matter” (Sache).935  But what does it mean to attend to the 
matter of thinking? Heidegger mentions two thinkers who have both 
urged us to go to the matters themselves: Hegel and Husserl. In the 
following I will concentrate on Husserl. 
      For Husserl the motto “To the matters themselves!” constituted 
something of a gathering battle cry for the phenomenological movement. 
As he writes in his 1911 programmatic article “Philosophy as Rigorous 
Science”: “The impulse to research must proceed not from philosophies but from the 
matters and problems.“936 According to Heidegger, the function of Husserl’s 
motto is in the first place negative: to ward off prejudiced theorizing either 
– as in the case of naturalism – barring the way to the phenomena of 
consciousness by applying a dogmatic method or – as in case of 
historicism – deteriorating into empty speculation on the basis of received 
philosophical concepts and standpoints. So how should we reach the 
matters themselves? Heidegger’s thesis is that Husserl call to go to the 
matters primarily concerns the “securing and elaborating of the 
method.”937 This, Heidegger claims, comes to clear expression in the way 
that Husserl in Ideas I articulates the basic attitude of phenomenology in 
terms of the “principle of all principles,” which states that “every originarily 
giving intuition (Anschauung) is a legitimizing source of knowledge, that everything 
originarily (in its tangible actuality, so to speak) offered to us in ‘intuition’ (Intuition), 
is simply to be received as what it gives itself, but also only within the limits in which it 
gives itself there.”938 According to Heidegger, it is clear that the principle of 
                                         
933 GA 14, pp. 70ff. 
934 GA 14, p. 74.  
935 GA 14, p. 75. 
936 Hua XXV, p. 61: “Nicht von den Philosophien sondern von den Sachen und 
Problemen muß der Antrieb zur Forschung ausgehen.” 
937 GA 14, p. 77: “Sicherung and Ausarbeitung der Methode.” 
938 Hua III, p. 51: “Am Prinzip aller Prinzipien: daß jede originär gebende Anschauung eine 
Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis sei, daß alles, was sich uns in der ‘Intuition’ originär, (sozusagen 
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all principles entails a thesis about the priority of the method: before every 
reflection on what constitutes the matter of philosophy the principle tells 
us how phenomenology is to proceed, namely in the manner of a strict 
registration and description of that which gives itself in our originary 
conscious intuition. This, however, implies that the principle has already 
unwittingly decided over “what matter alone can suffice for the 
method”:939   
 
The method is not only directed toward the matter of philosophy. 
It does not merely belong to the matter as a key does to a lock. 
Rather, it belongs to the matter because it is “the matter itself.” If 
one wished to ask: Where does “the principle of all principles” get 
its unshakable right? the answer would have to be: from 
transcendental subjectivity, which is already presupposed as the 
matter of philosophy.940 
 
The basic problem with Husserl’s understanding of his guiding motto is 
thus that it does not in fact grant radical primacy to our attention to the 
matters themselves but rather determines the phenomenological method 
before and irrespective of an open look at the matters in question. Due to 
this failure to attend to the matter of philosophy Husserl naively succumbs 
to the traditional metaphysical conception of the task of philosophy, so 
that his entire phenomenology develops as a qualified attempt to realize 
this task: to ground the presence of beings. It is, Heidegger claims, only 
because Husserl has already determined being as presence for the 
transcendental subject that he can fashion the phenomenological method 
as a demand for intuitive givenness, and outline the phenomenological 
reduction as the central methodological maneuver that gives us access to 
                                                                                                                      
in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit) darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei, als was es sich gibt, aber 
auch nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich da gibt.” 
939 GA 14, p. 78: “welche Sache allein der Methode genügen kann.” 
940 GA 14, p. 78f.: “Die Methode richtet sich nichts nur nach der Sache der 
Philosophie. Sie gehört nicht nur zur Sache wie der Schlüssel zum Schoß. Sie gehört 
vielmehr in die Sache, weil sie ‘die Sache selbst’ ist. Wollte man fragen: Woher nimmt 
denn ‘das Prinzip aller Prinzipien’ sein unerschütterliches Recht, dann müßte die 
Antwort lauten: aus der transzendentalen Subjektivität, die schon als die Sache der 
Philosophie vorausgesetzt ist.” 
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transcendental consciousness as the ground of the “objectivity of all 
objects.”941  
      Heidegger’s late critique of Husserl bears witness to how much the 
distance to his teacher has grown since the 1920s. In his earlier critiques 
Husserl had always appeared as a radically ambivalent figure: on the one 
hand, he was the philosopher par excellence who through his 
phenomenology had opened the path to Heidegger’s own thinking; on the 
other hand, he had hampered and disfigured the principal possibilities of 
his phenomenology by remaining stuck in the theoretical attitude of 
traditional philosophy, so that Heidegger’s own thinking essentially 
developed as a critical appropriation of Husserl, stressing the primacy of 
the pre-theoretical experience and explicating the historicity and 
understanding of being at work in all phenomenal givenness. Now, by 
contrast, Husserl comes into sight alongside Hegel as an emblematic 
representative of the metaphysical effort to ground the presence of beings 
in subjectivity. In this, Husserl’s phenomenology is not given any 
precedence as the possibility Heidegger himself develops but simply 
appears as a qualified method to realize the goal of metaphysics.  
      The distanced and general character of Heidegger’s critique also entails 
that it is massively simplifying as a reading of Husserl’s phenomenology. 
As said earlier I think there is much truth in Heidegger’s basic thesis that 
Husserl’s thinking on the whole exhibits a powerlessness to radically 
question the logical-existential meaning of the motivating problems of 
philosophy, and that this inability makes him inclined to get trapped in the 
traditional problems and ideals of philosophy. Still, even if this is true, the 
rest of Heidegger’s critique does not follow.  
   Although Husserl’s philosophical program is all too much guided by a 
traditional urge for grounding and certainty this urge does not completely 
determine the directions and results of his thinking. Rather, I think one 
could say that Husserl’s production is characterized by an unusually 
versatile drive to see and describe the phenomena at hand regardless of 
how they fit his overall program. Hence, even though Husserl’s 
conception of the intentional structure of phenomenal givenness is 
primarily modeled on the paradigm of theoretical observation his thinking 
of phenomenality – in an ambivalent manner, to be sure - incorporates a 
                                         
941 GA 14, p. 78: “die Objektivität aller Objekte.” 
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wide range of phenomenal aspects which are not given as thematically 
present to consciousness (e.g. the temporal, intersubjective, bodily and 
historical aspects and horizons of our experience). Moreover, even though 
there is a strong tendency in Husserl to privilege the noetic acts of 
subjectivity as the source of the noematic meaning of the objects, he time 
and again – in an ambivalent manner, to be sure – explicates the noematic 
meanings directly as experienced without deducing them from the acts of 
the subject. Finally there seems to be no warrant at all for claiming that the 
very idea of phenomenal givenness is essentially linked to the metaphysical 
ambition to ground the presence of beings. Basically, this idea is simply a 
formal indication of the possibility of an open experience which – 
whatever its specific form and mode – gives us access to the matters 
themselves as that which our historical concepts and theories aim to 
conceive. As such, the notion of phenomenal givenness is not inherently 
motivated by an ambition to ground or secure our knowledge but can also 
be motivated by a will to openly encounter and account for what we 
actually experience – regardless of any concern for certain, absolute or 
universal knowledge – instead of falling back on preconceived concepts, 
theories or other grounds that detract us from and distort these 
phenomena.   
      Heidegger’s harsh critique of Husserl must in the end be understood 
against the background of his driving ambition to demonstrate that his 
own late thinking in fact realizes the phenomenological demand for rigor 
in a more originary manner than Husserl himself. By straight away 
equating Husserl’s notion of phenomenal givenness with the metaphysical 
will to ground presence Heidegger cancels out the possibility that direct 
intuitive seeing could play any role whatsoever as a ground or critical 
measure of his historical thinking, thereby suggesting that his own 
thinking exhibits a rigor that has nothing to do with phenomenological 
seeing.    
      In the closing paragraph of the last text of On the Matter of Thinking, the 
brief autobiographical sketch “My Way to Phenomenology,”942 Heidegger 
sums up his relationship to phenomenology as follows:  
 
                                         
942 “Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie,” in GA 14.  
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And today? The age of phenomenological philosophy seems to be 
over. It is already taken as something past which is only recorded 
historically along which others schools of philosophy. But in what 
is most its own phenomenology is not a school. It is the possibility 
of thinking - at times changing and only thus persisting - of 
corresponding to the claim of what is to be thought. If 
phenomenology is thus experienced and retained, it can disappear 
as a designation in favor of the matter of thinking whose 
manifestness remains a mystery.943 
 
What happens here? To begin with, Heidegger separates his own thinking 
from the dwindling movement of “phenomenological philosophy,” by 
which he means Husserl’s development of phenomenology into a 
transcendental philosophy reflectively investigating the structures of 
intentional consciousness. Second, he puts forward the claim that his own 
thinking realizes phenomenology as “the possibility of thinking [...] of 
corresponding to the claim of what is to be thought.” Now, granted that 
Husserl’s phenomenology fails precisely in the task of attending to its 
matter and granted that his own thinking succeeds in this, then Heidegger 
can claim that his thinking indeed constitutes “true phenomenology” (die 
eigentliche Phänomenologie).944 However, Heidegger adds, as soon as 
phenomenology is thus conceived as the pure possibility of thinking to 
attend and answer to its matter we might as well give up the term 
phenomenology as a potentially misleading name – due to its association 
with Husserl’s intuitive method – for this possibility of thinking. Or, to 
quote another of Heidegger’s formulations: since the “event” (Ereignis) 
constitutes “the most inconspicuous of inconspicuous things” (das 
Unscheinbarste des Unscheinbaren)945 phenomenology henceforth has to take 
the form of a “phenomenology of the inconspicuous” (Phänomenologie des 
                                         
943 GA 14, p. 101: “Und heute? Die Zeit der phänomenologischen Philosophie scheint 
vorbei zu sein. Sie gilt schon als etwas Vergangenes, das nur noch historisch neben 
anderen Richtungen der Philosophie verzeichnet wird. Allein die Phänomenologie ist 
in ihrem eigensten keine Richtung. Sie ist die zu Zeiten sich wandelnde und nur 
dadurch bleibende Möglichkeit des Denkens, dem Anspruch des zu Denkenden zu 
entsprechen. Wird die Phänomenologie so erfahren und behalten, dann kann sie als 
Titel verschwinden zugunsten der Sache des Denkens, deren Offenbarkeit ein 
Geheimnis bleibt.” As regards Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology as a 
possibility, see also SZ, p. 38.  
944 GA 14, p. 54.  
945 GA 12, p. 247. 
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Unscheinbaren).946 Taken literally, this means nothing but a thinking that 
attends to and articulates that which cannot shine.  
       On the basis of the explication above there cannot be much doubt 
that Heidegger’s attempt to think the origin of phenomenality leads him 
away from phenomenology towards a thoroughly historical reflection on 
the happening which opens up finite historical worlds. As a result, the 
stronger claim of Steven Crowell to the effect that the later Heidegger still 
conceives of his thinking as essentially making use of phenomenological 
seeing cannot be upheld. Examining Crowell’s claim we see that it leans 
heavily on what seems to be Heidegger’s affirmation of 
“phenomenological seeing” in “Letter on Humanism.” Looking back at 
Being and Time as a first effort to penetrate towards the question of the 
truth of being Heidegger writes: 
 
In the poverty of its first breakthrough, the thinking that tries to 
advance thought into the truth of being brings only a small part of 
that wholly other dimension to language. This language even 
falsifies itself, for it does not yet succeed in retaining the essential 
help of phenomenological seeing while dispensing with the 
inappropriate concern with “science” and “research.” But in order 
to make the attempt at thinking recognizable and at the same time 
understandable for existing philosophy, it could at first be 
expressed only within the horizon of that existing philosophy and 
its use of current terms.947   
 
This Crowell interprets as meaning that from the viewpoint of the later 
Heidegger it is the “concern with ‘science’ and ‘research’” and not with 
“phenomenological seeing” that “spoils the project of Being and Time.”948 
However, even though the text can be taken to support Crowell’s reading, 
                                         
946 GA 15, p. 399.  
947 GA 9, p. 357: “Das Denken, das in die Wahrheit des Seins vorzudenken versucht, 
bringt in der Not des erstens Durchkommens nur ein Geringes der ganz anderen 
Dimension zur Sprache. Diese verfälscht sich noch selbst, insofern es ihr noch nicht 
glückt, zwar die wesentliche Hilfe des phänomenologischen Sehens festzuhalten und 
gleichwohl die ungemäße Absicht auf ‘Wissenschaft’ und ‘Forschung’ fallen zu lassen. 
Um jedoch diesen Versuch des Denkens innerhalb der bestehenden Philosophie 
kenntlich und zugleich verständlich zu machen, konnte zunächst nur aus dem 
Horizont des Bestehenden und aus dem Gebrauch seiner ihm geläufigen Titel 
gesprochen werden.” 
948 Crowell 2001, p. 227. 
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it is also open for a divergent reading. Bearing in mind that Heidegger is 
always apt to use the word “seeing” as a formal indication of whatever 
mode of thinking that answers to the matter in question, his dismissal of 
the “concern with ‘science’ and ‘research’” could also be read to include 
the Husserlian ideal of intuitive givenness as the paradigm of 
phenomenological seeing. Apart from the fact that Heidegger repeatedly – 
and perhaps even on this occasion – presents his own later thinking as an 
overcoming of intuition-based phenomenology, the decisive systematic 
reason for dismissing Crowell’s first claim is that Heidegger’s late 
conception of phenomenality cancels out the principal possibility that a 
transhistorical givenness could ever function as the ground of our 
understanding. If this would in fact turn out to be possible his basic 
analysis of the radical historicity of being and thinking would collapse, and 
the notion of historicity would have to be rethought and critically 
delimited anew.  
      Hence, the question arises: What does it mean for Heidegger’s late 
historical thinking to rigorously answer to its matter? 
 
The Matter of Thinking 
 
According to Heidegger, the heart of the phenomenological rigor 
expressed in Husserl’s maxim “To the matter themselves!” does not 
consist in intuitive givenness but in the ability of thinking to attend to its 
matter prior to and as a condition for any determination of its method: it 
is only by attending and answering to its matter that thinking can 
materialize as a qualified way of corresponding to this matter. Conversely 
every attempt to determine the method prior to the matter will necessarily 
entail a blind and dogmatic postulation of the matter. But how should the 
ability of thinking to attend to its matter be understood? If thinking is 
determined by the matter, then this also means that every reflection on the 
methodological mode of thinking – including the mode of Heidegger’s 
own late thinking – is bound to remains empty as long as it has not 
entered upon the matter. So what is the matter of thinking according to 
Heidegger?  
      The tradition of metaphysical philosophy which reaches its end and 
fulfillment in the modern era, Heidegger tells us, has always understood 
being as presence and its own task as the grounding of beings in an 
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exemplary presence, without, however, ever asking the question about this 
presence as such. Still, Heidegger argues, in order for something to be 
present for us as an intelligible phenomenon it has to be illuminated by a 
light, that is, by a preceding understanding of being. This light, in turn, has 
to transpire in an openness, a free space, in which it can shine forth and 
illuminate beings. Heidegger calls this openness die Lichtung – the clearing. 
In so doing, he stresses that the word “Lichtung” has nothing to with light 
but goes back on the verb “lichten” which means “to make something 
light, free and open, e.g., to make the forest free of trees at one place.”949 
The fact that this etymology is doubtful and forced only underwrites how 
anxious Heidegger is to distinguish between the historical being-world – 
the light – and the clearing which first makes such worlds, and, hence, all 
phenomenal presence and all phenomenological intuition, possible: 
 
We call this openness, which grants a possible letting-shine and 
show, the clearing. […] Light can stream into the clearing, into its 
openness, and let brightness play with darkness in it. But light never 
first creates the clearing. Rather, light presupposes it. However, the 
clearing, the open region, is not only free for brightness and 
darkness but also for resonance and echo, for sound and the 
diminishing of sound. The clearing is the open region for 
everything that is present and absent.950 
 
This also means that metaphysics, which attempts to think and ground 
being as presence, has always already unwittingly presupposed the clearing 
as its own constitutive element: “All philosophical thinking that explicitly 
or inexplicitly follows the call ‘to the matter itself’ is in its movement and 
with its method already admitted to the free space of the clearing. But 
philosophy knows nothing of the clearing.”951 However, Heidegger claims, 
                                         
949 GA 14, p. 80: “etwas leicht, etwas frei und offen machen, z.B. den Wald an einer 
Stelle frei machen von Bäumen.” 
950 GA 14, p. 80f.: “Wir nennen diese Offenheit, die ein mögliches Scheinenlassen und 
Zeigen gewährt, die Lichtung. […] Das Licht kann nämlich in die Lichtung, in ihr 
Offenes, einfallen und in ihr die Helle mit dem Dunkel spielen lassen. Aber niemals 
schafft das Licht erst die Lichtung, sondern jenes, das Licht, setzt diese, die Lichtung, 
voraus. Indes ist die Lichtung, das Offene, nicht nur frei für Helle und Dunkel, 
sondern auch für den Hall und das Verhallen, für das Tönen und das Verklingen. Die 
Lichtung ist das Offene für alles An- und Abwesende.” 
951 GA 14, p. 82: “Alles Denken der Philosophie, das ausdrücklich oder nicht 
ausdrücklich dem Ruf ‘zur Sache selbst’ folgt, ist auf seinem Gang, mit seiner 
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the fact that the clearing has remained unthought is not just the result of a 
failure on the part of metaphysical philosophy; rather, it belongs to very 
essence of the clearing that it withdraws from every possible presence: 
 
This remains concealed. Does it happen by chance? Does it happen 
only as a consequence of the carelessness of human thinking? Or 
does it happen because self-concealing, concealment, lēthē, belongs 
to a-lētheia, not as mere addition, not as shadow to light, but rather 
as the heart of alētheia? Moreover, does not a sheltering and 
preserving rule in this self-concealing of the clearing of presence, 
from which alone unconcealment can be granted, so that what is 
present can appear in its presence? If this were so, then the clearing 
would not be the mere clearing of presence, but the clearing of 
presence concealing itself, the clearing of a self-concealing 
sheltering.952 
 
That is: as the openness which first conditions all phenomenal presence 
and understanding  the clearing itself withdraws from the understanding 
that it makes possible. As the unthought origin of philosophy, Heidegger 
claims, the clearing is the matter of thinking – what remains to be thought 
at the end of philosophy.  
      As we have seen, Heidegger in addition to the word Lichtung – 
“clearing” – also all uses the word Ereignis – “event” or “event of 
appropriation” – to signify the matter of his later thinking. In the essay 
“Time and Being,” initiating the volume On the Matter of Thinking, 
Heidegger thus articulates the “event” as the happening which “gives” 
both being and time, arguing that the “event” cannot be explicated or 
determined as a higher or more basic dimension of phenomenal being but 
essentially withdraws from the totality of phenomenal presence whose 
                                                                                                                      
Methode, schon in das Freie der Lichtung eingelassen. Von der Lichtung jedoch weiß 
die Philosophie nichts.” 
952 GA 14, p. 88:  “Dies bleibt verborgen. Geschieht es aus Zufall? Geschieht es nur 
infolge einer Nachläßigkeit des menschlichen Denkens? Oder geschieht es weil das 
Sichverbergen, die Verborgenheit, die Λήϑη zur Ἀ-Λήϑεια gehört, nicht als bloße 
Zugabe, nicht so wie der Schatten zum Licht, sondern als das Herz der Ἀλήϑεια? Und 
waltet in diesem Sichverbergen der Lichtung der Anwesenheit sogar noch ein Bergen 
und Verwahren, aus dem erst Unverborgenheit gewährt werden und so Anwesendes 
in seiner Anwesenheit erscheinen kann? Wenn es so stünde, dann wäre die Lichtung 
nicht bloße Lichtung von Anwesenheit, sondern Lichtung der sich verbergenden 
Anwesenheit, Lichtung des sich verbergendes Bergens.” 
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origin it is: “Insofar as the destiny (Geschick) of being lies in the extending 
of time, and time, together with being lies in the event of appropriation 
(Ereignis), appropriating (Ereignen) makes manifest its peculiar property, 
that the event of appropriation withdraws what is most fully its own from 
boundless unconcealment. Thought in terms of appropriating, this means: 
the event of appropriation expropriates (enteignet), in this sense, itself of 
itself. Expropriation belongs to the event of appropriation as such. By this 
expropriation, appropriation does not abandon itself – rather, it preserves 
what is its own.”953 In his later writings Heidegger to a large extent uses 
the words “clearing” and “event of appropriation” as parallel designations 
for that which opens up being. As concerns their internal relationship he 
says the following: “[Appropriation] dispenses the open space of the 
clearing into which what is present can enter for a while.”954 However, it is 
important not to interpret this statement to the effect that the “event of 
appropriation” gives the “clearing” as a substantial being-world in which 
beings can appear, since the “clearing” also names precisely the dimension 
which first makes such worlds possible. Perhaps one could say that the 
“event” and the “clearing” designate different aspect of the same matter: 
whereas the “clearing” designates the constellation of self-withdrawing 
openness which encircles and conditions every substantial historical world 
“event” names the originary happening or dynamics which gives rise to 
and determine such constellations.  
      But how do we then know about the clearing/event, provided that it 
cannot be grasped as a phenomenon of a possible intuitive experience? 
How does the happening of being address thinking as its matter? 
      In a significant turn of phrase Heidegger writes that the clearing 
constitutes what Goethe called an “originary phenomenon” (Urphänomen), 
whereafter he immediately adds: “We would have to say: an originary 
matter” (Ur-Sache).955 That is, as the originary phenomenon which 
                                         
953 GA 14, p. 27f.: “Sofern nun Geschick des Seins im Reichen der Zeit und diese mit 
jenem im Ereignis beruhen, bekundet sich im Ereignen das Eigentümliche, daß es sein 
Eigenstes der schrankenlosen Entbergung entzieht. Vom Ereignen her gedacht, heißt 
dies: Es enteignet sich in dem gennanten Sinne seiner selbst. Zur Ereignis als solchem 
gehört die Enteignis. Durch sie gibt das Ereignis sich nicht auf, sondern bewahrt sein 
Eigentum.”  
954 GA 12, p. 247: “[Das Ereignen] er-gibt das Freie der Lichtung, in die Anwesendes 
anwähren.” 
955 GA 14, p. 81.  
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constitutes the origin of phenomenality itself the clearing cannot be 
understood as a self-showing phenomenon anymore, but rather has the 
character of a “matter,” an “originary matter.” But what is a “matter”? 
Heidegger explicates the word “matter” by invoking its old juridical 
meaning as “case” or “controversy,” such that the matter of thinking 
denotes “that which concerns thinking, is still controversial (strittig) for 
thinking, and is the controversy (der Streitfall).”956 In “Time and Being,” he 
supplements another important characteristic as he writes that the matter 
denotes “what is decisively at stake in that something uncircumventable is 
concealed within it.”957 Gathering the aspects cited above into a 
provisional formal definition we could say: the matter of thinking 
addresses us as something controversial and strained which, at the same 
time hidden and uncircumventable, lies at the origin of our historical 
understanding.  
      Still, should Heidegger’s thought of the clearing not just amount to a 
speculative postulation of a universal abyss at the basis of all presence and 
intelligibility, the clearing must somehow concretely announce itself to 
thinking in its controversiality. To see how this happens, it is crucial to 
recall Heidegger’s basic view of the radical historicity of thought: “every 
attempt to gain insight into the supposed task of thinking finds itself 
moved to review the whole history of philosophy.”958 That is, the history 
we inhabit harbors and delimits our possibilities of understanding. Hence, 
the metaphysical understanding of being as presence is not just a series of 
philosophical opinions but an articulation of the way in which being itself 
is still given to us.959 Moreover, to the extent that there are more originary 
possibilities of thinking the openness of being, these possibilities must 
always already be there as the latent but unthought possibilities of the 
history of metaphysics. The matter of thinking thus has the character of 
“something […] that was already said a long time ago, precisely at the 
beginning of philosophy and for that beginning, but has not been 
                                         
956 GA 14, p. 75: “dasjenige […] was das Denken angeht, was für das Denken noch 
strittig, der Streitfall ist.” Cf. also GA 14, pp. 46f.; GA 11, p. 53. 
957 GA 14, p. 8: “solches […] worum es sich in einem maßgebenden Sinne handelt, 
sofern sich darin etwas Unübergehbares verbirgt.” 
958 GA 14, p. 74: “jeder Versuch, einen Einblick in die vermutete Aufgabe des 
Denkens zu gewinnen, sieht sich auf den Rückblick in das Ganze Geschichte der 
Philosophie angewiesen.” Cf. also GA 14, p. 10f.; GA 11, p. 50.  
959 Cf. GA 16, p. 626. 
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explicitly thought.”960 Hence, the clearing cannot be postulated as the 
universal abysmal ground of phenomenality, but, in so far as it gives itself 
concretely, it gives itself as the specific finite origin of our finite history. In 
his well-known 1957 paper, “The Onto-teo-logical Constitution of 
Metaphysics”961 Heidegger offers a penetrating formulation of this logic: 
 
For us, the criterion for the conversation with historical tradition is 
the same [as for Hegel], insofar as it is a question of entering into 
the force of earlier thinking. We, however, do not seek the force in 
what has already been thought: we seek it in something that has not 
been thought, and from which what has been thought receives its 
essential space. But only what has already been thought, prepares 
what has not yet been thought, which enters ever anew into its 
abundance. The standard of what has not been thought does not 
lead to the inclusion of previous thought into a still higher 
development and systematization that surpass it. Rather, the 
standard demands that traditional thinking be set free into its 
essential past which is still preserved. This essential past prevails 
throughout the tradition in an originary way, is always in being in 
advance of it, and yet is never expressly thought in its own right 
and as the originary.962 
 
We see: the matter of thinking – the clearing – is not accessible as a “still 
higher development and systematization” which supersedes and embraces 
                                         
960 GA 14, p. 75: “etwas […] was längst und gerade am Beginn der Philosophie und 
für diesen schon gesagt, jedoch nicht eigens gedacht ist.” 
961 “Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik,” in GA 11.  
962 GA 11, p. 57f.: “Für uns is die Maßgabe für das Gespräch mit der geschichtlichen 
Überlieferung dieselbe, insofern es gilt, in die Kraft des früheren Denkens einzugehen. 
Allein wir suchen die Kraft nicht im schon Gedachten, sondern in einem 
Ungedachten, von dem her das Gedachte seinen Wesensraum empfängt. Aber das 
schon Gedachte erst bereitet das noch Ungedachte, das immer neu in seinen Überfluß 
einkehrt. Die Maßgabe des Ungedachten führt nicht zum Einbezug des vormals 
Gedachten in eine immer höhere und es überholende Entwicklung und Systematik, 
sondern sie verlangt die Freilassung des überlieferten Denkens in sein noch 
aufgespartes Gewesenes. Dies durchwaltet anfänglich die Überlieferung, west ihr stets 
voraus, ohne doch eigens und als das Anfangende gedacht zu sein.” In the essay “The 
Way to Language” Heidegger provides a similar formulation of the necessity of 
thinking the Ereignis on the basis of the historical saying as the happening which this 
saying itself refers to: “The event of appropriation, espied in the showing of the saying 
[…] can only be experienced in the showing of the saying as the granting event” (Das 
Ereignis, im Zeigen der Sage erblickt, läßt sich […] nur im Zeigen der Sage als das Gewährende 
erfahren) (GA 12, p. 247). Cf. also GA 7, pp. 184f.  
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the history of metaphysics; rather “what has already been thought, 
prepares what has not yet been thought, which enters ever anew into its 
abundance.” That is to say: the clearing grows and is only accessible out of 
the metaphysical understanding of being in which we always already live, 
namely as the dimension which metaphysics itself de facto unwittingly 
presupposes and leans upon in order to establish itself in the first place. 
      To specify the sense of this logic, we need to recall that Heidegger 
from the middle of the 1930s developed his basic analysis of the dynamics 
of the happening of being as a strife between the world and the earth. 
According to this analysis, our historical being-world arises as the result of 
a receptive-creative gathering of the world in the artwork which takes 
place on the basis of the still undetermined possibilities of history and the 
still dumb materiality of the earth. Now he draws the consequences of this 
analysis as concerns the phenomenal character of the clearing itself. Seeing 
that the “controversiality” of the matter of thinking refers to the 
“controversy” of the happening of being it becomes possible to grasp the 
way in which the clearing concerns us: if our historical understanding of 
being is essentially constituted by a strained gathering of a unified being-
world on the basis of an undetermined multitude of historical possibilities 
and a self-secluding element of materiality and sensuousness, then the 
clearing is bound to announce itself precisely as the controversiality of our 
received historical understanding: its groundlessness, finitude and lack of 
systematic closure. The basic quasi-conceptual relations of our world will 
always remain strained and underdetermined since they essentially refer to 
the exceeding dimensions of history and materiality which simultaneously 
constitute and withdraw from the world.  
 
The Way of Thinking 
 
According to Heidegger, metaphysics reacts to the groundlessness and 
finitude of historical being by forgetting its self-withdrawing origin and 
setting itself the task of grounding it in an absolute presence. By contrast, 
he characterizes the task of thinking as a “step back” (Schritt zurück) from 
metaphysics into the “region, initially indicated with the name of the 
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clearing, wherein we human beings always already sojourn.”963 Hence, the 
task of thinking should not be conceived as an effort to continue or 
surpass the metaphysical project by establishing the clearing as the 
abysmal ground of every metaphysical ground but rather as the challenge 
to let go of this impulse and instead try to let being be as the finite destiny 
that it is by articulating its origin in the clearing.  
     So how does thinking go about to think its matter? Formally, the way 
of historical thinking could be characterized as follows: 
      Since thinking, unlike poetry, is not creatively founding in character it 
is fundamentally referred to the historical possibilities harbored by our 
history and consequently takes the form of an intra-historical reflection. 
As such, thinking receives its ultimate guideline from the concrete 
givenness of the clearing as the controversiality characterizing our factical 
historical understanding. Guided by this matter, thinking then transpires as 
a tracing of our received metaphysical understanding of being back to its 
basic supporting conceptual elements, whereby it attempts to exhibit the 
groundlessness and tension of these elements as a testimony of their origin 
in the clearing - the free gathering of the multitude of historical 
possibilities into the finite unity that it is.  
      At the end of the day, Heidegger’s conception of the task of thinking 
implies that thinking itself takes on a finite and interminable character. At 
the very end of the essay “On the Question Concerning the 
Determination of the Matter for Thinking,” Heidegger again takes up the 
question of how the matter of thought is to be made accessible to 
thinking: 
 
Does the matter for thinking require a manner of thinking whose 
basic feature is neither dialectic nor intuition? Regarding this, only 
the question concerning the determination of the matter for 
thinking can prepare the answer. But what if the answer to this 
question of thinking were again only another question? And what if 
this issue, instead of pointing to an endless progression, indicated 
the finitude of thinking that lies in its matter?964 
                                         
963 GA 16, p. 632: “in den mit dem Namen Lichtung erst angezeigten Bereich, darin 
wir Menschen uns ständig schon aufhalten.” Cf. also, e.g., GA 9, pp. 343, 352; GA 11, 
pp. 41f. 
964 GA 16, p. 633: “Verlangt die Sache des Denkens eine Weise des Denkens, deren 
Grundzug weder die Dialektik noch die Intuition ist? Darüber kann nur die Frage 
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How should this be understood?  
      Since the clearing designates the openness out of which historical 
being arises and is only accessible as the concrete controversiality marking 
our factical understanding there is no principle possibility of investigating 
and determining once and for all the universal structure of the clearing as 
such. This, however, means that the task of thinking cannot consist in 
providing an answer to the question what the clearing is, but rather 
consists in tracing the effects and logic of the clearing in every new 
particular historical situation. Or, as Heidegger puts it in “Time and 
Being”: “Answering means the saying that corresponds to the matter that 
is to be thought here, the event of appropriation.”965 In short: as a result 
of the basic polemical logic of the happening which opens up being 
thinking must essentially take the form of a finite historical questioning of 
the matter of thinking, whose specific ways are always determined by the 
specific historical situation in which we find ourselves, and which, in the 
end, is always doomed to convert into a new questioning. Over and above 
the concrete work of tracing the logic of the clearing/event in our 
historical understanding, Heidegger believes that thinking will have to take 
recourse to silence966 and tautologies,967 i.e., to ways of expression whose 
central function it is to negatively delimit and let be the happening of 
being in its ungroundability.  
      Against the metaphysical effort to ground historical being in an 
absolute presence it is thus the infinite finite task of thinking to free up the 
dynamics of the openness of being in every new historical situation in 
order thereby to prepare the possibility of allowing finite being to arise 
and prevail as a unified and binding destiny.  
      So far I have concentrated on Heidegger’s explicit conception of the 
matter and method of thinking, whereby it has been become clear that at 
least on this level he gives up phenomenology in favor of a radically 
historical thinking. But what about his concrete enactment of this 
                                                                                                                      
nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens die Antwort vorbereiten. Wie aber, 
wenn die Antwort auf diese Frage des Denkens wieder nur eine andere Frage wäre? 
Und wenn dieser Sachverhalt, statt in einen endlosen Fortgang zu weisen, die in seiner 
Sache beruhende Endlichkeit des Denkens anzeigte?” 
965 GA 14, p. 25: “Antworten meint das Sagen, das dem hier zu denkenden Sach-
Verhalt, d.h. dem Ereignis entspricht.” 
966 Cf., e.g., GA 12, p. 255. 
967 Cf., e.g., GA 15, p. 399. 
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conception? To what extent do his texts realize his idea of the mode and 
rigor of historical thinking? Moreover, could it be that Heidegger in his 
concrete thinking despite his explicit program – as Crowell’s second claim 
goes – makes use of phenomenological seeing and description? 
      I think Heidegger’s articulation of the modus operandi of his later 
thinking to a great extent constitutes an apt description of what actually 
happens in his texts. As mentioned earlier, Heidegger’s effort to open up 
to basic question of his late thinking in the 1930s and 1940s was still 
marked by unclarity concerning the methodological mode of this thinking. 
Hence, he alternated between different strategies: from the quasi-poetical 
saying of Contributions and Mindfulness, over the more traditional 
phenomenological analyses found, e.g., “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 
to the massive historical explications recurring in his lecture courses on 
Nietzsche and Greek philosophy. However, notwithstanding the 
methodological dissonance of these years, Heidegger already at this time 
very much makes use of the kind of historico-dialectical inference which 
will reach its most consequent expression in the following decades. In the 
beginning of the 1950s – starting with the lecture series “Insight Into that 
Which Is” from 1949 – Heidegger finds what one could call the 
paradigmatic form of his later thinking. From now on, he largely gives up 
the above strategies in favor of shorter texts which in a simpler and more 
lapidary style draw up finite paths of thinking through limited historico-
textual landscapes. 
      Somewhat schematically we could say that Heidegger’s later texts in 
different ways tend to enact the following three basic steps: First, 
depending on the guiding question Heidegger sets out from a given textual 
or conceptual constellation which – he will argue – is at the heart of our 
metaphysical horizon of understanding, e.g., a philosopher or a poet 
(Nietzsche, Hegel, Hölderlin, Trakl, Kant, Husserl, Aristotle, Heraclitus), 
some word or concept (being, time, truth, identity, science, metaphysics, 
logos), or some other aspect of the contemporary situation (the modern 
technical world, our dwelling and relationship to things, the specialization 
of the sciences, the flight of the gods). Second, on the basis of the chosen 
constellation he proceeds by explicating the basic ontological elements 
supporting our received understanding of the question under 
consideration, whereby these elements are shown to be variations of the 
originary metaphysical understanding of being as presence determining the 
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history of metaphysics. The third step consists in demonstrating that our 
basic understanding of being cannot account for itself but by itself refers 
back to the clearing/event as its unthought origin. 
      Here I will not go further into the first two steps of Heidegger’s 
strategy: the description of the problem-constellation and the diagnosis of 
its basic ontological stratum of understanding. Let me only remark that 
even though these steps certainly contain a central and irreducible element 
of historical interpretation they are already guided by some understanding 
of the questions of concern and some understanding of the ontologico-
existential relations of meaning which allow us to grasp something as the 
ground or motivation of a certain conception – in such a way that this 
guiding understanding of the matters themselves already challenges the 
idea of radical historicity by operating in the tension between historical 
prejudice and truth. However, the question of the rigor of historical 
thought and its ability to reach beyond the prejudices of metaphysics 
becomes acute in the third step, whose aim it is to positively demonstrate 
the origin of our understanding of being in the clearing/event. 
      Heidegger’s positive articulation of the clearing/event basically has the 
character of a kind a historico-dialectical inference. As a necessary 
preparation for the inference, Heidegger always explicates our received 
metaphysical understanding of being laying bare its basic elements: the 
basic conceptions and meanings on which it rests without being able to 
account for their ground or origin. This diagnosis of the inability of 
metaphysics to account for the basic elements of its understanding – 
whereby these elements are manifested in their essential ungroundedness 
and underdetermination – by itself opens the question of the origin of this 
understanding. Yet what step leads from the documented limits of 
metaphysics to its supposed origin? Since the step to the origin cannot 
have the form of getting access to a determinable dimension beyond our 
historical understanding of being – this historical understanding in its 
ungroundedness and underdetermination being all we got – the step can 
only be enacted by inferring the clearing/event as a negative figure of 
thought supposedly articulating and circumscribing the groundlessness 
and tension of our received concepts as something ultimate. 
      Moreover, to guide his articulations of the clearing/event as the origin 
of history Heidegger consistently draws on etymological inferences. By 
tracing the historical roots of our common metaphysical concepts back to 
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earlier usages and older languages, Heidegger again and again attempts to 
open up originary meanings which our history allegedly already harbors in 
an unclear way and which have been neglected and forgotten due to the 
triumph of metaphysics. For example, he claims to demonstrate the roots 
of the word “Lichtung” in the old German verb “lichten,” which is said to 
mean “to make something light, free and open”;968 the roots of the word 
“Ereignis” in the verb “eräugen,” which is said to mean “to catch sight of, 
to call something to oneself through looking”;969 the roots of the word 
“Sache” in an older usage in which it still meant “legal case” or 
“controversy”;970 the roots of the word logos in the verb legein, which is said 
to mean “gather.”971 Such an employment of etymologies in philosophical 
reasoning quite naturally gives rise to the critical question: how can 
references to etymology ever give any grounds for our systematic 
understanding of the matter in question? Heidegger, being well aware of 
this objection, already common in his lifetime, responds as follows:   
 
It might look as though the essence of the thing as we are now 
thinking of it had been, so to speak, thoughtlessly poked out of the 
accidentally encountered meaning of the Old High German thing. 
The suspicion arises that the understanding of the essence of the 
thing that we are here trying to reach may be based on the 
accidents of an etymological game. The notion becomes established 
and is already current that, instead of giving thought to essential 
matters, we are here merely using the dictionary. The opposite is 
true. […] The truth is […] not that our thinking feeds on 
etymology, but rather that etymology is referred to the task of 
thinking in advance the essential issues involved in what the words, 
as words, denote in an undeveloped way.972 
                                         
968 GA 14, p. 80: “etwas leicht, etwas frei und offen machen.” 
969 GA 11, p. 45: “erblicken, im Blicken zu sich rufen.”  
970 GA 14, pp. 46, 75. 
971 GA 40, p. 236. 
972 GA 7, p. 176f.: “Es könnte so aussehen, als werde das jetzt gedachte Wesen des 
Dinges aus der zufällig aufgegriffenen Wortbedeutung des althochdeutschen Namens 
thing gleichsam herausgedröselt. Der Verdacht regt sich, die jetzt versuchte Erfahrung 
des Wesens des Dinges sei auf die Willkür einer etymologischen Spielerei gegründet. 
Die Meinung verfestigt sich und wird schon landläufig, hier werde, statt die 
Wesensverhalte zu bedenken, lediglich das Wörterbuch benutzt. Doch das Gegenteil 
solcher Befürchtungen ist der Fall. […] In Wahrheit steht es […] nicht so, daß unser 
Denken von der Etymologie lebt, sondern daß die Etymologie darauf verwiesen 
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Hence, what Heidegger here claims is that his tracing of etymologies in no 
way implies that he would try to ground his articulation of the matters 
themselves on some information about the earlier meanings of our words 
available in dictionaries and etymological studies. On the contrary, 
etymology itself already presupposes an understanding of the matters that  
the words signify; only thus can the old words and usages appear and be 
determined as embryonic expressions of these matters.  
      However, even though Heidegger insists on the priority of thinking in 
relation to etymology his abundant use of etymologies is not a superficial 
or accidental feature of his thinking but is deeply motivated and prompted 
by his notion of the historicity of thought. Given the claim that the 
thinking of the openness of being is essentially referred to the meaning-
possibilities harbored by our history, the etymological inferences become 
important as they seem to confirm that the clearing/event which 
Heidegger tries to articulate is de facto always already there in our history 
as a possibility which metaphysics has intimated and made use of without 
thinking it as such. But this is not all. Over and above the explication of 
the basic concepts of metaphysics in their groundlessness and tension, 
Heidegger’s historical thinking strictly speaking has no positive guidance 
except the kind of unthought meaning-possibilities that old words can be 
taken to bear witness to. As a result, Heidegger’s late thinking essentially 
transpires in a zigzag movement: on the one hand, an exposition of the 
basic groundlessness and tension of metaphysics which negatively opens 
up the abyss at the root of all presence; on the other hand, a guiding-
confirming etymological tracing which allows for a more substantive 
articulation of the clearing/event as the unthought origin of metaphysics. 
In addition to etymologies Heidegger also makes use of poetry (e.g. 
Hölderlin, Rilke, Trakl) and earlier thinkers (e.g. the early pre-Socratic 
thinkers, Aristotle, Goethe) to provide guidance for his thinking. The logic 
is the same as in the case of etymology: Heidegger employs a historical 
poem or saying as an embryonic indication which lets him confirm and 
spell out the possibility of meaning which his explication of metaphysics 
negatively opens up.  
      We can now see clearly that Heidegger in his later thinking not only 
abandons phenomenology in principle but also for the most part 
                                                                                                                      
bleibt, zuvor die Wesensverhalte dessen zu bedenken, was die Wörter als Worte 
unentfaltet nennen.” 
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abandons it in practice in favor of another kind of historical thinking. 
Nevertheless, I think Crowell’s second weaker thesis is quite true, namely 
that Heidegger in his concrete thinking does not altogether ditch 
phenomenology even though it stands in a tense and conflicting relation 
to his program and primary methodological practice.  
      Ultimately, I believe that Heidegger’s inability to manage without 
phenomenology depends on a systematic necessity – on the inability of his 
historical thinking to realize its claims and on what I consider to be the 
fact that phenomenological description constitutes the decisive 
methodological moment determining the possible clarificatory force and 
truth of all philosophical thinking.  
      As I will argue in the last chapter of this part, the basic problem of 
Heidegger’s late historical thinking is that it is unable to account for a 
truth that would transcend historical prejudices and theoretical 
constructions. The sole thing that such a mode of thinking, if rigorously 
pursued, can achieve is a certain negative critique and beyond that nothing 
but dialectical-rhetorical force.  
      As concerns the critically-dialectically inferring moment in Heidegger’s 
strategy it is certainly possible – as Heidegger in many cases has shown – 
to trace the basic concepts supporting our common philosophical self-
understanding and expose the groundlessness and tension characterizing 
these concepts. It is also clear, I think, that the ostensibly constant inability 
of metaphysics to ground our understanding is an indication that there are 
principle reasons why this cannot be done. However, Heidegger’s 
historical mode of thinking hinders him from providing a positive 
articulation of these reasons. As long as he is satisfied with exposing the 
inability of metaphysics to ground its basic concepts and advances the 
clearing/event as an articulation of this inability, the notion of 
clearing/event does not add anything to the negative critique that would 
shed light on the predicament and limits of metaphysics. In order to take 
the decisive step from an exposition of the de facto inability of 
metaphysics to ground our understanding to the claim that this inability 
has its roots in the principal groundlessness of historical being he would 
have to offer some kind of concrete description of what this 
groundlessness is all about. Yet Heidegger’s historical thinking lacks the 
means to take this step: in so far as he hopes to establish the 
clearing/event as the origin of being on the basis of his critique of 
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metaphysics and with the aid of etymological inferences it is doomed to 
remain a historical-dialectical construction which does not really show 
anything at all. In so far, however, as he is able to give to his notion of 
clearing/event any concrete descriptive content it is because he, despite 
his intentions, in fact attempts some phenomenological descriptions of 
this dynamics. As concerns the etymological moment of Heidegger’s 
historical thinking the only thing such etymological reasoning can strictly 
speaking add to his thinking of the clearing/event is rhetorical force. Even 
if it were possible to show – which it hardly is – that Western philosophy 
has always presupposed something like the clearing/event as its unthought 
ground, this would only give us reason to reflect on the meaning and truth 
of this notion. At best, then, Heidegger’s work of etymological tracing is 
able precisely to uncover forgotten meanings which can serve as guidelines 
and indicate new possibilities for our thinking of the matters in question – 
yet it can never by itself contribute to the truth of this thinking.  
      So what about phenomenology? 
      Of course we look in vain in Heidegger’s later texts for the ambition 
to ground and clarify every central concept of his thinking through 
phenomenological analyses, which still characterized Being and Time. Still, a 
large portion of the texts written by Heidegger after 1935 involve greater 
or smaller bits of phenomenological description. In the 1930s and 1940s, 
when Heidegger’s thinking is still in search of its new form, the 
phenomenological element is stronger. In several lecture courses 
Heidegger has recourse to phenomenological descriptions which do not 
base themselves on historical explications but on concrete attempts to 
exhibit and explicate the experiences in question. His most ambitious 
labor of phenomenological description from this period is found in “The 
Origin of the Work of Art.” Taken his starting point in the work of art as 
it meets us and works on us in our experience of it, and concretely 
explicating a Greek temple as a paradigmatic artwork, he attempts to show 
how the artwork opens up being by realizing the strife between the world 
and the earth. As Heidegger after 1950 sharpens his historical mode of 
thought, the phenomenological element dwindles. Even so, his later texts 
also include phenomenological descriptions. For example, as we saw 
above, in the essays “Building Dwelling Thinking” and “The Thing” 
Heidegger offers concrete depictions of how the central dimensions of the 
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fourfold – sky and earth, gods and mortals – interact in and constitute 
concrete things such as a bridge or a jug.  
      However, even though Heidegger’s later thinking entails an essential 
element of phenomenological description the role and status of 
phenomenology in this thinking is highly ambivalent. Given that his basic 
conception of the historicity of being and thought cancels out and cannot 
account for the possibility of phenomenology functioning as a ground of 
understanding he is bound to live in a certain denial of the 
phenomenological element of his thought. This means that he naturally 
tends to minimize the amount of phenomenological descriptions and also 
to cut them short and not let them develop freely and generously in  the 
way that would be needed in order to shed light on the phenomena in 
question. Moreover, Heidegger’s governing historical self-understanding 
also brings with it that his later phenomenological accounts are often 
characterized by a peculiar deficit of autonomous seeing and description.   
      The problem comes especially clearly to the fore in those of Heidegger 
later texts in which the phenomenological description is guided and bound 
by an explication of a poem. For example in the essay “Language” from 
1950 Heidegger interprets the poem “Winter Evening” (Winterabend) by 
Georg Trakl, the last stanza of which reads: 
 
Wanderer tritt still herein; 
Schmerz versteinerte die Schwelle. 
Da erglänzt in reiner Helle 
Auf dem Tische Brot und Wein. 
  
In stillness, wanderer, step in;  
Pain has petrified the threshold. 
There lie, in pure radiance shining, 
Upon the table bread and wine.973  
  
On the backdrop of the poem in its entirety and also drawing on other 
textual sources Heidegger explicates this as follows: 
 
Where does the pure radiance shine? On the threshold, in the 
discharge (Austrag) of pain. The rift of the dif-ference (der Riß des 
                                         
973 Trakl 1977, p. 58. My translation is based on the one provided by Jim Doss and 
Werner Schmitt in Trakl 2010, p. 111. 
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Unter-Schiedes) makes the pure radiance shine. Its luminous joining 
decides the brightening of the world into its own. The rift of the 
dif-ference expropriates the world into its worlding, which grants 
things. Through the brightening of the world in its golden luster, 
bread and wine at the same time attain to their own shining. The 
nobly named things are lustrous in the simplicity of their thinging. 
Bread and wine are the fruits of sky and earth, gift from the 
divinities to mortals. Bread and wine gather these four to 
themselves from the imply unity of their fourfoldness.974  
 
We can see how Heidegger here goes along with and at the same time 
expands and elaborates the poem’s concrete depiction, so that he projects 
the bread and wine of the poem as gathering points of the fourfold. This 
quasi-concrete projection of a nexus of meaning-relations, however, is all 
that Heidegger offers as he refrains from going one step further and offer 
some autonomous description of how this projection actually illuminates 
the central aspects of a meal with bread and wine.  
   This problematic tendency is in fact already present in Heidegger’s 
description of the strife between the world and the earth in “The Origin 
of the Work of Art” and above all characterizes his later accounts of the 
fourfold – even though his thinking here does not have the form of an 
interpretation of poems. As we know, Heidegger insists that our 
understanding of the structures and dynamics of being cannot be 
grounded in a direct seeing explication of these structures but has to base 
itself on meanings harbored by our history. Now to the extent that 
Heidegger is able to ascribe to phenomenological description some 
function within the task of thinking such description must receive its 
entire force from its ability to articulate what is already there as meaning-
possibilities in our heritage. Hence, the decisive work of a 
phenomenological description does not consist in clarifying our concepts 
by anchoring them in the concrete experiences and situations of which 
                                         
974 GA 12, p. 25: “Wo erglänzt die reine Helle? Auf der Schwelle, im Austrag des 
Schmerzes. Der Riß des Unter-Schiedes läßt die reine Helle glänzen. Sein lichtendes 
Fügen ent-scheidet die Auf-Heiterung von Welt in ihr Eigenes. Der Riß des Unter-
Schiedes enteignet Welt in ihr Welten, das die Dinge gönnt. Durch die Auf-Heiterung 
von Welt in ihren goldenen Glanz kommen zugleich Brot und Wein zu ihrem 
Erglänzen. Die großgenannten Dinge leuchten in der Einfalt ihres Dingens. Brot und 
Wein sind die Früchte des Himmels und der Erde, von den Göttlichen den 
Sterblichen geschenkt. Brot und Wein versammeln bei sich diese Vier aus dem 
Einfachen der Vierung.” 
 Critical Delimitations 443 
 
 
they are concepts but in projecting nexuses of meaning which resonate 
with and bring to expression historical possibilities already there but not 
yet thought. The concrete result of this is, however, that Heidegger is 
tempted to be satisfied with descriptions that are so lacking in 
autonomous descriptive work that they risk remaining at the level of 
rudimentary outlines or constructions with little clarificatory force.    
      In sum, we can say that Heidegger’s late thinking lives in a deep and 
irresolvable ambivalence between the ambition to realize a radically 
historical thinking and the impossibility of not letting phenomenology in 
as an essential element of this thinking. In Being and Time the ambivalence 
run straight between Heidegger’s conception of the historical structure of 
understanding and the deconstructive program on the one hand, and his 
concrete phenomenological analyses on the other. Now the ambivalence is 
played out within the framework of his conscious attempt to overcome it. 
The impossibility of this effort, however, makes it even more violent. 
Whereas the strict historical thinking in the fore of Heidegger’s late 
production lacks the potential of accounting for the central theme of this 
thought, i.e., for the openness of being, the phenomenological work de 
facto performed in a denied and ambivalent manner still gives his thinking 
whatever clarificatory power it possesses.   
 
3.6 Critical Delimitations  
 
As we have seen, Heidegger’s later thinking can be described as one long 
attempt to draw the consequences of his analysis of the historical as-
structure of phenomenal understanding first developed in the 1920s, the 
systematic heart of which consists in the ontological difference: the notion 
that our understanding of the historical contexts of meaning in which we 
live determines our possibilities to experience particular entities as 
meaningful, whereby our direct experience or reflection cannot serve as a 
basic measure of understanding anymore. Whereas in Being and Time 
Heidegger was still unable to account for how being can be given as an 
ultimate historical context of meaning beyond our common prejudices, his 
later thinking is guided precisely by the aim to investigate the 
clearing/event that opens up historical being as a binding historical world 
that we are called to take over as a groundless destiny. In this, thinking 
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itself has to renounce phenomenology as its modus operandi and instead 
take the form of a historical reflection on the unthought possibilities of 
meaning always already harbored by our history.  
      But how does this effort succeed? 
      So far – in the first and second part of the thesis – I have concentrated 
my main critical interest on laying bare the deep ambivalences in 
Heidegger’s earlier thought issuing from his central attempt to work out 
the historicity of phenomenal understanding while at the same time falling 
back on the phenomenological method of intuitive description in his own 
concrete investigations. Now I will turn to critically interrogating the 
systematic clarificatory force of Heidegger’s later effort to articulate the 
radical historicity of being and thinking.  
      My critique will focus on two of the basic ambitions of Heidegger’s 
later thinking of the clearing/event of being: first, on his attempt to 
compensate for the rejected question of truth by accounting for how our 
historical world can arise and address us as a binding destiny; second, on 
his attempt to account for the bindingness of the world as the ultimate 
source of ethical-existential significance, which allows as to experience 
particular beings as significant and important in the first place.  
      Both these aspects of Heidegger’s thinking have been subject to 
critical challenge before. Ernst Tugendhat and, more recently, Cristina 
Lafont have criticized Heidegger’s rejection of the question of truth 
concerning our historical world, both arguing that this rejection is 
unjustified and leads Heidegger to advocate a dogmatic acceptance of our 
factical world. However, even though I believe Tugendhat’s and Lafont’s 
critique is ultimately on target it seems to me that both of them 
underestimate the extent to which Heidegger, although rejecting the 
question of truth, nevertheless remains acutely concerned with the 
problem of how to distinguish between prejudiced and primordial 
understanding of historical being. As a result, they fail to diagnose how 
this problem forces Heidegger to hark back – in an extremely ambivalent 
way – to an intuition-based phenomenological method in the concrete 
investigations of Being and Time. Neither do they offer any extended critical 
examination of Heidegger’s later attempt to compensate for the question 
of truth by accounting for how a historical world can arise and address us 
as a binding destiny. By contrast, Emmanuel Levinas has leveled severe 
critique at Heidegger’s idea of our historical world as the source of 
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significance of all beings, insisting that Heidegger’s ontological difference 
reduces and covers up our primary ethical relation to the other human 
being, who encounters us and claims us as such irrespective of the 
historical world we happen to live in. Still, although I also agree with the 
basic thrust of Levinas’s critique he, too, refrains from offering a detailed 
analysis of Heidegger’s late account of the bindingness of the world. 
Whereas I have already analyzed Tugendhat’s critique in the second part 
of the thesis, I will discuss Lafont and Levinas in some detail in the 
epilogue.  
      In my critique, I will concentrate on Heidegger’s ability to 
compensate/account for the question of truth and for the question of 
ethical-existential significance, leaving aside the other questions and 
themes that he is grappling with. Although severe, the purpose of my 
critique is not just negative in the sense of demonstrating deficiencies and 
inconsistencies in Heidegger’s thought but essentially positive. In critically 
probing what Heidegger wants to but cannot account for these questions 
are opened up anew for us in the light of the challenge that his thinking 
poses to so many of our traditional ways of handling them. Moreover, by 
exposing the problems and unclarities of Heidegger’s highest 
philosophical ambitions it becomes possible to clarify and appropriate the 
genuine sense and insights of his thinking within their proper limits. The 
work of critically delimiting the truths and insights of Heidegger’s 
manifold paths of thinking still to a large extent lies ahead of us and here I 
can do no more than hint at some of these tasks.  
        In staking out the limits of Heidegger’s late historical thinking, I 
already anticipate the epilogue of the thesis, in which I go on to question 
the ontological difference at the root of Heidegger’s conception of the 
historicity of being, and provisionally outline a more positive vision of 
what I suggest is our openness towards beings as the source of truth and 
significance. Here is – as a backdrop for my critical delimitations – a rough 
outline of my positive account, which consists of two basic claims. First, I 
will suggest that our conceptual understanding, although always already 
guided by our factical concepts, is essentially open towards the particular 
matters that we experience, and that these matters constitute the source of 
truth of our understanding. Hence, I will suggest that our historical 
concepts and meanings do not determine our experience; rather, they 
constitute our provisional grasp of the matters and situations we 
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experience, whereby their truth/untruth consists in their ability to open up 
and illuminate or cover up and distort these matters. Second, I will suggest 
– following Levinas – that we, prior to and irrespectively of every 
historical context of meaning, encounter the other human being – and, in 
a way both similar and different, the animal – as someone who matters to 
me and addresses me personally, and whom I can either relate to in an 
open and loving way or whom I can turn away from and grasp solely in 
terms of the social role or meaning I ascribe to her. This primary access to 
the other as someone to love and care for is, I will argue, nothing but our 
basic source of moral and existential significance. As such, it is also the 
origin of whatever possible moral relevance our historical concepts and 
values can have in our lives.   
      In what follows I will basically rely on my previous explication of 
Heidegger’s later thinking of phenomenality, and refrain from detailed 
commentaries on his texts. I will begin by interrogating the ability of 
Heidegger’s conception of the clearing/event of being to account for the 
bindingness of the world. After that, I turn to examining the limits and 
possibilities of his late historical mode of thinking. 
 
The Bindingness of Historical Being 
 
Heidegger’s late thinking of the clearing/event of being is intended to 
show how a historical world can open up and prevail as a groundless 
binding destiny. 
       I have already explicated Heidegger’s conception of the dynamics that 
opens up a world in some detail. It comprises two main moments: First, 
thinking articulates the clearing/event as the self-withdrawing happening 
which grants historical being as a groundless and finite destiny. Second, 
the work of art – poetry above all – opens up a concrete world by co-
realizing the strife between the world and the earth, i.e., by gathering the 
world as a finite paradigmatic totality of meaning on the basis of the still 
undetermined meanings bestowed by our history and on the basis of the 
dark materiality and sensuousness of the earth. What is it in this account 
that is supposed to grant to the world its status of something ultimate and 
binding that we are to receive and accept? 
      To begin with, it is crucial to take note of the basic role that 
Heidegger’s conception of the clearing/event as a groundless happening 
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plays in his account of what it means to take over a world. To the extent 
that historical being is always granted as a groundless and finite 
constellation of meaning, we are confronted with the necessity of having 
to take over a certain finite world as a destiny without final grounds or 
reasons. If, however – as I will argue – our historical worlds of meaning 
do not determine but are in fact open towards the particular beings and 
situations that they grasp, then these worlds and their conceptual elements 
are strictly speaking not groundless at all but essentially part of our 
struggle with the truth: to open up to and take responsibility for or turn a 
blind eye to what we see – or could see, if we wanted to. Then, moreover, 
we are strictly speaking never faced with the necessity of accepting a world 
as a groundless and finite destiny. On the contrary, once we take heed of 
the dynamics of truth at the heart of our understanding, the very notion 
that we need to take over a certain constellation of meaning as a 
groundless destiny emerges as serving basically the same legitimizing 
existential function as the old metaphysical project of grounding: it allows 
us to close our eyes and opt for a certain framework of meaning with the 
legitimizing and reassuring argument – ground – that such decisions are 
necessary and cannot in principle be grounded. To be sure, there are 
situations in which we are faced with the problem of choosing a strategy 
of action on the basis of ideas whose truth is uncertain, and which may 
still prove false or misleading, but such an ungrounded choice does not 
cancel out but rather presupposes the dynamics of truth. The challenge of 
such a choice consists precisely in the need to act upon a set of ideas 
without being able to ground them while knowing all too well that they are 
not groundless in themselves but will eventually show up to be more or 
less true or false.  
      Still, although Heidegger believes that the world ultimately has to be 
understood and taken over as groundless this does not mean that he 
would conceive of historical worlds as arbitrary possibilities for us to 
choose between according to who knows what preference. Indeed his 
description of the strife between the world and the earth in “The Origin 
of the Work of Art” constitutes precisely an attempt to show what it is 
that allows a world to assert itself as a strong and binding destiny. 
However, apart from his concrete description of the strife Heidegger does 
not offer any additional explanation of how the different moments of the 
strife are supposed to grant to the world its binding power. The only way 
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to explicate Heidegger’s conception is thus to extract those moments of 
the dynamics of being which could be thought to perform this function.  
      Here are some candidates for such moments: 
      1. In so far as the work of art receives and gathers meanings harbored 
by our history in a yet undetermined manner, this could be taken to imply 
that these meanings are able to address us as familiar and age-old. Though 
Heidegger believes that a new world always arises in a revolutionary 
tension to the old it nevertheless draws on and gives expression to 
meanings which are always already there in our heritage.  
      2. In so far as the work of art gathers and articulates meanings which 
constitute an unthought and conditioning dimension of our previous 
understanding, this could be taken to imply that these meanings are able to 
address us as cognitively-dialectically superior or even uncircumventable in 
relation to the old.  
      3. To the extent that the work of art grounds the world on the earth 
(remembering that this does not upset the ontological difference, that the 
world does not need to measure up to the earth as an autonomous source 
of meaning, but, rather, that the historically received meanings of the 
world only need to be specified and fleshed out in accordance with the 
local earth), this could be taken to entail that the world is able to address 
us as rooted in and expressive of our local material-sensuous milieu, to 
which we are more or less adapted and emotionally attuned.  
      4. To the extent that the artwork gathers and presents the meanings of 
the world in the form of concrete paradigmatic figures, this could be taken 
to strengthen the aesthetic-dramatic power of the world to impress and 
overawe us.  
      5. In so far as the work of art involves consecration and praising of 
our paradigmatic values as holy gods this could be taken to entail 
employing various mechanisms of collective pressure – e.g. putting the 
gods on pedestal in the social space, surrounding them with limits and 
taboos, singing their praise and condemning their denial – to invest the 
world with social import.   
      Now it seems that all the reasons I tried to extract from Heidegger’s 
account in the end amount to different sorts of rhetorical-persuasive force: 
cognitive-dialectical force in so far as the meanings of the world appear 
not as true or false in relation to some independent beings or absolute 
standards but as in some sense cognitively superior in relation to other 
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meanings; sentimental force in so far as they appear as historically familiar 
and expressive of our local natural milieu; aesthetic-dramatic force in so 
far as they address us as a striking and overpowering paradigm of 
meaning; collective force in so far as the address us as ideals regulating the 
honor and shame of the community.  
      Our questions are: Can Heidegger’s conception of the rhetorical-
persuasive force of historical worlds compensate for the question of the 
truth, and uphold the crucial distinction between prejudice and primordial 
understanding? Moreover, can it account for a source of ethical-existential 
significance distinct from mere power and prejudice, and constituting a 
motive beyond our egoistic-collectivist desires? Let us consider these two 
questions successively. 
   
The question of truth. As we have seen, Heidegger from the outset 
rejects the possibility of conceiving of our understanding of the world as 
true or false. Since the world constitutes the historical network of meaning 
which determines what we can grasp as meaningful phenomena it cannot 
in itself be true by corresponding to or false by misrepresenting beings 
accessible independently of this world. But is this move viable? Is it 
possible to replace the notion of truth with a notion of the rhetorical-
persuasive force of our concepts without losing the capacity to account 
for essential elements of our experience and understanding? Can 
Heidegger’s account provide an alternative or better description of what I 
have called the truth or falsity of our understanding? 
      It does not seem so. 
      The basic problem of Heidegger’s conception of the rhetorical-
persuasive force of the world – and the differences in such force – is, I 
think, that it cannot account for or replace the difference between the 
truth and falsity of our conceptual understanding. There seems to be 
nothing that prevents a historical constellation of meaning which fulfills all 
the criteria of rhetorical-persuasive force laid down by Heidegger from 
nevertheless containing essential elements of untruth – tendencies to omit, 
cover up and distort different aspects of our de facto experience – just as 
there seems to be nothing that prevents a conceptual setup that fails to 
satisfy these criteria from being able to open up and illuminate the matters 
we experience. 
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      Consider, as an example, a culture that since time immemorial has 
upheld a rigorous classification of people into separate groups or classes 
characterized by different tasks, different social status and different codes 
of honor – all this, of course, in accordance with the will of the gods. Now 
there seems to be no principal hindrance for this world to fulfill all 
Heidegger’s criteria for a strong historical world nor for freeing it of its 
metaphysical-theological self-interpretation and affirming it as a 
groundless destiny: it could articulate comparatively convincing meaning-
possibilities harbored by the history of the culture in question, it could be 
rooted in and expressive of the local earth, it could – through art and 
other founding practices – be manifest in a strong paradigmatic shape. 
But, even so, it could be false and distortive in many respects: its 
classification of people into groups could be shown to cover up and 
distort essential aspects of what we de facto experience in our relations to 
others, for example that the other person primarily addresses me not on 
account of her social role or group but in herself – as a “you” whom I can 
either relate to in an open and caring way or close myself to and deal with 
only in terms of her social role and attributes; moreover, the origins of this 
classification could be shown to lie not in the gods or in the groundless 
happening of being but in the complex weave of existential motives 
(power, repression, utility, love, curiosity, hunger, etc.) and historical 
givens which tend to decide the shape of history. Indeed – as I will argue 
in the epilogue – it seems that all the historical meanings and concepts we 
employ to grasp human and natural realities beyond our factical concepts 
are centrally characterized by a dynamics of truth which cannot be 
reduced to a matter of rhetorical-persuasive power: regardless of their 
rhetorical-persuasive force, it belongs to these concepts that they can be 
more or less true or false, that is, more or less good – illuminating, 
opening, rich – or bad – obfuscating, distortive, poor – in helping us grasp 
the matters we experience.  
        However, would it not be possible to argue that Heidegger’s 
conception leaves open the possibility in principle of a critical reflection 
on different conceptual alternatives on the basis of the concepts and 
meaning-possibilities at hand – a reflection which, although renouncing 
the idea that our concepts could be true or false in relation to some 
independent reality, would be able to account for differences in cognitive 
force and rationality that would transcend differences in pure rhetorical 
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force? The fact is that Heidegger himself never develops any notion of a 
historical reflection that would critically assess and compare the cognitive 
force of different substantial worlds and meanings. This, however, does 
not shut out the possibility that such a critical reflection could find a place 
within the framework of his thinking. Indeed, many attempt have been 
made to develop the idea of such a reflection by philosophers largely 
sharing the historicism of Heidegger, e.g., by Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Charles Taylor and Alisdair MacIntyre.975  
      Although I cannot offer any ample treatment of this notion here, I 
briefly want to mention my reasons for thinking that no intraconceptual 
reflection can account for the dimension of truth characterizing our 
understanding. The idea at stake here is basically the idea that the 
historical conceptual possibilities at our disposal in themselves provide a 
basis for critically judging different conceptual constellations: concepts 
within our own tradition can be shown to be incoherent or unclear, or to 
contravene or have the character haphazard ad hoc-constructions in 
relation to more basic concepts within our historical understanding; 
regarding the possibility of critically assessing different historical 
frameworks of meaning - worlds, traditions – it almost always seems 
possible to find common conceptual ground on the basis of which a 
discussion can be enacted. Still, whatever forms such a critical reflection 
could exhibit it is hard to see that it could ever account or compensate for 
the question of the truth and untruth of concepts that belongs to our 
understanding of conceptual meaning. However strong or justified a 
constellation of meaning may appear in relation to our most basic 
concepts, or however basic a concept or meaning may be within our 
overall understanding – this does not make them true. The cognitive force 
or weakness of a concept issuing from its role within some conceptual 
context simply does not coincide with its being true of false in the 
irreducible sense of illuminating or distorting what we actually experience. 
Of course, concepts may seem self-evident and unquestionable to us on 
account of their normality, their historical dignity, their collective 
acceptedness, their role within a theoretical framework, their emotional 
and aesthetic vigor, and so on, but all these elements of rhetorical-
persuasive force can be distinguished from the ability of our concepts to 
                                         
975 Cf. Gadamer 1990; Taylor 1989; 1995b; MacIntyre 1977; 1985.  
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open up and organize our experience of the world. In fact, it is very hard 
to see how such historical reflection on the relative cognitive force of our 
concepts – which does not stop at negative critique – could strictly 
speaking be carried out at all without more or less covertly referring to the 
ability of the concepts in question to illuminate experiences that are not 
already totally determined by these concepts.    
      It seems that Heidegger’s bypassing of the dynamics of truth and 
falsity makes it impossible for him to account for what it means to 
understand concepts and meanings in the first place. It is precisely the 
openness of our concepts towards that which they conceive that makes it 
possible for such concepts to be illuminating, clarifying, enabling or 
distortive, misleading, obstructive – whether we take these alternatives as 
reasons for appropriating or for rejecting them (it is of course not unusual 
that we make a concept our own precisely because it allows us to see what 
we want to see and disregard what we do not want to see). Not only does 
this openness form an integral moment of our understanding and 
appropriation of concepts within our own culture; it also lets us see how 
the encounter between different worlds and cultures always revolves 
around an irreducible dimension of shared experience. As soon as we 
recognize this, the very idea of our ultimate referredness to finite historical 
contexts of meaning, and of the possibility of radical conceptual gaps 
between different worlds and the necessity of finding common ground, 
loses its grip on us and emerges as a dogmatic construction. If our 
concepts would not offer themselves to us as possibilities to grasp or 
misinterpret matters that we experience irrespective of these concepts, 
would not our understanding of concepts be reduced to something like a 
skill in playing an autistic game with more or less determinate rules? A 
game which, to the extent that it determines truth in itself has nothing to 
do with truth, falsity, illusion, mistake, self-deception and insight? A 
Glasperlenspiel. 
      My critique of Heidegger’s conception of the radical historicity of 
being and thinking should not cover up but rather enable us to see the 
true – yet limited – insights of this conception. Hence, as Heidegger’s 
reflections have shown, there is no doubt that we always already live in a 
factical historical context of meanings and concepts, which unthematically 
guides our experience of and expectations about the beings and situations 
we experience, which provides the customary patterns for thinking and 
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talking about things, and which also forms the point of departure for 
every modification of our concepts. However, our historical concepts do 
not determine our experience of meaningful phenomena so that they 
would be immune to the question of truth; rather; they constitute nothing 
but our factical fallible – more or less true – grasp of what we experience 
independently of these concepts. Also, Heidegger’s analysis of the 
clearing/event of being points to important aspects of those mechanisms 
that allow a world to address us as cognitively and emotionally powerful. 
Such power, however, has nothing to do with the truth or untruth of the 
world. Moreover, Heidegger’s inability to account for the difference 
between truth and power – and to see to what extent his own analysis 
focuses on power – severely weakens his capacity to critically analyze the 
different motives that interact in the formation of collective contexts of 
meaning.976 
 
The question of ethical-existential significance. Heidegger’s analysis 
of the basic historical structure of phenomenality implies not only that our 
historical world contains the patterns of meaning which determine what 
we can experience as unified phenomena, but also that it constitutes the 
source which grants to particular beings their significance and weight. 
Prior to our understanding of our historical world – so the argument goes 
– we merely have access to a pointless and chaotic sensuality, so that it is 
only on the basis of the gods and purposes of our historical world that 
                                         
976 In Being and Time, Heidegger’s analysis of the “They” displayed a sharp awareness of 
the mechanisms of collective pressure, especially as regards their role in shaping and 
directing our understanding and speaking. It is, however, no coincidence that he drops 
the notion of the “They” after Being and Time, and that it never reappears in his later 
writings. Why is this so? What made it possible for Heidegger to make room for the 
notion of the “They” in Being and Time was that he could still – although with difficulty 
– handle the distinction between the prejudiced understanding of the They and a more 
originary understanding, since he held on – in an extremely ambivalent manner – to 
the possibility of a direct phenomenological experience of the matters themselves as a 
measure of understanding. However, in his later writings he attempts to account for 
the difference between historical worlds solely in terms of their different degrees of 
rhetorical-persuasive power. As a result, the holy and binding world that Heidegger 
envisions – in contrast to the powerless and levelled world of European modernity – 
is nothing but a world with superior rhetorical-persuasive force, a kind of idealized 
and sublimated They-world. It would certainly have been difficult for Heidegger to 
pursue his analysis of the They in this context without disturbing his concepts of 
“holiness” and “bindingness” by revealing their basis in collective pressure.   
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particular beings can show up as significant phenomena that matter to us 
and claim us.  
      Although Heidegger’s existential analytic in Being and Time already gave 
rise to the question about the bindingness of Dasein’s historical purposes, 
he was not yet able to explicitly interrogate how such purposes can 
address us as important. One of the main objectives of Heidegger’s later 
analysis of the dynamics which opens up being – the strife between the 
world and the earth – is to provide an answer to the question how a 
historical world can arise and claim us as binding and holy. Hence, we 
need to ask: Can Heidegger’s conception of the bindingness of historical 
worlds compensate for his rejection of the possibility of a direct 
experience of others as significant in themselves? Can it account for how 
our world addresses us as binding and holy in a way that distinguishes it 
from mere collective pressure and prejudice? 
      It seems that this is impossible. 
      As I see it, the basic problem of Heidegger’s conception lies in his 
denial of the possibility of encountering other people – or animals – as 
persons who concern and claim us as such, and whom we can love and 
care for, irrespectively of the historical context of values and purposes that 
we happen to live in. As a result, Heidegger’s analysis of the rhetorical-
persuasive power of historical worlds is essentially unable to account for 
ethical-existential significance beyond collective pressure.   
      Let us again reflect on the familiar example of a culture that upholds 
an age-old division of people into different hierarchically ordered groups 
or classes. Such a world, it seems, could well appear as holy and binding 
according to Heidegger’s criteria: it could address us as familiar and 
alluring on account of its ability to bring to expression ancient historical 
ideals as well as the local earth; its highest ideals – its gods – could appear 
as cognitively-dialectically superior to our previous ideals; the paradigmatic 
shaping of the gods in art and poetry could be aesthetically-dramatically 
striking and sublime; the gods could finally be invested with all the 
collective force issuing from their function as standards for what the 
community holds to be honorable or shameful.  
      However, all the aspects of rhetorical-persuasive force listed above as 
granting holiness to the world are radically separate from the kind of 
ethical claim which we experience in encountering another human being. 
Whatever ideals or values such a world contains – be they better or worse 
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– the rhetorical and collective force they exert on us must be sharply 
distinguished from the ethical significance of the other person: to 
experience a certain historical paradigm as holy in Heidegger’s sense is 
basically just to be impressed by its rhetorical-aesthetic-cognitive force and 
its status within the community; it has nothing to do with the other 
person’s ethical appeal to me, which is independent of the rhetorical-
persuasive power of my historical world. Correspondingly, our existential 
motives for wanting to comply with the values and ideals of our historical 
world are basically reducible to our egoistic-collectivist desire to excel in 
the eyes of our community, and need involve no genuine care for other 
particular persons as such. Hence, to deny or transgress the parameters of 
such a holy world could never in itself give rise to bad conscience or to 
remorse but only to feelings of collective shame and guilt.  
      These considerations seem to hold not only for whole worlds but for 
all our ethical-existential concepts and values: taken by themselves such 
concepts – e.g. goodness, love, freedom, courage, honor, trust, envy, 
authenticity – cannot make any ethical claim on us at all save for the 
power they exert on us on account of their role and status within our 
historical community. And how could they? As soon as we raise the 
question in earnest, it immediately seems quite unintelligible how a 
historical paradigm of meaning could ever address us as important in 
itself, as something we could care about for its own sake or which could 
grant meaning to anything else.  
      Heidegger’s notion of historical being as the ultimate source of ethical-
existential significance becomes especially problematic in his conception 
of the logic of fall and rebirth characterizing historical worlds. Given – as 
Heidegger argues – that we live in the nihilistic end-stage of the history of 
metaphysics, in which the world has grown dim and powerless and all 
beings – e.g. human beings – have lost their significance for us, it becomes 
our highest task to think the openness of being in order to prepare the 
possibility of the onset of a holy and binding historical world, a task which 
is superior to and overrides every ethical concern for particular human 
beings. What basically happens here is that Heidegger’s disavowal of our 
primary ethical relation to others takes the form of a concrete denial of 
their significance in the present situation, and of a false promise to restore 
their significance as the result of the establishment of a strong collective 
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world – although in fact such a world would in no way open up the appeal 
of the other.  
      Earlier I argued that it was precisely the above scheme of thought that 
constituted a basic motivation for Heidegger’s engagement in National 
Socialism. However, although Heidegger in his later thinking rejects 
Nazism, which he interprets as a manifestation of the modern techno-
subjectivist understanding of being, he nevertheless retains his notion of 
the priority of ontology over ethics as well as his idea of the destruction of 
the meaning of our old world and the need to project a new meaningful 
world. The ethical deficit of this scheme manifests itself especially plainly 
in those passages where he highlights the import of his own thinking by 
contrasting it to merely ontic matters and catastrophes. For example, in 
“On the Question of Being” from 1955 Heidegger compares the polemos of 
the history of being with ordinary wars: “This is no war, but the polemos 
that first lets gods and humans, freemen and slaves, appear in their 
respective essence and enacts a differentiating dispute of being. Compared 
to this dispute, world wars remain superficial. They are less and less 
capable of deciding anything the more technological their armaments.”977 
In “The Thing” Heidegger makes use of a similar contrast:  
 
Man stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb could bring 
with it. He does not see that the atom bomb and its explosion are 
the mere final emission of what has long since taken place, has 
already happened. Not to mention the single hydrogen bomb, 
whose triggering, thought through to its utmost potential, might be 
enough to snuff out all life on earth. What is this helpless anxiety 
still waiting for, if the terrible has already happened?978 
 
                                         
977 GA 9, p. 424f.: “Es ist kein Krieg, sondern der Πόλεμος, der Götter und 
Menschen, Freie und Knechte, erst in ihr jeweiliges Wesen erscheinen läßt und eine 
Aus-einander-setzung des Seins heraufführt. Mit ihr verglichen, bleiben Weltkriege 
vordergründig. Sie vermögen immer weniger zu entscheiden, je technischer sie sich 
rüsten.” 
978 GA 7, p. 168: “Der Mensch starrt auf das, was mit der Explosion der Atombombe 
kommen könnte. Der Mensch sieht nicht, was lang schon angekommen ist und zwar 
geschenist als das, was nur noch als seinen letzten Auswurf die Atombombe und 
deren Explosion aus sich hinauswirft, um von der einen Wasserstoffbombe zu 
schweigen, deren Initialzündung, in der weitesten Möglichkeit gedacht, genügen 
könnte, um alles Leben auf der Erde auszulöschen. Worauf wartet diese ratlose Angst 
noch, wenn das Entsetzliche schon geschehen ist?” 
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What is it that makes these passages so worrying? The problem is not, of 
course, that they are too gloomy and pessimistic in their diagnosis of our 
time as characterized by a reductive and dehumanizing metaphysics. What 
makes them so sad and problematic is rather the deep contempt and 
closedness towards the lives and suffering of concrete human beings that 
they express, which in effect make Heidegger’s apocalyptic projection of a 
greater metaphysical catastrophe appear as a petty flight from the moral 
heart of life: if the lives of others human beings are not more important 
than that – if they are not absolutely important in themselves, regardless 
of the historical framework of meaning within the framework of which we 
happen to encounter them – then it is unintelligible why Heidegger’s 
metaphysical catastrophes would be anything to worry about.  
      Still, the misleading pretensions of Heidegger’s conception should not 
make us blind to the limited truths that it contains. Heidegger is 
doubtlessly right in claiming that we always already live in historical 
contexts of collective ideals and values which exert a powerful pressure on 
us, although this pressure should be clearly distinguished from the ethical-
existential appeal and significance of the other human being. Moreover, in 
his analyses of the dynamics that makes a historical world arise and shine 
forth he is able to indicate some of the vital mechanisms that contribute to 
uphold the rhetorical-persuasive power of collective ideals and values. 
However, Heidegger’s confused equation of the holiness of the world with 
its rhetorical-persuasive power substantially hampers his ability to 
transparently analyze the power interests that shape our historical worlds 
and sharply distinguish them from truth and ethical significance. Finally, it 
must be said that Heidegger’s diagnosis of modernity in terms of an 
increasingly technical understanding of being contains important analyses 
and insights although I think that he ultimately misinterprets the basic 
sense of the situation and the tasks it engenders.  
 
The Limits and Possibilities of Historical Thought 
 
Heidegger’s basic analysis of the historical structure of phenomenality 
induces him to develop a radically historical mode of thinking. While this 
ambition largely remained at the level of program in Being and Time, his 
later texts constitute a series of attempts to elaborate and enact such a 
thinking concretely. But how does this attempt succeed? What kind of 
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truth or cognitive force can Heidegger’s historical thinking lay claim to? 
What are the principal possibilities and limits of such thinking?  
      Let me begin by briefly recapitulating the basic setup of Heidegger’s 
historical thinking: 
      Since our phenomenal experience of beings as beings is determined by 
our preceding understanding of the historical meanings and contexts in 
which we live the possibility of thinking must in some sense consist in 
tracing and articulating the most qualified meanings that our history 
harbors. However, we presently live in a metaphysical understanding of 
being which is both distorted and uprooted: on the one hand, it 
understands being as presence – ousia – while leaving unthought and 
covering up the happening which opens up present being; on the other 
hand, it has been detached from its historical origin and handed down 
through history in an autistic fashion, so that it even lacks a clear grasp of 
its own basic understanding of being as presence. Hence, the task of 
thinking becomes to free ourselves from our metaphysical understanding 
of being and gain access to an understanding of the openness of being. 
But how? In Being and Time Heidegger thought that thinking must take the 
form of a destruction which dismantles our uprooted basic ontological 
concepts by tracing them back to their historical origin. This origin he 
found in Aristotle, whose texts, he believed, not only established the 
understanding of being as presence-at-hand dominating the history of 
philosophy but also – in an ambivalent manner – harbored a more 
originary understanding of the temporal sense of being. By returning to 
Aristotle he thus believed it would be possible to clarify the meaning of 
our received understanding of being, to free ourselves from this 
understanding, and to retrieve the more originary understanding of the 
temporality of being which Aristotle’s texts have in store. However, since 
Heidegger did not yet pursue the question of how an originary historical 
understanding of being is given, his investigations in Being and Time did not 
in fact transpire through a retrieval of Aristotle but through direct 
phenomenological descriptions of the structures of Dasein. As Heidegger 
later elaborates his historical thinking, he is also guided by the conviction 
that in order for thinking to overcome metaphysics it needs to return to 
the first beginning of metaphysics in Plato and Aristotle. However, in 
contrast to his earlier view that thinking could proceed as a critical 
retrieval of Aristotle he now holds that it needs to take on the character of 
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a reflection, which, by attending to the controversiality and groundlessness 
of our basic metaphysical understanding of being as presence is able to 
think and articulate what this understanding presupposes yet essentially 
leaves unthought: the happening which opens up being.  
      In the preceding paragraphs I argued that Heidegger’s basic denial of 
the openness of our historical concepts towards the beings they conceive 
makes him unable to account for the truth or falsity of our concepts – 
their ability to illuminate or cover up things – so that his analysis of the 
dynamics which opens up being is only able to provide a description of 
the rhetorical-persuasive force of these concepts. In the end, this also 
means that his late attempt at a historical thinking which fundamentally 
transpires as an internal reflection on our historical meanings and 
concepts is doomed to lack the capacity to openly describe the matters at 
stake as that which alone can measure the truth of our concepts and allow 
us to distinguish them from prejudices. However, even though 
Heidegger’s historical thinking is unable to offer independent positive 
articulations of the matters it may still have important philosophical 
functions to perform. In what follows, I will briefly examine the two main 
methodological components of Heidegger’s late historical thinking with a 
view to their limits and possibilities: 1. The method of returning to the 
historical origin of our understanding. 2. The method of attending to the 
controversiality and groundlessness characterizing our metaphysical 
understanding of being as a way to articulating the happening which opens 
up being.  
 
The method of returning to the historical origin. For Heidegger the 
task of returning to the historical origin of our current understanding of 
being is no secondary appendage to some primary systematic investigation 
but constitutes the necessary way for thinking to access its matter: the 
openness of being. This notion of the necessity of a historical return rests 
heavily on two ideas: first, on the idea that our historical meanings are 
rooted in an originary opening of the world; second, on a specific 
interpretation of the autistic history of Western philosophy. 
      According to the later Heidegger, all our historical meanings and 
concepts ultimately have their origin in the creative-receptive realization of 
the happening of being whereby a historical world is opened up. It is here, 
in this originary event, that meanings are formed and acquire their 
460 The Openness of Being 
 
 
concrete paradigmatic shape. This, Heidegger claims, is precisely what 
happened in ancient Greece. On the backdrop of the early pre-Socratic – 
still vague and groping – conception of the openness of being as physis 
Plato and Aristotle developed an understanding of being as ousia: presence. 
The fateful thing about this metaphysical understanding of being, 
however, was that it left unthought and covered up the historical 
happening which made it possible. Since the guiding ontological 
understanding of philosophy thus blinded itself to the historicity of being, 
philosophy henceforth became the prisoner of this understanding, 
following and transmitting it in an autistic fashion without questioning its 
roots or legitimacy. As a result of this autistic uprooting of its dominating 
metaphysical understanding of being, philosophy also gradually lost sight 
of the originary meaning of this understanding as it gave way to a more 
and more technical and subjectivist interpretation of being. This 
constellation prescribes Heidegger’s view of the necessary methodological 
pathway of thinking: to trace our current understanding back to its 
historical origin in Plato and Aristotle, the first beginning, in order to 
clarify its basic and guiding interpretation of being as presence; then, to 
reflect on the roots of being in the clearing/event of being, which Plato 
and Aristotle presupposed but essentially left unthought, and, by so doing, 
open up the possibility of a new realization of the happening of being: an 
other beginning.  
      But what about the truth of this picture? 
      In fact, I think that the basic premise of Heidegger’s conception of the 
historicity of being,  which supports his idea of the necessity of returning 
to historical origins, is untrue. The openness of our concepts towards that 
which they conceive implies that we are not referred to the meanings and 
concepts of our history as a groundless ground, moreover, that our 
meanings do not receive their concrete content from a primordial world-
opening event. Although it is true that we always already live in historical 
conceptualities which primarily tend to guide our understanding, and 
which may be more or less empty and prejudiced, we are nevertheless free 
in principle to openly see and examine the matters we experience as the 
source of truth of our concepts. From this, however, it follows that even 
though the traditional concepts primarily guiding our sight would have the 
character of uprooted prejudices, there would be no essential need to 
return to their historical origin in order to emancipate ourselves from their 
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grip and access the matters. Indeed, it also follows that such a historical 
return cannot by itself yield any independent understanding of our 
concepts-and-their-matters at all. On its own it can only shed light on the 
histories of our conceptual formations and widen our horizons of 
conceptual possibilities without itself being able to distinguish 
understanding from mere prejudice. By contrast, the very possibility of an 
independent understanding resides in an open seeing and explication of 
the matters we experience, whereby the truth and meaning of the concepts 
we employ lie in their ability to help us grasp the matters in question.   
      Consequently, Heidegger’s view of the historical logic and 
development of philosophy cannot be right. Even if philosophy had been 
dominated by an understanding of being covering up its own historical 
character, this would not have made it captive of its own heritage even 
though it might certainly have weakened its predisposition to question it 
critically. Since we are essentially open towards whatever we experience no 
historical beginning or paradigm could ever determine and delimit our 
possibilities of seeing and understanding with any necessity. Hence, 
Heidegger’s depiction of the history of Western philosophy as an autistic 
and unified series of events completely determined by the metaphysical 
understanding of being issued by the first Greek beginning cannot but 
emerge as a dogmatic construction. To be sure, his diagnosis of the 
metaphysical nature of philosophy in my view captures a basic tendency in 
the history of philosophy and I also agree that the context of Greek 
philosophy provides an exemplary zone for reflecting on the driving 
problems and motives of philosophy – as well as on alternatives to these. 
Still, I think there is no doubt that Heidegger’s mythologizing narrative 
about the history of philosophy as a monolithic unity determined by a 
singular Greek origin belongs to the weakest parts of his thinking: as 
concerns the matter of philosophy, it dogmatically shuts out all alternative 
questions, problems, motives, and tasks as irrelevant in relation to the 
determining metaphysical understanding of being; as concerns the 
historical sources of philosophy, it systematically disregards other 
traditions and contexts as irrelevant in relation to the straight Euro-Greco-
462 The Openness of Being 
 
 
Germano-centric line of development Heidegger so badly wants to draw 
up from the Greeks to his own thinking.979  
      My claim about the openness of our conceptual understanding 
towards what we experience also has consequences for what it means to 
interpret the historical texts of philosophy. Granted that we are always 
fundamentally free in relation to the meanings and concepts we inherit – 
free to see the matters we experience, and to probe and modify the 
meaning of our concepts on the basis of this experience – this 
predicament also pertains to the texts of philosophy. Even though a text 
would take over its central concepts from the tradition without explicit 
critical reflection on their sedimented meanings, this would not in 
principal prevent it from modifying and giving new meaning to these 
concepts through its concrete analyses and descriptions of the matters in 
question. This freedom also pertains in relation to concepts which the text 
adopts as ontologically or otherwise systematically-architectonically basic. 
There is thus nothing that precludes a text from uncritically taking over 
some basic metaphysical concepts, e.g. of being or the human being, and 
nevertheless provide descriptions which are not determined by these 
concepts – although the relation between different levels of the text might 
in effect become contradictory and unclear. Hence, despite the fact that 
philosophy has always suffered from a strong tendency to let itself be 
guided by traditional concepts in a prejudiced manner, when we read a 
philosophical text it is always an open question to what extent the 
traditional philosophical concepts it employs determine the direction and 
content of its investigations and to what extent its concrete investigations 
determine the meaning of these concepts.   
      The upshot of this is that Heidegger’s strong thesis about the 
necessary and fundamental nature of historical reflection is not only 
wrong, but that the strategy of historical interpretation it induces runs an 
essential risk of neglecting and misinterpreting the meaning of 
philosophical works. Heidegger’s late readings of philosophical texts have 
a strong tendency to follow some version of the following scheme: first, 
an explication of the basic ontological concepts of the text, revealing that 
these concepts have been taken over from the tradition without a radical 
questioning of their meaning; second, a tracing of these concepts back to 
                                         
979 For a critique of Heidegger’s monolithic narrative of the history of philosophy see, 
e.g., Derrida 1989.  
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their historical sources; third a clarification of the originary meaning of 
these concepts and their unthought premises. Still, if the above 
considerations are accurate no examination of the ontological-systematic 
grounds of a text and of its ability to question them critically can decide in 
advance the extent to which the text has been able to emancipate itself 
from these concepts. The only way to decide this is to follow the concrete 
investigations of the text and find out what they are able to teach us about 
the matters it discusses – and thus about its concepts – in such a way that 
we, guided by the text, independently try to see and understand the 
matters as well as we can. If, however, we all too hastily interpret the text 
from its basic concepts and infer the meaning of these concepts 
historically we risk blinding ourselves to what the text actually has to say 
and falsely reduce it to some historical meaning from which it has in fact 
freed itself. 
      It is clear, I think, that Heidegger’s late strategy of historical 
interpretation, tied as it is to his mythical conception of the logic of origin-
and-fall characterizing the history of philosophy, entails a strong tendency 
to downplay the autonomy and manifold meanings of particular texts and 
let them collapse into their roles in the monolithic story he has to tell 
about the history of Western philosophy. By this, however, I do not mean 
to suggest that Heidegger’s immense concrete work of explicating 
historical texts would completely fall victim to the distortive tendencies of 
the scheme of historical reflection outlined above. Far from it. In fact, I 
think there is no doubt that Heidegger’s historical explications to a large 
extent exhibit an exemplary ability to engage the texts of the history of 
philosophy in his primary effort to ponder his guiding philosophical 
problems, and to make them speak to us in the light of these problems.  
      Thus far, I have only focused on the limits of historical reflection and 
the risks it harbors if one does not take heed of these limits. However, 
even if the work of historical reflection must always stand in a serving 
relationship to the work of independent seeing and explication this does 
not mean that it would be futile or inherently distortive. So what are the 
positive possibilities of such reflection? 
      Heidegger’s basic analysis of the historical structure of phenomenality 
rests on the insight that we always already live in historical quasi-
conceptual contexts of meaning, which primarily tend to guide our 
experience and understanding, and which constitute the starting point for 
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all our attempts at independent understanding. In addition, it rests on the 
insight that we – philosophers as much as everybody else – have a very 
strong inclination to let our seeing and thinking be led by the historical 
concepts at hand on account of their normality, familiarity, self-evidence, 
and social acceptability. While having these phenomena in sight Heidegger 
at the same time distorts their sense by misinterpreting our provisional 
guidedness by history and our tendency to let it determine our 
understanding in terms of a necessary hierarchical structure according to 
which our understanding of historical being determines our understanding 
of beings. However, even though his analysis of the historical structure of 
phenomenality is false, and the method of historical reflection is neither as 
basic nor as necessary as he thinks, the insights at the basis of this analysis 
still constitute motivations for historical reflection.  
      How? 
      To begin with, it is clear that historical reflection on the contexts and 
origins of historical texts forms an integral and irreducible part of all our 
efforts to understand such texts. Since every text is bound to set out from 
and make use of the conceptual and linguistic resources of its historical 
contexts, it will necessarily have to draw on – affirm, modify, specify, 
criticize, ironize – these resources in order to be able to say what it has to 
say in an intelligible way. Hence, to understand a historical text we have to 
have some understanding of the historical concepts and language that it 
draws on. Only such an understanding allows us to follow the text 
wherever it goes, be it that it remains stuck within the prejudices of its age, 
be it that it transcends these. However, in so far as our driving concern is 
to understand what the text has to say about its matters the historical 
reflection on contexts and origins will always play a subordinate and 
enabling role in relation to the decisive task of following and giving 
meaning to the concrete investigations of the text by relating them to our 
own best effort to see and understand the matters in question. But the 
explanatory capacity of historical reflection grows in relation to the 
incapacity of the text for independent thinking. To the extent that the 
philosophical text adopts its concepts from the tradition without being 
able to give them meaning through its own investigations, these concepts 
take on the character of prejudices whose meaning and truth is not 
grounded in the text. In such cases where the concepts themselves call for 
explanation, it may be of help to trace the historical origins of these 
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concepts. Here, the work of historical retrieval might shed light on why 
the concepts have been chosen and play the role they do, also, it might 
disclose historical meanings which the text draws on in an implicit 
manner. Hence, to the extent that we blindly let ourselves be guided by 
traditional historical concepts, history emerges as an explanation for the 
form our thinking takes.      
      In fact, historical reflection can have many vital roles to play in our 
philosophical effort to understand our lives and the world. Historical 
reflection has a powerful emancipatory potential in making us aware of the 
historical finitude and contingency of the meaning-worlds we live. By 
opening us up to alternative meanings and concepts either from our own 
history or from other cultures and histories such a reflection can confront 
us with meanings which transcend our normal horizons of understanding, 
potentially destabilizing our sense of normality and opening us up to new 
and unexpected, perhaps insightful or repressed ways of looking at things. 
This said, it is important to remember that the work of historical reflection 
can never in itself engender a positive understanding of concepts-and-
their-matters but always has the function of guidelines or suggestions for 
our independent effort at seeing and understanding. Whatever historical 
concepts we might find and however great their potential insight or 
questioning force, they are bound to remain nothing more than new sets 
of prejudices as long as they have not been engaged in our open effort to 
see and understand the matters they are all about.  
 
The method of examining the controversiality of metaphysics. If the 
first methodological step of Heidegger’s historical thinking consisted in 
tracing our traditional metaphysical understanding back to its historical 
origin in ancient Greece, the second step consists in attending to and 
articulating what the metaphysical understanding of being as presence 
presupposes yet leaves unthought: the roots of being in the clearing/event 
which opens up being. Above I have already indicated that the kind of 
internal historical reflection Heidegger proposes is incapable of 
independently exhibiting the matters of thinking in a way that would 
distinguish them from prejudice and construction. Here I briefly want to 
spell out this argument in order, then, to attempt to delimit the positive 
potential of this aspect of Heidegger’s historical thinking. 
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      To account for how his historical thinking is to establish the 
clearing/event as the source of being Heidegger, as far as I can see, 
employs two main stratagems. On the one hand, he seems to believe that a 
reflection on the historical beginning of metaphysics is able to 
demonstrate the clearing/event as a historically-cognitively ultimate figure 
of thought – a figure which the metaphysical understanding of being itself 
presupposes and refers to in an implicit manner, and which his own 
thinking is supposed to be able to exhibit as the ultimate and 
insurmountable ontological horizon harbored by our history. On the other 
hand, in his later years, he develops the notion that thinking by attending 
to and articulating what he calls the “controversiality” of our received 
metaphysical understanding of being – its basic tensions and 
groundlessness – can indicate the clearing/event as the self-withdrawing 
source of this understanding.  
      However, none of these stratagems is capable of offering a positive 
demonstration of the clearing/event as the originary happening which 
grants historical being. As concerns the first strategy we must conclude 
that even though thinking would be able to present something like the 
clearing/event as an ultimate horizon of thought, which our tradition has 
always already presupposed as its basis, and which appears ontologically 
insurmountable given our historical context, this in itself would in no way 
show that the notion of the clearing/event would be true or genuinely 
clarifying. It would, at most, show that this notion would exert more or 
less strong rhetorical pressure on us due to its role in the tradition and its 
relative cognitive-dialectical power. In fact, the very idea that some 
concept or figure of thought could ever emerge as ultimate or basic for a 
given historical context is problematic. Since we are essentially free in 
relation to all such meanings, they can never absolutely delimit our 
possibilities of making sense. Hence, even in an extremely monolithic or 
totalitarian culture, the basic never-questioned concepts would still have 
the character of concepts that people would tend to allow to determine 
their understanding – but which they would nevertheless in principal be 
free to question in relation to what they see and experience.  
      But neither can Heidegger’s second stratagem attain its goal. It is, to 
be sure, possible to examine the controversiality exhibited by the texts of 
the philosophical tradition: the tensions, incompleteness and 
groundlessness charactering their basic concepts. Yet no such 
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deconstructive examination could in itself show that the controversiality 
thus demonstrated in some number of texts would be a necessary feature 
of historical being ultimately stemming from the polemical logic of the 
happening which opens up being. To positively interpret the 
controversiality as a testimony of the clearing/event would be pure 
speculation. It is precisely because Heidegger’s strictly historical thinking 
lacks the basic capacity of showing up the matters themselves that he even 
in his later years is compelled to continue making use of phenomenology 
to give concrete content to his thoughts.  
      Heidegger’s late strategy of examining the controversiality of being is 
ultimately grounded in two notions that are presupposed in advance and 
which this strategy itself is incapable of establishing: first, the notion that 
our understanding of historical meaning not only determines our 
experience of beings but that it is itself hierarchically structured, so that 
our understanding of being and the openness of being guides our 
understanding of other historical meanings and concepts; second, the 
notion that our understanding of being has its source in the polemical 
happening which opens up a strained and ungroundable historical world. 
Together these notions prescribe Heidegger’s strategy for articulating the 
matter of thinking: to trace the ontological concepts at the basis of our 
received understanding, to disclose their tensions and groundlessness, and 
to take this controversiality as evidence of the self-withdrawing happening 
of being.  
      However, my reflections on the openness of our conceptual 
understanding make me believe that both these notions are false and that 
the methodological path that Heidegger proposes to the matter of 
thinking is neither necessary nor possible. However, apart from this it also 
– like the method of historical return – contains an inborn risk to miss and 
distort the meaning of the texts examined if it does not attend to its own 
limits.  
      As argued above, the thinking of philosophical texts is not only free in 
relation to the historical concepts it employs but also in relation to the 
concepts that are ontologically-systematically basic within its own 
conceptuality. Hence, it is in principal possible for a text to offer 
investigations which transcend and gainsay what its basic concepts – of 
being, knowledge, the human being – seem to have prescribed as the 
possibilities and limits of the investigations. The upshot of this is that no 
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strict examination of the basic concepts of a text can be sure to capture 
the determining horizon of the text, which means that if it is not attentive 
to the concrete investigations of the text, it risks reducing the text to its 
basic ontological framework in a blind and prejudiced manner. Moreover, 
a demonstration of the controversiality and groundlessness of the basic 
concepts of a philosophical text cannot by itself establish that the text 
suffers from some fundamental inability to account for its meaning. If the 
meaning and truth of our concepts resides in their ability to illuminate 
whatever experiential matter they are used to conceive it is quite possible 
for a text to use concepts in a more or less clear and meaningful way that 
is not dependent on any ability to systematically define and circumscribe 
their meaning.  
      But what about the positive possibilities of Heidegger’s strategy? Has 
not Heidegger – and later, e.g., Derrida – shown that there are a lot of 
things that a critical deconstructive analysis of philosophical texts can do? 
      He has. Clearly, in many of his readings of the classical texts of 
philosophy he has been able to lay bare their dependence on basic 
ontological concepts of being and the human being which in a more or 
less hidden way determine the investigations without the texts’ being able 
to ground or account for their meaning. Still, to grasp the sense and limits 
of such deconstructive analyses it is crucial to see that what they are able 
to show is not that our understanding is essentially determined by a 
groundless and polemical understanding of being rooted in the 
clearing/event. Rather, what they reveal is that the tradition of Western 
philosophy has de facto largely been characterized by the driving ambition 
to ground our knowledge of the particular matters of life and the world on 
a supposedly more basic understanding of the nature of being, knowledge, 
the human being, God, etc. – whereby this very ambition presupposes that 
the operation of grounding has the character of a conceptual-dialectic 
systematics in which our basic general concepts determine and delimit the 
meaning of our more specific concepts. 
      Far from mirroring the essential structure of understanding this 
dominating ambition in my view rests on a fateful denial of the openness 
of our understanding towards the beings we encounter. However, to the 
extent that philosophy de facto exhibits the effort to ground our 
knowledge on a basic understanding of being/knowledge/subjectivity/ 
God in the manner of some conceptually-dialectically determined systems, 
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the strategy of critically deconstructing such efforts becomes a vital 
methodological possibility of philosophy. It can, for example, trace and lay 
bare the basic conceptions which, often in a hidden and unclear way, guide 
the projections of philosophy; it can analyze the failures of philosophical 
texts to ground and account for the meaning and legitimacy of their basic 
concepts, which inevitably arise from the very effort to ground meaning 
through conceptual-dialectical determination; it can investigate the 
omissions and repressions which haunt and destabilize the effort to attain 
systematic unity and closure. However, in and by itself the strategy of 
internal historical deconstruction can never achieve a positive 
understanding of the philosophical matters – nor, thus, of its own sense 
and limits – but is bound to remain a critical preparation for the task of 
independently describing and conceptualizing what we experience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
Epilogue: the Openness of Understanding 
 
 
This thesis has been an attempt to trace and critically explicate Heidegger’s 
life long struggle to come to terms with the problem of phenomenality 
and to account for the structure and dynamics which makes it possible for 
things to appear and be given as meaningful phenomena in our human 
experiences.  
      The historical story I have told was divided into three main parts 
centering on what I proposed can be viewed as the three main stages of 
Heidegger’s thinking of phenomenality. In rough outline – omitting all the 
details, intermittences, complexities, ambivalences – the story could be 
summarized as follows: 
      In his earliest Freiburg lecture courses 1919-1921 Heidegger adopts 
Husserl’s basic phenomenological principle that philosophy must do 
nothing but attend to and describe what is concretely given in our 
experience. In so doing, he insists that the primary sphere of givenness lies 
in our pre-theoretical experience, which does not have the character of 
distanced theoretical observation of objects, but transpires as a unified 
temporal experience of significance. However, Heidegger’s early vision of 
phenomenology as an originary science of pre-theoretical life gives rise to 
deep ambivalences. First, although Heidegger claims that our experience 
and thinking are radically historical he as yet provides no account of the 
supposedly historical structure of phenomenality and basically presents 
and enacts his own investigations as reflective phenomenological 
descriptions of the basic ahistorical structure of our pre-theoretical 
experience. Second, by emphasizing the self-sufficiency of pre-theoretical 
life Heidegger loses the means to account for the role of philosophy in 
life. As a result, he oscillates between viewing phenomenological 
philosophy as a way to knowledge of the originary structure of life 
necessary for authentic existence, and as a historically contingent means to 
abandon the theoretical attitude in favor of the kind of direct enactment 
of pre-theoretical life he finds in early Christianity.  
      Then, in 1921-1922, Heidegger begins a period of massive explications 
of Aristotle in whose texts he believes he discovers the basic structure of 
phenomenality, centered in what he will eventually call the ontological 
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difference: it is only on the basis of our pre-understanding of historical 
being into which we have always already been thrown that we can 
experience particular beings as meaningful phenomena. Heidegger’s 
conception of this structure seems to open up the possibility of 
accounting both for the historicity of phenomenality as well as for the 
function of philosophy in life. On the one hand, it suggests that our 
experience of particular meaningful phenomena is determined by our 
historical contexts of meaning. Hence, philosophy must abandon 
intuition-based phenomenology and instead take the form of a historical 
destruction, which, by dismantling the prejudiced tradition and tracing it 
back to its origin in Aristotle, opens up the possibility of retrieving the 
most qualified possibilities of understanding harbored by that origin. On 
the other hand, since Heidegger believes that our understanding of 
historical meaning is itself guided by an understanding of the sense of 
being, the philosophical task of clarifying the sense of being emerges as 
the decisive condition for achieving a clear understanding both of 
ourselves and of the world. However, Heidegger’s conception of the task 
of philosophy as fundamental ontology, which he launches in Being and 
Time in 1927, is still beset with basic ambiguities which will eventually lead 
to its demise. Contrary to the analysis of the historical structure of 
phenomenality which dictates Heidegger’s program of destruction, the 
concrete investigations of Being and Time basically transpire as reflective 
phenomenological descriptions of the ahistorical structures of Dasein: 
being-in-the-world, care, temporality. Ultimately, I suggested, the reason 
why Heidegger has recourse to the kind of phenomenological description 
which his analysis of the structure of phenomenality forbids, is that he is 
still unable to pose and answer the question how historical meanings can 
address us as in some sense true or binding – as not reducible to mere 
historical prejudices. This basic lacuna, besides hindering Heidegger from 
pursuing his program of a radically historical thinking, also gives rise to an 
uncontrolled tension between collectivism and subjectivism in his account 
of Dasein’s authentic existence. Since he is unable to tell how it is that our 
guiding historical purposes or heroes are able to address us and bind us, 
he is forced to ground them either in the facticity of the collective world in 
which we happen to live or in the groundless arbitrary choice of the 
particular Dasein. What is more, I argued that Heidegger’s account of the 
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ethical-existential motives determining Dasein’s experience and acting is 
basically egoistic-collectivist.  
      Heidegger’s philosophical investigations in the years 1928-1933, 
following the publication of Being and Time, gradually lead him to abandon 
the project of fundamental ontology. However, it is only after 1935 that he 
is able to articulate the basic question of his later thinking: how should we 
understand the originary happening which opens up and gives a historical 
world as a binding destiny? Heidegger’s entire later thought is devoted to 
reflecting on the openness or phenomenality of historical being, which he 
will primarily call the “clearing” or “event.” He elaborates his first 
paradigmatic account of the dynamics which opens up a world in the essay 
“The Origin of the Work of Art” from 1936, where this dynamics is 
explicated as a strife between the historical world and the material-
sensuous earth enacted by the work of art. Later he rearticulates the 
dynamics of phenomenality in terms of the interplay of the fourfold: the 
divinities and the mortals, the earth and the sky. Elaborating the 
consequences of his view of the radically historical structure of 
phenomenality, Heidegger conceives of his later thinking as a strict 
historical reflection which returns to the first Greek beginning of 
metaphysics in order to attend to that which is presupposed but yet 
remains unthought, and which announces itself as a controversiality within 
the metaphysical understanding of being as presence: the self-withdrawing 
happening which first opens up finite historical being.  
      In the end, however, I argued that even Heidegger’s later attempt to 
explicate how historical worlds can arise and address us as binding fails to 
account both for the question of truth and for the question of ethical-
existential significance. Ultimately, his analysis only amounts to a 
description of the rhetorical-persuasive power of our historical contexts of 
meaning and value. In effect, I also argued that his historical strategies of 
thinking are unable to articulate the matters themselves as something 
separable from historical prejudice. Hence, the function of such strategies 
remains limited to negative critique and to providing suggestions for what 
I proposed constitutes the systematically decisive task of philosophical 
thought: to openly and independently see and describe what we actually 
experience from the point of view of the questions or problems at stake.  
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      This is, in rough outline, what I have done so far. Now, however, I 
want to venture a few steps forward and critically question the ontological 
difference at the heart of Heidegger’s thinking of phenomenality. 
      As I have tried to demonstrate, the ontological difference between our 
understanding of historical being and our experience of particular beings 
forms the core of Heidegger’s paradigmatic analysis of the basic structure 
of phenomenality developed in the early 1920s. The difference is strictly 
hierarchical: our understanding of historical being determines in advance 
what we can experience as meaningful phenomena, whereas our direct 
intuitive experience of particular beings cannot constitute a measure for 
our understanding of being. As such, the ontological difference sets the 
stage for Heidegger’s late attempt to account for the dynamics which 
opens up historical being as a binding destiny as well as for his effort to 
develop a radically historical thinking tracing the basic yet unthought 
meaning-possibilities harbored by the history of metaphysics.  
      In the last chapter I indicated that Heidegger’s failure to account for 
the cognitive and morally binding force of historical being was a 
consequence of the ontological difference and of his denial of the 
openness of our experience and understanding towards particular being. 
Yet I never asked the basic critical question about the truth and limits of 
the ontological difference, and about what it would mean to overcome it. 
In this epilogue I want to take the risk of asking this critical question 
straight out and try to indicate – in a very schematic and provisional 
manner to be sure – what the ontological difference dogmatically denies 
and covers up: our experiential openness towards particular beings as a 
basic and irreducible source of truth and moral significance.  
      Obviously this epilogue cannot hope to provide anything like a 
comprehensive and satisfactory discussion of the ontological difference, 
which, as we shall see, is not only basic to Heidegger’s thought but has 
also for more than half a century guided the self-understanding of much 
philosophy. This would have required another book. Now, some readers 
might consider this reason enough to think that it would have been better 
to leave out the epilogue instead of adding such a sketchy and provisional 
endeavor to the interpretational work of the main text. To this, I answer: 
My reasons for writing the epilogue are both philosophical and personal, 
since I think it is not only potentially clarifying but also a matter of 
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honesty to try to bear witness to the place where I stand and from which I 
have tried to speak about Heidegger.   
      The epilogue unfolds in five consecutive steps: first, I outline what I 
call the “metaphysics of historical meaning,” which has for some time 
dominated the self-understanding of large parts of contemporary 
philosophy; second, I examine one of Heidegger’s last articulations of the 
problem of phenomenality, an articulation in which he suggests the 
“overcoming of the ontological difference”; third, I present my proposal 
that our conceptual understanding is essentially open towards the beings 
we experience as the source of truth of this understanding; fourth, I 
present my proposal that we are essentially open towards other persons as 
the source of truth of ethical-existential significance; fifth, I outline some 
of the transformations of our concept of philosophy that the above 
suggestions bring with them.  
 
The Metaphysics of Historical Meaning 
 
To get a sense of the stakes of a critique of Heidegger’s ontological 
difference – but also of the difficulties of and resistance to such a critique 
– it is important to see the extent to which this notion articulates a 
paradigm which has to a great extent dominated the self-understanding of 
philosophy since the middle of the 20th century, a paradigm which I will 
call the metaphysics of historical meaning.  
      The defining tenet of what I call the metaphysics of historical meaning 
is – to put it as formally as possible – the notion that there is a dimension 
of historical meaning which determines our experience and understanding 
of entities as meaningful, and which it is the task of philosophy to reflect 
on and clarify. In the continental tradition, Heidegger plays a pivotal role 
in establishing the metaphysics of historical meaning as a ruling paradigm. 
Drawing on different historical sources – e.g. Aristotle, Dilthey, 
Schleiermacher, German idealism – Heidegger elaborates a critique of 
Husserl’s basic phenomenological belief in an intuitive experience of 
meaning as the ultimate measure of understanding, insisting that it is our 
historical understanding of being which allows us to experience things as 
meaningful phenomena. In the second half of the century Heidegger’s idea 
of the primacy of historical meaning attains an almost hegemonic role 
within the continental tradition, and is primarily developed in the 
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hermeneutics of Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur and others, and in the post-
structuralist and deconstructivist thinking of Derrida, Jacques Lacan, 
Michel Foucault and others. The structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure 
and Claude Lévi-Strauss basically shares the same paradigm. In the 
tradition of analytic philosophy, the metaphysics of historical meaning 
arises as a strong paradigm after the Second World War. This very much 
happens through a series of attacks against the fundamental empiricist trait 
of logical positivism, whereby the new commonly shared notion emerges 
that our experience and understanding of what is experientially given is 
determined by the language and the concepts in which we live. This 
common notion is articulated and developed in many different directions 
during the second half of the century, constituting a central tenet of the 
philosophy of the later Wittgenstein and – especially – of his heirs, of the 
ordinary language philosophy of John Austin, of the neo-Kantianism-
cum-Hegelianism of Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell and Robert Brandom, 
of the historicist thinking of Charles Taylor and Alisdair MacIntyre, and of 
the neo-pragmatism of Richard Rorty. However, in the analytic tradition 
the metaphysics of historical meaning has never achieved a ruling position 
but has always lived in a tense relationship to the central tendency towards 
naturalist philosophy  
      Clearly, the field of philosophers and philosophical directions staked 
out above is extremely complex and heterogeneous, including a manifold 
number of diverging views both concerning the nature of the dimension 
of meaning (e.g. historical tradition, limitless differential context, sign 
systems, regimes of power, grammar of language games, theoretical 
wholes, conceptual schemes, pragmatic vocabularies) and concerning the 
philosophical task and method of thinking it (e.g. hermeneutic 
interpretation, deconstruction, structural analysis, analysis of power, 
therapeutic clarification, conceptual analysis, ironic discourse). Even so, I 
think it is no exaggeration to claim that they to a large extent share the 
same basic idea that there is a primary dimension of historical meaning 
which determines what we can experience and communicate as 
meaningful, whose truth and content cannot be investigated through any 
direct intuition of experiential givens, but which requires another kind of 
philosophical reflection on this dimension as such. Still, the point of 
sketching such a paradigm is not to lock a diverse group of philosophers 
into a uniform mold but to indicate a basic trait that they largely share and 
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vary. Of course, the texts of these philosophers also contain thoughts that 
do not fit into or even challenge the paradigm. 
      Although it seems to me that the metaphysics of historical meaning 
has for a long time played a dominant role both in philosophy and in the 
wider cultural discourse and imagination, it has naturally co-existed with 
various other philosophical paradigms, the strongest of which is surely to 
be found in the various types of bourgeoning naturalist philosophy. 
Moreover, there have been some general criticisms of the metaphysics of 
historical meaning, the most important of which are, to my mind, the 
following: first, the idea that our understanding of conceptual meaning 
determines our knowledge of empirical reality has been contested by the 
naturalist thought of Willard Van Orman Quine and Donald Davidson 
and by Hilary Putnam’s theory of direct reference; second, the idea that 
our historical meanings and values determine the existential significance of 
particular beings has been challenged by Emmanuel Levinas, who insists 
that it is our encounter with the particular other human being that is the 
source of all moral claims on us. In fact, as will become clear, I consider 
the following an attempt to critically question the ontological difference 
and provisionally articulate what I call the openness of our understanding 
to travel in the same general direction as these criticisms.   
      What is it that allows the metaphysics of historical meaning to ascend 
as a dominating paradigm of contemporary philosophy? It would of 
course be absurd to attempt to give a complete answer to this question 
here, covering all the philosophical and non-philosophical motives 
influencing the development of philosophy. Nevertheless, I think it might 
be illuminating to point to some of the basic philosophical reasons which 
contributed – and still contribute – to giving the paradigm its persuasive 
force. 
      It seems to me that there are two basic meaning-aspects characterizing 
the idea of a primary dimension of meaning – or its equivalents – which 
have for a long time lived side by side in contemporary philosophy 
without always being clearly distinguished from each other. First, the 
notion of meaning has signified the sphere of concepts or meaning-
structures which determine what we can experience and understand as 
identifiable unities of meaning. Thus, e.g., our concept of a bicycle allows 
us to identify and understand the point and use of particular bicycles just 
as our concept of courage allows us to identify and judge actions as 
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courageous. Secondly, the notion of meaning has denoted the sphere of 
values and norms which determine what we can experience and 
understand as ethically-existentially significant and important. Thus, e.g., 
our historical values of love and courage constitute the ground of our 
ethical-existential appreciation of love and courage as important in our 
lives.  
      Now the gradual emergence of the metaphysics of historical meaning 
is very much due to the fact that it seemed to offer a convincing general 
picture of human experience and reality which allowed philosophy to 
overcome some of the basic problems and notions which had guided 
modern philosophy well up into the early 20th century, but which now 
began to appear misguided or senseless. To begin with, the idea of the 
primacy of historical meaning allowed – in accordance with its first aspect 
– philosophy to radically question and surmount the basic 
epistemological-ontological framework which had governed philosophy 
since the beginning of the modern era. On the one hand, it lets us dismiss 
the traditional dualism between inner consciousness and outer reality, as 
well as the ensuing epistemological question of how we can attain 
knowledge or the outer world, by suggesting that our access both to 
ourselves and to reality is guided by our historical concepts which 
determine in advance what we can identify as inner experiences, as 
external empirical objects or as reasons and grounds for knowledge. On 
the other hand, it allows us to overcome the traditional oscillation between 
empiricism and rationalism by suggesting that both our sense perception 
and our rational understanding of ideas is always already guided by our 
factical concepts which cannot be grounded either on empirical givens or 
on some self-grounding principles. Moreover, the idea of the primacy of 
meaning – in accordance with its second aspect – allowed philosophy to 
overcome the traditional paradigm of moral philosophy. During the whole 
modern era, moral philosophy had been led by the ambition to ground the 
moral concepts in terms of which we value and judge our souls and 
actions on some kind of ultimate universally binding principles, these 
principles being inferred in many different ways and from many different 
sources, e.g., from the laws and rights of nature, from the constitution of 
human reason, or from the happiness of human beings. The metaphysics 
of historical meaning allowed philosophy to leave behind this apparently 
hopeless ambition by claiming that our moral experience and 
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understanding is grounded in the values, norms, and virtues bestowed by 
our history. While it is generally agreed that such factical values and norms 
cannot be justified with reference to some external ahistorical grounds, it 
is an open and widely debated issue how critical discussion of such values 
is possible within and between different historical traditions.  
      However, the metaphysics of historical meaning does not only imply 
an alteration of our basic ontological picture of the world. After the death 
of the age-old project of philosophy to find ultimate grounds for our 
knowledge of life and the world, the idea of the primacy of historical 
meaning also allows philosophy to retain its rank as a fundamental and 
autonomous task of understanding. Given that our understanding of the 
historical contexts of meaning in which we live determines our experience 
and understanding of meaningful beings, and given that we first and 
foremost – both in our everyday lives and in the positive sciences – tend 
to employ these meanings in a naive and unthematic manner, then the 
philosophical reflection on the domain of meaning emerges as the 
fundamental form of understanding which, prior to every empirical 
experience, is able to examine and clarify the constitution of the 
meaningful world in which we live. Moreover, given that our 
understanding of the historical contexts of value in which we live 
determine what we can experience and judge as ethically-existentially 
significant, and given that we normally tend to enact this understanding 
naively as normal and self-evident, then the philosophical reflection on 
our values and norms appears as the basic form of understanding which is 
able to investigate the sources of our ethical evaluation of courage, love, 
honor, honesty, authenticity, justice, etc. In short, the metaphysics of 
meaning permits philosophy, as a reflection on the domain of meaning, to 
maintain its status as our most basic possibility of understanding reality as 
well as good and evil – this regardless of how philosophy more specifically 
conceives of its task: its guiding problems, its knowledge claims, its mode 
of investigation and communication.  
      But why call the philosophical paradigm I have tried to outline above a 
metaphysics of historical meaning? Is not this paradigm in point of fact 
superior to the earlier philosophical paradigms which it has helped us 
overcome? Is it not on the whole true and illuminating – even though, of 
course, it leaves a host of questions open, including questions concerning 
the nature of the paradigm itself? 
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      My reason for calling the basic conception of the primacy of historical 
meaning a metaphysics is my belief that this paradigm for a long time has 
had – and still has – the character of a dogmatic view of the nature of 
reality and thinking, a view which to a very large extent functions as a 
collectively accepted truth which guides and limits our philosophical 
imagination and dialogue in advance, and which is very seldom radically 
questioned concerning its basic tenets. The dogmatic character of the 
paradigm does not prevent it from exhibiting genuine clarificatory power: 
if we look at our de facto experience there is obviously truth in the notion 
that our experience and understanding are generally guided by a historical 
understanding of meanings and concepts which lets us see reality as 
intelligible and meaningfully structured. What is more, there is evidently 
truth in the notion that we are always already thrown into historical 
contexts of values regulating what a given community regards as good or 
bad, and which are generally backed up by strong collective mechanisms 
of honor and shame. However, notwithstanding that the metaphysics of 
meaning harbors potential truth and clarificatory force its dogmatic 
character implies that this conception is blindly taken over and 
exaggerated, and almost never questioned and critically delimited in its 
genuine truth. Still, as I indicated in my earlier criticisms of Heidegger, I 
believe that the metaphysics of meaning fundamentally misconstrues the 
guidedness of our experience by historical concepts in terms of a radical 
determination of the former by the latter, whereby this denial of our 
primary experiential openness towards particular beings results in a 
blindness both to the source of truth of our understanding as well as to 
the source of significance in our lives.  
      Heidegger’s groundbreaking articulation of the ontological difference 
has played a vital role in establishing the paradigm which I have called the 
metaphysics of meaning. This is the reason why he belongs to those few 
philosophers from the first half the 20th century – Wittgenstein being the 
other outstanding example – who we are still able to read and discuss with 
as our contemporaries. But this also seems to be the reason why the 
enormous discourse generated around Heidegger’s thinking has tended to 
pay relatively little attention to the ontological difference itself. Whereas 
the phenomenological interpretation has never seriously taken on the 
challenge which the ontological difference poses for the decisive notion of 
an intuition-based reflection on our experience, but has simply insisted on 
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the possibility of such reflection, the hermeneutic-deconstructive 
interpretation has tended to take the ontological difference for granted 
and, instead of halting at this question, has rushed on to explicate and 
elaborate its consequences, e.g., the temporality, historicity, finitude, and 
differentiality of being and thinking.   
      However, it is precisely the fact that the ontological difference has for 
a long time tended to appear as the self-evident  beginning of Heidegger’s 
further thinking which should make us halt – as this fact bears witness to 
the basic yet unclarified role this difference has played for Heidegger and 
still plays for us today. 
 
Heidegger’s Last Word 
 
In my thesis I have claimed to explicate Heidegger’s basic conception of 
the structure of phenomenality which guides his thinking from the early 
1920s onwards and which is centered in the ontological difference. Still, 
this is not the whole story of Heidegger’s thinking of phenomenality. In 
one of his last texts, he returns once more to the problem of 
phenomenality only to question – for the first and last time – the 
ontological difference at the root of his thinking. The text in question is a 
short note on Cézanne’s painting. Originally the text was part of a series 
of remarks published in a supplement – devoted to the poet René Char, 
who was a friend of Heidegger’s – of the quarterly L’Herne in 1971, yet 
Heidegger had occasion to rework the text on Cézanne as late as 1974. 
      So why have I have put off dealing with this text until now? Well, for 
the reason that the text itself amounts to something like an epilogue to 
Heidegger’s thinking. By questioning the ontological difference, it opens 
up questions which unsettle and, hence, cannot be integrated within the 
philosophical framework which constitutes Heidegger’s earlier work 
anymore. At the same time, the text is too sparse to open up and establish 
a new framework. In this sense, it is really writing after the writing.  
      Heidegger’s short text begins with a description of how Cézanne’s 
paradigmatic landscape – the Montagne Sainte-Victoire – is gathered into 
its unity in his paintings. The text culminates in the following passage: 
 
What Cézanne names la réalisation is  
the appearance of what is present in the clearing  
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of presence – such that the duality of both 
is bound up in the simplicity of the pure 
shining of its images.  
For thought, this is the question of   
the overcoming of the ontological difference between  
being and beings. But the overcoming only becomes  
possible if the ontological difference is first experienced 
and pondered as such, which in turn can only occur  
on the basis of the “question of being” posed  
in Being and Time.980  
 
What happens here? The passage unfolds as an interpretation of 
Cézanne’s term “la réalisation,” by which he designates what takes place in 
his paintings. According to Heidegger, this term denotes “the appearance 
of what is present in the clearing of presence,” that is, the ontological 
difference at the root of his conception of phenomenality: in order for a 
being to appear as a meaningful phenomenon it must do so on the basis 
of the historical context of being which has been opened up by the 
clearing. However, as he continues the sentence this difference undergoes 
a decisive displacement which deprives it of its fundamental role. In 
Cézanne’s paintings, the appearance of what is present in the presence of 
the clearing happens in such a way that “the duality of both is bound up in 
the simplicity of the pure shining of its images.” For thinking, Heidegger 
continues, this implies nothing but an “overcoming of the ontological 
difference.” He ends the passage by stating that such an overcoming is 
only possible to the extent that the ontological difference has first been 
experienced and articulated as such.  
     Undoubtedly, this passage suggests a radical disruption in Heidegger’s 
thinking given that for the first time it announces the overcoming of the 
very basic tenet that has carried his thinking of phenomenality so far. Yet 
what is the concrete philosophical content of this passage, and what 
clarificatory force does it possess?   
                                         
980 Figal [ed.] 2007a, p. 342: “Was Cézanne la realisation nennt, ist das Erscheinen des 
Anwesenden in der Lichtung des Anwesens – so zwar, daß die Zweifalt beider 
verwunden ist in der Einfalt des reinen Scheinens seiner Bilder.Für das Denken ist 
dies die Frage nach der Überwindung der ontologischen Differenz zwischen Sein und 
Seiendem. Die Überwindung wird aber nur möglich, wenn die o. Di. zuvor als solche 
erfahren und bedacht ist, was wiederum nur geschehen kann auf dem Grunde der in 
‘Sein u. Zeit’ gefragten Seinsfrage.” 
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      In his introduction to the anthology The Heidegger Reader, in which 
Heidegger’s text on Cézanne is reprinted, Günter Figal comments on this 
text as follows: “In this notion of Heidegger’s, a fundamental theme of his 
thinking returns: All reflections on discovery, truth as unconcealment, 
physis, and being were part of the attempt to trace the mystery of 
phenomena that lies in their self-showing. Now, at eighty-five, Heidegger 
has found the clear and yet enigmatic answer in the ‘pure shining’ of the 
images.”981 It is clearly true, I think, that Heidegger’s rooting of the 
ontological difference in the pure shining of Cézanne’ paintings 
constitutes his final attempt to find an answer to his life-long question 
concerning the enigma of phenomenality. Still, it seems an overstatement 
to say that Heidegger’s formulation really amounts to an answer – even an 
enigmatic answer – to this question, given that its sense is bound to 
remain so underdetermined. In so far as it implies a revolution of the basic 
setup of his thinking so far, but offers nothing but a vague hint forward, it 
robs us of every possibility of interpreting it with any certainty. 
Nevertheless, I want to make an attempt to reflect on the possible senses 
of the text by projecting it in the direction of two possible philosophical 
interpretations.   
      What I will call the radical interpretation of the text would be 
something like the following: by grounding the ontological difference in 
the “simplicity of the pure shining” of the images, Heidegger undermines 
the strict hierarchy of difference. If up to this point he had conceived of 
the particular phenomenon as determined by the historical context of 
meaning, he now lets the ontological difference be rooted in a more 
primary phenomenality. His talk of a “reines Scheinen” – “pure shining” - 
indicates such a displacement: by removing the prefix er-, which in the 
word “erscheinen” conveys that the appearance in question is the result of a 
prior happening, and adding the attribute “pure,” he seems to want to 
point to a primary sphere of phenomenality which cannot be grounded in 
anything else and which constitutes the ground for the ontological 
difference. But what is this pure shining? Heidegger does not give 
anything like a clarifying answer to this question.  He only indicates what 
he has in mind by describing the pure shining as a unity between being 
and beings, which precedes the ontological difference. However, the very 
                                         
981 Figal [ed.] 2007a, p. 43. 
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idea of a unified phenomenality preceding and constituting the ontological 
difference seems to imply a disruption of the hierarchical order of 
determination implied by this difference, and to suggest a deeper 
interdependence between historical being and particular beings, such that 
our understanding of being would not only determine our understanding 
of beings but would itself be determined by our experience of particular 
entities.  
      If this line of interpretation is correct, Heidegger’s brief remarks on 
Cézanne would necessitate a radical critical revision of his earlier analysis 
of phenomenality and, hence, of his guiding idea about the task and 
historical method of philosophical thinking. Heidegger’s basic idea of the 
hierarchical as-structure of understanding would have to give way to a 
conception in which our direct experience of particular beings would play 
an irreducible and determining role in the constitution of our phenomenal 
understanding. Hence, his notion of philosophical thinking as a historical 
reflection on the unthought meaning-possibilities of our history would 
give way to a thinking in which phenomenological seeing would play an 
irreducible role. Moreover, the very need to account for the binding force 
of historical being by anchoring it in the clearing/event would evaporate 
in so far as our access to particular beings would co-constitute both the 
truth and significance of our phenomenal understanding. Instead, we 
would be thrown back on the question how we should understand the 
basic relationship between being and beings – the question Heidegger here 
opens but never answers: In what sense could our direct experience of 
particular entities constitute a source of truth and significance for our 
understanding of meaningful reality? And what would this mean for the 
task of philosophy? 
      But does this interpretation go too far? Can we be sure that 
Heidegger’s talk of overcoming the ontological difference was intended to 
radically question his entire earlier approach and open up a new 
beginning? We cannot. 
      Against the radical interpretation suggested above the following critical 
reply – which I will call the weak interpretation – could be mustered: 
Should not Heidegger’s text primarily be interpreted as a commentary on 
what happens in works of art, more precisely in the specific art of 
Cézanne’s paintings? Is not the overcoming of the ontological difference 
explicitly announced as something that happens in these images, so that 
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the difference is grounded in the “simplicity of the pure shining of its 
images”? Does not this, in turn, indicate that Heidegger’s commentary is 
still basically in line with his earlier analysis of the artwork in The Origin of 
the Work of Art, so that his talk of a unified pure shining would be a 
reformulation of his earlier analysis of how the work of art opens a world 
by realizing the strife between the world and the earth? Does not 
Heidegger’s formulation earlier in the text, that Cézanne’s images “join 
simplicity” (fügend die Enfalt) – i.e. that they join and gather the world into 
its unity – confirm this? However, as we saw earlier Heidegger’s 
description of the strife between the world and earth in The Origin of the 
Work of Art did not imply a radical break with the ontological difference. 
Even though the artwork had to ground the world on the earth Heidegger 
never allowed our direct experience of the particularities of the material-
sensuous earth to emerge as an autonomous source of meaning: the world 
projected by the artwork received all its guiding meanings from the 
historical heritage whereby the earth was reduced to the material-sensuous 
element granting concrete shape to these meanings. Moreover, the world 
thus projected determined all our possibilities of experiencing meaningful 
phenomena. Could not Heidegger’s commentary on Cézanne easily be 
interpreted as saying basically the same, that Cézanne’s paintings open up 
a unified world by realizing some kind of interplay between being and 
beings, whose nature remains obscure, and which it would be most natural 
to interpret as a variation on his earlier analysis of the strife between the 
world and the earth?  In that case, Heidegger’s talk of overcoming the 
ontological difference would strictly speaking amount to a hyperbolic 
restatement of the dynamics of that strife.  
      At least for now – and perhaps forever – I think we have to leave the 
question of the sense of Heidegger’s last articulation of the nature of 
phenomenality open and undetermined. Since the text on Cézanne is too 
short and vague to give us a clear understanding of its philosophical sense 
and consequences, and since it is not followed by other texts that would 
shed light on its content – if it is to be read back into his earlier 
philosophical framework or if it breaks with that framework and opens a 
radically new horizon of thinking – it is in principal impossible to attain a 
definitive answer as to how it should be read. However, this in itself is no 
great loss. In so far as our driving motivation for reading Heidegger is 
philosophical rather than philological, the point of the texts eventually 
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resides in their ability to teach us to see matters for ourselves. Arguably, 
Heidegger was never as generous and demanding as when he ended his 
philosophical path by opening up the question of phenomenality anew 
while leaving us alone with this question. 
      But how is it possible to overcome the ontological difference, which 
has now informed philosophy for many decades, without falling back into 
the futile dualisms – subject/object, idealism/realism, empiricism/ 
rationalism – that Heidegger has helped us free ourselves from?  Would 
this not mean forfeiting the insights into the domain of historical meaning 
always already determining our understanding that it has taken so much 
philosophical work to achieve?  And what would be the consequences for 
our conception of the task of philosophy? I want to end this thesis by 
attempting a brief sketch of what it would mean to overcome the 
ontological difference and learn to see what I suggest to be the openness 
of our understanding towards the particular beings that we experience and 
understand. Of course, the only thing I can do here is to indicate the 
perspective and direction that I see opening up as a possibility for 
philosophy. The task of working out and probing the different aspects of 
this perspective lies in the future.   
    
Our Openness Towards Beings as the Source of Truth 
 
My first proposal is that our conceptual understanding, in its central parts, 
is open towards the particular beings and situations we encounter in our 
experience as the source of truth of our understanding.  
      Heidegger’s analysis of the as-structure of understanding undoubtedly 
exposes a central feature of our everyday experience, namely that we 
always already tend to live in an understanding of general historical 
meanings and concepts that allow us to apprehend beings as meaningful 
phenomena: this as a human being, this as a dog, this as a chair. On the 
basis of this analysis Heidegger then articulates his conception of the 
ontological difference, such that he ascribes a strict – ontologically 
determining – priority to our historical understanding of being in relation 
to our experience of particular beings. However, what his concrete 
analysis of the as-structure of understanding actually shows is that our 
understanding of being is primary in the sense that it constitutes the 
factical pre-understanding that provisionally guides our experience and 
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allows us to identify the beings we experience in a smooth and 
unreflective manner. And yet, what Heidegger claims is not only that our 
understanding of being provisionally guides our experience but that it 
determines what we can grasp as meaningful phenomena; it determines – 
given his identification of phenomenality and being – what beings can be. 
It is this idea that makes Heidegger cancel out the possibility that our 
direct experience of beings could function as the ground for our 
understanding of the meanings of beings, and which makes him insist that 
a transparent understanding of being can only be achieved through a 
historical reflection on the meaning-possibilities harbored by our history.   
      As far as I can see, the most powerful critique of Heidegger’s 
ontological difference from the point of view of the question of truth has 
been delivered by Cristina Lafont in her book Heidegger, Language, and 
World-disclosure.982 Elaborating on Tugendhat’s classical critique of 
                                         
982 Lafont’s book, which was published in English in 2000 constitutes an extensively 
revised version of the original German book Sprache und Welterschließung from 1994. 
Jacques Derrida is also known for having proposed a critical deconstruction and 
delimitation of Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference. However, I will not 
be considering Derrida’s critique since I believe it does not really question the 
ontological difference in the sense attempted here but rather amounts to a kind of 
critical elaboration of the ontological difference, an elaboration that rests on a basic 
affirmation of that very difference. Derrida writes: “entity and being, ontic and 
ontological, ‘ontico-ontological,’ are, in an original style, derivative with regard to 
difference; and with respect to what I shall later call differance, an economic concept 
designating the production of differing/deferring. The ontico-ontological difference 
and its ground (Grund) in the ‘transcendence of Dasein’ are not absolutely originary. 
Differance by itself would be more ‘originary,’ but one would no longer be able to call 
it ‘origin’ or ‘ground,’ those notions belonging essentially to the history of onto-
theology, to the system functioning as the effacing of difference. It can, however, be 
thought of in the closest proximity to itself only on one condition: that one begins by 
determining it as the ontico-ontological difference before erasing that determination. 
The necessity of passing through that erased determination, the necessity of that trick 
of writing is irreducible” (Derrida 1997, pp. 23f.). However, even though Derrida 
suggests that the ontological difference is “derivate” with respect to différance – that 
“différance […] (is) ‘older’” than the ontological difference (Derrida 1982, p. 22) – his 
own idea of différance presupposes the ontological difference: the notion that our direct 
intuitive experience of beings as meaningful is determined by the historical contexts of 
meaning into which we are thrown. It is the ontological difference which forms the 
basis of Derrida’s attempt to articulate différance as the logic of differing/deferring 
which, he claims, characterizes our historical contexts of meaning, and which 
supposedly produces what appears as the identifiable meanings of our direct 
experience. Hence, the ontological difference cannot be conceived as another 
historical effect of différance. Instead, it must be presupposed as the basic hierarchical 
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Heidegger’s conception of truth, Lafont critically interrogates Heidegger’s 
ontological difference at the root of this conception by drawing on the 
theories of direct reference developed by Hilary Putnam and Keith 
Donnellan. 
      Lafont’s principal thesis is that Heidegger basically understands 
language as world-disclosure, which means that he believes that our 
experience of beings is radically determined by the meanings and 
categories of our language. Although this conception of language receives 
a clear and consistent articulation only in Heidegger’s writings after the 
Kehre, Lafont claims that it is already – albeit in an ambivalent way – at the 
basis of his thinking in Being and Time. The idea of language as world 
disclosure is, in turn, grounded in the ontological difference. According to 
Lafont, Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference implies the 
semantic thesis that meaning determines reference in the radical sense that 
our understanding of being determines not only what we can refer to with 
our words but also what we can experience as meaningful entities: “Given 
that our understanding of being is constitutive for what these entities are for 
us, it determines how we understand, perceive, and experience the 
world.”983 Even though Heidegger insists that our understanding of being 
is factical, i.e., historically contingent and changeable, he nevertheless 
conceives of it as strictly a priori: it precedes and determines in advance – 
as an absolute and uncircumventable historical fate – our experience of 
beings and it is, consequently, unrevisable by such experience.984 As a 
result, Lafont argues that Heidegger’s thinking of the ontological 
difference in the end amounts to a linguistic idealism and leads to a 
relativization of the truth – understood by Heidegger as unconcealment – 
to our different historical ways of linguistically constituting the world.985 
According to Lafont, however, Heidegger’s ontological difference cannot 
                                                                                                                      
structure that grounds the possibility of postulating différance as the “non-full, non-
simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences” and deconstruction as a 
primary task of thinking (Derrida 1982, p. 11). If it turned out that Heidegger’s notion 
of the ontological difference is flawed and misleading; if it turned out that our factical 
historical contexts of meaning do not determine what we can experience but merely 
constitute our fallible preconceptions and concepts which receive their truth/untruth 
from our direct experience of beings – then Derrida’s conception of différance as the 
basic logic regulating the production of meaning and truth would also collapse.  
983 Lafont 2000, p. xiii. 
984 Cf. Lafont 2000, pp. 110-112, 253-257.  
985 Cf. Lafont 2000, pp. xv, 111. 
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be upheld. Drawing on Putnam and Donnellan, she argues that our 
understanding of the factical concepts and meanings that always already 
guide our experience of beings is, in so far as it has empirical content, 
essentially hypothetical and fallible in character, and cannot determine in 
advance the possible content of our experience. Moreover, it is a central 
feature of our language that we can use words to refer directly to beings 
without possessing an a priori knowledge of meaning supposedly 
necessary to allow us to pick out the referent. In referring to beings 
directly we use our factical understanding to refer to the beings themselves 
as independent of our understanding, that is, regardless of how they are 
ultimately to be described: “We can see that the referential use of terms 
presupposes the unproblematic availability of the distinction between 
language and what language is about. Only on the basis of grasping this 
difference can we adopt a hypothetical attitude toward the ascriptions we 
undertake vis-à-vis the objective world, a world presupposed by the 
activity of designation.”986 Heidegger, Lafont has it, is certainly right in 
claiming that we always already live in a factical understanding of being 
which guides our referring to and experience of beings. However, this 
understanding does not a priori determine our experience but merely has 
the status of fallible hypotheses about independent beings.  
      It seems clear to me that Lafont’s critique is able to track some of the 
basic problems of Heidegger’s ontological difference, and I see my own 
account as an elaboration and radicalization of this critique. Nevertheless, 
I want to draw attention to some problems with Lafont’s analysis, which 
delimit the force of her critique.   
      To begin with, I do not agree with Lafont’s exegetical claim that 
Heidegger would already in Being and Time put forward the thesis that our 
understanding of being is linguistically constituted. As I argued earlier, the 
early Heidegger basically conceives of Dasein’s understanding of being 
and the world as an understanding of pre-linguistic patterns of meaning, 
so that these meanings form the basis for our possibilities of linguistic 
expression and communication. However, regardless of whether 
Heidegger conceives of the understanding of being as linguistic or not, I 
think Lafont is right in maintaining that Heidegger’s conception of the 
ontological difference implies that our historical understanding of being a 
                                         
986 Lafont 2000, p. 244. 
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priori determines our experience of beings, and that this conception 
suffers from deep problems of the kind she points to.987  
      Still, although Lafont is on the right track, it seems to me that her 
critical explication tends to pass by the central philosophical concern 
underlying Heidegger’s ontological difference, something that severely 
weakens the force of her criticism.  
      Lafont basically explicates Heidegger’s ontological difference as the 
general thesis that our factical pre-understanding of being determines what 
we can experience as beings. Her central critical argument is that 
Heidegger fails to see that our understanding of being, in so far as it has 
empirical content, must be conceived as fallible hypotheses about the 
world such as it is in itself independently of our understanding. In this, the 
theoretical concepts of the empirical sciences provide the paradigm for 
her critique of what Heidegger cannot account for and what the theory of 
direct reference can account for.   
      However, in so doing Lafont from the outset overlooks that the 
primary question guiding Heidegger’s analysis of the ontological difference 
concerns the structure of our understanding and experience of significant 
phenomena. Central to this analysis is Heidegger’s claim that our pre-
theoretical experience of ready-to-hand beings in terms of their functions 
and significances is irreducible to and determines the possible relevance of 
our theoretical knowledge of present-at-hand beings. As Heidegger writes: 
                                         
987 Taylor Carman and Mark Wrathall have both contested Lafont’s claim that 
Heidegger is already a linguistic idealist in Being and Time, and I basically agree with 
their critique on this point (see Carman 2002, pp. 206-213; Wrathall 2002, pp. 222-
224). However, both of them wrongly take this as evidence for the untenability of 
Lafont’s central thesis that, according to Heidegger, our understanding of being 
radically determines what we can experience as beings. In this, it seems to me that they 
do not see or acknowledge the challenge that Lafont’s critique actually poses to 
Heidegger’s basic notion of the ontological difference, and the additional arguments 
they offer against Lafont are quite meager and unconvincing. Although Lafont, in 
replying to Carman and Wrathall, retains her thesis about the linguisticality of Dasein’s 
understanding of being, she also – quite rightly – notes that this thesis is not relevant 
for the force of her basic critique: “Here, I must confess that I do not understand how 
the issue of whether meaning is prelinguistic or not could have any impact whatsoever 
on the question whether (and in which way) our experience is essentially prejudiced by 
a prior understanding, linguistic or otherwise. My concern here is the allegedly a priori 
status of such an understanding and not its specific structure or content. If it turned out 
that our cognitive capacities are essentially determined by our prelinguistic 
interpretative access to the world, I would not feel any better about it” (Lafont 2002, 
p. 244). 
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all the “properties” of the equipment are “bound up in” the ways in which 
it is “appropriate or inappropriate” in relation to some task or purpose.988 
According to Heidegger, our primary understanding of beings as 
significant phenomena is determined by our prior understanding of the 
historical being-senses and paradigms of value – the heroes or gods – that 
form the teleological horizon of our world. This prior understanding of 
being organizes the networks of instrumental relations in which we live, 
and the significant roles and functions in terms of which particular beings 
can show up for us. However, this claim about the historical structure of 
our primary understanding of significance in no way commits Heidegger 
to the thesis that our knowledge of presence-at-hand objects – as 
paradigmatically manifested in the natural sciences – would be radically 
determined by our factical conceptual pre-understanding of the empirical 
characteristics of these objects. Heidegger is, to be sure, quite ambivalent 
regarding this question.989 Still, from a systematic point of view it is clear 
that he could retain his primary thesis that our understanding of 
significance is structured by the ontological difference, while admitting 
that the concepts of the empirical sciences function as fallible hypotheses 
about the beings under investigation. However, according to Heidegger, 
such empirical knowledge is not constitutive of our understanding of the 
significance of beings. For example, he could argue that whereas our 
empirical knowledge of the material and technical aspects of the car is 
clearly fallible, it is our historical understanding of the values and practices 
constituting the role of the car in our world which determines the way in 
which such empirical knowledge becomes relevant in the first place.   
      Now, I believe Heidegger is basically right in insisting that our 
understanding of the significance of beings is irreducible to, and not 
primarily constituted by, our empirical knowledge of the material-causal 
traits of these beings. This, however, implies that Lafont’s critical thesis 
about the fallible nature of the concepts of the empirical sciences, 
although true of them, strictly speaking does not unsettle Heidegger’s 
central notion of the historicity of understanding. For us, then, the 
question remains: Is our understanding of significance radically 
determined by our historical pre-understanding of being, or must this pre-
                                         
988 SZ, p. 83: “Zuhandenes hat allenfalls Geeignetheiten und Ungeeignetheiten, und 
seine ’Eigenschaften’ sind in diesen gleichsam noch gebunden.” 
989 Cf., e.g., GA 41, pp. 65-108. Cf. also Lafont 2000, pp. 259-275. 
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understanding rather be conceived in terms of our fallible provisional 
grasp of independent realities? 
      To specify the sense and direction of our question, it is crucial to 
begin by noting that there are in fact some kinds of understanding 
concerning which it seems true to claim – with Heidegger – that our 
understanding of the factical meanings and concepts of our culture 
ontologically determine what we can understand as meaningful beings. 
What I have in mind is our understanding of conventional practices and 
our understanding of social norms. It is, as we have seen, precisely these 
kinds of understanding that are paradigmatic for Heidegger in his analyses 
of equipment and of the gods and norms of our historical world. The 
problem arises in so far as he takes these specific types of understanding 
as the unquestioned starting point for his general interpretation of the 
basic structure of phenomenal being.  
      By conventional practices, I mean all the habits of acting that have 
been established and institutionalized in a given historical community. In 
our society, such conventions include hammering, driving cars, living in 
houses, using money, and so on. To understand the factical meanings and 
concepts characterizing the convention and to understand the convention 
itself ultimately amount to the same thing, whereby this understanding 
totally determines how particular entities can show up as relevant for the 
convention in question. By social norms or values, I mean the conceptions 
of what is good or evil, valuable or worthless, decent or indecent that 
characterize a given historical community, and which measure the value – 
the honor or shame – of the individual in the eyes of this collective. To 
understand social norms is essentially to understand the factical norms 
that happen to dominate in a given community, whereby these norms 
determine what meaning particular actions or traits can take on. As 
regards conventional practices and social norms, we see that it is true that 
our understanding of the factical meanings and concepts of our society 
determine what we can experience as meaningful beings. Here, there is no 
further question about the truth of our understanding – about how well it 
is able to grasp and illuminate realities beyond our factical historical 
concepts. To understand such concepts is simply to understand how one 
acts – and how one ought to act – in a given society.   
      However, Heidegger’s analysis cannot account for our understanding 
of significance in so far as it involves a claim to grasp human and social 
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realities transcending our factical historical concepts. Here belongs, e.g., 
our understanding of ethical-existential significance beyond social norms, 
our understanding of the dynamics of the psyche and of our social world, 
as well as our philosophical understanding of the sense-structures of our 
experience. It is, I want to suggest, a central feature of this kind of 
understanding that it is essentially open and directed towards the particular 
beings we experience and understand. Although our understanding is 
always already guided by some historical pre-understanding, it belongs to 
the very sense of this experience that it is directed towards the particular 
beings as something which transcends our pre-understanding, and which 
constitutes the source of truth of our understanding.    
      To get a sense of the dynamics of truth characterizing our 
understanding of significance, let us consider the following examples. 
First, take a person who has always considered the soldier as a paradigm 
of courage, and who has, accordingly, always looked down on 
conscientious objectors and their likes as cowards. However, one day this 
person comes to realize that the task of withstanding and retaining one’s 
moral autonomy in the face of social pressure might be equally demanding 
as the task of encountering physical danger. Second, consider someone 
who pictures a human being as a basically egoistic creature, and who uses 
this notion to justify a cynical attitude towards all moral and political 
claims on her. However, at some point this person opens up to and 
acknowledges the possibility of loving and caring for people in a non-
egoistic manner, and simultaneously comes to recognize the role her 
notion of egoism has so far played in allowing her to cover up and 
legitimize her flight from this possibility and the moral claims that flow 
from it.  
      Now, it seems clear to me that we can only account for the dynamics 
of truth operative in the above examples if we conceive of our 
understanding in terms of our grasp – be it better or worse – of 
independent matters. What makes the initial understanding in the 
examples untrue is that it fails to account for and instead covers up and 
distorts what is actually there and accessible in our experience 
independently of our factical concepts; what makes the resulting 
understanding more true is its better ability to grasp and articulate the 
phenomena in question: the different faces of courage, the possibilities of 
egoism and love. By contrast, it seems quite impossible to account for the 
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play between truth and untruth exhibited in the examples in terms of how 
well the person’s understanding complies with and makes use of the 
factical concepts of courage, egoism and love available in her historical 
context – or perhaps in some other context. Indeed, we need to see that 
all our factical concepts – however central or basic they are in a given 
context – gain their truth or untruth from their capacity to help us 
conceive of and articulate the transconceptual beings and situations we 
experience. There have been – and probably still are – historical 
communities dominated by a conception of courage modeled on the 
warrior, just as the conception of the human being as an egoistic creature 
exerts an equally strong and widespread influence in the contemporary 
Western world. However, even if these factical concepts were the only 
ones available in our culture – or in all the world’s cultures – they would 
still be untrue, given that the truth or untruth of whatever concepts we 
possess essentially consists in the resources they provide for 
understanding what we experience.   
      What I want to suggest, then, is that the significant beings and 
situations that we experience as independent of our factical concepts 
constitutes the source of truth of our conceptual understanding; 
moreover, that it is our open transconceptual access to these matters – 
this primordial phenomenality, as it were – that makes the truth or untruth 
of our understanding experienceable in the first place. 
      Now, to claim that our conceptual understanding bears a relation of 
truth to the beings and situations that it grasps does not imply that it can 
be true or false in the same sense as propositions about empirical states of 
affairs. Such propositions – e.g. “the picture on the wall hangs askew” or 
“apes generally like bananas” – can be true or false depending on whether 
they present the matters they are about correctly or incorrectly. Our 
conceptual understanding, by contrast, is an understanding of general 
concepts and meanings, and does not involve any claims about specific 
empirical data. But neither is there any ground for trying to rehabilitate the 
old philosophical notion that our conceptual understanding would be true 
or false depending on how well it corresponds to some kind of universal 
general essences. However, if we – as I suggest – see our conceptual 
understanding as our provisional general grasp or the particular matters 
and situations given in our experience, then its truth or untruth must be 
conceived in terms of its ability to help us grasp the matters we 
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experience. In this, it can be more or less illuminating, clarifying, rich, 
precise or obscure, poor, limited, distortive. 
      Heidegger is of course right in claiming that our experience is always 
already guided by the factical conceptual pre-understanding we live in. 
This pre-understanding contains the typical general patterns of meaning 
which determine what we first and foremost tend to identify as unified 
phenomena and situations, which possibilities and scenarios we tend to 
anticipate, and which conceptual contexts we tend to draw on when we 
think about or discuss the matters in question. It also forms the point of 
departure – and provides the conceptual resources – for every 
modification of our concepts. If the culture we live in has only a poor or 
distortive conceptuality for accounting for a certain matter, this might 
make it quite difficult to grasp and articulate – both for ourselves and for 
others – what we experience. Nevertheless, our conceptual pre-
understanding does not determine what we can experience as meaningful. 
Rather, it is essentially provisionally guiding and open towards the 
particular matters we experience: it is no more than our factical guiding 
grasp of matters and it possesses no epistemic authority other than its 
potential de facto ability to account for what we experience.   
      The fact that our understanding is not determined by our factical 
conceptual understanding also implies that the central moment of 
understanding consists in openly seeing and grasping the particular 
matters in question. In this, our factical concepts may help us or hinder us 
– yet they do not decide what we will understand. This is especially crucial 
to note when the question concerns our understanding of significant 
things that matter to us, because here our understanding is so intimately 
bound up with our emotions and our will. Given the difficulty of 
encountering and acknowledging a range of matters – e.g. moral 
challenges in relation to others, things that threaten our honor and self-
esteem, our own crooked existential motives – we have a strong tendency 
to look away from these matters and to reach for concepts and 
explanations that cover up what we do not want to see and legitimize our 
attitude. Here it is obvious that our concepts do not function as lamps 
that illuminate what we experience. Instead, our understanding centrally 
depends on our will and ability to face and see what we encounter. In fact, 
our unwillingness to acknowledge central matters in our moral life has 
always to a greater or lesser degree shaped the collective moral 
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conceptuality of the community we live in. An extreme case in point is 
provided by all the historical communities who conceive of some group of 
people as essentially inferior or subhuman. Obviously, in such a situation 
it is easy to repress the moral possibility of relating to, say, the slave or the 
castless person as a you in a loving manner, whereas it is hard to find 
words for and communicate this possibility. However, even if our culture 
possessed the conceptual resources for accounting for a matter that we do 
not want to acknowledge, it is always in principal possible to 
misunderstand it by appropriating concepts and ideas that explain away 
the matter and allow us to see what we want to see.  
      In sum, then: whereas the truth of our understanding consists in our 
ability to see and account for the significant matters we experience, the 
truth of our factical concepts consists in their ability to help us grasp and 
articulate what we experience.  
 
Our Openness Towards Persons as the Source of Significance 
 
My second proposal is that we are open towards other human beings – 
and, in an analogous sense, animals – as persons to love and to care for, 
and that this openness constitutes our source of ethical-existential 
significance. 
      Let me, again, begin by critically delimiting the truth of Heidegger’s 
viewpoint. Heidegger’s basic notion of the ontological difference implies 
not only that our understanding of the historical contexts of meaning we 
live in conditions our possibility to identify particular beings as distinct 
meaningful phenomena, but also that it determines what we can 
experience as ethically-existentially significant and important. It is, he 
claims, the guiding values, ideals and virtues – the “gods” – of our 
historical world that determine what we can experience as ethical-
existential claims and reasons in the first place, and which character traits 
and actions that will appear good or bad, honorable or despicable, 
meaningful or futile to us. Obviously, this conception is not plainly false 
but has a limited truth. It is clear that we always already live in – and that 
we have always already to some extent appropriated – the historical values 
of our community, and that these values exert a strong normative power 
over us.  
      But what kind of normative power? 
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      It seems that taken by themselves our historical values and ideals can 
only concern us on account of their rhetorical-persuasive power, above all 
on account of the collective power they possess in  our society. And this 
power is always strong. The task of living up to the norms pervading our 
collective group is generally totally decisive for our honor and reputation 
within the community and, hence, for our own feeling of self-esteem. 
Failure to comply with these norms is punished with shame, exclusion, 
and oppression. However, just as our historical values basically concern us 
in terms of their collective power, our motives for living up to such norms 
in view of this power are basically egoistic-collectivist. To the extent that 
my will is determined by my ambition to realize some value or virtue – e.g. 
I might want to be a good, wise and courageous person – and not by my 
sympathy and care for some particular person or persons, what motivates 
me is nothing else than my concern for how I appear in the eyes of my 
group and in the light of my collectively formed identity, into which I have 
invested my self-esteem. 
      In short, our historical values and norms cannot – however basic they 
are for our culture and for our personal identity – in themselves constitute 
the source of genuine moral claims or motives beyond our urge for 
egoistic-collectivist self-affirmation. The problem here does not lie in the 
possible historical relativity or finitude of our historical values but in their 
failure to exert any genuine moral claim on us. On this point, nothing is 
gained by positing universally valid moral principles or norms supposedly 
grounded in God, in nature or in human reason. Even if a norm addresses 
us as universal or well grounded, this does not by itself grant it moral 
significance even though it might increase its rhetorical-persuasive power. 
However, the fact that values and norms cannot constitute the source of 
moral significance does not, as we shall see shortly, exclude the possibility 
that they might indirectly serve genuine moral purposes. 
      So what is the source of ethical-existential significance? In fact, we 
already know it – how could we not –and I am certainly not the first 
person to point it out: it is the other human beings and our possibility of 
caring for them as such.   
      It is, of course, Emmanuel Levinas who first and paradigmatically 
presents the critique that Heidegger’s ontological thinking sidesteps and 
reduces the primacy of our ethical relationship to the other human being. 
According to Levinas, Heidegger’s ontology exceeds the “classical 
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intellectualism” of the philosophical tradition in stressing that our 
comprehension of being is not a merely theoretical attitude but 
fundamentally involves the whole of our pre-theoretical – temporal, 
practical, social – existence in the world.990 Nevertheless, Heidegger 
retains the central idea that our relation to particular beings basically has 
the form of comprehension, so that our ability to grasp a being as 
meaningful is conditioned by our prior understanding of its being: “For 
Heidegger, an openness upon Being, which is not a being, which is not a 
‘something,’ is necessary in order that, in general, a ‘something’ manifest 
itself.”991 Although Levinas believes that Heidegger’s ontological 
difference captures the structure of our knowledge of impersonal beings 
he insists that it implies a radical reduction of the other human being to an 
entity which addresses us as significant only on the basis of our 
understanding of being: “To affirm the priority of Being over existents is to 
already decide the essence of philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation 
with someone, who is an existent, (the ethical relation) to a relation with the 
Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the 
domination of existents (a relationship of knowing).”992 Against Heidegger 
Levinas argues that the other human being does not primarily meet me as 
an object of comprehension at all. Rather, the other in his presence as a 
face addresses me as someone who “counts as such,” as someone who 
claims me and whom I am called to address and welcome regardless of the 
historical context or situation I happen to live in:993 “the face speaks to me 
and thereby invites me to a relation incommensurate with a power 
exercised, be it enjoyment or knowledge.”994 According to Levinas, the 
other puts my egoistic urge to dominate all beings into question and 
reveals my “infinite responsibility” to the other person.995  
      I think Levinas’s central critique of Heidegger is basically correct and 
of decisive importance. Even though Levinas’s explication of Heidegger is 
in some respects insufficient, and does not always do justice to the 
complexity and potential of Heidegger’s thinking, he is certainly right in 
                                         
990 Levinas 1996, p. 4. 
991 Levinas 1969, p. 189. Cf. Levinas 1996, p. 5. 
992 Levinas 1969, p. 45. 
993 Levinas 1996, p. 6. Cf. also Levinas 1969, p. 53, where he writes: “When man truly 
approaches the Other he is uprooted from history.”  
994 Levinas 1969, p. 198. 
995 Levinas 1969, p. 240. 
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claiming that Heidegger’s thinking of being reduces and covers up the 
primacy of our direct ethical relationship to the other person. However, 
even though the vision I try to outline here is very much in line with the 
perspective opened up by Levinas,996 it must also be said that there are 
many aspects of his ethics that I find problematic. Since this is not the 
place for a detailed critique of Levinas, suffice it to mention what I see as 
some of the main problems in his thinking.  
      First, Levinas basically elaborates his thinking of the ethical 
relationship to the other in negative contrast to what he sees as the main 
tendency of Western philosophy to dominate and totalize beings, and he 
does this in a heavily theoretical-dialectical jargon. Both of these factors 
hamper his ability to phenomenologically access and clarify the existential-
psychological dynamics characterizing our relations to others. Second, 
even though Levinas stresses the other’s claim on me and my 
responsibility for the other it seems that, in the end, he shuts out the 
possibility of a direct loving care and desire for the other person as such; 
instead, he ultimately conceives of our direct relation to the other human 
being – who, in himself, is characterized as “the nondesirable, the 
undesirable par excellence”997 – as an indirect means to realize our primary 
desire for God as the totally other. Third, this explains why Levinas 
articulates the claim of the other on me in terms of an obligation or 
demand imposed on my basic egoism, and my possibility of goodness in 
terms of a “sacrifice without reserve.”998 Fourth, it also explains why he 
articulates our relation to the other as movement in which I transcend my 
tendency to totalize and dominate beings as the same, and reach out 
toward the “alterity” and “infinity” of the other.999 Both of the above 
characterizations are symptoms of Levinas’s repression of the possibility 
                                         
996 From a historical point of view, the perspective I try to articulate here belongs to 
the tradition of dialogical thinking initiated, above all, by Martin Buber and Franz 
Rosenzweig, and developed in France by Gabriel Marcel and Emmanuel Levinas. The 
guiding idea of this tradition is that the personal relationship between “I” and “you” 
constitutes the ethical-existential center of our lives, and forms the point of departure 
for all philosophical understanding of our selves, of language, of knowledge, of being. 
Recently, this tradition has received a new, strong and original articulation in the work 
of my friends and collegues, Joel Backström and Hannes Nykänen, to whom my 
account is much indebted. Cf. Nykänen 2002 and Backström 2007. 
997 Levinas 1998, pp. 68f. 
998 Levinas 1981, p. 15. 
999 Cf. Levinas 1969, pp. 194ff. 
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of an unegoistic love and care for the other as such – in which the other 
does not essentially appear as an obligation or as fundamental alterity – 
and his subordination of the I-you relationship to the concrete other to 
the supreme adventure of a self-overcoming communion with God. Fifth, 
Levinas’s inability to account for the possibility of a positive love for the 
other goes hand in hand with an inability to distinguish clearly between 
such love and its opposite, namely the egoistic-collectivist attitude in 
which I relate to others solely as players within my desire for collective 
recognition and self-affirmation – for honor and self-esteem as opposed 
to dishonor and shame. It is precisely Levinas’s blindness on this point 
that makes him unable to recognize the extent to which his desire for God 
must be seen as yet another strategy for covering up the possibility of 
loving and caring for the other, a strategy characterized by a narcissistic 
logic of resentment according to which my sacrifice and self-denial are 
taken as evidence of the superior dignity and godliness of my soul.1000  
      Let me now briefly try to sketch my view of our relation to the other 
as the source of ethical-existential significance.  
      I suggest that we view our ethical relationship to other persons as a 
primordial phenomenal fact that cannot be explained or inferred from 
anything else. The other human being essentially meets and addresses me 
as a you who claims and concerns me personally, and whom I can relate to 
in love and care prior to and regardless of all possible values, principles, 
arguments, or gods. If we lacked the basic possibility of sympathy for the 
other we would, on a fundamental level, be morally autistic creatures. 
However, it is difficult to relate to the other in a loving way. There is a 
very strong tendency in us to close ourselves to the possibility of openly 
encountering the other with sympathy as a personal you, and instead yield 
to the egoistic-collectivist attitude in which I primarily care about how I 
appear in the eyes of my collective group or in the light of my collectively 
formed identity, my persona. In this attitude, others are reduced either to 
impersonal representatives of my collective audience or to role characters 
in my performance. In so far as I feel that others in one way or other 
threaten my persona, this typically generates powerful emotional reactions 
of envy, contempt, resentment, hatred, etc. The challenge of the personal 
encounter is basically the challenge of breaking with our egoistic-
                                         
1000 For an excellent critique of Levinas, which elaborates in more detail many of the 
central points sketched above, see Backström 2007, pp. 183-192. 
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collectivist desire for self-affirmation and of opening up to the personal 
you in sympathy.  
      The possibility of a personal care for the other as such must be sharply 
distinguished from other motives that might encourage morally good 
actions. Take, for example, the situation where on my way home in the 
evening I see a person being abused and beaten by another. Granted that I 
decide to act, we can think of two possible motivations for my action: 
first, I can be driven to act because I feel an immediate sympathy for the 
abused person and want to help her; second, I can be driven to act 
because I want to live up to my self-understanding as a good and 
courageous person, and I would feel ashamed and would not be able to 
look at myself in the mirror if I just walked away. Now, whereas in the 
second scenario I do not primarily think about the abused person herself 
but only about how I perform in the light of my collective identity, in the 
second scenario I am directly concerned with the maltreated person 
herself irrespective of her role and the value of my actions in my egoistic-
collectivist project of self-affirmation.  
      I think there can be no doubt that our personal I-you relationship to 
other persons constitutes our central ethical-existential challenge, and is 
decisive for the goodness and meaningfulness of our lives, namely 
whether we are able to live in an open and loving relation with others – in 
joy, sorrow or anger – or whether we close ourselves up within the 
enchanted circle of our egoistic-collectivist attitude. However, although 
our personal relationship to the other constitutes the source of morality, 
this does not imply that our moral life would exclusively take place in our 
personal relations to particular people. We are, indeed, from the very 
outset open to the ethical appeal of all human beings as persons to love 
and care for – whether we acknowledge this or not. In this, it is quite 
possible to have a certain general understanding of this ethical appeal 
which is to some extent independent of our ability to answer to it in our 
concrete relations to others, and which can serve as a guide for our ethical 
and political efforts. In so far as the traditional notions of the “holiness” 
or “absolute value” of human beings has a moral meaning, I would 
suggest that it is as articulations of a more or less abstract and vague 
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understanding of the absolute ethical appeal of all human beings and of 
the basic possibility of relating to them with sympathy.1001    
      It is precisely our understanding of the holiness of each person that 
constitutes the moral guideline for all political action. By politics I here 
mean all thinking and acting in which we are concerned with an 
anonymous collective group of people with the aim of forming and 
improving the factors – laws, institutions, habits, standards – that regulate 
the collective life of the group in question in order to make possible as 
good a life together as possible. Hereby, the relationship between ethics 
and politics is characterized by the following tension: on the one hand, our 
personal ethical relation to the other forms the source of all politics and 
can never in itself be understood in political terms; on the other hand, our 
openness to the ethical appeal of the other necessarily calls for political 
action that is directed at improving the social frameworks and living 
conditions of people considered in an anonymous way, and which 
essentially also involves an element of instrumental and economic 
thinking. Hence, we could say that our personal ethical relation to the 
other person – irreducible to politics – in itself demands politics – 
irreducible to ethics.  
      We are now also in a position to indicate the possible moral relevance 
of our historical norms and values. At the outset I stated that our will to 
realize the collective values of our community cannot constitute a 
genuinely moral motive since it is reducible to our egoistic-collectivist 
desire for self-affirmation. This is still as true as ever. Nevertheless, just as 
our openness to the ethical appeal of the other motivates political action it 
also grants indirect moral relevance to our collective values. This relevance 
stems directly from the fact that the values and norms regulating the 
collective dynamics of honor and shame as a rule constitute one of the 
                                         
1001 The fact that many historical cultures have tended to ascribe full humanity only to 
members of a certain group of people – more or less widely defined – does not 
gainsay my thesis. On the contrary, I would suggest that it is precisely the basic 
possibility of encountering other persons in an open and loving manner, and the 
certainty that this possibility concerns all human beings, that motivates the need to 
define some people as sub-human to consolidate the status and power of the group 
that does the defining. To claim that there are historical cultures which, due to their 
horizon of meaning and values, lack the basic possibility of understanding and relating 
to some groups of people – e.g. slaves – as fully human is in effect to deny, often in 
the mode of an ostensibly benevolent, exoticizing racism, that the people of these 
cultures are fully human.   
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most powerful forces determining the course of collective action, namely 
how we collectively think and act in relation to freedom, justice, and 
equality; how we think and act in relation to other people and minorities; 
how we think and act in relation to war and torture, and so on. Of course, 
seeing the enormous power of our collective norms is also seeing our own 
moral weakness. However, the very power of social norms gives them a 
kind of indirect moral relevance on account of their potential to serve 
good or evil. Hence, in so far as we care for other people we are called to 
engage in the paradoxical challenge of fighting for the best values of our 
community while at the same time unmasking the moral emptiness and 
danger of all social normativity. In all this, the moral motivation of our 
thinking and acting, and the very possibility of distinguishing between 
good and evil in the first place, lies in our personal love and care for the 
other as such. 
 
Transformations of Philosophy 
 
The above account of our openness towards beings as the source of truth 
and significance at the end of the day brings with it a transformation of 
the identity of philosophy, both as concerns its task and its epistemic 
claims.  
      Philosophy has always seen it as its ultimate task – as its name also 
promises – to attain and foster wisdom: a qualified ethical-existential 
understanding of the good and meaningful life. It is this promise that has 
upheld the ambition of philosophy to play a leading role in the self-
reflection both of the individual and of society at large. At the same time, 
philosophy, at least since Plato, has been characterized by a strong 
tendency to initially turn away its gaze from the concreteness of our 
immediate life with each other, and insist that the sole way to a qualified 
and well-grounded ethical understanding of life must go through a primary 
investigation of the nature of being and knowledge. It is only by 
understanding what being in general is, and what knowledge in general is, 
that we can hope to gain an understanding of ethical being and ethical 
knowledge. Hence, philosophy’s way to wisdom has essentially had the 
character of a detour motivated by the notion of the primacy of 
ontology/epistemology over ethics. The notion of the primacy of 
ontology/epistemology has archetypally been grounded in some version 
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of the thought that our ethical understanding is hierarchically conditioned 
by our ontological-epistemological understanding of the basic stratum of 
being-knowledge – Platonic ideas, God, the conditions for certain 
knowledge,  nature, transcendental subjectivity, language, being –  that 
determines our ethical understanding of ourselves and of the good life. 
The metaphysics of historical meaning – including Heidegger – carries on 
this notion in the form of the idea that it is only through a reflection on 
our historical contexts of meaning and value that we can access the 
ultimate sources of our understanding of the good and meaningful life.   
      In the identity of philosophy the notion of the primacy of 
ontology/epistemology over ethics has been tightly linked to the notion of 
the a priori character of philosophical understanding: the notion that 
philosophy investigates a stratum of being-knowledge which determines 
and organizes our experience and knowledge of particular entities. This 
notion is also carried on by the metaphysics of historical meaning – 
including Heidegger. Even though these philosophers maintain that the 
meaning explicated by philosophy is not, as traditionally claimed, universal 
and necessary but historically factical and finite, they retain the basic 
notion that the philosophical understanding of historical meaning – 
language, concepts – precedes and determines our experience and 
knowledge of particular beings as meaningful phenomena.   
      However, if my account of the openness of our understanding 
towards particular beings is basically true, both of the above notions, 
which have for so long constituted the identity of philosophy, must be 
given up. As concerns the task of philosophy we must learn to see ethics 
as first philosophy; as concerns its method and epistemic claims we must 
learn to conceive of the basic understanding of philosophy as radically a 
posteriori phenomenology.  
    
Ethics as first philosophy. To me there is no doubt that we must give 
up the traditional notion of the primacy of ontology/epistemology over 
ethics and henceforth – as Levinas suggests – conceive of ethics as “first 
philosophy.”1002  
      Granted that our immediate I-you relationship to others constitutes 
the central ethical-existential challenge of our lives– it is nothing less than 
                                         
1002 Levinas 1987, p. 59. Cf. also Levinas 1989.  
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the place where the substance of our souls and our central insights into 
life get decided – philosophy must, in so far as it wants to maintain its 
claim to wisdom, be primarily concerned with this challenge: try to 
understand and articulate it in the effort of living openly and clear-
sightedly. In order to gain access to what directly encounters us in our 
lives with others, and to our own psychological dynamics, there is no need 
to start with a supposedly more fundamental and conditioning 
ontological-epistemological investigation of the nature of being, 
knowledge or meaning. But this does not mean – as history shows – that 
ethical-existential insight would be easy to attain. However, the primary 
difficulty here is not the intellectual difficulty characteristic of ontological-
epistemological investigations. What makes personal ethical-existential 
insight difficult is that it is hard to live lovingly and openly in relation to 
others and that, in so far as we fail to do this, we are bound to repress, 
cover up, and distort the challenges facing us and the meaning of our own 
motives and reactions to make them more bearable and manageable. 
Moreover – and very much as a result of this – our present and our past 
tend to be dominated by paradigms of thought that cover up and steer us 
away from the primary ethical problematic of our lives.   
      The primacy of ethics in philosophy does not by itself imply that the 
traditional ontological-epistemological questions of philosophy would 
become meaningless or inherently repressive – although it certainly opens 
up a new critical awareness and a prima facie need to question their 
ethical-existential meaning and function. Clearly, there might be perfectly 
meaningful – even if not ethically-existentially central – questions to ask 
and investigations to undertake about different domains of being, 
knowledge and language, and about how these domains relate to each 
other. However, what the primacy of ethics does imply is that in so far as 
our philosophical questioning in any way concerns or draws upon the 
significance that the matters under investigation have in our lives it must 
be rooted in ethics.  
 
Philosophy as a posteriori phenomenology. In accordance with its task 
to clarify our ethical-existential experience, and, more generally, the 
significance of different matters in our lives, philosophy must primarily 
take the form of phenomenology: a reflective description of the meaning-
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structures and dynamics of our first-person experiences.1003 In this, it must 
give up the traditional claim to a priori knowledge still characterizing the 
metaphysics of historical meaning without, however, giving in to the 
naturalist impulse to reduce our understanding of meaning to the kind of 
empirical knowledge sought by the natural sciences.  
      As Heidegger’s criticisms of the possibility of direct phenomenological 
description have shown, the phenomenological undertaking is a 
demanding one. We always already live in historically transmitted and 
collectively sanctioned concepts and meanings which tend to guide our 
sight and which invite us to attend only to what our pre-understanding 
commands. Moreover, when it comes to ethically-existentially difficult 
matters we are tempted to repress what we encounter and instead fall back 
on concepts and descriptions that cover up and explain away what we do 
not want to see. However, such considerations do not in any way cancel 
out the basic possibility of phenomenologically describing our 
experiences.    
     Put quite formally, a phenomenological description is a description 
which, on the basis of a reflective intuitive explication of a certain 
experience, attempts to articulate the basic structures of meaning 
constituting the experience in question. As such, the phenomenological 
description is a posteriori in the sense that it essentially relies on our de facto 
concrete experiences, and is nothing but a description of these 
experiences.1004 Indeed, it is quite possible – in light of the guiding 
                                         
1003 Even if I believe that phenomenology in a wide sense – considered as our basic 
access to our experience of meaning – must have methodological primacy in 
philosophy, I do not mean to suggest that there could not also be other vital and 
fruitful forms of philosophical investigation and argument.   
1004 For a good articulation of the reliance of phenomenological descriptions on our de 
facto experiences as their contingent ground, see Crowell 2002, where he writes: “For 
Husserl, essences are grasped in re through imaginative variation of what is given. 
Hence their necessity is always conditional: given such and such a thing, it must have 
these and those features. Whereas Kant attempts to establish that a certain type of 
experience is necessary by arguing that without it no unified self-consciousness is 
possible, Husserl can only reflect on the essential features of experiences that the 
subject happens to have. […] For the same reason, phenomenological necessity differs 
from traditional metaphysical or absolute necessity. It cannot explain why there must be 
certain things. For instance, phenomenological reflection can establish a necessary 
connection between memory and perception: the act of remembering something 
refers necessarily to a previous act of perceiving it. But phenomenology can give no 
reason why there must be anything like memory, as a Leibnizian might argue that 
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problem at hand – to attempt to describe and articulate the structures of 
meanings constituting different kinds of experience, and without which 
they could not be what they actually are: love, shame, the call of 
conscience, erotic attraction, memory, courage, sense perception, practical 
coping, experiences of art and literature, etc. What is described here are 
not essences or forms that would in any way be prior to and, as such, 
determine our experiences; rather, what is described are the experiences 
themselves with a view to their basic structures.   
      Phenomenological descriptions are fallible: they can be true or false of 
the experiences they describe, and we are often mistaken. However, given 
that such descriptions are all about meaning, they are also – in a way that 
has not been given enough attention by phenomenologists – inherently 
threatened by confusion and essentialization: on the one hand, in 
describing general patterns of meaning there is always the risk of referring 
to different kinds of paradigmatic experience in an unclear and ambivalent 
way; on the other hand, there is the risk of dogmatically generalizing the 
structure of one kind of experience and postulate it as an essential 
structure necessarily determining experiences that are actually dissimilar. 
For example, in describing a certain kind of experience, which we call 
anxiety, we might easily confuse it with other experiences that are 
designated by this name; moreover, in so far as we understand our 
description as a description of anxiety as such we have essentialized it in a 
way that threatens to dissimulate and distort other more or less related 
experiences. In order to avoid ambivalence and essentialism and get a 
sense of the possibilities and limits of phenomenological descriptions we 
need to take seriously the fact that a phenomenological description can 
only arise and justify itself as a description of a particular kind of 
experience, whereby the scope and clarificatory force of the description is 
always bound to remain open and undetermined.  
                                                                                                                      
memory is necessary to the best of all possible worlds” (p. 108). Crowell’s central 
point is that the phenomenological understanding can only ground itself on the 
factical experiences we happen to have; whereas it cannot say anything about the 
necessity of these experiences – for all we know, they could have been otherwise or 
they could change in the future – it can explicate the essential and necessary structures 
characterizing these experiences: “The hermeneutic exploration of our factic situation 
suffices for insight into necessary connections” (p. 110). 
 
508 Epilogue
 
 
 
      Given that our phenomenological understanding of general meaning-
structures is nothing but an understanding of our de facto experiences, it 
cannot determine in advance what we can experience and grasp in 
particular situations – unless, of course, we let it do so. Since we are 
basically open to what we experience and encounter it is always an open 
question how we will see and understand the particular phenomena we are 
facing – whether we find the phenomena in question illuminated and 
clarified by our previous understanding, whether we employ our previous 
understanding to cover up and distort what we experience, or whether our 
understanding is put into question and modified through the encounter.  
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